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Abstract 
 
South Carolina offers a history of defiant politicians who sought to protect their 
state from federal interference. With the Supreme Court handing down some of 
the most important rulings in US history, including Brown (1954), Baker (1962) and 
Miranda (1966), three South Carolinian Senators – Olin Johnston, Strom Thurmond 
and Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings – waged war on the Court through the judicial 
nominations process. In scrutinising presidential nominations and attempting to 
restrict the power of the Court, these Senators played leading roles in the most 
explosive confirmation battles in recent history, including those of Thurgood 
Marshall, Abe Fortas and Clement Haynsworth. The South Carolinians defied not 
only the Democratic Party leadership but also time-honoured Senate traditions of 
hierarchy and seniority. In maintaining their conservative credentials, they ensured 
continuous re-election, yet the dominance of the state’s conservative 
segregationist political establishment, which maintained control of South 
Carolina’s legislature, drowned out the moderate voices that remained critical of 
each Senator’s obstructionism. A comparative lack of violence has been identified 
in South Carolina’s transition to ‘integration with dignity’, but the behaviour of the 
state’s Senators in the nominations process in Washington, DC was anything but 
dignified or peaceful. In fact, South Carolina has played the most important, and 
overlooked, role in the development of Supreme Court nomination hearings into 
political, and confrontational, public events. The state’s war on the Court would 
transcend ‘massive resistance’ to civil rights, highlighting questions of law and 
order, obscenity, communist subversion and school prayer in a radical, ground-
breaking response to the Court’s role as the final arbiter of policy. Furthermore, 
the South Carolinian experience suggests that existing studies of Supreme Court 
nominations as ‘one-off’ events are narrow and restrictive, and the practice of 
emphasising the final vote on a nominee’s confirmation or rejection is unhelpful in 
understanding this complex process.
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
And The Chips Did Fall ... 
South Carolina and the Supreme Court 
 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court is one of the most powerful political institutions 
in the world. Comprised of nine Justices, each appointed by the President and 
approved by a majority of the US Senate, the Supreme Court has transformed the 
American polity on countless occasions by imposing its authority when five or 
more Justices consider states or other institutions to be in violation of the words 
of the United States Constitution. 
Throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the Supreme 
Court has reached across the full spectrum of American political issues, shaping 
the course of political development in gun politics, abortion, race and affirmative 
action, religion in schools, presidential authority during wartime, capital 
punishment, executive privilege, gay rights, and, in December 2000, the outcome 
of a presidential election. Justices who are idolised by conservatives tend to 
endure intense vilification from liberals, and Justices who are praised for 
remaining faithful to the original intentions of the nation’s Founding Fathers are 
inevitably condemned in equal measure for being out of touch, reactionary, and 
intolerant of minority rights. The question of whether or not the Supreme Court is 
too powerful is, inevitably, complicated by the polarised nature of American 
politics in the early twenty-first century: the term ‘judicial restraint’ is adopted by 
both liberals and conservatives to indicate a particular perception of sensible 
behaviour on the part of the Justices, while the pejorative term ‘judicial activism’ 
is frequently adopted by both groups to indicate an intolerable political intrusion 
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by a Court which has misused its authority and taken the policy-making process 
away from Congress, the legislative branch.1 
 During the twentieth century, the resentment of the Southern states of 
the landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision became the 
ultimate example of a collective political resistance to the power of the Supreme 
Court. The 1954 decision, in which the Justices ruled that racially segregated 
schools could no longer be maintained when judged against the wording of the US 
Constitution, proved to be a political bombshell for Southern leaders, most of 
whom viewed the Court’s judgement as a direct threat to the ‘Southern’ way of 
life. The ensuing Southern struggle to curb the power of the Supreme Court 
involved continuous efforts by the region’s leaders to impeach the Justices; to link 
the Court’s decisions to the communist threat; to nullify the Court’s authority in 
matters relating to schooling; to change the conditions for nominating judges to 
the Supreme Court, and to impose the doctrine of ‘interposition’ – James 
Madison’s notion of states retaining the right and duty to prevent unreasonable 
federal interference – as a barrier between the Southern states and the Court’s 
authority. 
In the US Senate, where two Senators represent each state, the formation 
of a Southern anti-Court ‘bloc’ experienced little or no success in reining in the 
Court’s power during the period 1954-1970. While Article I of the Constitution 
provides for the power of the Senate in ten lengthy sections (including a list of 
enumerated powers in Section 8), the paltry three sections of Article III leave the 
Supreme Court relatively unencumbered by constitutional limitations. 
Nonetheless, with seats on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Southern Senators 
James Eastland (Mississippi), John McClellan (Arkansas), Sam Ervin (North 
Carolina), Strom Thurmond (South Carolina), and Olin D. Johnston (South Carolina) 
                                                             
1 See Laurence Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court (New York, NY: Random House, 1985), p.100-3, for a brief discussion 
of the relevance of these terms in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices. See also Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong, The Brethren (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979); Ronald Kahn and Kenneth I. Kersch (eds.) The Supreme 
Court and American Political Development (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim 
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); 
Alpheus T. Mason, The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren (New York, NY: W Norton, 1958); John R. Schmidhauser, The 
Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); and John R. 
Schmidhauser and L. L. Berg, The Supreme Court and Congress (New York, NY: Free Press, 1972). 
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were able to use their powers under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution to 
advise on and consent to the confirmation of individuals nominated by the 
President for vacancies on the Supreme Court. Even if the Southern ‘bloc’ proved 
incapable of organising a majority of Senators from other regions to oppose 
Supreme Court nominees considered unacceptable to the South, the Southern 
Judiciary Committee members were at least able to reassure their constituents at 
home that they were acting in the best interests of the ‘Southern’ way of life. The 
1950s witnessed an intensification in the Committee’s scrutiny of potential 
Supreme Court Justices, with many nominees receiving a sharp, provocative and 
angry line of questioning from Southern Senators on issues relating to police 
powers, communist subversion and racial segregation. Indeed, this was an era in 
which a string of nominees – including Thurgood Marshall, the charismatic black 
lawyer who had convinced all nine Justices to overturn the constitutionality of 
racially segregated schools in Brown – would be forced to face down Dixie before 
taking their seat on the federal bench.2 
Senators from the state of South Carolina proved particularly indignant in 
their response to Brown. Olin D. Johnston, Strom Thurmond and Ernest ‘Fritz’ 
Hollings would each exert an extraordinary influence over the nomination of 
Supreme Court Justices, using a variety of methods, including advice to the 
nominating President; the triggering of investigations into nominees’ backgrounds 
as a delaying tactic, or simply a test of the nominee’s composure, stamina and 
constitutional knowledge in the form of gruelling Q&A sessions before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. As the thesis will assert, South Carolina’s war on the 
Supreme Court was very much in the tradition of the state’s history of defiance in 
the assertion of conservative white Southern values. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 See, generally, L.A. Scott Powe, ‘The Senate and the Court: Questioning a Nominee’, Texas Law Review 54 (1975-6), 
pp.891-902. 
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Research Objectives and Contribution to Scholarship 
 
In analysing the influence of South Carolina’s Senators in the Supreme Court 
nomination process during the period 1954-1970, the thesis offers original 
contributions to the existing scholarship by focusing on the following six research 
objectives: 
(1) It will be established in Chapters Four, Five and Six that, of all states, 
South Carolina has played the most important (yet overlooked) role in the 
development of Supreme Court nomination hearings into political, and 
confrontational, public events; 
(2) Given that a state’s influence within the process of senatorial 
consideration of judicial nominees may result in that state’s political agenda 
achieving disproportionate importance on a national scale, it will be argued in 
Chapters Three, Four and Five that South Carolina provided the best example of 
this phenomenon throughout a lengthy period in the era of civil rights; 
(3) The impressive long-term solidarity and consistency of South Carolina’s 
senatorial partnerships in the nomination process suggests – for reasons which 
will be explained in Chapters Five, Six and Seven – that analysing Supreme Court 
nominations as ‘one-off’ events is restrictive and unhelpful; 
(4) The thesis brings together the Supreme Court nomination process with 
the study of Southern political history – two worlds of the existing US politics 
literature which have rarely, if ever, been studied together. This approach will be 
most evident, for reasons which will be explained, in Chapters Two, Four and 
Seven; 
(5) The thesis offers, for the first time, a thorough and objective study – 
with an in-depth analysis of archive material – of a ten-year period in the life and 
career of Olin D. Johnston following his election to the US Senate. Chapters Two 
and Three will highlight the significance of this overlooked Southern statesman in 
the relationship between judicial politics and Southern political history; 
5 
 
(6) In addition to influencing and defining the growing tensions within the 
nomination process for Supreme Court Justices, the actions of South Carolina’s 
Senators had the very same effect on the intense politicisation of appointments to 
the lower courts, as will be explained in Chapters Two, Three and Five. 
 There will be a review of research objectives within each of the chapters 
which follow, in order to establish the historical and political significance of each 
instalment in the story of South Carolina and the Supreme Court. 
 Having provided an outline of the research, and set out the objectives of 
the thesis, this introductory chapter will now offer a brief political history of the 
state of South Carolina in order to contextualise the subject analysed in the 
following chapters. From here, the chapter will turn to a brief biographical outline 
of the three Senators under study. The chapter will then explain the importance of 
the Supreme Court nomination process in some detail, before outlining the nature 
and scope of the primary research used to complete each of the main chapters. 
This chapter then concludes with a brief overview of how the thesis will proceed. 
 
 
Rationale for Research: Why South Carolina? 
 
The view of historian James Haw that South Carolina’s antebellum leaders created 
an image of a superior Southern civilization provides a useful starting point for an 
examination of the South Carolinian sense of ‘exceptionalism’ which characterises 
the state’s history.3 As Jack Bass and Marilyn Thompson have argued, the South 
Carolinian distrust of executive power originates from the colonial era, when the 
Governor was appointed by the King of England, an experience which influenced 
the decision to concentrate political power within the state’s legislature, making 
South Carolina’s Governor, until recently, one of the weakest Governors in the 
                                                             
3 Charles W. Joyner, ‘Shared Traditions: South Carolina as a Folk Culture’, in Roger Figueira and Stephen Lowe (eds.), 
Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Historical Association), p.9, cited in 
Jack Bass and W. Scott Poole, The Palmetto State: The Making of Modern South Carolina (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2009), p.27. 
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United States.4 In addition to a sense of separatism, if not outright secession, a 
strong tradition of defiance permeates South Carolina’s history: the image of the 
palmetto tree was adopted for the state flag in honour of the soft, spongey 
palmetto log walls of Fort Sumter, which absorbed the shock of British 
cannonballs without shattering when nine British ships attempted to enter 
Charleston Harbour on 28th June 1776.5 With African slaves responsible for over 
half the annual value of South Carolina’s exports, the state’s leaders sought to 
ensure the continuation of a thriving economy while at the same time easing 
white fears of the state’s black slave majority, which became a greater concern 
after the failed Stono Rebellion of 1739.6 The wealth achieved through the 
enormous success of the South Carolinian slave economy, fuelled by rice and 
indigo exports, gave the state an influential voice in national politics which South 
Carolina’s leaders wished to maintain.7  
Following the Nullification Crisis, during which the state bitterly rejected 
the Tariff of 1828, South Carolina’s relationship with national party politics was 
damaged irreparably, to the extent that, by 1860, Robert Barnwell Rhett, editor of 
The Charleston Mercury, expressed hope that Abraham Lincoln’s election victory 
would create a Southern backlash which would lead to the break-up of the Union 
and the establishment of a separate Southern nation.8 Given its long tradition of 
independence, it seems unsurprising that South Carolina became the first state to 
secede from the Union in December 1860, triggering the Civil War. 
From the 1890s, South Carolina would implement one of the most savage 
and uncompromising systems of Jim Crow segregation in the American South, and 
the principle of ensuring white supremacy would continue to characterise the 
state’s cultural and political identity long after the abolition of slavery and the 
                                                             
4 Jack Bass and Marilyn W. Thompson, Strom: The Complicated Personal and Political Life of Strom Thurmond (New York, 
NY: Public Affairs, 2005), p.42; V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State Nation (New York, NY: Vintage, 1949), p.150; Jamie W. 
Moore, ‘The Lowcountry in Economic Transition: Charleston Since 1865’, The South Carolina Historical Magazine 80:2 (April 
1979), pp.156-171, p.157. 
5 Bass and Poole, Palmetto State, p.15. 
6 David Brown and Clive Webb, Race in the American South: From Slavery to Civil Rights (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), p.36; p.41-2; p.72; Bass and Poole, Palmetto State, p.9-10. 
7 Robert Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), p.65. 
8 Walter Edgar, South Carolina: A History (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), p.337-8; Bass and Poole, 
Palmetto State, p.42. 
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failure of the ill-fated Reconstruction-era reforms. During the early twentieth 
century, South Carolina’s politicians openly exploited the presence of a black 
majority in certain counties in order to secure re-election: arch segregationist 
Senator ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith was returned to the US Senate continuously over a 
thirty-four year period by conservative white voters in the state’s ‘black belt’ 
region.9 Following the announcement of Brown, black belt cities such as 
Orangeburg, which had a 70% African American population in the mid-1950s, 
would become centres of activity for the white Citizens’ Councils, which were 
created primarily as a means of opposing the racial integration of Southern 
schools.10 The ongoing persistence of white supremacy had become so deeply 
ingrained in South Carolina’s cultural identity by the 1950s that, in the words of C. 
Vann Woodward, African Americans felt ‘little need for Jim Crow laws to establish 
what the lingering stigma of slavery – in bearing, speech and manner – made so 
apparent.’11 
South Carolina became one of only two states to impose segregation in 
hospitals, and the only state which segregated a third caste by establishing 
separate schools for ‘mulatto’ as well as ‘white’ and ‘Negro’ children.12 The 
frequent call of South Carolina’s demagogic politicians, in particular the notorious 
Coleman L. Blease, for the use of violence to maintain racial order resulted in a 
total of 155 lynchings during the period 1880-1930.13 The state’s notoriety for 
racial violence even stirred the Presidency into action: after a black veteran 
named Isaac Woodard suffered a blow to the face from a policeman during an 
incident in Batesburg, which left him permanently blinded in one eye, President 
Harry S. Truman created a Committee on Civil Rights.14 Racial violence would 
                                                             
9 Key, Southern Politics, p.143. 
10 John W. White, ‘The White Citizens’ Councils of Orangeburg County, South Carolina’, in Winifred B. Moore and Orville 
Vernon Burton (eds.), Toward the Meeting of the Water: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South Carolina During the 
Twentieth Century (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2008), pp.261-273; p.261; Bass and Poole, Palmetto State, 
p.93; Mickey, Paths, p.223. 
11 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.32. 
12 Earl Black, Southern Governors and Civil Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p.81; Woodward, 
Strange Career, p.99; p.102. 
13 Bruce Baker, This Mob Will Surely Take My Life: Lynchings in the Carolinas, 1871-1947 (London: Continuum, 2008), p.4. 
14 Brown and Webb, Race in the American South, p.264; Kari Frederickson, ‘”The Slowest State” and “Most Backward 
Community”: Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Legislation, 1946-48’, The South Carolina Historical 
Magazine 98:2 (1997), pp.177-202, p.198. 
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persist despite Truman’s intervention, prompting one South Carolinian minister to 
remark in 1957 that ‘fear covers South Carolina like the frost.’15 
The legendary V.O. Key, whose 1949 assessment of South Carolina remains 
the most insightful study of the state’s politics after an incredible sixty-six years, 
highlighted one particularly important reflection that assists in explaining the 
state’s virulent defence of white supremacy. As established in the Constitution of 
1890, the system of apportionment that applied to the State Senate – namely, one 
Senator per county – gave the conservative politicians of the state’s lowcountry 
counties an ironclad control over South Carolina’s internal politics. Enjoying a 
higher rate of incumbency than Congressmen from upcountry counties, the 
lowcountry politicians reaped the benefits of seniority through chairing various 
committees, resulting in a situation in which large numbers of white voters in 
upcountry counties were at a disadvantage in terms of their congressional 
representation, while the counties of the lowcountry – with comparatively small 
numbers of white voters but sizeable, disenfranchised, black majorities – were 
represented by the most powerful politicians in the state.16  As Bryant Simon has 
shown, the effects of South Carolina’s malapportionment only worsened with the 
large-scale migration of the state’s residents from rural to metropolitan areas 
during the early twentieth century, constituting ‘a dilution of democracy, even 
racially skewed democracy’ even when compared to similar systems in place in 
other states.17 
As a result, the state’s political character, at least as it applied to elected 
representatives, was defined to a great extent by the preferences of white voters 
residing in counties ‘with the highest proportions of Negroes.’18 South Carolina’s 
relatively weak Governors were, therefore, hamstrung, if not at the mercy of, a 
deeply conservative state legislature which, in the words of Key, ‘grasped firm 
                                                             
15 Stan Opotowsky, ‘Dixie Dynamite: The Inside Story of the White Citizens Councils’ (reprinted from New York Post, 6–20 
Jan 1957), p.12; Michael J. Klarman, ‘Why Massive Resistance?’ in Clive Webb (ed.), Massive Resistance: Southern 
Opposition to the Second Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.21-34, p.25. 
16 Key, Southern Politics, p.150-5. Bryant Simon, ‘The Devaluation of the Vote: Legislative Apportionment and Inequality in 
South Carolina, 1890-1962’, The South Carolina Historical Magazine 101:3 (July 2000), pp.234-252; p.247-8. 
17 Simon, ‘The Devaluation’, p.238. 
18 Key, Southern Politics, p.139. 
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control of the critical sectors of state administration.’19 The politicians of Barnwell 
County, particularly Senator Edgar A. Brown, who served in the State Senate for 
forty-four years and was referred to by Key as the state’s ‘prime minister’, and 
Speaker Solomon Blatt, who served in the State House of Representatives for a 
staggering fifty-four years (thirty-two of them as Speaker), became the 
embodiment of this phenomenon.20 
All three of the Senators studied in this thesis were forced to contend with 
the Barnwell effect during their terms as Governor of South Carolina: Johnston 
waged a bold but ultimately unsuccessful war with the legislature in a row over 
the state’s Highway Division; Thurmond railed against the ‘Barnwell Ring’ during 
his successful election campaign of 1946, and Hollings was forced to charm state 
legislators (including the ageing Senator Brown) with a bottle of bourbon in order 
to secure authorisation for his ambitious programme of technical training.21 
The reflections of Key and subsequent scholars suggest that South 
Carolina’s political elite succeeded not only in constructing an unbreakable 
conservative dominance of the state’s politics but also managed to smother, or at 
least conceal, the potential for alternative, even moderate, political ideologies to 
emerge.22 The version of ‘massive resistance’ practiced by the state’s leaders 
created, in the words of Tony Badger, ‘a closed society, just as closed as 
Mississippi, in which dissent was not tolerated,’ but this is not to suggest that the 
state had been open to alternative political viewpoints prior to the announcement 
of Brown.23 As Robert Mickey has explained, South Carolina’s response to Brown 
‘did not crush a burgeoning racially moderate public sphere [because] prior to 
Brown, none existed.’24 
                                                             
19 Ibid., p.151. 
20 Frank E. Jordan, The Primary State: A History of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, 1896-1962 (self-published; 
unknown date), p.162-3; Simon, ‘The Devaluation’, p.248. 
21 John E. Huss, Senator for the South: A Biography of Olin D. Johnston (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p.64-72; Jack Bass and 
Marilyn W. Thompson, Strom: The Complicated Personal and Political Life of Strom Thurmond (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 
2005), p.78-9; Jack Bass and W. Scott Poole, The Palmetto State: The Making of Modern South Carolina (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2009), p.112. 
22 Key, Southern Politics, p.131. 
23 Anthony J. Badger, ‘From Defiance to Moderation: South Carolina Governors and Racial Change’, in Anthony J. Badger, 
New Deal/New South: an Anthony J. Badger Reader (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2007), pp.127-143; 
p.133. 
24 Mickey, Paths, p.224. 
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The current South Carolina political scholarship suggests strongly that 
aspirants to political office were forced to conform to an intolerant political 
system in which the racial prejudices of the lowcountry were deeply ingrained. If 
this is truly the case, it seems surprising that few scholars have considered the full 
reach of this effect by exploring the impact of South Carolina’s racial politics in 
Washington, DC, particularly as Key has observed that the state’s Senators ‘used 
the floor of the United States Senate as a rostrum for white supremacy oratory, 
matched in virulence mainly by such Mississippi spokesmen as [James K.] 
Vardaman, [Theodore] Bilbo [and John E.] Rankin.’25 In fact, the US Senate itself is 
a highly relevant aspect of South Carolina’s history, in that many of the most 
violent, dramatic and notorious events associated with the state’s Senators and 
the issue of race have taken place on the Senate floor itself, including the 
infamous Brooks-Sumner incident of 1856, when Congressman Preston Brooks 
subjected Senator Charles Sumner to a vicious beating with a cane; the recitation 
in 1929 of the poem N*****s in the White House by Coleman Blease in reaction to 
First Lady Lou Hoover taking tea with the wife of African-American Congressman 
Oscar DePriest, and Strom Thurmond’s remarkable twenty-four hour filibuster 
opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which remains to date the longest recorded 
filibuster in US history.26 With South Carolina’s powerful conservative leaders 
unable to exert, at the federal level, a measure of influence on a par with their 
control over the state legislature, it was perhaps inevitable that the state’s 
Senators would clash repeatedly with Senators from other states in their 
uncompromising defence of white supremacy. 
The healthy South Carolinian distrust of executive power, particularly in 
matters of race relations, makes it logical that the US Supreme Court would 
become a target of the state’s defiant politicians. The state would find itself at the 
centre of several landmark Court decisions relating to racial politics, all of which 
would fuel the protests of South Carolina’s politicians that the Justices of the 
                                                             
25 Key, Southern Politics, p.130. 
26 See David Herbert Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1960) for a thorough 
account of the Brooks-Sumner Incident. 
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Supreme Court were leading a vindictive attack on the ‘Southern’ way of life 
under the leadership of the arch-liberal Chief Justice Earl Warren. The Brown 
decision drew together five cases relating to segregated schooling, among them 
Briggs v. Elliott, which originated from a challenge to segregated schooling in 
Clarendon County, South Carolina. Briggs had been the original case, but, as 
Orville Vernon Burton has explained, the Court’s Texan Justice, Tom C. Clark, 
suggested that the group of five cases be named after the Brown case so that it 
would not be viewed as dealing solely with a ‘Southern’ issue, with the result that 
‘Linda Brown and Topeka became famous, and Harry Briggs and Clarendon, South 
Carolina, did not.’27 In defending South Carolina’s system of segregated education, 
the state’s counsel, John W. Davis, emphasised the promises made by the state to 
invest heavily in its schools, with the intention of ironing out the inequalities 
between black and white children which had been identified during the original 
oral arguments in Briggs, heard two years earlier.28 
The Brown decision, announced on 17th May 1954, struck down the 
established system of segregated education in its entirety and proved to be a 
hammer blow for the state of South Carolina. The decision voided Article XI, 
Section 7 of the state’s Constitution and also suggested an overwhelming vote of 
no confidence in Governor James F. Byrnes’ pledge to address racial inequalities in 
South Carolina’s schools. While the Attorney General of neighbouring Georgia 
tried to argue that segregation ought to be maintained in that state because 
Georgia had had nothing to do with the original group of cases, South Carolina 
could make no such claim, and would forever be linked with one of the most 
controversial Supreme Court decisions of the twentieth century.29 Further 
decisions followed: on 25th February 1963, the Court handed down its opinion in 
Edwards v. South Carolina, which ruled that South Carolina’s authorities had 
                                                             
27 Orville Vernon Burton et al., ‘Seeds in Unlikely Soil: The Briggs v. Elliott School Desegregation Case’, in Winifred B. Moore 
and Orville Vernon Burton (eds.), Toward the Meeting of the Water: Currents in the Civil Rights Movement of South Carolina 
in the Twentieth Century (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2008), pp.176-200; p.190. 
28 John W. Davis, oral argument, as printed in ‘In The Supreme Court’ booklet, Herman E. Talmadge Collection, Subgroup C, 
Series 3: Civil Rights, Box 17, Folder 6. 
29 The Atlanta Constitution, 18th May 1954, p.1, Richard B. Russell Collection, Subgroup C, Series 3: Speech/Media, Box 27, 
Folder 9. 
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violated the rights of African American protestors by forcing them to disperse. In 
January 1966 came South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which dismissed South 
Carolina’s challenge to the pre-clearance provisions of the landmark Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 in an opinion drafted by Earl Warren himself, which has been cited by 
Jim Newton as an example of the Chief Justice’s personal ‘campaign against 
Southern racism.’30 During oral arguments, Warren cited ‘an invidious and 
pervasive evil’ in South Carolina’s history of defying the Fifteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution through disenfranchising African Americans.31 In December 1965, 
the Court commanded South Carolina to reconstruct completely its system of 
representation in the state Senate in order to ensure the representation of African 
American voters, a challenge later upheld by the Stevenson v. West decision of 
1975.32 Despite the obvious obstructionism being neutralised in these decisions, it 
is not difficult to understand why South Carolinian citizens and politicians might 
have had compelling reasons to take a greater interest in the affairs of the US 
Supreme Court than Americans elsewhere in the nation. 
One particularly notable aspect of the political interactions of South 
Carolina and the Supreme Court is the manner in which the state’s Senators have 
been deeply involved in the process of nominating and confirming Justices for 
seats on the Court, occasionally going to extraordinary lengths to scrutinise or 
obstruct nominees, or influence the process of selection themselves. As far back 
as April 1930, an editorial in The Buffalo Progressive Herald identified Coleman 
Blease as a ringleader in the fierce opposition to President Herbert Hoover’s 
nomination of Charles Evans Hughes for the position of Chief Justice.33 A more 
famous example is the melodramatic style of questioning employed by Strom 
Thurmond when scrutinising President Lyndon Johnson’s nominations of 
Thurgood Marshall for Associate Justice in 1967, and Abe Fortas for Chief Justice 
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in 1968. More complex is the role of Senator Fritz Hollings, whose personal 
recommendation to President Richard Nixon that he make the ill-fated 
nomination of South Carolinian Clement Haynsworth occurred at a time of press 
speculation that Nixon would ‘repay’ the Southern states for crucial support 
during the 1968 Presidential Election, with one newspaper noting Strom 
Thurmond’s ‘passionate’ interest in matters of the Court.34 
Perhaps more remarkably, South Carolina has the unusual distinction of 
being one of the few states in American history to have elected a former Supreme 
Court Justice as its Governor: James F. Byrnes, who had been appointed to the 
Supreme Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 before being removed 
in order to head the Office of Economic Stabilization, had the unenviable task of 
governing South Carolina during the early 1950s, when the Court announced the 
Brown decision. Byrnes became an outspoken critic of the Court on which he had 
previously served, condemning his former colleagues in a pamphlet entitled ‘The 
Supreme Court Must Be Curbed!,’ which was re-printed and circulated extensively 
throughout South Carolina during the mid-1950s.35 Given the significance of South 
Carolina’s role in Briggs v. Elliott, the prominent role of Senators Thurmond and 
Hollings in the Fortas and Haynsworth nomination disasters, and the influence of 
Governor Byrnes (a former Supreme Court Justice and Senator), it is quite clear 
that South Carolina holds a unique place in the history of the US Supreme Court, 
and vice versa.  
 In waging a war on the Court following the announcement of Brown, South 
Carolina’s Senators employed a variety of measures aimed at restricting the 
power of the Justices in order to re-assure their constituents that segregation 
would be maintained.  Olin Johnston was an active participant in efforts to gather 
information that might be used to discredit the Court’s decisions, while Strom 
Thurmond advocated the impeachment of Supreme Court Justices on an almost 
regular basis, making a special effort to target the elderly liberal Justice William O. 
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Douglas.36 In addition, Johnston and Thurmond unleashed a wave of legislation 
aimed at weakening the Court’s power, including a Johnston bill to eliminate the 
Court’s jurisdiction in matters relating to schools, and a Thurmond bill requiring 
Justices to hold a minimum of five years’ judicial experience in order to be eligible 
for nomination.37 The legislative element of South Carolina’s war on the Court 
highlights one of the more overlooked aspects of the Southern states’ anti-Court 
agenda: ‘court-baiting’, rather than race-baiting, could be used by South 
Carolina’s Senators as a convenient means of asserting their state’s independence 
by blaming Presidents of both parties for making disastrous nominations.38 By 
using the resistance of northern Senators as a convenient excuse for the South’s 
failure to prevent the Court’s interference in the practice of segregation, Southern 
Senators were able to make a plausible case for their continuous re-election. 
Southern voters came to believe that the only means of containing the influence 
of the Supreme Court would be to re-elect their Senators. With re-election came 
seniority, with seniority came senior positions on Senate committees, and with a 
senior position on the Judiciary Committee came the power to scrutinise and 
influence the very process which determines the individuals who sit on that Court. 
 From 1953 until his death in 1965, Olin Johnston was better placed than 
any other South Carolinian politician to influence the judicial appointments of 
Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. Having secured a place on 
the Judiciary Committee thanks to the influence of Senate Minority Leader Lyndon 
Johnson (who viewed his near-namesake as a natural ally as well as a loyal 
Democrat), Johnston was frequently selected by fellow Southerner and 
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Committee Chairman James Eastland to sit on sub-committees to assess the 
suitability of Court of Appeals nominations.39 In using his position to delay the 
confirmation of any nominee he considered unsuitable, Johnston made a lasting 
imprint on the history of the US Senate, marking a period in which Southern 
Senators utilised Senate procedures to enforce a Southern agenda on a national 
scale.40 He was at his most obstructive when considering the Circuit Court 
nominations of Simon Sobeloff and Thurgood Marshall, both of which were made 
with the Supreme Court as the backdrop: the latter nomination was made amid 
speculation that President Kennedy would eventually make Marshall the first 
African American Supreme Court Justice, while Sobeloff was supposedly being 
‘groomed’ to replace the ailing Justice Felix Frankfurter.41 Johnston’s tactics 
alienated his Senate colleagues and tested the patience of President Kennedy, 
who intervened personally in an effort to overcome Johnston’s obstruction of the 
Marshall appointment.42 
Strom Thurmond preferred a more confrontational approach toward 
nominees: his aggressive interrogation of Abe Fortas – inspired in part by his fury 
that the Court had thrown out the conviction of Andrew Mallory, a black South 
Carolinian man who choked and raped a white woman and went on to re-offend – 
is immortalised in the now-infamous outburst, ‘Mallory – I want that word to ring 
in your ears.’43 Fritz Hollings would carve out an equally distinctive record on 
Supreme Court nominations. His decision, only a few years after establishing 
himself as one of South Carolina’s more moderate Governors, to oppose the 
Supreme Court nomination of Thurgood Marshall, drew criticism from the state’s 
black leaders, and remains, according to the man himself, one of Hollings’s biggest 
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personal regrets.44 His record on Supreme Court appointments would remain 
unusually conservative throughout his thirty-eight-year career in the Senate, most 
notably with regard to President Ronald Reagan’s failed nomination of Robert 
Bork, which Hollings supported despite the opposition of sixteen of his seventeen 
fellow Southern Democrats.45 
One of the more remarkable aspects of this story is the manner in which 
Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings always seemed to agree on the South Carolina 
position toward each Supreme Court nomination as it was made, yet they did not 
communicate regularly, nor did they seem to discuss the formulation of a 
coherent strategy in the state’s war on the Court. The relationship between 
Johnston and Thurmond remained strained following their bitter 1950 primary 
contest, and Johnston’s reluctance to associate himself with Thurmond’s racist 
posturing was summed up neatly in his (possibly apocryphal) remark to Harry 
Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas Gazette: ‘It’s no use trying to talk to Strom. He 
believes that shit.’46 Johnston’s daughter, former Congresswoman Elizabeth J. 
Patterson, recalls, of her father, that ‘I never heard him say anything bad about 
him, OK, but he did say “poor Strom” a couple of times. He just sort of ignored 
him, I think.’47 Johnston and Thurmond did not meet regularly, and maintained a 
cordial written agreement that each would not object to the other’s judicial 
recommendations.48 Like Thurmond, Hollings would wage a bitter and ultimately 
unsuccessful effort to unseat Johnston in the 1962 Democratic Party primary 
contest, and would clash openly with Thurmond during discussions over the 
extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1982.49 
In addition to a lack of personal warmth between the three Senators, there 
were various different political agendas to contend with. While Hollings crafted a 
reputation as a moderate, Thurmond filibustered against passage of the 1957 Civil 
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Rights Act not only to assure his constituents that segregation in South Carolina 
would be maintained, but also to demonstrate to his Southern colleagues that his 
commitment to the preservation of white supremacy was stronger and more 
authentic than theirs.50 The testosterone-fuelled energy with which South 
Carolina’s politicians have defended their state is quite evident in Thurmond’s 
correspondence with his constituents during the debate over the Civil Rights Act 
during the summer of 1957, which includes his pledge to ‘speak at great length 
and to the full extent of my physical capacity.’51 
Thurmond’s provocative promotion of the Southern Manifesto – signed by 
most of the Southern congressional delegation in defiance of Brown – led to a 
physical altercation with Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas, and his twenty-four-
hour filibuster prompted a very public rebuke from the leader of the Southern 
delegation, Georgia’s Richard Russell, who condemned Thurmond’s pursuit of 
‘personal political aggrandizement.’52 Hollings later claimed that Thurmond’s 
aggressive interrogation of Abe Fortas ‘had left even some of his own staffers 
shaking their heads,’ illustrating, as with Johnston’s delay of Thurgood Marshall’s 
confirmation, that the actions of South Carolina’s Senators often proved to be 
deeply unpalatable to others in Washington, DC. 53 Furthermore, as this research 
will indicate, the war waged by South Carolina’s Senators was only partially 
successful in convincing the state’s white voters that segregation could be 
prevented and the Court’s power contained. 
 It will be established through research objective (1) that South Carolina has 
played the most important (yet overlooked) role in the development of Supreme 
Court nomination hearings into political, and confrontational, public events. 
Highlighting the enduring Southern obsession with the Supreme Court in the 
twenty-first century, former South Carolinian Congressman John Spratt refers to 
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the influence of the nine Justices as ‘one of the defining differences. If you want to 
know the difference between a Democrat and a Southern Democrat, my answer 
would be that it’s about where you stand on the Supreme Court, particularly on 
recent rulings, such as those dealing with gay rights.’54 In line with research 
objective (4), the thesis brings together the history of the Supreme Court 
nomination process with the study of Southern political history, but once again, 
the unique role of South Carolina’s politicians in the nominations process must be 
emphasised. Although the states of Arkansas, Mississippi and North Carolina also 
had ardent segregationist representatives on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
during this era, none of these Senators ever initiated a one-man crusade against a 
nominee, as in the case of Johnston’s fight against the Court of Appeals 
nominations of Marshall and Sobeloff, and Thurmond’s obstruction of the 
Supreme Court nominations of Marshall and Fortas. The unyielding dissent of 
South Carolina’s Senators truly stands out from the actions of other 
segregationists in the nomination process throughout the period under study. 
Thurmond virtually stood alone in his vote against the confirmation – as Associate 
Justice – of Abe Fortas in 1965, and his crusade against Thurgood Marshall in 1967 
was blunted by Lyndon Johnson’s success in convincing Southerners James 
Eastland, John Stennis, John McClellan and Richard Russell to ‘take a walk’ by 
abstaining from the final vote.55 
 Although the influence of the state’s politicians on the nominations of 
Supreme Court Justices has been noted by many scholars, including Thorpe 
(1969), Murphy (1988), Silverstein (1994), Abraham (1999) and Comiskey (2004), 
the impact of South Carolina’s Senators has never been analysed at a level which 
might allow insight into the themes discussed above. Given the significant South 
Carolinian opposition to Charles Evans Hughes’s nomination as Chief Justice; the 
withdrawal of Abe Fortas’s nomination, and the Senate rejections of both Clement 
F. Haynsworth and Robert Bork, it is clear that the influence of South Carolinian 
Senators has featured prominently in some of the most explosive Supreme Court 
                                                             
54 Interview with John Spratt, 28th September 2014. 
55 Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall (New York, NY: Random House, 1998), p.337-8. 
19 
 
nomination battles of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the consistency of the 
state’s Senators in the nomination process, and the volatile nature of their actions 
and behaviour, suggests that South Carolina illustrates best the argument, made 
in the form of research objective (3), that the frequent analysis of Supreme Court 
nominations as ‘one-off’ events is restrictive and unhelpful, for reasons which will 
be explained. 
The significance of South Carolina’s role in the Briggs v. Elliott case and the 
prominent role of Senators Thurmond and Hollings in the Fortas and Haynsworth 
disasters constitute a sufficient rationale for highlighting South Carolina as the 
most logical choice for a study which looks in detail at the significance of racial 
politics in the resistance of presidential nominations to the Supreme Court.56 A full 
examination of how the state’s politicians responded to concerns over judicial 
nominations is certainly warranted, if only to investigate in detail the connection 
between political activity in the US Senate and the activities of Southern white 
communities resisting federal intervention in South Carolinian affairs, particularly 
with regard to race relations. As noted above in the form of research objective (2), 
a state’s influence within the process of judicial selection may result in that state’s 
political agenda achieving a disproportionate influence on a national scale. With 
its striking history of political dissent, and its unique relationship with the 
Supreme Court, South Carolina’s influence on the judicial selection process offers 
a crucial, yet overlooked, example of this phenomenon throughout a lengthy 
period in the era of civil rights. 
Before this introductory chapter proceeds to offer a brief outline of the 
lives and careers of the Senators under study, it is necessary to make three points 
regarding the use of the expression ‘war on the Supreme Court’. The first is that 
the expression has been used throughout the thesis to refer to the attempt of 
South Carolina’s Senators to achieve a variety of objectives, including the 
maintenance of conservative segregationist credentials through regular 
condemnation of the Brown decision; a characterisation of themselves as 
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defenders of the South against an institution purported to be the region’s number 
one enemy, and an attempt to obstruct liberal appointments to the judiciary 
whilst promoting the nomination of conservative judges who, supposedly, would 
defend Southern interests through strict adherence to the original meaning in the 
words of the US Constitution. It should not be assumed that the expression refers 
to a consistent attack, nor will it be apparent from the research that the state 
remained on the offensive throughout the period under study. 
The second point is that the term ‘war’ seems appropriate given the 
significance of the Supreme Court within the broader response of South Carolina 
to the Brown decision. The term seems even more fitting when considering the 
influence of the man whose actions defined South Carolinian, if not Southern, 
politics throughout this era. Strom Thurmond’s recent biographer, Joseph 
Crespino, has argued that the aforementioned Southern Manifesto ‘initiated for 
Thurmond a war on the Warren Court that became the most consistent theme of 
his politics for the next decade and a half.’57 Although the judicial selection 
process would eventually accommodate Thurmond’s preferences, the Court’s 
liberal majority would remain a threat to the Southern way of life unless diluted 
by a long-term presidential commitment to the appointment of conservative 
judges. 
Thirdly, it must be understood that the nature of South Carolina’s war 
varied throughout the period under study. For example, the repeated 
condemnations of the attitude, style and judicial philosophies of the nine Justices 
suggests that the state’s war on the Court was largely rhetorical. This was perhaps 
most evident in Thurmond’s speech before the Citizens Committee for 
Constitutional Government in Augusta, Georgia in November 1958, when, in one 
of many condemnations, he declared ‘total and unremitting war on the Supreme 
Court’s unconstitutional usurpations and unlawful arrogations of power.’58 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the state’s involvement in the politics of the 
Supreme Court ought not to be referred to as a ‘war’ following the inauguration in 
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January 1969 of Richard Nixon, a Republican President elected on the back of a 
successful ‘Southern strategy’, who set out to nominate the very brand of 
conservative judges sought by South Carolina’s Senators over so many years. On 
the other hand, the Senate’s rejection in 1969 and 1970 of two Southern Supreme 
Court nominees (including South Carolina’s Clement Haynsworth) ensured that 
South Carolina’s Senators remained at war with Northerners wishing to protect 
liberal gains made during the 1960s, and claims of an anti-Southern bias 
suggested that South Carolina would continue to fight for regional, and state, 
interests in the Senate. 
Similar doubts may be voiced when it is remembered that South Carolina’s 
Senators did not wage ‘war’ on the Supreme Court through a defiant gesture of 
secession worthy of Vice President John Calhoun’s leadership of the state during 
the drama of the Nullification Crisis, but instead chose to work within the existing 
system by invoking the senatorial right to ‘advice and consent’ in the judicial 
confirmation process. Yet, although the Nixon Presidency marked the beginning of 
Thurmond’s re-invention into a pillar of the Republican Party establishment, the 
record of Democrat Fritz Hollings in maintaining a consistent streak of 
independence in his support for conservative nominees ensured that the tradition 
of South Carolina Democrats defying the national party was continued. Hollings’s 
record in the Supreme Court nomination process from 1970 until his retirement in 
2005 does not suggest a continuation of a war on the Supreme Court, but rather a 
reflection of a lengthy battle to protect the Democratic Party in South Carolina by 
using a conservative voting record to prevent Republican Party encroachment into 
the state’s conservative white voting bloc. Despite the lack of agreement or co-
ordination, and clear evidence of very different political agendas, it remains the 
case – as this thesis will explain – that a clear solidarity was maintained by the 
three Senators over the course of each roll call vote. 
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The Three Senators 
 
The research focuses on the three South Carolina Senators who served during the 
period under study: Olin Johnston, who served from 1945 to 1965, Strom 
Thurmond, who served from 1955 to 2003, and Fritz Hollings, who served from 
1967 to 2005. Aside from the fact that the period of study in this research 
encompasses an era in which racial politics played a crucial role in influencing the 
outcome of some of the most controversial and catastrophic Supreme Court 
nominations in US history, the other advantage to studying these three pivotal 
South Carolinian figures is the fact that their lives and careers illustrate several 
common strands of the state’s political culture, but also exhibit many crucial 
differences. 
Strom Thurmond was the last in a long line of controversial South Carolina 
Senators. His birth on 2nd December 1902 in Edgefield County links him to two 
other notorious figures born in the same county: the aforementioned 
Congressman Preston Brooks, and the enormously influential Governor Benjamin 
R. Tillman, who presided over the complete disenfranchisement of black men and 
called openly for the use of lynching to maintain white supremacy.59 Thurmond 
claimed he wished to run for Governor when his father took him to a stump 
meeting in Edgefield, where the nine-year-old Strom witnessed first-hand the 
demagogic, race-baiting oratory of Coleman Blease. Thurmond later claimed that 
he learned from Blease the necessity of aggressive, rousing speeches in winning 
over cynical Southern crowds.60 Following a successful legal career, he won the 
Governorship in 1946. Despite an initially moderate position on race, he did not 
question the Democratic Party’s maintenance of Jim Crow laws established by 
Tillman in the 1880s. After serving less than two years as Governor, he broke from 
the Democratic Party in disgust at President Harry S. Truman’s civil rights plank 
during the 1948 presidential campaign and ran for president himself on a 
Southern Democrat (‘Dixiecrat’) ticket, winning electoral college majorities in four 
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Southern states. The campaign ensured Thurmond’s credibility as a defender of 
racial segregation, but marked the beginning of a confrontational relationship 
with the Democratic Party. He defied the South Carolina Democratic 
establishment by running successfully as a write-in candidate in the 1954 Senate 
race, and angered Southern Senators with his filibuster against the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act.  
A fitness fanatic who cultivated a macho persona, Thurmond seized on 
opportunities to showcase his physical prowess in order to impress his 
constituents, not always successfully. A Life Magazine photograph of him standing 
on his head was used frequently by political opponents to ridicule him, while the 
remarkable stamina displayed during his Senate filibuster proved to be in vain 
when the Civil Rights Act was passed successfully on 9th September 1957. 
Although still a Democrat at the start of 1964, Thurmond had not supported a 
Democratic presidential candidate in twenty years, and his decision to become a 
Republican and support Barry Goldwater’s effort to reach out to disaffected white 
Southerners proved to be a landmark event in the South’s conversion to the 
Republican Party.61 Thurmond retained his huge base of support despite his party 
defection, and Republican Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan found him 
to be a reliable and influential ally in securing Southern votes.  
Although the Southern crusade to maintain segregation was effectively 
decapitated by passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Thurmond took the 
leading role in the Southern resistance of President Lyndon Johnson’s 1967 
nomination of Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, and 
also Johnson’s attempted elevation of Abe Fortas to the Chief Justiceship during 
the summer of 1968.62 Thurmond’s support for segregationist Albert Watson’s 
unsuccessful 1970 gubernatorial campaign against the liberal John C. West proved 
to be his final roll of the dice, and, during the 1970s, Thurmond’s sense of political 
pragmatism was evident in efforts to win over newly-enfranchised black voters, 
even adding his voice to the chorus of approval for the 1982 renewal of the Voting 
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Rights Act. Although he retained an old-fashioned lecherous quality in his dealings 
with women, Thurmond did attempt to demonstrate a more enlightened 
approach to race in his later years by hiring black employees and enrolling his 
daughter at an integrated school, but these token gestures remained 
overshadowed by the 1948 Dixiecrat campaign, which had already confirmed his 
place in history.63 Nonetheless, Thurmond continued to win re-election as a 
Republican, without black support, until he left the Senate in 2003, aged 100. He 
died less than a year later. 
A fascinating postscript to Thurmond’s life was the revelation after his 
death that, at age 22, he had fathered a mixed-race daughter with his family’s 16-
year old black maid. Although he maintained contact with his unacknowledged 
fifth child and supported her financially as a youth, Thurmond concealed her 
existence to prevent accusations of hypocrisy, and spent years representing 
disaffected white voters while making a case that his commitment to racial 
segregation was more authentic than that of his Southern colleagues, including 
fellow South Carolinian, Olin Johnston. The discovery of a more ‘liberal’ attitude 
toward black Americans in Thurmond’s personal life was less surprising to those 
who recalled his womanising, but for others, the emergence of Essie Mae 
Washington-Williams only added to the continuing fascination with the 
controversy surrounding Strom Thurmond as an icon of the twentieth century 
American South.64 
Olin D. Johnston was destined to become a champion of South Carolina’s 
textile community. Born on 18th November 1896 in Anderson County, in the heart 
of the Piedmont region, he worked as a youth in the Chiquola Manufacturing 
Company mill and earned his high school diploma at the Textile Industrial 
Institute. He entered politics while still enrolled at the University of South 
Carolina, serving in the state’s House of Representatives prior to being elected 
Governor in 1934. His support for Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal produced many 
progressive policy outcomes including South Carolina’s comprehensive rural 
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electrification programme. His failure to unseat ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith in a 1938 run at 
the Senate left him feeling he had not made a sufficient case for the maintenance 
of racial segregation.65 He did not make the same mistake in 1944, when his 
defeat of the ailing Smith was due in no small part to a bold crusade to ensure the 
total exclusion of African Americans from the South Carolina Democratic Party 
primary system. In his opposition to the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright 
decision, Johnston declared that ‘white supremacy will be contained in our 
primaries – let the chips fall where they may.66 In his final year as Governor, he 
declined to intervene on behalf of the youngest person executed in the state’s 
history, allowing George Stinney, a fourteen-year-old African American boy, to 
face the electric chair when found guilty of murdering two white girls. In 
December 2014, the conviction was vacated by Judge Carmen T. Mullen, 
effectively clearing Stinney’s name seventy years after his execution.67 
In the Senate, Johnston condemned the Supreme Court’s Brown decision, 
initiated various measures to curb the power of the Supreme Court, and added his 
signature to the Southern Manifesto to confirm his commitment to the 
preservation of racial segregation in his state. Although as Governor he had 
famously called out the National Guard to occupy the State Highway Division, his 
senatorial career was largely free from dramatic behaviour, although he caused a 
stir in 1948 when refusing to attend a racially-integrated Democratic fund-raising 
dinner so that his wife, Gladys, would be spared the experience of sitting next to a 
black man.68 As chair of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, he earned the 
nickname ‘Mr Civil Service’, and remained a reliable Southern vote on the 
Judiciary Committee against President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s supposedly liberal 
Supreme Court appointments, voting against the confirmations of Earl Warren, 
John Marshall Harlan and Potter Stewart. While other Southerners clashed with 
the Democratic Party or bolted it completely, Johnston remained a loyal Democrat 
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throughout his life, putting his reluctant support behind the liberal presidential 
candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Despite their differences 
on civil rights, Johnston retained a warm friendship with President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, as evidenced by a telephone call from 26th December 1963, when 
Johnson informed the Senator that, ‘I’m an Olin Johnston man. I’ll work with you 
any way I can.’69 
Until his death from cancer in 1965, Olin Johnston’s brand of economically 
progressive yet racially conservative Democratic politics was appealing to a 
sufficient number of South Carolinians for him to win re-election over two 
decades. Although he had made a more aggressive case in support of racial 
segregation in order to win his Senate seat in 1944, Johnston was able to defend it 
against more conservative contenders in the Democratic primaries. The most 
famous example was Strom Thurmond, whose ‘Dixiecrat’ run for president in 1948 
destroyed any hope of him attracting significant black support in his bitter 
campaign to win Johnston’s Senate seat two years later. Despite his conservative 
position on race, Johnston was able to win a sufficient number of black votes to 
ensure his re-election: thanks to Thurmond’s notorious ‘Dixiecrat’ reputation, 
Johnston was even able to win the endorsement of African American civil rights 
activist Modjeska Simkins during the 1950 Senate campaign.70 Despite lacking the 
national profile which Thurmond sought, Olin Johnston remains an influential 
figure in the history of Southern politics. His enormous contributions to the 
agricultural and textile industries in South Carolina have been acknowledged by 
few outside the state, but the lengthy, and successful, campaign to prove George 
Stinney’s execution a miscarriage of justice has ensured the recognition of his 
racial conservatism on a national scale. 
Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings is one of the more complex figures in South 
Carolina’s political history. Born in Charleston on New Year’s Day in 1922, he 
                                                             
69 Telephone conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Olin D. Johnston, 26th December 1963, Lyndon B. Johnston 
Presidential Recordings, Miller Center, University of Virginia, K6312.18. 
70 Wim Roefs, ‘The Impact of 1940s Civil Rights Activism on the State’s 1960s Scene: A Hypothesis and Historiographical 
Discussion, in Winifred B. Moore and Orville Vernon Burton (eds.), Toward the Meeting of the Water: Currents in the Civil 
Rights Movement of South Carolina During the Twentieth Century (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2008), 
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aimed for a career in law before being seduced by the glamour of South Carolina 
politics. Following three terms in the State House of Representatives, he was 
elected Lieutenant Governor at the age of 32, before reaching the Governor’s 
mansion in January 1959. As Governor, Hollings’s main political interest was 
education. Unlike Olin Johnston, who escalated a dispute with the State Highway 
Division by calling out the National Guard, Hollings used his charm to the full 
when making a case for the state’s investment in technical training, a previously 
unheard-of innovation in the state’s history. Hollings claims that his views on race 
were influenced during World War II, when he saw black American soldiers 
standing outside being given food through a window while white German 
prisoners of war sat inside at tables. 
Hollings secured his gubernatorial election victory by campaigning on a 
platform of maintaining racial segregation, but once elected, he proved more 
liberal on civil rights than any of his predecessors. He ensured the safety of 
demonstrators at lunch counter sit-ins, and allowed the admission of African 
American student Harvey Gantt to Clemson University, offering his now-famous 
declaration that a process of desegregation ‘must be done with dignity. It must be 
done with law and order.’71 Hollings’s support for liberal presidential candidate 
John F. Kennedy damaged his popularity in South Carolina, contributing partly to 
his failed primary challenge to Olin Johnston in 1962. Nonetheless, through his 
youth, energy and enthusiasm for business opportunities, he was able to attract a 
wealth of investment for subsequent Governors to build on. He was once again 
unequivocal in his support for maintaining segregation in his unsuccessful 1962 
primary campaign, and also in his successful 1966 campaign for the Senate 
following the death of Olin Johnston. Yet, as with his term as Governor, Hollings 
carved out a moderate path during a thirty-eight-year career in the Senate, 
remaining a popular Democratic Senator despite the party defection of his South 
Carolina colleague and a series of Republican challenges to his incumbency during 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
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His moderate views on race were indicated further by his 1969 ‘hunger 
tour’, his 1982 vote to renew the Voting Rights Act, and his 1988 endorsement of 
fellow South Carolinian Jesse Jackson in that year’s Presidential Election. Hollings’s 
position on budget-related issues was just as proactive yet more conservative, 
most notably with his sponsorship of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, a 
collaboration with Senators Phil Gramm of Texas and Warren Rudman of New 
Hampshire, intended to reduce the national deficit. He maintained a conservative 
position on judicial appointments, voting against the first ever African American 
Supreme Court nominee, Thurgood Marshall, in 1967, and supporting the 
conservative Republican nominations of Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence 
Thomas in 1991. 
With his dry, self-deprecating wit and heavy Charleston accent, Hollings 
stood out as a particularly colourful figure during his tenure on the Senate 
Commerce Committee, during which he questioned Frank Zappa on obscene lyrics 
in rock music, and cited ‘Buffcoat and Beaver’ (more commonly known as Beavis 
and Butthead) as an example of the unhealthy influence of television on American 
families. His passion for fiscal responsibility is discussed extensively in his 2008 
memoir, Making Government Work, and he has proved to be an outspoken and 
provocative figure in his early 90s, particularly regarding his views on the Obama 
Administration’s handling of the global economic crisis. 
 Despite the similarities, there are many differences between the three 
Senators to illustrate the unique facets of South Carolina politics. Johnston and 
Hollings represent different sides of the traditional divide between upcountry and 
lowcountry politics, while Thurmond’s birthplace of Edgefield County makes him 
the last in a long line of controversial South Carolinian politicians.72 Each of the 
three Senators under study represents, characterises and defines a different era 
of twentieth century South Carolina politics: the ‘classic’ era of Democratic 
dominance and black disenfranchisement is illustrated by Johnston’s continued 
emphasis on racial segregation; the era of ‘massive resistance’ is defined by 
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Thurmond’s 1948 presidential run, his leading role in drafting the ‘Southern 
Manifesto’ of 1956, and his landmark 1957 filibuster, and the more progressive 
era referred to as the ‘Second Reconstruction’ is illustrated by Hollings’s farewell 
address as Governor in 1963, in which he called for the ‘dignified’ integration of 
Clemson University.73 While all three claimed during their gubernatorial and 
senatorial campaigns to oppose integration, each reflected very different levels of 
enthusiasm for, and belief in, the principle of racial segregation. Johnston 
maintained a political stance against segregation as a matter of necessity, while 
Thurmond’s aggressive opposition to integration reflected a more radical stance 
on the race issue which, although quite consistent with the careers of earlier 
‘demagogic’ South Carolinian figures, did alienate some of Thurmond’s Southern 
colleagues.74 While Thurmond defected to the Republicans in 1964 to campaign 
for Barry Goldwater (and later Richard Nixon), both Johnston and Hollings 
remained loyal to the Democratic Party throughout their careers in the Senate 
despite misgivings regarding the party’s presidential nominees. While Johnston 
was often unimpressed by some of the more moderate positions on race adopted 
by the national party over the years, Hollings risked deep unpopularity among 
South Carolina’s voters with his enthusiastic support for John F. Kennedy’s 
successful Presidential Election campaign in 1960.75 
 A comprehensive study of South Carolinian resistance to judicial 
nominations will benefit enormously from focusing on the Senate careers of Olin 
Johnston, Strom Thurmond and Fritz Hollings. Their individual and collective 
influence on the nomination of Supreme Court Justices will contribute to the 
existing literature on the Supreme Court and provide further insight into the study 
of race and Southern politics. 
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The Supreme Court Nomination Process 
 
American Presidents have been selecting individuals to serve on the Supreme 
Court – the most powerful judicial body in the United States – since 1789. The 
factors behind the selection of nominees have varied enormously. Some 
nominees have been chosen due to a personal friendship with the President; 
others through general agreement on the nominee’s suitability for the position; 
others through recommendations from individuals considered important enough 
for Presidents to listen to. Some nominees have been selected by Presidents with 
specific ideological objectives in mind, believing that these objectives can be met 
through the force of Supreme Court decision-making. Some selections have been 
made because a President has taken time to gather together different 
perspectives before making an informed decision, while others have been made 
as a result of a President’s stubborn refusal to listen to others. It is quite common 
for a President’s relationship with the other branches of government to determine 
a selection: there are many examples of a nominee being chosen because a 
President was particularly deferential to, or antagonistic towards, the Congress, or 
to the Supreme Court itself.76 
While all of these factors may influence the manner in which Presidents 
select candidates, none is sufficient to explain fully the process of how an 
individual is nominated and confirmed by the Senate, as there are an infinite 
number of external factors which have applied to the process since 1789. The one 
consistent feature of a President’s choice of nominee, regardless of all other 
factors, is the need to have the nominee confirmed by the United States Senate.77 
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Under the terms of Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the 
President of the United States has the power to nominate, and ‘by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate’, to appoint Justices of the Supreme Court.78 The 
existing literature places a great deal of emphasis on presidential selection, yet 
offers no consistent explanation regarding who holds the real power in this 
process. A Senate rejection of a nominee or a withdrawal of a nominee’s name 
from consideration are both seen as political defeats for a president, and when a 
vacancy remains unfilled for an extended period of time, leading to a backlog of 
deadlocked Supreme Court decisions, the political embarrassment for a President 
is only exacerbated. 
Furthermore, a successful confirmation is not always a guarantee of 
presidential success: many nominees have failed to live up to the expectations of 
the Presidents who nominated them, and there are some famous examples of 
Presidents who later regretted their selections, including Harry S. Truman’s 1949 
nomination of Tom C. Clark; Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1953 nomination of Earl 
Warren and also his 1956 nomination of William Brennan, and George H.W. 
Bush’s 1990 nomination of David Souter.79 On the other hand, it has been noted 
that it takes an enormous amount of time and effort, not to mention some highly 
complicated considerations of a multitude of competing interests, for Senators to 
unite in opposition to a president’s nominee.80 Presidents tend to have a plethora 
of administrative tools and a large team of dependable staff to push a nomination, 
but an individual Senator, carrying the burden of proof, will not succeed in 
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winning support from other Senators for the rejection of a nominee without 
superior powers of persuasion and strong emotional issues to pursue.81 
With these themes in mind – and given the importance of research 
objective (3) in rejecting the study of nominations as ‘one-off’ events – the thesis 
will avoid the tendency of the current literature to focus on presidential selection, 
and will instead highlight the responses of Senators from one particular state. The 
remarkable lack of Senate rejections during the lengthy period of 1895-1967 does 
not indicate a nomination process free from controversy. Rather, it invites a closer 
inspection of the intricacies of all aspects of the process which have been 
neglected in the existing research, namely, the relationships between Southern 
Senators on the Judiciary Committee; the relationships of these Senators with 
their constituents; the question of how the ‘Southern’ agenda with regard to the 
selection of Supreme Court Justices ultimately influenced judicial politics, and the 
question of how the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions relating to the race issue 
may have held particular significance for the state of South Carolina. The struggle 
of South Carolina’s Senators to influence the nomination process for Supreme 
Court Justices remains an important yet overlooked chapter in the determination 
of Southern Senators to impose their regional agenda on a national scale. South 
Carolina’s role in that story only emphasises the relevance of state, as opposed to 
‘regional’, traditions during the most tumultuous period of social and political 
transformation in twentieth century US race relations. 
 
 
Primary Research 
 
The research for the thesis was undertaken at a variety of archive collections in 
the United States. In South Carolina, research was carried out at Clemson 
University, where the Strom Thurmond and Edgar A. Brown Collections were 
consulted, and also at the University of South Carolina, in Columbia, where the 
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collections of Olin D. Johnston, Ernest F. Hollings and Robert E. McNair – located 
in the South Carolina Political Collections – were examined. In Athens, Georgia, 
research at the Richard B. Russell Library at the University of Georgia involved 
research in the Richard B. Russell and Herman Talmadge Collections. At the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, the papers of 
Attorney General William P. Rogers were examined, while in Washington, DC, the 
research benefitted from an examination of the Herbert Hoover National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) records at the 
Library of Congress. 
The purpose of concentrating the research within these archives was to 
achieve three essential goals. Firstly, these research materials have assisted in 
providing insight into the complex political relationships between the three 
Senators, and also the relationships they would build with their constituents and 
with the Democratic Party as a whole. This aspect of the research has been 
essential in analysing the behaviour of these Senators with regard to the Supreme 
Court nomination process, particularly in relation to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Secondly, the materials have enabled the contextualisation of the 
thesis within the literature relating to ‘massive resistance’ of civil rights, and 
therefore help make a lasting contribution to the existing research on race 
relations in the twentieth century American South. Thirdly, these materials have 
enabled a contribution of new perspectives to the existing studies of the Supreme 
Court nomination process by taking the emphasis away from presidential 
selection and focusing instead on the neglected theme of how Senators shaped 
the process through complicated relationships, seniority in the US Senate, and 
political agendas with regard to the race issue. 
The research has benefitted enormously from the contributions of 
Congressman James Clyburn, Assistant Democratic Leader in the US House of 
Representatives; Jaime Harrison, Chair of the South Carolina Democratic Party; 
former Congresswoman Elizabeth J. Patterson, daughter of Olin Johnston, and 
former Congressman John Spratt, all of whom very kindly agreed to be 
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interviewed. I also received some helpful written correspondence from former 
Democratic Senator David Gambrell of Georgia, and former Republican Senator 
Bill Brock of Tennessee. It must be noted with regret that I was unable, despite my 
best efforts, to secure an interview with Senator Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings. Not having 
had any direct contact with Senator Hollings, the specific reason for my failure 
remains somewhat shrouded in mystery despite six months of email 
correspondence with his personal assistant and a written submission of questions 
to be asked in the interview. 
A comprehensive analysis of secondary sources of research utilised for the 
thesis is provided in the following chapter, after which the story of South 
Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court is introduced in Chapter Two. That chapter 
assesses the impact of the Brown decision in triggering the escalation of South 
Carolina’s war on the Court, with Olin Johnston using his positon on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to scrutinise and obstruct the judicial nominations of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower – particularly that of Simon Sobeloff to the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals – and Strom Thurmond achieving a ground-
breaking write-in election victory through his frequent condemnation of the 
unrestricted power of the nine Justices. In Chapters Three and Four, the 
significance of civil rights hero Thurgood Marshall to the story of South Carolina 
and the Supreme Court is examined in depth. Chapter Three outlines Johnston’s 
determination to obstruct John F. Kennedy’s appointment of Marshall to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while Chapter Four analyses Thurmond’s very 
public attempt (following his defection to the Republican Party) to humiliate 
Marshall during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings. The careful position 
adopted by the newly-elected Fritz Hollings with regard to the Marshall Supreme 
Court nomination is covered in depth, and the Hollings enigma is explored further 
in Chapter Five, the focus of which is Thurmond’s explosive, and successful, 
crusade to prevent the promotion of Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justiceship.  
Chapter Six analyses the South Carolinian shift from a 
defensive/obstructionist agenda in the Supreme Court nomination process to a 
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more pro-active position, with Hollings taking the lead in promoting Richard 
Nixon’s nomination of South Carolinian Judge Clement Haynsworth. Chapter 
Seven considers the integration of a mellowed Thurmond into the Republican 
Party establishment while Hollings maintained South Carolina’s defiant 
conservative streak in his complex support for several Republican Supreme Court 
nominees. The final chapter provides some concluding remarks on the story of 
South Carolina’s war on the Court in the context of a Southern secessionist 
tendency, focusing largely on the rapid development of the state’s two-party 
system. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
South Carolina and the Supreme Court in the Existing Literature 
 
 
 
There is a real spark of independence that ignites men once they become 
immune from all political pressures. As Justices, they sit as neither 
conservative nor liberal, but as intelligent human beings doing their utmost 
within their God-given capacities to search for and uphold the truth.1 
 
Barry Goldwater, 1972 
 
 
Having outlined the rationale for research in the previous chapter, the thesis will 
now provide a thorough examination of the secondary literature as it applies to 
the racial politics of South Carolina, and the nomination of Supreme Court 
Justices. In the process, an overview of each body of literature shall be given, with 
the key texts highlighted and explained, prior to a conclusion being offered to 
contextualise the thesis within the existing research. It should be pointed out that 
one of the defining features of the thesis is the manner in which two separate 
bodies of literature have been combined. Despite the considerable number of 
studies focusing on the politics of South Carolina, and an equally bulging literature 
on the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, there has not yet emerged a single 
study which analyses the role of South Carolina’s politicians in the nomination 
process. This combination of the two literatures is reflected in research objective 
(4), through which the thesis brings together the Supreme Court nomination 
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process with the study of Southern political history, which have rarely, if ever, 
been studied together. 
 The review has been organised into four sections. In the first section, the 
existing literature on the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices will be 
assessed. The second section analyses the current literature as it relates to the 
history and racial politics of the state of South Carolina, while the third section 
explores the many existing biographies of Presidents, Senators and Justices as 
they relate to the themes of the thesis. The final section of the review highlights 
two sources in particular that have informed and inspired this work. 
 
 
The Supreme Court Nomination Process Literature 
 
Within the enormous literature relating to the Supreme Court nomination 
process, scholars have attempted to understand better the manner in which the 
relationship between the Presidency, the Senate and the Supreme Court – and 
also the influence of the media and interest groups – has determined the 
outcome of appointments to the nation’s highest court. Much of the literature has 
been written in response to the rare yet highly explosive Senate rejections of 
nominees, offering new perspectives on the supposed ‘politicisation’ of the 
selection and confirmation process. Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of the literature 
consists of studies that focus on only one particularly explosive nomination. 
 The usefulness of studies that seek to analyse the nominations process has 
been limited somewhat by three patterns within the existing literature. The first is 
the manner in which many of the best-known studies tend to prioritise methods 
of presidential selection rather than the regional political interests that have 
influenced Senators. Abraham (1999) remains the ultimate guide to the Supreme 
Court nomination process, but the author’s approach of providing a brief account 
of every nomination in chronological order renders the work a reliable reference 
point for Supreme Court scholars, rather than a guide to senatorial behaviour over 
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a lengthy period of time.2 The fact that the book was originally published in 1974 
as Justices and Presidents, and re-printed in 1999 as Justices, Presidents and 
Senators (as though the Senators as individuals were something of an 
afterthought) is perhaps instructive. Other studies, such as Yalof (1999) and 
Nemacheck (2008), provide greater depth over a shorter period while utilising a 
similar approach to that of Abraham, and others, such as Greenburg (2007), have 
applied the focus on Presidents and Justices to explain how recent compositions 
of the Court have been formed.3 Yalof’s work outlines in detail the methods of 
selection employed by each President, and his comments on Eisenhower’s choices 
have informed some of the material in this thesis. Studies such as Johnson and 
Roberts (2004) have analysed the President’s role in the process in greater depth, 
while Perry (1991) has provided a general overview, without studying in depth the 
manner in which race, religion and gender intersect with one another, or the 
complex influence of regional politics on the role of Senators with regard to each 
of these issues.4 
 For scholars seeking to re-evaluate Dwight D. Eisenhower’s record on civil 
rights, it was inevitable that attention would turn to Eisenhower’s Supreme Court 
appointments. Studies such as Kahn (1992), Wermiel (1994) and Nichols (2004) 
have proved useful for the research, but, as with so many of the other studies 
considered in this review, the focus of the writer tends to be on the President’s 
role in the process, rather than that of the Senators.5 While Nichols offers a full 
and frank discussion of Eisenhower’s civil rights record generally, the work of Kahn 
and Wermiel is focused specifically on Eisenhower’s intentions in naming Justices 
to the Court, with challenges made to two of Eisenhower’s (possibly apocryphal) 
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comments, one referring to his nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice in 1953 
as ‘the biggest damnfool mistake’ he ever made, and another claiming that his 
two biggest mistakes as President were ‘on the Supreme Court’ – a reference to 
Warren and also Justice William J. Brennan. These studies offer some insight into 
the tensions that would build during the 1950s, when South Carolina’s Senators 
openly opposed Eisenhower’s nominations because they feared precisely what 
Kahn and Nichols have claimed, namely, that Eisenhower was appointing Supreme 
Court Justices who would uphold the constitutionality of the Brown v. Board of 
Education decision. 
The second pattern that can be identified within the nominations 
literature is the tendency of some scholars to encourage a perception of Senators 
as ‘deferential’ to presidential nominations of Supreme Court justices prior to the 
late 1960s. It is largely the work produced in the 1970s and early 1980s that has 
established this trend, with examples including Kutner (1974), Songer (1979), 
Sulfridge (1980) and especially Friedman (1983).6 While Friedman has attempted 
to argue that the ‘deferential’ attitude of Senators toward each President was 
established at the turn of the century, the other three articles discuss the 
existence of a ‘presumption of confirmation’ within the nomination process. The 
claim of Sulfridge that such a presumption exists is undermined somewhat by his 
vague reference to ‘the apparent attitude of the Senate’; his observation that ‘the 
concession of presidential prerogative appears to exist’, and his conclusion that 
‘ideology ... appears to play a significant role’ in the process.7 Similarly, Kutner has 
argued that a ‘presumption’ of confirmation for Supreme Court nominees was in 
place prior to 1968, but the research lacks a coherent or convincing argument to 
explain how and why this existed, and how and why it eventually broke down. 
Scholars within this category have not considered the possibility that, even if a 
presumption of confirmation did exist, the threat of a Senate rejection – or, at the 
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very least, the insistence of thorough scrutiny by interested Senators – was 
present throughout most of the twentieth century. 
One reason for the re-occurrence of the ‘presumption of confirmation’ 
theory is the frequent references to the lengthy period of 1895-1967, during 
which only one Supreme Court nominee – John J. Parker of North Carolina – was 
rejected by the Senate, while the period beginning in 1968, which saw the 
dramatic failure of Abe Fortas’s nomination to the Chief Justiceship, has seen 
several rejections, withdrawals and fierce confirmation battles. The lack of Senate 
rejections during the period 1895-1967 would appear on first impression to 
support the theory of presidential nominees being approved time and time again 
by ‘deferential’ Senators, but, on the other hand, the statistics can facilitate only a 
simplistic understanding of the complex process of selecting and confirming an 
individual for a seat on the Supreme Court. The fact that the confirmation of 
nominees went virtually uninterrupted over several decades does not take 
account of the true nature of opposition to any nominee throughout that period, 
and the lengthy list of confirmations offers no information concerning party 
control in the Senate, contemporary policy issues, Senate Judiciary Committee 
personnel, or party fragmentation. Furthermore, the statistics provide no insight 
into how the Justices have timed their retirements, and no information to provide 
a true picture of how each nominee’s ethnicity, religion, ideology, or geographical 
location may have influenced the political conflict over each nomination. The 
simple fact that Charles Evans Hughes, Louis Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, William 
Rehnquist and Clarence Thomas were not rejected by the Senate when nominated 
to the Supreme Court tells the political historian nothing whatsoever about the 
controversial confirmation hearings resulting from each man’s selection. 
Given the limitations of the mathematical/statistical studies of the 
Supreme Court nomination process, articles such as Segal and Cover (1989) have 
had only limited use for this thesis, as have studies in which scholars have taken 
quantitative research on the Supreme Court nomination process into the realms 
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of scatter diagrams and mathematical equations.8 Aside from providing little use 
for the casual reader, it is difficult to see how studies such as these can achieve 
anything other than concealing the character of political agendas and also the 
complexities inherent within the many conflicts which have taken place over 
nominations. Predictably, it became necessary to prioritise qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, sources when undertaking research for this thesis. The 
mathematical/statistical approach remains at odds with this research, given the 
overwhelming ‘Southern flavour’ of the characters and events involved, and the 
need to consider the myth of ‘Southern exceptionalism’ in addition to the 
unpredictable voting patterns of Southern Senators during the period under 
study. One exception in this sub-category has been provided by Garrett and 
Rutkus (2009), who have offered a concise and detailed record of all relevant 
statistics relating to a lengthy period of Supreme Court nominations. Although not 
an analytical study, this work has proved invaluable in ensuring accuracy in all 
statistics relating to the relevant dates and roll call votes with regard to each 
nomination.9 
Some scholars have been sceptical of the ‘deferential Senators’ theory, not 
least Laurence Tribe, who, in Chapter Five (‘The Myth of the Spineless Senate’) of 
his book God Save This Honorable Court, argues convincingly that there is ample 
evidence of Senators applying rigorous scrutiny when considering nominations to 
the Supreme Court during the period 1895-1967.10 Tribe’s argument that ‘the 
Senate has vigorously exercised its power to provide “advice and consent” on 
presidents’ Court nominations since the time the very first Justices were selected’ 
is supported overwhelmingly by the research undertaken into the behaviour of 
South Carolina’s Senators covered in this thesis.11 Tribe might have added that 
there is also ample evidence of Presidents spending many hours considering their 
nominations and discussing them with advisors, and also, as this research will 
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illustrate, evidence to show that Senators were taking seriously the overwhelming 
power of the Supreme Court as a political institution long before 1968. For 
example, Danelski’s (1964) lengthy analysis of President Warren G. Harding’s 
nomination of Pierce Butler in 1922 gives an indication of the hours spent by 
William Howard Taft (as President and, later, as Chief Justice) in selecting 
nominees for the Supreme Court.12 In addition to detailing Taft’s meticulous 
approach to ensuring the safe passage of his nominees through the Senate, 
Danelski offers a comment from Taft on his nomination of Joseph R. Lamar in 
1910, which hints at the notion of Southern exceptionalism in the nomination 
process: ‘I only succeeded in securing a man such as I wanted in the South by 
going down South and staying there for several vacations. This enabled me to 
know him.’13 Kutner (1974), despite his references to ‘a slight presumption in 
favour of confirmation’ in the politics of judicial nominations, concedes that the 
presumption ‘reduces’ in the case of Supreme Court selections, and points out 
that, prior to Clement Haynsworth, no nominee ‘has ever met with a stronger or 
more determined opposition to his appointment’ than Louis Brandeis, who, in 
1916, was ultimately confirmed.14 
Thirdly, scholars of Supreme Court nominations have not yet devoted an 
entire study to the Southern influence on the process. With a plethora of studies 
focusing on ‘massive resistance’ and an equally colossal literature analysing the 
Supreme Court nomination process, it seems surprising that no scholar has 
offered a logical combination of the two fields of study, particularly given the 
overwhelming significance of the Brown decision with regard to the consistent 
Southern influence on the Senate Judiciary Committee from the mid-1950s until 
the early 1970s. Many scholars have considered the Southern influence as part of 
their overall analysis, including the aforementioned Abraham (1999) and 
Comiskey (2004), and also Powe (1975-6) and Thorpe (1969), but no study has yet 
provided a comprehensive analysis of the Southern attempt to influence the 
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Supreme Court nomination process, and no scholar appears to have identified the 
significance of South Carolina in that process during the era of civil rights.15 
Thorpe (1969) has analysed, in a case-by-case approach, the behaviour of 
Senators and nominees during the process of confirmation, and, while Strom 
Thurmond’s theatrical style of questioning is discussed, the author, given the 
purpose of his research, has not pursued the ‘South Carolina’ angle in the history 
of the process to reveal the patterns evident within the chapters of this thesis. 
Perhaps more instructive is Powe’s article, which points out the extraordinary 
nature of the ‘point of order’ proposed during the tense Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings into Potter Stewart’s Supreme Court nomination in 1959.16 
As Chapter Two will illustrate in detail, the Stewart hearings are significant for 
marking the first occasion on which Southern Senators were prepared to discuss 
the Court’s Brown decision openly and at length during confirmation hearings. 
 Much of the Supreme Court nominations literature encompasses research 
completed in the aftermath of some of the landmark occasions on which the 
Senate has rejected a nominee. The controversial rejection of President Richard 
Nixon’s nomination of Clement Haynsworth in 1969 prompted increased 
academic interest in the nomination process, with Grossman and Wasby (1972) 
offering one example.17 Perhaps more notable are the studies offered by 
individuals who were actively engaged in the political process during the 
deliberations over Haynsworth’s nomination, including McConnell (1970-71), 
whose work is particularly significant given that the text of his article formed the 
basis of Senator Marlow Cook’s ‘new standards’ speech, which, as will be 
explained in Chapter Six, summarised the bitterness of Southern Senators over 
the Haynsworth rejection, attributed by some to an anti-Southern prejudice on 
the part of Northern Senators.18 To illustrate both sides of the debate over the 
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Senate’s ‘proper’ role in the nominations process, the two Senators from the state 
of Michigan published articles in Prospectus 2 (1968-69), with Republican Robert 
P. Griffin arguing for ‘The Broad Role’ and Democrat Philip A. Hart arguing for ‘The 
Discriminating Role’.19 The Griffin/Hart articles, which are also considered in 
greater depth in Chapter Six, are highly instructive for highlighting to the scholar 
of Supreme Court politics a point in history when tensions flared between 
Senators partly because of conflicting views on the most appropriate method of 
providing ‘advice and consent’ on nominations. 
A renewed surge of scholarly interest in the nomination process occurred 
following the 1987 rejection of Robert Bork, resulting in the publication, during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, of books and articles focusing on the emergence 
of an overly ‘political’ confirmation process, with some studies considering 
suggestions for reform. Examples include Freund (1988), Carter (1988), Monaghan 
(1988), Felice and Weisberg (1988-9), Gauch (1989) and Massaro (1990).20 More 
studies followed in the wake of Clarence Thomas’s explosive confirmation 
hearings in 1991, among them Reynolds (1991-2), Melone (1991-2), Ruckman 
(1993), Silverstein (1994), Maltese (1998) and Pickering (2005).21 Many of these 
studies have focused on the importance of ‘ideology’ in the nomination process, 
yet the manner in which ‘ideology’ is defined is often questionable. For example, 
Felice and Weisberg (1988-9) have highlighted the relevance of ‘region’ as an 
indicator of Senatorial behaviour in the process, but claim that ‘regional 
differences’ as they apply to the South ‘are expected to be a function of 
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ideology.’22 As much of the Southern literature, covered in the paragraphs below, 
suggests, the complexities of Southern politics have accommodated a very diverse 
range of ideologies within a multitude of factions, throughout many variations on 
one-party, two-party and ‘no-party’ systems.23 Olin Johnston’s career provides a 
useful example: despite maintaining a predictable conservative stand on matters 
of segregation, Johnston’s support for organised labour regularly put him at odds 
with his business-friendly Southern colleagues in the Senate, including fellow 
South Carolinian Strom Thurmond.24 For this reason alone, studies such as those 
discussed above have not proved especially helpful to the thesis, although the 
view of Felice and Weisberg (1988-9) that ‘party affiliation’ was ‘the most 
powerful predictor’ of voting during the Bork controversy is useful in illustrating 
the extent to which Southern Democrats had become far more likely to maintain 
solidarity with others in the Democratic Party by 1987 – at least when it came to 
Supreme Court nominations – than they had been only fifteen years previously.25  
Similarly, Silverstein’s (1994) arguments regarding party affiliation have 
proved to be insightful, not least his references to the ‘minnows’ and ‘whales’ 
system described in Chapter Five of this thesis. Nonetheless, his view that the 
‘politics of deference ... no longer predominates’ because of the decline of the 
‘tightly structured, leadership-controlled’ Congress would appear to overlook the 
rebellious trait of South Carolina’s Senators, which existed long before 1968 and 
was quite evident in the tensions between Strom Thurmond and Senator Majority 
Leader Lyndon Johnson in the mid-1950s.26 Silverstein’s claim that ‘in the highly-
structured world of the Senate at mid-century, few Senators would challenge the 
leadership’ would appear to highlight Thurmond’s significance once again.27 
Furthermore, the correspondence between South Carolina’s Senators and their 
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constituents – examined in great detail throughout the thesis – would contradict 
entirely the claim that ‘for the typical Senator of this era, an appointment, even to 
the Supreme Court, was rarely critical to the interests of constituents.’28 As part of 
research objective (6), through which the thesis argues that the actions of South 
Carolina’s Senators had an equally powerful effect on the intense politicisation of 
appointments to the lower courts, Chapters Three and Four will challenge 
Silverstein’s claim that Senators were unwilling or unable to contest lower court 
nominations during the era of the Eisenhower Presidency.29 
 The fact that so many studies within the Supreme Court nominations 
literature are focused on the ‘politicisation’ of the confirmation process since 
1968 suggests an on-going fascination among scholars with some of the more 
dramatic events, many of which have defined the process in more recent years. 
While even some of the scholars mentioned above, such as Melone (1991-2), have 
argued that the practice of Senators considering their vote on the basis of a 
nominee’s ideology ‘did not start with Robert Bork, as has been argued’, it 
remains the case that a large number of Supreme Court scholars have been 
attracted to some of the more recent phenomena in the nominations process, 
including the growing importance of the abortion issue; the increasingly complex 
influence of interest group involvement; the emergence of Supreme Court 
nominations as a public spectacle resulting in huge media coverage, and the 
greater likelihood of Senators supporting or opposing confirmations through 
maintaining, rather than defying, party solidarity.30 The Southern influence has 
certainly been referred to on many occasions, but links have rarely been made 
between the behaviour of Southern Senators in the nominations process and the 
complex regional political interests which each of them had to contend with. Also, 
given the emphasis on the nomination process since 1987, this literature has 
informed the study of Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings’s role in the process, as covered in 
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Chapter Seven, but offers little when studying the nomination process prior to 
1968. 
 Given the scholarly preference for the more controversial nominations, 
particularly those which resulted in a rare Senate rejection, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many studies have considered in depth the Haynsworth and 
Bork nominations. With Bronner (1989) providing the most comprehensive study 
of the Bork nomination, the Haynsworth controversy has been examined in depth 
by Beiser (1969-70), Frank (1991), and the aforementioned McConnell (1970-1).31 
The fascination with Senate rejections has not been limited to the post-1968 
period, however, with several books and articles focusing on the one Supreme 
Court nominee rejected during the period of supposed ‘deference’, 1895-1967. 
The John J. Parker rejection of 1930 has been studied by Watson (1963), 
Mendelsohn (1968), Lisio (1985), Goings (1990) and Kluger (2004-5).32 One 
particularly excellent study which makes a direct comparison between the Parker 
and Haynsworth nominations is Grossman and Wasby (1971), in which the 
comment regarding ‘the relationship of a nomination to the one that proceeded 
it’ proves useful not only for challenging the approach of most scholars in 
analysing nominations on a ‘stand-alone’ basis, but also because this observation 
is directly relevant to the relationship between the Abe Fortas rejection of 1968, 
covered in Chapter Five, and the Clement Haynsworth rejection of 1969, covered 
in Chapter Six.33 
Some studies, such as Massaro (1990) and Johnson and Roberts (2004), 
consider the manner in which Presidents have ‘gone public’ in an attempt to rally 
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support for a nomination when there appears to be resistance within Congress. 
But, once again, the focus tends to be on the period from 1968 to the present day. 
Little attention has been paid to the fact that Olin Johnston’s opposition to the 
Court of Appeals nominations of Simon Sobeloff and Thurgood Marshall prompted 
both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to criticise the attempted 
obstruction and also defend their nominees at press conferences. 
Other studies which highlight key events in the history of the nomination 
process include Fish (1988), whose analysis of the behaviour of President Herbert 
Hoover in his reaction to the Senate’s rejection of John J. Parker is directly 
comparable to Richard Nixon’s far more ‘spiteful’ nomination of G. Harrold 
Carswell following the Senate’s rejection of Clement Haynsworth, and therefore 
provides some welcome historical context.34 Dean (2001) has provided a unique 
example of a study of one individual who was confirmed twice – once for the 
position of Associate Justice, and once for the position of Chief Justice – and has 
proved useful for the attention given to William Rehnquist in this work.35 
Nevertheless, the studies which focus on only one nomination, or only one 
individual, are of limited use to a scholar wishing to assess the evolution of 
Senatorial behaviour throughout a long period of time, meaning that most of 
them, as with the case-by-case approach of Abraham (1999), only re-enforce the 
perception of each Supreme Court nomination as a ‘one-off’ event. As explained 
in the previous chapter, the thesis, through research objective (3), will avoid 
studying Supreme Court nominations as ‘one-off’ events and instead offer a more 
accurate perspective of the selection process, partly through focusing on the long-
term consistency of South Carolina’s Senators in pursuing their complex political 
agendas. 
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The South Carolina Racial Politics Literature 
 
There exists a wealth of literature on South Carolina’s racial politics, most of which 
falls into three basic categories: firstly, the state’s civil rights protest movement; 
secondly, the behaviour and activities of the state’s Democratic Party politicians 
and, thirdly, the study of ‘massive resistance’ to the threat of racial integration. 
Inevitably, there is a significant overlap between the categories. Within the first 
category, the state’s civil rights protest movement has been analysed and 
discussed in depth, particularly by Lau (2006).36 James L. Felder (2012), a former 
activist in the South Carolina National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), has analysed the state’s civil rights movement region-by-
region.37 Other studies focus on more specific areas of protest, such as Hine 
(1996), while Grose (2006) has built on these studies by offering a comprehensive 
guide to the long-overlooked Orangeburg Massacre, and the much-criticised role 
of Governor Robert E. McNair in presiding over the crisis.38 Given that all of these 
studies are concerned primarily with social movements, their use has been limited 
with regard to the thesis, other than offering valuable contextual information 
relating to the impact of various Supreme Court decisions, without considering 
the process for appointing the Justices. 
 Moore and Burton (2008) have put together an invaluable collection of 
paper presentations and Q&A sessions which took place at a landmark civil rights 
conference held at the Citadel in Charleston on 5th-8th March 2003. The essays 
within this volume have been successful in detailing many of the overlooked 
elements of South Carolina’s civil rights history, particularly Farmer’s article on the 
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state’s defiance of the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright decision, and the study 
of the landmark Briggs v. Elliott case offered by Burton, Burton and Appleford.39 
As a comprehensive guide to the civil rights history of South Carolina, this volume 
is probably the most effective offering within this category of the literature. Most 
importantly, it brings together the key themes of the existing scholarship relating 
to South Carolina’s racial politics in the twentieth century, namely, the state’s 
history of lynching (particularly the Willie Earle case); the rise of ‘massive 
resistance’ and the white Citizens’ Councils; black activism and protest; the 
legacies of the state’s important Governors, and the story of desegregation in the 
state’s educational institutions, notably Clemson University. This suggests an 
exciting possibility that the thesis offers a new theme in the scholarship, in the 
sense that none of the studies within this volume appear to address the behaviour 
of South Carolina’s Senators in the Senate itself, and, while Farmer notes the 
influence of the state’s political culture on the defiant behaviour of South 
Carolina’s leaders, the attitude of those leaders toward the Supreme Court has 
not been analysed in depth.40 
Badger (2007) has offered a detailed overview of the state’s adjustment to 
racial integration during the 1960s and early 1970s.41 Originally presented by the 
author at the aforementioned Citadel conference, while sharing the stage with 
former Governors Fritz Hollings and John C. West, the article provides a useful 
example of the manner in which the state has been neglected in the existing 
literature. Declaring at the outset that ‘I am not a historian of South Carolina’, 
Badger proceeds to compare what he refers to as the ‘self-exculpatory’ model of 
1950s resistance to integration (in which everyone except the state’s politicians 
are blamed for ‘massive resistance’) and the ‘self-congratulatory’ model (in which 
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the state’s responsible leaders take the credit for overseeing South Carolina’s 
acceptance of integration during the 1960s).42  
Although Badger remains one of the more distinguished scholars of 
Southern political history – and ‘From Defiance’ has proved to be very useful for 
the thesis – his published output suggests that South Carolina is not one of the 
author’s passions. In ‘Whatever Happened to Roosevelt’s New Generation of 
Southerners?’, he looks at the emergence of a new wave of Southern Senators 
during the 1930s, who were allied with Franklin Roosevelt and supportive of early 
New Deal measures, but who ultimately pursued a conservative line on the race 
issue in the Senate. One of Roosevelt’s closest Southern allies, throughout the 
New Deal and beyond, was South Carolina’s James F. Byrnes, but Byrnes is not 
mentioned in the article, despite being discussed at length in ‘From Defiance’. 
Furthermore, there is no mention in the ‘New Generation of Southerners’ chapter 
of Olin Johnston, even though Badger mentions Roosevelt’s attempted ‘purge’ of 
conservative southerners in 1938, a ploy which involved the President’s backing of 
Johnston to replace Senator ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith.43 Naturally, in ‘Southerners Who 
Refused to Sign the Southern Manifesto’, Badger is more concerned with the few 
Southern politicians who qualified for the label offered in the title, rather than the 
murky world of the many others who did sign the manifesto but with great 
reluctance – a fate which might have applied to Senators and Congressmen from 
South Carolina.44 
The transition of South Carolina into an acceptance of desegregation, as 
symbolised by Harvey Gantt’s enrolment at Clemson University, is a much-
discussed topic within the literature, as demonstrated by McMillan (1973), and, 
more recently, Mickey (2015).45 Most of these works, and some others, including 
Black (1976), focus on Governors, rather than Senators, thus allowing useful 
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contextual knowledge but ultimately rendering them little use in a study of 
Southern senatorial behaviour in the nomination process for Supreme Court 
Justices.46 While Mickey (2015) considers the breakdown of ‘authoritarian 
enclaves’ within three Deep South states throughout a time period which 
coincides neatly with that adopted for the thesis (devoting several large sections 
to the state of South Carolina), the work is concerned primarily with competing 
political factions, rather than the relationship between one state and one 
particular political institution at the federal level. It does, on the other hand, 
provide an excellent analysis of the political enclave that controlled South Carolina 
during this period, allowing opportunities for reflection on the influence of the 
state’s political culture and dominant ideology, which build usefully on Simon’s 
(2000) analysis of South Carolina’s system of malapportioned representation in 
the General Assembly. 
The significance of Republican Party growth in South Carolina during the 
1960s has been covered admirably in two excellent articles from Hathorn (1988) 
and Merritt (1997).47 Despite the fact that neither study focuses on the Supreme 
Court nomination process, both articles have provided invaluable contextual 
information in the assessment of Olin Johnston’s behaviour in the nomination of 
Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and also the 
significance of Strom Thurmond’s defection to the Republican Party during a 
period in which moderate Democratic Governors were steering South Carolina 
through a complex process of desegregation. Hathorn’s observation that 
‘[Congressman Albert] Watson’s defeat seemed to convince Southern candidates 
after 1970 that they could not realistically challenge or undermine the nation’s 
acceptance and growing commitment to civil rights’ provides a useful historical 
signpost for the thesis, marking a period in which the Southern conservative 
forces on the Senate Judiciary Committee – motivated for years by fury at the 
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Brown decision – were finally beginning to decline.48 Although not dealing with 
the nomination process, Frederickson (1997) has highlighted the manner in which 
South Carolina’s brutal regime of segregation proved significant enough to 
influence President Harry S. Truman’s decision to set up the Committee on Civil 
Rights.49 
Despite the best efforts of this writer to avoid the predictable habit of 
most Southern political scholars in eulogising V.O. Key’s seminal Southern Politics 
in State and Nation (1949), it must be acknowledged that Key’s chapter on South 
Carolina remains, after a staggering sixty-six years, by far the most useful and 
readable guide to the state’s political tradition.50 Key’s account of Olin Johnston’s 
defiance of the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright decision in 1944, located in a 
later chapter in the same book, has also proved remarkably useful to this thesis. It 
is instructive that no subsequent scholar has succeeded in improving upon Key’s 
work with regard to the political history of this particular state. His view, outlined 
in his chapter on South Carolina, that ‘the race problem in exaggerated form adds 
a weapon that can be used at times to destroy all semblance of a rational politics’ 
might have made for an equally inspiring opening quote for this chapter.51 
Frank E. Jordan’s well-regarded study, The Primary State: A History of the 
Democratic Party in South Carolina, 1896-1962 offers a punctilious account of 
South Carolina’s Democratic primary elections, and has been extremely valuable 
in providing the necessary dates, figures and other information for accurate 
reporting of all relevant contests throughout the period under study. The book is 
difficult to find, and I am indebted to Jaime Harrison, the Chairman of the South 
Carolina Democratic Party, for lending me his battered but perfectly readable 
copy. Historical perspective on South Carolina’s racial politics has been facilitated 
by the legendary W.J. Cash, whose mammoth 1941 study, The Mind of the South, 
remains essential reading for Southern historians, while further insight into the 
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era of Governors Benjamin Tillman and Coleman L. Blease has been offered by 
more recent studies, notably, Simkins (1964) and Simon (1996).52 Although 
Edgar’s (1998) treatment of the civil rights era is no more thorough than the study 
offered by Bass and Poole (2007), his enormous and brilliant account of the 
complete history of South Carolina prior to Brown has allowed much insight into 
the significance of the ‘peculiar institution’ of slavery – particularly with regard to 
the unique influence of the slave system used in Barbados, which was exported to 
South Carolina – and also the incredible legacy of the Nullification Crisis of the 
1830s, which, as will be argued in the thesis, has informed to some extent the 
course of events in the story of South Carolina and the Supreme Court.53 
Other, more philosophical studies, notably, Rogers (2000), offer reflections 
on the psychology of South Carolinians, which may have informed the overall 
analysis of the state’s racial politics.54 Some studies have been helpful in 
considering South Carolina’s political history and tradition: the aforementioned 
Mickey (2015) has suggested that the state’s deeply conservative political culture 
created a hugely successful slave economy, giving South Carolina a degree of 
wealth which ‘amplified South Carolina’s voice in national politics ... and later 
developed the doctrine of nullification.’55 This analysis has provided a generous 
measure of context for some of the sensational episodes of rebellion in the state’s 
history that would occur during the twentieth century. 
 A variety of studies, including Wilhoit (1973), and, more recently, Bartley 
(1999), Webb (2005) and Lewis (2006), have analysed the phenomenon of white 
resistance movements.56 Each of these studies focuses on the activities of 
conservative organisations such as the white Citizens’ Councils and the Ku Klux 
Klan and each tends to focus on community organisation, public protests and 
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political violence. Despite the voluminous literature on this topic, few if any of 
these scholars appear to have made the suggestion that the war of Southern 
Senators on the Supreme Court ought to be considered an integral part of the 
‘massive resistance’ concept. Despite the limited use of these studies to this 
particular thesis, the current batch of available research on ‘massive resistance’ 
does provide a useful indication of the gap in the existing literature regarding the 
behaviour of Southern Senators with regard to Supreme Court appointments 
following the announcement of the Brown decision. 
The absence of the nomination process in the existing ‘massive resistance’ 
literature is perhaps explained by the fact that the writers have emphasised the 
relevance of protests and confrontations rather than the less thrilling but equally 
significant institutional procedures of the US Senate. Another explanation for the 
limited use of this category of literature is the fact that the transformation of 
South Carolina’s racial politics during the period under study does not conform 
strictly to the massive resistance narrative present in the histories of other 
Southern states: Congressman James Clyburn has argued that massive resistance 
did not take place in South Carolina, while Robert Mickey has argued persuasively 
that the state’s acceptance of peaceful integration was ‘harnessed’ by the careful 
political co-ordination of influential South Carolinian politicians, notably, Fritz 
Hollings.57 While the nature of South Carolina’s ‘massive resistance’ may be 
contested, the thesis will argue, through research objective (1), that the state has 
played the most important (yet overlooked) role in the development of Supreme 
Court nomination hearings into political, and confrontational, public events. 
 Of the many studies that examine the Brown decision itself, and the 
political consequences for the nation, Patterson (2002) remains perhaps the most 
comprehensive of the relatively recent studies.58 A Southern legal perspective is 
provided by at least two rather unique works, namely, Peltason (1971) and 
Wilkinson (1979), which have allowed some insight into the influence of Judges 
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from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which included the state of South 
Carolina.59 Other studies, such as Klarman (2004), mentioned in the previous 
chapter, appear to highlight the significance of Dwight Eisenhower’s appointment 
of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, yet, notably, the significance of the selection and 
confirmation process which resulted in Warren taking his seat has not been 
considered.60 
 Although much of the vast literature on the overwhelming significance of 
the Brown decision considers the controversy of an ‘activist’ Supreme Court 
making highly political decisions which struck at the heart of race relations in the 
Southern states, it does seem remarkable that so few of these studies appear to 
make the logical connection between white resistance to judicial decisions on 
school desegregation and the selection of the Justices who made such decisions. 
Klarman (2004) argues that the nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice was the 
key event which shifted the nine Justices from a 5-4 decision against 
desegregation in 1952 to a unanimous decision supporting desegregation in 1954. 
If it is truly the case that Warren’s appointment had such a dramatic impact on 
the course of American history, it is notable that Klarman spends virtually no time 
considering the politics of Warren’s appointment. While other studies comment 
on the highly controversial nature of Warren’s reputation in the South (where his 
impeachment was regularly endorsed), few studies appear to consider the 
manner in which the Warren appointment might have motivated Southern 
Senators to apply greater scrutiny to future Eisenhower nominees, despite the 
fact that the aforementioned Powe (1976) has cited the ‘point of order’ raised 
during the Potter Stewart hearings of 1959, by which time Olin Johnston was a 
senior Judiciary Committee member, as a ‘watershed’ moment in Senate hearings 
of presidential nominations to the Supreme Court.61 
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 The thesis has benefitted from studying various texts which have 
influenced countless scholars of the South, becoming ‘staples’ of the region’s 
political history, including Woodward (1974), Tindall (1975), Bartley and Graham 
(1975), Grantham (1988), Black and Black (1989), Rae (1994), Bass and DeVries 
(1995), Bartley (1996), and more recent works, including Pascoe et al (2005) and 
Cobb (2012).62 All of these studies have discussed briefly the racial politics of 
South Carolina but focus on the Southern region as a whole. Nonetheless, these 
sources have provided much in the way of contextual information: Tindall’s (1975) 
comments on ‘populism’ have contributed in no small part to an informed 
understanding of the Southern political tradition, while Rae’s (1994) comments on 
the significance of Fritz Hollings in his study of Southern Democratic political 
identity have been useful in the study of Hollings’s contribution to the history of 
Supreme Court nominations offered in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
Biographies of Senators, Presidents and Justices 
 
Given the rather obvious fact that a biography tends to focus on one particular 
subject, it was never likely that this category of the literature would prove 
especially useful in studying the Supreme Court nomination process over a 
twenty-year period. It was necessary, however, to investigate the existing 
biographical material relating to the South Carolina Senators, if only to establish 
the political context within which each of them attempted to influence Supreme 
Court nominations.  
Of the three Senators under study in this thesis, only Strom Thurmond has 
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been the subject of high-quality political biographies. Cohodas (1995) and 
Crespino (2012) have provided excellent studies which analyse Thurmond’s highly 
significant role in Southern politics, and his enormous contribution to the modern 
US conservative movement.63 Although less impressive as a political biography, 
Bass and Thompson (2005) have offered one of the most thorough examinations 
of the life of Thurmond’s mixed-race daughter, Essie Mae Washington-Williams, 
whose existence remained secret until after the Senator’s death.64 The use of the 
Crespino biography in providing a fresh, modern perspective on the Thurmond 
legend is evident in the author’s discussion of the infamous speech in which 
Thurmond declared, during his 1948 ‘Dixiecrat’ run for President, that ‘there’s not 
enough troops in the army to force the Southern people to break down 
segregation and admit the Negro race into our theatres, into our swimming pools, 
into our homes and into our churches.’ Crespino claims that Thurmond said 
neither ‘Negro’ nor ‘Nigra’, and that he did in fact use a more offensive term 
beginning with ‘n’, knowing that ‘this throng of angry white men was testing him, 
and he was determined not to fall short.’65 National newspapers substituted the 
word ‘Negro’ for what was actually said, leading biographers and historians – 
unwittingly – to produce inaccurate versions of this notorious speech. Indeed, 
both Mann (1996), who is discussed below, and Badger (2007) have used the 
‘Negro’ version. The audio recording of the speech, used in Stefan Forbes’s 
brilliant 2008 documentary, Boogie Man: The Lee Atwater Story, proves that 
Crespino is correct, and that Thurmond did in fact refer to ‘the n***** race’.66 
Crespino’s discussion of this historical oversight is notable for his valuable 
observation that ‘the better class of white folks’ avoided the term ‘n*****’ in 
order to distinguish themselves from ‘those sorrier, lower class whites whose 
hatred of blacks was understood to derive from their own insecure place in the 
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pecking order.’67 This distinction is evident in Thurmond’s personal 
correspondence, in which the term was used occasionally in letters from some of 
his constituents. 
Fritz Hollings has, with Kirk Victor, produced his memoirs in the form of 
Making Government Work (2008), which has preserved his career as he wishes it 
to be remembered.68 As a former segregationist politician who was able to carve 
out a moderate path during the South’s acceptance of desegregation, Hollings has 
been selective in telling the story of his political life, and devoted much of this 
work to his arguments regarding the effectiveness of the Federal Government, 
particularly on the issue of fiscal responsibility. Despite this focus, Hollings’s 
memoir does offer insight into his views on the Supreme Court, with an entire 
chapter devoted to the Clement Haynsworth rejection, and another chapter – 
entitled ‘The Supreme Court Corrupts Congress’ – making clear his disgust at the 
Court for striking down provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. 
In this regard, the book has been valuable to the study of Hollings offered in 
Chapter Seven, but less so in the case of his decision to oppose Thurgood 
Marshall’s Supreme Court nomination, covered in Chapter Four, and also Abe 
Fortas’s confirmation as Chief Justice, covered in Chapter Five. 
The one Olin Johnston biography in existence was published during the 
Senator’s lifetime, in 1961, and was written by his pastor, John E. Huss. With 
Senator for the South: A Biography of Olin D. Johnston, Huss has managed to 
create a remarkably dull account of the life of an otherwise fascinating Southern 
politician.69 Despite his good intentions, the pastor has undermined the quality of 
his research with the overwhelming admiration he expresses for his subject, and 
his defence of Johnston’s stand on every issue, including segregation, eventually 
becomes distracting. A typical example is Huss’s conclusion that ‘nineteen 
hundred and forty-eight was a year in which Johnston courageously maintained 
loyalty both to his principles and to his party. His opposition to President Truman 
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did not stem from personal animus but was sincerely a matter of principle.’70 
While Thurmond’s biographers have been compelled to discuss their subject’s 
confrontational approach in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices – 
particularly as it related to his views on segregation, obscenity and crime and 
punishment – none of these writers has accommodated an in-depth consideration 
of each man’s role in a long-term campaign of obstruction with regard to the 
Supreme Court. 
While the current literature on South Carolina’s politics is sorely missing 
comprehensive biographies of both Johnston and Hollings, both men have 
featured prominently in studies of the state’s textile industry, including Simon 
(1998) and Minchin (2008).71 No study has yet emerged to provide an in-depth 
account of either man’s lengthy career in the US Senate, and so research on their 
behaviour in the Supreme Court nomination process is still lacking in the existing 
literature. Arguably the finest biographical work of a South Carolinian political 
figure is Robertson’s (1994) study of James F. Byrnes, which remains essential 
reading for any scholar of South Carolina’s politics during the period under study 
in this thesis.72 Although Byrnes is not one of the three Senators being studied, his 
long-term influence on the state’s politics proved to be colossal, and, as the 
following chapters will illustrate, his presence permeates the early stages of the 
story under examination. 
Despite the overwhelming emphasis on presidential selection of Supreme 
Court nominees, rather than senatorial ‘advice and consent’, it remains the case 
that many of the presidential biographies provide little insight into the Supreme 
Court nomination process. On the other hand, scholars of the Presidency tend not 
to examine the nomination of Supreme Court Justices without an obvious 
example of a spectacular occurrence in the process of confirmation. Robert 
Dallek’s (2003; 2004) biographical works on Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
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provide typical examples: while John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, 1917-1963 
contains no reference whatsoever to Kennedy’s nominations of Byron White and 
Arthur J. Goldberg, Dallek’s study of Lyndon Johnson, Flawed Giant: Lyndon 
Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973, offers only the briefest account of Johnson’s 
nomination of Abe Fortas, who became the subject of one of the most spectacular 
confirmation battles in US history.73 Studies focusing on Presidents will elaborate 
on the Supreme Court nomination process only when offering a more focused 
study, as in the case of Nichols (2007), who re-considers Dwight Eisenhower’s 
record on civil rights and includes some consideration of the influence of Southern 
Senators on his judicial nominations. His claim that Eisenhower selected judges 
who would uphold the constitutionality of the Brown decision is not unique, but it 
does serve as an interesting starting point for a comprehensive consideration of 
the Southern anti-Brown influence on the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
One possible exception to the trend of presidential biographers largely 
overlooking the nomination process may yet be supplied by Robert J. Caro, who is 
currently working on the fifth volume of his exhaustive and much-celebrated 
biography of Lyndon Johnson, which has been published in stages since 1982. In 
the meantime, McFeeley (1987) has discussed the much-overlooked importance 
of lower court nominations in a study which has assisted in highlighting elements 
of Chapter Five concerning the argument of research objective (6) that South 
Carolina has contributed enormously to the intensification and politicisation of 
Court of Appeals nominations.74 
 The current literature includes some excellent biographical studies of 
Supreme Court Justices, of which Newman’s (1994) exceedingly thorough study of 
Hugo Black is surely among the best and most enduring.75 Abe Fortas has been the 
subject of two excellent studies, namely Murphy (1988) and Kalman (1992).76 In a 
remarkable study that covers several chapters, Murphy has provided the 
                                                             
73 Robert Dallek, John F. Kennedy: An Unfinished Life, 1917-1963 (London: Allen Lane, 2003); Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: 
Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
74 Neil D. McFeeley, Appointment of Judges: The Johnson Presidency (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987). 
75 Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: a Biography (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1994). 
76 Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: a Biography (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Bruce Allen Murphy, Fortas (New 
York, NY: William Morrow and Co, Inc, 1988). 
62 
 
definitive account of the controversial Fortas confirmation hearings, making this 
section of his biography an essential read for any serious scholar of the Supreme 
Court nomination process. The strength of Murphy’s study lies in the fact that he 
has illustrated the extraordinarily complex mass of events, processes and 
relationships that determine the final outcome of a controversial Supreme Court 
nomination. By focusing on the President, the nominee, the Senators and outside 
influences, Murphy has excelled where so many studies of Supreme Court 
nominations have not succeeded, simply in the sense that he has not neglected 
any of the relevant aspects of the process. However, as detailed and impressive as 
his work is, Murphy’s contribution only emphasises the fact that biographies of 
Justices provide only a snapshot of the nomination process as it functioned when 
the biographer’s subject was nominated. In other words, the biographies of the 
Justices only maintain the current pattern of assessing each Supreme Court 
nomination in isolation. 
Newton (2007) has offered a well-written account of Chief Justice 
Warren’s leadership of the Supreme Court during the civil rights era, which has 
been useful to the research, given that Warren’s influence is a consistent theme 
to which the thesis returns regularly.77 Thurgood Marshall has been the subject of 
several studies, including Tushnet (1997) and also Williams (1988), who has 
provided detailed accounts of Johnston’s opposition to Marshall’s Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals nomination, and, later, Thurmond’s opposition to Marshall’s 
Supreme Court nomination.78 However, Williams’s focus is, of course, his subject, 
and so, despite his extensive account of Marshall’s trip to South Carolina to argue 
the Briggs v. Elliott case, which has influenced much of the material in Chapter 
Three, he has not pursued the ‘South Carolina’ angle in the story of Thurgood 
Marshall’s judicial appointments. 
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Sources of Inspiration 
 
In addition to the work of Key (1949) and Tribe (1985) considered above, there are 
two other sources that, while not immediately relevant in terms of their focus, 
have influenced (or perhaps inspired) this research. The Brethren (1979), the 
legendary study of the Supreme Court written by Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong, and Robert Mann’s The Walls of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert 
Humphrey, Richard Russell, and the Struggle for Civil Rights (1996) have 
established a particular tradition of US political history which this research is 
inclined to follow. One reason is that Mann, Woodward and Armstrong have 
backgrounds in journalism, thus freeing them from the conventional academic 
approach that characterises most of the existing literature, with a sophisticated 
and readable style which encourages the reader to turn the page. As with Bruce 
Allen Murphy’s study of the Fortas nomination, Mann has not neglected any of 
the relevant institutional aspects of the story he wishes to tell, while Woodward 
and Armstrong have rejected the clichés of most Supreme Court studies and 
focused instead on the political realities of how the Justices reach a decision on 
each case.  
The remarkably frank and personal insights within The Brethren, achieved 
through hours of interviews, have allowed greater insight into the minds of the 
Justices than studies which offer hundreds of pages focusing on judicial 
interpretation.79 By avoiding a dry analysis of constitutional interpretation, The 
Brethren offers perhaps a more stark demonstration of the Court’s raw judicial 
power than a study such as McKeever (1995), which offers much in the way of 
constitutional interpretation but little to explain the political context of each 
Justice’s background and approach. 80 While scholars might dismiss or minimise 
the relevance of, say, Justice Harry Blackmun’s personal foibles – including the 
revelation that ‘number two pencils, needle sharp, neatly-displayed in the pencil 
holder, need only include one number three or a cracked point to elicit a harsh 
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word’ – the personal insights unearthed through hours of interviews have allowed 
a greater understanding of the minds of the Justices than some other studies that 
offer hundreds of pages focusing on judicial interpretation.81  
Secondly, Mann, Woodward and Armstrong have succeeded in proving 
what many of their more academic-minded contemporaries would presumably 
dispute, namely, that the inner workings of the Senate and the relationships 
between the Senators, and the relationships between the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, are topics which can and do allow for the creation of fascinating work if 
understood properly, researched well and chronicled competently. Thirdly, Mann, 
Woodward and Armstrong have taken their work on political science into the 
realm of collective biography, which has proved to be an appropriate style for my 
own research, focusing as it does on three men whose lives and careers were 
linked inextricably for decades. 
Finally, both The Brethren and Walls of Jericho have benefitted from the 
willingness of the authors to engage with the political process and the individuals 
they have written about: Mann worked alongside Louisiana Senators Russell Long, 
John Breaux and J. Bennett Johnston prior to completing Walls of Jericho, while 
Justice Potter Stewart proved to be the main source of information for Woodward 
and Armstrong, who also interviewed a large number of law clerks who worked 
alongside Stewart and other Justices of the Supreme Court. My own experience 
has taught me that a true understanding of the complexities of US politics, 
particularly as it relates to the South, can be attained only through engaging with 
individuals who have lived, and contributed to, the political process itself. It was 
with this view in mind that interviews were conducted with Congressman John 
Spratt, who represented South Carolina’s Fifth District for nearly thirty years; 
former Congresswoman Elizabeth J. Patterson, who represented the state’s 
Fourth District and is the daughter of Olin Johnston; the aforementioned Jaime 
Harrison, Chairman of the South Carolina Democratic Party, and Congressman 
James Clyburn, who has represented the state’s Sixth District for twenty-two 
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years, and is currently the Assistant Democratic Whip in the House of 
Representatives. The research also involved interviews with four members of the 
Friendship Nine group of protesters – Clarence Graham, W.T. ‘Dub’ Massey, James 
Wells and David Williamson Jr – who staged the famous ‘jail no bail’ protest in 
Rock Hill, South Carolina during the sit-in movement of the early 1960s. 
Mann, Woodward and Armstrong have proved that archive research 
constitutes only one part of the process of crafting an effective study of US 
politics. As they have demonstrated, an effective study depends also upon 
engagement with the individuals who have lived the experiences being chronicled, 
and also the development of a writing style that will encourage readers to return 
to the work regularly over the years.  
 
 
Research Objectives in the Context of the Secondary Literature 
 
Having offered a review of the existing scholarship on South Carolina’s political 
history and also the Supreme Court nomination process, the chapter will now 
conclude with an outline of how each research objective within this thesis will 
build on the secondary literature while also addressing various gaps and 
oversights on the part of previous scholars. 
Firstly, there is a consensus among scholars that Supreme Court 
nomination hearings have developed into highly political, and confrontational, 
public events. Through research objective (1), it will be established that, of all 
states, South Carolina has played the most important (yet overlooked) long-term 
role in that process. This is a particularly important research objective in the sense 
that the current scholarship is dominated by a focus on presidential selection and 
management, and also a method of study which focuses largely, if not exclusively, 
on nominees who ultimately failed to be confirmed; 
Secondly, while Supreme Court scholars such as Thorpe (1969), Abraham 
(1999) and Comiskey (2004) have highlighted the Southern influence in the 
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Supreme Court nomination process, this thesis, through research objective (2), 
will argue that South Carolina provides the best example of an individual state 
achieving a disproportionate influence on a national scale through exerting an 
extraordinary influence in the judicial selection process throughout a lengthy 
period in the era of civil rights;  
Thirdly, given that the state of South Carolina departs from the 
conventional narrative outlined in studies such as Perry (1991), Abraham (1999) 
and Yalof (1999), it will be argued, through research objective (3), that the long-
term solidarity and consistency of South Carolina’s Senators in the Supreme Court 
nomination process suggests that an analysis of nominations as ‘one-off’ events is 
unhelpful and restrictive, particularly when emphasising the role of Senators 
rather than Presidents; 
Fourthly, given the absence of a focus on the politics of the nomination 
process in the work of Southern political scholars such as Klarman (2004), and also 
the tendency of Supreme Court nomination scholars such as Massaro (1990), Yalof 
(1999) and Nemacheck (2008) to focus on methods of presidential selection 
rather than the impact of states or the role of individual Senators, research 
objective (4) will bring together the study of the nominations process with the 
study of Southern political history; 
With the good intentions of Huss (1961) failing to provide a 
comprehensive and impartial political biography of Olin Johnston, and studies 
such as Simon (1998) focusing only on Johnston’s years as Governor, the thesis 
will offer, by way of research objective (5), a thorough and objective study of ten 
years in Johnston’s Senate career; 
Finally, through research objective (6), the thesis will build on the work of 
McFeeley (1987) by highlighting the importance of South Carolina’s role in 
nominations to the Courts of Appeal, contesting the view of Silverstein (1994) and 
others that lower court nominations were of little significance during much of the 
period under study.  
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In conclusion, this research aims to fill what appears to be a surprisingly 
large gap in the literature. By rejecting the current trend of analysing nominations 
as ‘stand-alone’ events and instead assessing the evolution of the process over 
time, the research rejects entirely the theory that a lack of Senate rejections 
constitutes Senatorial ‘deference’ toward a nominating President. The story of 
South Carolina and the US Supreme Court suggests that a lack of Senate rejections 
of Supreme Court nominees reflects only the reality that a single Senator, or a 
small group of Senators, will find it very difficult indeed to encourage other 
Senators to support their cause, especially if the cause revolves around 
controversial, and regional, interests. The behaviour of Olin Johnston, Strom 
Thurmond and Fritz Hollings in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices 
will help to discourage further academic claims of a ‘deferential Senate’ and 
instead highlight the fact that the Supreme Court nomination process has always 
constituted a far more complex, controversial and confrontational arena of 
debate within the US political system, with the final vote on each nomination 
representing only a minor aspect of each thrilling story. 
The thesis will now proceed to the chapters that consider primary research 
materials in depth in order to analyse the behaviour of South Carolina’s Senators 
in the Supreme Court nominations process. There is, however, one final item of 
secondary material to acknowledge, which constitutes something of an oddity in 
the existing literature. In 1972, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona authored an 
article in the American Bar Association Journal, in which the future icon of US 
conservatism argued at length that a vast number of Supreme Court nominees 
would have been rejected prior to the early 1960s had Senators applied more 
‘modern’ judgements of nominees’ judicial philosophies, as in the case of the 
Fortas and Haynsworth nominations. Given the enormous significance of 
Goldwater in the meteoric rise of the US conservative movement, his close 
political alliance with Strom Thurmond, and his success in the Deep South states 
in an otherwise disastrous campaign for the Presidency in 1964, which signposted 
a landmark event in the development of South Carolina’s two-party system, it was 
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deemed necessary to include at least an indication of Goldwater’s views on the 
Supreme Court. As the following chapters illustrate, Goldwater’s profound, even 
poignant, sentiment (outlined at the beginning of this chapter) highlights the 
concern felt by South Carolina’s Senators that the nomination process for the 
judges who sit on the nation’s highest court demanded a more rigorous form of 
scrutiny in the age of civil rights. As Chapter Two will explain, the South 
Carolinians would never enjoy the Justices’ ‘immunity’ from political pressures 
during the 1950s. Following Earl Warren’s announcement of the Brown decision, 
Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings would impose a uniquely Southern conservative 
influence on the politics of the Supreme Court, with the South Carolina political 
establishment, and the state’s white voters, supposedly looking on in anticipation 
of their success in defending the Southern way of life. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
A Rendezvous with Reality: 
South Carolina and the Judicial Nominations of the 1950s 
 
 
 
I hope you realise that the only way you can win a case is somebody has to 
lose.1 
John W. Davis to Thurgood Marshall, 1954 
 
 
Following Chief Justice Earl Warren’s announcement, on 17th May 1954, of the 
Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision, South Carolina’s political 
leaders lined up to express their shock. The state’s senior US Senator, Burnet R. 
Maybank, commented that ‘the Supreme Court decision shocked me’, while 
Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, the youthful Speaker Pro Tempore of the South Carolina 
State House, claimed that the decision to end racial discrimination in all public 
facilities came as ‘a real shock’.2 In an article from The Charleston News and 
Courier entitled ‘Governor Byrnes “Shocked” by High Court Ruling’, the state’s 
Governor, James F. Byrnes, expressed his own ‘shock’ at the Brown decision, and 
urged ‘all of our people, white and coloured, to exercise restraint and preserve 
order.’3 Some South Carolinians offered more stirring condemnations, such as US 
Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, who labelled the decision ‘a tragic mistake’, 
adding that it created ‘one of the gravest problems to confront the white people 
of the South since the days of Reconstruction’, while others expressed more 
optimistic reflections: Olin D. Johnston, the state’s junior US Senator, claimed, ‘I 
                                                             
1 Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary (New York, NY: Random House, 1988), p.229. 
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have faith and confidence in the people of South Carolina and I know they are 
capable of solving this problem, although it is a perplexing one.’4  
As shocked and perplexed as South Carolina’s politicians wished to appear, 
it is unlikely that the state’s leaders were entirely surprised by the Court’s decision 
to rule racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional. For South Carolina, 
the fight to maintain segregation began long before Brown. Ten years earlier, as 
Governor, Olin Johnston had taken the lead in abolishing the state laws relating to 
the Democratic Party primary system following the Supreme Court’s Smith v. 
Allwright decision, which had ruled the all-white Democratic primary 
unconstitutional.5 When the charismatic black lawyer, Thurgood Marshall, went to 
South Carolina to challenge the racial segregation of schools in Clarendon County 
in the Briggs v. Elliott case in 1951, a majority of the judges were discouraged 
from siding with Marshall’s argument by a pledge that South Carolina would 
invest heavily in order to improve the quality of schools for black children. By the 
time that Briggs was grouped with four other segregation cases and brought 
before the Supreme Court in the form of Brown, Governor James F. Byrnes had 
implemented a massive long-term strategy to ‘equalise’ South Carolina’s schools, 
hoping that it would encourage the Justices of the Court to uphold the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ established by the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896. Byrnes 
utilised his considerable political influence by calling on John W. Davis, one of the 
most respected US lawyers, to defend South Carolina before the Court, and 
persuading his friend, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, to prevent the Justice 
Department from filing an amicus curiae (‘friend of the Court’) brief in support of 
Marshall and the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People 
(NAACP).6 
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A colossal figure in South Carolina’s politics, Byrnes had represented the 
state in the US Senate prior to being appointed as a Justice of the Supreme Court 
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941. After heading Roosevelt’s Office of 
War Mobilisation, Byrnes served as US Secretary of State in the administration of 
President Harry S. Truman, during a pivotal era in the early Cold War. His 
reputation as a statesman is immortalised in the famous photographs of Truman, 
Clement Atlee and Josef Stalin sitting alongside each other in wicker chairs at the 
Potsdam Conference in August 1945. Byrnes is one of the four figures standing at 
the back, flanked by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Russian Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, gently clutching Molotov’s arm in the characteristic 
Byrnes gesture of friendship. In 1950, his election as Governor of South Carolina, 
aged 68, constituted an overwhelming vote of confidence from both the 
traditional county communities and the new metropolitan elites.7 
The implementation of the ambitious ‘equalisation’ project indicates the 
long-held belief of Byrnes and others in the genuine possibility of Court-ordered 
desegregation, not least because the Justices had sided with Marshall and the 
NAACP in previous landmark cases.8 Given Byrnes’s key role in attempting to 
prevent the Justices from ruling segregation unconstitutional, it is not surprising 
that he felt a sense of personal defeat following the announcement of Brown. 
Fritz Hollings, who had supported the Byrnes plan by authoring legislation to 
‘equalise’ the state’s schools through imposing a three-cent tax, and who 
accompanied John W. Davis at the oral arguments, recalled years later that 
‘Byrnes was totally disillusioned when we lost that case. He'd been on the Court 
itself, and said we had some dangerous fellows like [Justice] Felix Frankfurter, you 
couldn't tell which way they'd go, but he knew the Court would find the right 
thing, and that there wasn't any chance of us losing and what have you, so when 
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he lost in 1954, that was it.’9 The Governor would later publish an article entitled 
‘The Supreme Court Must Be Curbed’, in which he slammed his former colleagues 
for ignoring the legal precedent of Plessy and instead deciding to ‘legislate a policy 
for schools’, offering the grave warning that ‘when the next Court is called upon 
to “read into” the Constitution something which was never there, another 
segment of the people may be the victim. It may be you.’10  
With Plessy now overturned by a unanimous Court, and Byrnes’s 
‘equalisation’ project shot down in flames, South Carolina’s concerned white 
community began calling on a more radical figure in the state’s politics. Although 
no longer in public office at the time of the Brown decision, ex-Governor James 
Strom Thurmond had already established a national profile by breaking 
dramatically with the Democratic Party to run for President on an independent 
‘states’ rights’ ticket in response to President Truman’s announcement of a civil 
rights plank at the 1948 Democratic Party Convention.11 To an audience of wild 
supporters who knew nothing of the twenty-three year old mixed-race daughter 
whose identity would remain secret until after his death, Thurmond had declared 
that ‘there’s not enough troops in the army to force the Southern people to break 
down segregation and admit the n***** race into our theaters, into our 
swimming pools, into our homes and into our churches.’12 Having won Electoral 
College majorities in four Deep South states in the 1948 Presidential Election, 
Thurmond made a bold challenge to Olin Johnston’s incumbency in the 1950 
Democratic Senate primary contest but failed to unseat the popular 
upcountryman.13 
Despite his defeat in 1950, many white Southerners sought Thurmond’s 
advice on the best way to maintain segregation in schools four years later, and the 
opportunist Thurmond was happy to use the South Carolinian outrage over Brown 
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to make a second attempt at the Senate following the sudden death of the state’s 
senior Senator, Burnet Maybank, in September 1954. Running as a write-in 
candidate as a means of defying the efforts of the state’s Democratic 
establishment to install state Senator Edgar A. Brown in Maybank’s seat, 
Thurmond prevailed spectacularly, defeating Brown by 145,444 votes to 83,525. 
Despite the misspelling of his name on the ballot papers of many adoring 
supporters, ‘Strum Thormond’ became the first candidate elected to the Senate in 
a write-in victory.14 
Olin Johnston and Strom Thurmond proved to be a formidable pairing in 
the US Senate. The lingering bitterness of their 1950 primary battle aside, the pair 
had little in common politically or personally. Johnston was a Democratic loyalist 
who maintained a consistent defence of organised labour, while the lecherous, 
provocative Thurmond’s openly racist demagoguery confirmed a willingness to 
rebel against party leaders at the state and federal levels. The defence of white 
supremacy would unite them as they formed a conservative ‘bloc’ with fellow 
Southerners in the US Senate as a means of resisting moves toward 
desegregation. Their persistence in holding the conservative line on the race issue 
was informed to a great extent by the close and uniquely ‘Southern’ relationship 
each man maintained with his constituents. Johnston’s daughter, former 
Congresswoman Elizabeth J. Patterson, recalls that her father’s folksy ‘biscuits and 
gravy’ style with his supporters became legendary in the state, while former South 
Carolina Congressman John M. Spratt insists that Thurmond ‘had the best 
constituent service on the Hill, amongst Southerners at least. Back home, they 
remembered Strom calling on the telephone when somebody died, they 
remembered his wedding gifts, they remembered his telephone calls at critical 
moments, things like this.’15 As with their fellow Southerner, Herman Talmadge, 
who ensured his constituents in Georgia received written responses within 
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twenty-four hours, both Johnston and Thurmond issued swift and highly affable 
communications with South Carolinians and many other correspondents from 
elsewhere in the nation.16 
Many of the letters which arrived in the offices of South Carolina’s 
Senators represented the worst excesses of racism, particularly in the aftermath 
of the Little Rock integration crisis of 1957, such as a letter from a resident of 
Auburn, California, informing Thurmond that ‘unless white children can be 
educated in private schools ... America will soon be a nation of mongrels.’17 
Having received a letter from J.H. Bickley, the Grand Dragon of the South Carolina 
Ku Klux Klan, Johnston scrawled a note in pencil, advising his staff to ‘tell him to 
rest assured of my efforts to defeat civil rights legislation’, but adding, ‘don’t refer 
to him as Grand Dragon.’18 After reading a detailed rant from a South Carolinian 
urging, ‘pray that God prevents the crime of “negro” integration and “colored” 
bastardism against the white race in America’, Thurmond’s response opened with, 
‘Mrs Thurmond and I sincerely appreciate your Christmas card.’19 On the other 
hand, some of the writers did engage the Senators in intelligent discussions over 
complex and highly relevant political issues. When a resident of Florence, South 
Carolina, asked Thurmond if the Fourteenth Amendment – introduced essentially 
as a means of ensuring constitutional protection for black Americans following the 
abolition of slavery – was ratified ‘under force’, the Senator agreed that it was, 
and provided a detailed and passionate response. Enclosing a speech which he 
had made on the very same subject, Thurmond argued that ‘the radical 
Republican majority which was in power in the Congress following the War 
Between the States forced enough of the Southern states to agree to the 
ratification before they could be re-admitted into the Union so that the necessary 
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majority was obtained for ratification purposes.’20 Aside from highlighting the 
manner in which the lingering bitterness over the South’s treatment after defeat 
in the US Civil War would inform much of the region’s resistance to civil rights 
during the twentieth century, the arguments made by Thurmond in this letter 
would re-surface in the obscure questions offered during his infamous 
interrogation of Thurgood Marshall during the latter’s Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, which are covered in detail in Chapter Four. 
Given the sense of ‘shock’ articulated by South Carolina’s political 
community following the announcement of Brown, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the unlikely partnership of Johnston and Thurmond offered little in the form of a 
coherent strategy when tackling the problem of curbing the power of the 
Supreme Court during the mid-1950s. The nominations to the Court of John 
Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan and Charles Evans Whittaker remained 
relatively untroubled by South Carolinian agitation, but Johnston’s sustained 
opposition to the nomination of Simon E. Sobeloff to the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals would illustrate, firstly, the potential for immense controversy in the 
nomination process, which would later characterise the Supreme Court 
nominations of the 1960s, and secondly, the fact that while South Carolina’s war 
on the Court was provoked by the Brown ruling, the agitation of the state’s 
Senators in the field of judicial appointments would also extend to nominations 
made to the lower courts. Johnston’s attempt to block Sobeloff’s appointment to 
the Fourth Circuit suggested a defensive strategy to prevent liberal judges 
reaching South Carolinian territory, but his obstruction to the appointment of 
Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit, covered in Chapter Three, highlights the 
insistence of both Thurmond and Johnston that the Supreme Court threatened 
Americans on a national, not just regional, scale. 
The involvement of South Carolina’s Senators in the pursuit of multiple 
failed attempts to introduce court-curbing legislation reflected a concerted effort 
to weaken the Court as an institution, yet the battle which would emerge in the 
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nomination process suggests that Johnston, Thurmond and, later, Senator Ernest 
‘Fritz’ Hollings, considered the liberal ideologies of the individual Justices to be the 
root cause of the threat posed to the South. As history would prove, this belief 
was particularly relevant in the case of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the man who led 
the Supreme Court throughout this most turbulent period of political 
transformation. 
This chapter commences with an assessment of Earl Warren’s influence 
over the Court’s decision in Brown in order to explain the actions of Southern 
Senators in applying greater scrutiny in the Supreme Court nomination process, as 
became evident in the case of Eisenhower’s nomination of John Marshall Harlan in 
1954. By highlighting the overlooked significance of Olin Johnston through 
analysing his crusade to block the nomination of Simon Sobeloff to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the chapter will address research objective (5) by 
highlighting the significance of the much-overlooked Johnston in the relationship 
between judicial politics and Southern political history. With the Sobeloff 
controversy as the chapter’s centrepiece, there will be an emphasis on research 
objective (6) in explaining the significance of Court of Appeals appointments in the 
wider war on the Supreme Court, and also the contribution of South Carolina’s 
Senators to the intensification of judicial politics with regard to these lower court 
appointments. The chapter examines the change in behaviour of Southern 
Senators in the nomination process following, first, the announcement of the 
Court’s decision in Mallory v. United States, and, second, Eisenhower’s use of 
federal troops to ensure the integration of Little Rock Central High School in 
Arkansas. The manner in which the Potter Stewart confirmation hearings 
suggested the emergence of a more confrontational nomination process, the 
significance of which will be analysed in subsequent chapters, will also be 
considered. Finally, the chapter will contribute to the development of research 
objective (4) by bringing together the study of Southern politics with the history of 
the modern Supreme Court nomination process in addition to outlining the 
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beginning of South Carolina’s crucial role in escalating the political tension within 
that complex process. 
 
 
The Finger of Suspicion 
 
Southern suspicion of Chief Justice Earl Warren began long before the 
announcement of Brown. A former Republican Vice Presidential candidate and 
Governor of California, who had used his influence to assist Dwight Eisenhower in 
securing the Republican nomination for the 1952 Presidential Election, Warren 
was appointed to the Supreme Court to replace the late Chief Justice Fred Vinson 
on 5th October 1953. After serving for three months on a recess appointment 
before the ‘official’ nomination was made by President Eisenhower on 11th 
January 1954, Warren was scrutinised by the Senate Judiciary Committee, after 
which three of its members, Olin Johnston of South Carolina, James Eastland of 
Mississippi, and Chairman William Langer of North Dakota, voted against his 
confirmation.21 Agreeing with Eastland that their opposition was due to a belief in 
Warren’s lack of judicial experience, Johnston complained that a report on 
Warren by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), requested by the two 
Southerners via the Chairman, had failed to materialise.22 Drew Pearson 
speculated in The San Francisco Chronicle that Eastland’s concern over Warren’s 
position on the segregation issue was in fact at the heart of the request for the 
investigation, but the opposition of Johnston and Eastland became overshadowed 
by condemnation in the press of Chairman Langer’s repeated delays of Warren’s 
confirmation, motivated solely by his continued irritation that no judge from his 
home state of North Dakota had ever been nominated to the Supreme Court.23 
While the antics of ‘Wild Bill’ ultimately achieved little – he reportedly ‘chewed on 
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his ever-present unlighted cigar but said nothing’ while Warren was confirmed by 
a unanimous voice vote – the Chairman’s eccentric obstructionism masked the 
scepticism beginning to brew among the Southern members of the Judiciary 
Committee in their consideration of Supreme Court nominees.24 
As Chief Justice, Warren remained an unpopular figure in the South, and 
for two reasons in particular, Southerners remained adamant that the Court’s 
landmark ruling in Brown was largely, if not entirely, his fault. The first is that, with 
one unanimous opinion, written and read from the bench by the Chief Justice 
himself, it was inevitable that Warren would become the ‘face’ of the decision. 
During 1952, when Chief Justice Vinson and several others on the Court, including 
Justices Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson and Tom C. Clark, 
expressed serious concerns over whether the Court could or should overturn 
Plessy v. Ferguson, Governor James Byrnes might have had a good reason to 
expect the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of South Carolina’s 
segregated schools.25 Six months later, when the case was re-argued, the death of 
Vinson from a heart attack and his replacement by the new Chief Justice proved 
critical, with the dynamic Warren utilising his skills as diplomat, umpire and 
negotiator to steer the other Justices toward a unanimous opinion, partly through 
convincing his brethren that a dissenting opinion would be used as a rallying cry 
by segregationists in the event of a Southern backlash.26 Marking the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Briggs v. Elliott case in 2002, Fritz Hollings claimed that when 
Warren arrived on the Supreme Court in late 1953, ‘he didn’t want to hear about 
“separate but equal.” He wanted the case re-argued on the constitutionality of 
segregation itself.’27 Predictably, the final outcome of the Brown case became 
linked inextricably with the considerable influence of Earl Warren in the minds of 
Southerners during the mid-1950s. 
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The second reason for laying the blame for Brown at Warren’s door was 
his inclusion in the opinion, in the form of Footnote 11, of a reference to Gunnar 
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, a critical sociological study of US race relations 
which had infuriated many in the South when published in 1944, largely for its 
attack on white prejudice toward African Americans.28 As Jim Newton has argued, 
the Myrdal footnote appeared to suggest ‘what many Southerners suspected: the 
Court was striking down school desegregation not because the law commanded it 
but because modern experts no longer approved of it,’ particularly as Warren had 
added the words ‘see generally’ to the footnote.29 This highly negative reaction 
had been anticipated months earlier by two of the Court’s Southerners, Justice 
Hugo Black of Alabama and Justice Tom Clark of Texas, both of whom had advised 
Warren against quoting Myrdal’s work.30  
Their fears proved well-founded: in June 1955, South Carolina’s Olin 
Johnston initiated a Southern effort to gather information on the sources of 
recent Court decisions, teaming up with Mississippi’s James Eastland to introduce 
Senate Resolution 104 as a means of investigating what Johnston described as the 
‘pink, red or actually communistic sources’ of information which he believed to be 
the inspiration for the Justices’ legal reasoning.31 So keen was Johnston to 
investigate the Court’s sources of information that he wrote to his Mississippi 
colleague one year later, advising Eastland, by now Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, to set up a sub-committee in order to implement the 
resolution.32 Even in a friendly letter to a colleague of the same ideology, Johnston 
was keen to point out that the Brown decision was ‘illegal from the Constitutional 
point of view, unlawful in a jurisprudential sense, and was purely a political 
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pronouncement based upon psychological, sociological and other non-judicial, un-
factual theories and fallacies.’33 
For many in the South, Warren’s authorship of the Brown ruling, and his 
insistence on quoting ‘generally’ a controversial work such as Myrdal, suggested 
that the Chief Justice had brought his private motivations into the decision to 
order the desegregation of schools. South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond, who had 
proved his willingness to lead disenchanted Southerners out of the Democratic 
Party when he headed the ‘Dixiecrat’ presidential ticket in 1948, put his criticism 
of Warren at the centre of his warning of a second Southern ‘bolt’ from the party, 
arguing that ‘Democratic Presidents appointed eight of the nine judges on the 
Court at the time of the [Brown] decision, and President Eisenhower appointed 
the man who wrote the opinion ... The South blames both parties.’34 The truth of 
Eisenhower’s position on the segregation issue was more complex. Mindful of 
Southern fears of a desegregation order well before Brown, the President had 
considered at least two Southern judges to replace the Kentuckian Chief Justice 
Vinson.35 With John W. Davis’s advanced age ruling him out, and Judge John J. 
Parker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit tainted by the 
Senate’s rejection of his nomination to the Supreme Court by President Herbert 
Hoover in 1930, Eisenhower chose instead to honour a private promise, made 
long before, that Earl Warren would be put forward for the first Court vacancy to 
come up during his Presidency.36 
The Senate Judiciary Committee hesitated when, on 9th November 1954, 
Eisenhower nominated Judge John Marshall Harlan II of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, to replace the late Justice Robert Jackson on the 
Supreme Court. Having seen the outcome of Earl Warren’s confirmation over their 
objections, Southerners Johnston and Eastland were determined to ensure a full 
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background check on Eisenhower’s second Supreme Court nominee. The 
Committee initially declined to act on the nomination, made only one week after 
the 1954 mid-term elections, forcing Eisenhower to re-nominate Harlan in January 
1955, by which time the Democratic Party had taken control of the Senate, with 
Republican William Langer replaced as Judiciary Committee Chairman by 
Democrat Harley Kilgore of West Virginia.37 The Harlan nomination illustrates the 
manner in which Southern Senators, still reeling from the announcement of 
Brown and still considering methods of counter-attack, were not yet prepared to 
oppose Supreme Court nominations by declaring openly their concern over a 
nominee’s position on segregation. While happy to speak at length on their 
reservations regarding Harlan, the comments offered by Southerners obscured, or 
at the very least blunted, the true motivation for their obstruction during 
Committee hearings. 
The appearance of Supreme Court nominees before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee had been very rare up until the mid-1950s, but the Southern influence 
on the Committee was sufficient to bring Harlan before them to testify.38 The one 
mention of segregation throughout two days of hearings occurred during a round 
of questions from James Eastland, who, when putting to Harlan a query 
‘requested by a member of the Senate to propound’, appeared adamant that the 
segregation issue had no relevance to his interrogation: 
 
Senator Eastland: I do not think you understood the question. This is not a 
case – this is not a question that would come before the Court. It says – 
 
Do you believe that the Supreme Court should change established 
interpretations of the Constitution to accord with the economic, political 
and sociological views – 
 
that is, the personal views – 
 
of the judges who from time to time constitute the membership of the 
Court? 
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Judge Harlan: I misinterpreted the question. 
Senator Eastland: I knew you did. 
Judge Harlan: The purport of your inquiry. To lay the inquiry bare, as I 
understand it, you are asking me how I would have voted on the 
segregation issue? 
Senator Eastland: No, sir. That has not anything to do with it. What he is 
asking you is this – it is not my question – do you think that a judge should 
interpret the Constitution in accordance with the personal views of that 
judge on economic, political or sociological questions? 
Judge Harlan: That gives a different thrust to the question. No, sir.39 
 
 The ongoing debate regarding the Bricker Amendment – a proposed 
adjustment of the US Constitution that would have reduced the President’s 
authority in signing future treaties with foreign powers – led Senators to focus on 
the nominee’s views regarding ‘world government’ throughout most of the 
hearings.40 But the brief mention of ‘the segregation issue’, brought into the 
hearings by Harlan rather than Eastland, is significant for providing the first 
example of a Southern Judiciary Committee member probing a nominee’s attitude 
toward Brown by offering questions which supposedly referred only to the issue 
of constitutional interpretation.  
On the Senate floor, Eastland maintained that he was opposed to Harlan 
for his views on US sovereignty, his lack of judicial experience, and the fact that he 
came from the state of New York, a state in which, according to Eastland, people 
‘possess views and philosophies which are different from the viewpoints of the 
rest of the country.’41 Given that Harlan had spent only one year on the Second 
Circuit, his relative lack of judicial experience was an obvious weakness for 
Southerners to exploit. Both Eastland and Johnston were happy to press the point, 
as they had done the previous year with the Warren nomination, and the fact that 
the nominee was the grandson of the earlier Justice John Marshall Harlan of 
Kentucky, who had rejected the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine in the sole 
                                                             
39 Hearings Before the Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Fourth Congress, First Session on 
Nomination of John Marshall Harlan, of New York, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, printed for the use of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Government Printing Office (1967), 24th February 1955, p.140. 
40 ‘Senate Confirms Harlan to Bench’, The New York Times, 17th March 1955, p.1. 
41 Ibid., p.1. 
82 
 
dissenting opinion in Plessy, was unlikely to inspire reverence among other Deep 
South Democrats.42 Johnston also concurred with Eastland regarding the ‘world 
government’ issue, claiming he feared that Harlan ‘would put the United Nations 
above the United States Constitution.’43 Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the 
leader of the Southern bloc in the Senate, echoed the concerns regarding Harlan’s 
judicial experience, and added that ‘I do not propose, Mr President, to vote to 
advise and consent to the nomination of any judge to the Supreme Court bench 
who has not had considerable judicial experience under the restraint of 
precedent.’ Russell was asked to yield by his Southern colleague, Senator Sam 
Ervin of North Carolina, who pointed out that ‘of the eight present members of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, only one had as much as a single 
second’s judicial experience on an appellate court or a court of general jurisdiction 
prior to his elevation’, to which Russell responded, ‘I am quite confident that that 
the statement made by the distinguished Senator from North Carolina is 
correct.’44  
As with Eastland’s criticism of the state of New York, the ambiguity of the 
comments made during the Russell/Ervin double act did not prevent The New 
York Times from making the rather obvious observation that ‘all of the Senators 
who voted against confirmation come from states where opposition to integrated 
schools is strong.’45 Just as Southern Senators sought to offset charges of racism 
by arguing that Earl Warren’s opinion in Brown contained no references to 
precedent or legal text but did refer ‘generally’ to a sociological study written by a 
non-American author, the Southern bloc would adopt an obstructive position to 
Supreme Court nominees by emphasising concerns with judicial interpretation, 
the specific wording of the US Constitution, and, of course, the ‘economic, social 
or political’ views of the Court’s Justices.46 
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Away from the deliberations in the Senate, the comments of Johnston’s 
South Carolina colleague, Strom Thurmond, suggested that the Supreme Court 
nomination process would soon emerge as an arena of battle between the 
Eisenhower Administration and the South. With his belief that ‘there is little 
apparent concern over whether the new members of the courts will follow the 
Constitution instead of the psychology books’, the junior Senator made a speech 
before The Southern Society at the Plaza Hotel in Harlan’s home state of New 
York, only days after the nomination was announced.47 In a bold statement of 
intent which only hinted at his controversial future in the Supreme Court 
nomination process, Thurmond pledged ‘to consider carefully every nomination 
made by the Chief Executive to the courts and to other positions of power. If I find 
the appointee, by his actions and statements, to be disqualified for the trust he 
would assume, I shall vote against his confirmation.’48 In the final words of the 
speech, Thurmond announced that ‘the Supreme Court by its decree has impeded 
the progress made in seventy-five years of work to provide equal and adequate 
public education for the white and Negro children of the South. No accuser can 
point his finger in any other direction with as much accuracy.’49 South Carolina’s 
war on the Supreme Court had been declared. 
Despite their reluctance during the Harlan hearings to push the 
segregation issue, or even mention it by name, Southern Senators had registered 
their first significant protest against a Supreme Court nominee in the aftermath of 
Brown. Unlike Warren, who was approved by a unanimous voice vote, Harlan’s 
confirmation was opposed by eleven Southern Democrats. Joining Johnston, 
Eastland, Russell and Ervin in opposition were Senators Lister Hill of Alabama, 
John McClellan of Arkansas, George Smathers of Florida, John C. Stennis of 
Mississippi, and the newly-elected freshman Senator from South Carolina, Strom 
Thurmond. Republican William Langer maintained his cigar-chewing bitterness 
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over the fact that no-one from North Dakota had been chosen, and was joined in 
opposition by only one other member of his party, Senator Herman Welker of 
Idaho, making the final vote, on 16th March 1955, a total of 71-11 in favour of 
confirmation.50 The two Republicans aside, the vote seemed to reflect Olin 
Johnston’s view, expressed in a letter to a South Carolina constituent, that ‘the 
Southern states are alone in this battle against the Supreme Court decision.’51 
Only one month after Harlan’s confirmation, the Supreme Court heard 
arguments from school boards requesting relief from the order to desegregate 
issued in the Brown ruling. In a decision commonly referred to as ‘Brown II’, the 
Court ruled, on 31st May 1955, that school authorities were required to ensure 
desegregation ‘with all deliberate speed’, a term which Justice Hugo Black later 
regretted, recognising that the ambiguity of the Court’s language would 
effectively ‘authorise’ Southern leaders to drag their heels in implementing the 
desegregation of their schools.52 Blaming Justice Felix Frankfurter for the inclusion 
of ‘all deliberate speed’ in the ruling, Black frequently claimed to his law clerks 
that ‘I should never have let Felix get that into the opinion.’53 The Court’s leniency 
allowed Judge John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to declare that 
the Justices were merely forbidding segregation, rather than demanding 
integration.54 
Thurmond praised the efforts of his former speechwriter, Robert M. Figg, 
who had defended the Clarendon County school district which had been the 
original setting for the Briggs v. Elliott case, and who had argued before the 
Justices in ‘Brown II’ that ‘the handling of this problem should be left to those 
familiar with local conditions.’55 In the event, the Court sided with the Federal 
Government’s brief, argued by Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff, which laid out an 
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assertive plan for the enforcement of Brown, albeit in wording which was toned 
down by President Eisenhower, reportedly in his own handwriting, to avoid 
‘rhetoric that might shame the South.’56 
Thanks to the outcome of ‘Brown II’, South Carolina’s Senators were now 
acquainted with a brand new nemesis in the struggle over segregation. 
 
 
The Man From Maryland 
 
President Eisenhower’s nomination, on 14th July 1955, of Simon Sobeloff to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit signposted the first truly 
significant battle waged by South Carolina in the lengthy war inspired by the high 
court’s ruling in Brown. Despite the fact that the selection was made for a lower 
court vacancy, rather than the Supreme Court, the outrage of Olin Johnston, 
Strom Thurmond and other South Carolinians over the Solicitor General’s 
nomination was logical. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (which comprised the 
states of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina) had 
been without a South Carolinian judge since the death of Charles A. Woods in 
1925, and President Eisenhower was now proposing to appoint Sobeloff, who was 
from Baltimore, Maryland, following the promotion to senior status of Judge 
Morris A. Soper, also from Maryland.57 Where South Carolina’s Senators 
considered Brown an insult to the South, they were able to portray the Sobeloff 
nomination as an insult to the state of South Carolina specifically. In so doing, 
Johnston and Thurmond could play down claims that their opposition was due to 
Sobeloff’s role in presenting the Federal Government’s brief before the Supreme 
Court during the ‘Brown II’ arguments.58 
Unlike Warren and Harlan, whose ambiguous positions on the race issue 
offered little opportunity for attack during debates over their appointments to the 
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high court, Sobeloff’s role in ‘Brown II’ appeared to confirm what South Carolina’s 
Senators had suspected: the President of the United States was prepared to back 
the appointment of judges who openly supported the Brown ruling. If Eisenhower 
genuinely believed that the selection of such a nominee would prove less 
controversial because the vacancy existed on a lower court, rather than the 
Supreme Court, his prediction proved ill-judged. As if the imposition of such a 
judge on their own turf was not enough, Johnston and Thurmond were no doubt 
mindful of the fact that Sobeloff’s appointment to the Fourth Circuit made his 
elevation to the Supreme Court an increasingly likely possibility: as David A. 
Nichols has argued, Eisenhower and his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, were 
‘grooming’ Sobeloff for the Supreme Court’s ‘Jewish seat’ in the event of the 
elderly Justice Felix Frankfurter deciding to retire.59 
As in the case of John Marshall Harlan, the Sobeloff nomination was 
blocked immediately by Johnston and James Eastland in order for a thorough 
investigation into the nominee’s background to take place. Of particular concern 
was a speech given by Sobeloff before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth 
Circuit, during which he reportedly claimed that ‘the Supreme Court is not merely 
the adjudicator of controversies, but in the process of adjudication, it is in many 
instances the final formulator of national policy.’60 The Washington Post-Times 
Herald claimed that Sobeloff’s argument on behalf of the Federal Government in 
‘Brown II’ formed the ‘real’ objection of both Johnston and Eastland, who 
remained ‘wholly unappeased by the fact that [Sobeloff] advocated a course of 
statesmanly moderation in applying the segregation decision.’61 The nomination 
would ultimately meet the same fate as Harlan’s, with the delay causing Sobeloff’s 
nomination to expire under Section 6 of Rule 38 (Standing Rules of the Senate), 
forcing Eisenhower to re-nominate him at the start of the next Congress.62  
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Never one to miss an opportunity to influence events in a manner which 
might raise his public profile, Thurmond proposed, as an alternative nominee, his 
former speechwriter, Charleston resident Robert Figg, and continued to push 
Figg’s appointment throughout the controversy.63 As a result, Sobeloff and Figg – 
the two men who had argued against one other during the South Carolina 
segment of ‘Brown II’ – were now being set up as opponents once again, this time 
as potential nominees for a vacancy on the Fourth Circuit. One frequently 
overlooked yet particularly notable aspect of the Sobeloff episode is the fact that 
Thurmond, in offering his personal recommendation, was effectively pushing 
Eisenhower to choose between the man who had argued for the desegregation of 
Southern schools in ‘Brown II’, and the man who had made the counter-argument 
on behalf of South Carolina in the very same case. 
When Eisenhower re-nominated Sobeloff in January 1956, Johnston – 
who, like Thurmond, was facing re-election – remained determined to use his 
position on the Judiciary Committee to defend the honour of South Carolina.64 
With Thurmond dismissing Sobeloff by claiming ‘I do not know the appointee or 
his qualifications’, Johnston composed a detailed letter to Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Harley Kilgore, declaring, ‘Since I am vitally interested in any nomination 
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, I would sincerely appreciate your 
instructing the staff member handling receipts of such nominations to 
immediately and personally notify me of receipt of any new nomination, because I 
may not be present on the floor of the Senate to hear them read when they come 
over.’65 Only two days later, Johnston wrote a longer and more detailed letter to 
the Chairman, requesting that Kilgore set up a sub-committee to look into the fact 
that Sobeloff had been paid $30,000 to investigate The Baltimore Trust Company, 
and later represented clients with claims against the same company.66 In response 
to Johnston’s request for careful scrutiny of the nominee, Sobeloff was quoted in 
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the press as declaring, ‘it is undoubtedly the privilege of the Senator to inquire, 
and it will be my pleasure to answer his questions, and the sooner the better.’67  
The nomination was complicated by two crucial developments during the 
month of February. The first, at the start of the month, was the elevation of Judge 
Armistead M. Dobie to senior status, which created a second vacancy on the 
Fourth Circuit. Secondly, at the end of the month, the Judiciary Committee was 
without a Chairman following the sudden death of Senator Harley Kilgore from a 
cerebral haemorrhage. The fact that arch-segregationist James Eastland was next 
in line for the chairmanship caused consternation among many, both inside and 
outside the Senate, but Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, who chaired 
the party’s Steering Committee, realised that the Senate’s Southern bloc would 
react unfavourably to any effort to prevent the Mississippian inheriting the 
chairmanship.68 With Eastland succeeding Kilgore as Chairman, Olin Johnston now 
had his closest ally on the Committee in the most influential position of all, but on 
the other hand, the opening-up of the second vacancy on the Fourth Circuit would 
potentially be used by the Eisenhower Administration as an olive branch to satisfy 
the demands of South Carolinians, which might undermine Johnston’s principal 
argument against Sobeloff. 
In a newsletter dated 12th April 1956, Johnston made clear to his 
supporters that he was entirely committed to opposing the Sobeloff nomination, 
taking the trouble to point out, in terms worthy of Thurmond, that ‘I believe it is 
vital for every South Carolinian to know that President Eisenhower is directly to 
blame for the farm woes, the civil rights turmoil, our textile industrial problems, 
our failures in international diplomacy, the steady destruction of our states’ rights 
and the many other serious problems that face our people today.’69 Following an 
announcement on the Senate floor, the Senator submitted a full account of the 
conflict-of-interest charges – as offered by a Mr Charles Shankroff of Baltimore, 
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Maryland – to a Senate Judiciary sub-committee chaired by Senator Joseph C. 
O’Mahoney of Wyoming, which began public hearings into the nomination on 5th 
May 1956.70 Having refuted Shankroff’s charges before the Senate sub-committee 
while sitting alongside Senator J. Glenn Beall of Maryland, Simon Sobeloff 
composed a five-page letter to Chairman O’Mahoney, in which he provided 
detailed responses to each of the charges. Without commenting on Johnston or 
the other Southerners opposing his nomination, the Solicitor General concluded 
that ‘it is sheer presumption of [Mr Shankroff] to suggest after two decades that 
he has found irregularities that have been overlooked by a community and its 
press that were watching these proceedings with keenest interest.’71 In addition 
to the support of both Maryland Senators, Sobeloff was backed by an impressive 
range of judges, lawyers and businessmen from Washington, DC, and his home 
state.72 
Now recognised as Sobeloff’s ‘arch challenger’ by The Washington Post-
Times Herald, and criticised for his obstructionism in various other newspapers, 
Johnston showed no sign of relenting in his crusade. Hitting back against his critics 
in a newsletter, the Senator took the opportunity to reassure his constituents that 
he would continue to block the nomination.73 In late April and early May, the 
expansion of Johnston’s investigation of Sobeloff’s background was aided by the 
Columbia-based law firm of Tompkins, Tompkins and McMaster, with John Gregg 
McMaster forwarding to the Senator a revelation that Sobeloff had spoken 
favourably of recording jury deliberations, a practice which, allegedly, had been 
condemned by Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Johnston discovered that 
Sobeloff had attended a judicial conference in Denver, Colorado, during which 
recordings of jury deliberations were played and Sobeloff reportedly ‘made no 
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protest.’74 As Senator Beall of Maryland later observed, ‘it is doubtful if any 
judicial nomination has received more minute examination.’75 Before long, 
President Eisenhower became frustrated with the delay, criticising the Senate 
Judiciary Committee during a news conference on 23rd May and defending his 
selection of the controversial nominee.76 
The Sobeloff nomination divided the members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.77 Minutes from a Committee meeting which took place on 25th June 
1956 suggest that the discomfort of some members with Johnston’s agenda must 
have been palpable.78 Chairman Eastland began by recognising Senator 
O’Mahoney, who requested a special meeting to take a roll call vote on Sobeloff’s 
nomination. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cantankerous, cigar-chewing William 
Langer of North Dakota recalled a similar experience regarding the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and queried the details of the last occasion on which a South 
Carolinian was appointed to the Fourth Circuit, receiving confirmation from 
Johnston that the last appointment of a South Carolinian judge occurred in 1913. 
Senator Langer then raised the complicated issue of the second vacancy. The fact 
that the Eisenhower Administration was refusing to nominate a judge for this 
vacancy until the Committee acted on the Sobeloff nomination must have put 
pressure on O’Mahoney, who was chairing the sub-committee.79  
In order to confirm the position of the Administration, Chairman Eastland 
read to the Committee a letter from Attorney General Brownell dated 8th June, in 
which Eastland had been assured that the matter of the second vacancy was 
‘under active consideration.’ Adding a ‘respectful’ reminder that the first vacancy 
had been outstanding for over a year, Brownell had urged that ‘anything that the 
Committee does to expedite action on [the Sobeloff] nomination, which is still 
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pending before it, would considerably alleviate the pressure on the Court.’80 
Senator O’Mahoney moved that a vote on the Sobeloff nomination be made the 
first order of business at a special Committee meeting to take place that same 
week. The Committee took a roll call vote on O’Mahoney’s motion, with votes of 
‘nay’ registered by Southern Democrats Johnston, Eastland, and Price Daniel of 
Texas, joined by one Republican, Langer, with the five other members present 
voting ‘yea’. Among the five voting in favour, Democrat O’Mahoney was joined by 
three Republicans – Everett Dirksen of Illinois, Arthur V. Watkins of Utah and John 
Marshall Butler of Maryland – in addition to the moderate Southern Democrat 
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee.81 
While the minutes suggest that Committee members were prepared to 
respect senatorial courtesy by recognising Johnston’s right as a South Carolinian 
Senator to withhold consent on a nomination to the Fourth Circuit, the result of 
the roll call vote suggested that most members were keen to draw the on-going 
obstructionism to a close. Furthermore, the minutes indicate that Johnston’s 
position was supposedly fireproof, not only because the sympathy of the new 
Chairman was guaranteed, but also because he could simply insist that South 
Carolina had missed its turn, rather than been deprived of a judicial appointment 
altogether. He was able to press the point further the very same day, in a detailed 
written response to Senator Langer’s query, in which he informed the North 
Dakotan that ‘there have been two judges *on the Fourth Circuit+ from every state 
except Maryland, which has three. If Mr Sobeloff is confirmed, Maryland will have 
had four in comparison to two from every other state ... according to the rotation 
of appointments, South Carolina should be recognised.’82  
Despite the lukewarm feelings within the Committee, several letters from 
Johnston’s constituents suggested widespread support for his actions in South 
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Carolina. One anonymous writer urged the Senator to ‘call upon all available help’ 
to prevent Sobeloff’s confirmation, observing that ‘some politicians seem 
determined to set the South up for a raping.’83 Others focused on Sobeloff’s 
religion, with one resident of Lexington writing, ‘Tell me who the honourable man 
is, please: Name sounds like a Greek, or other foreigner. Is he a churchman? Or 
what?’84 The Senator responded that Sobeloff ‘is active in the Jewish faith’, adding 
that ‘the press reported that he received the “Man of the Year” Award last year 
from the B’Nai B’rith fraternity.’85 One resident of Columbia presumably hoped 
that Johnston would agree with his view that ‘when one reads of the success of 
certain “Jewish groups” in running the government in this country ... it just seems 
that they are so well-mobilised, and organised, that it’s almost impossible to 
“sidetrack” any important matter which concerns them.’86 Perhaps inevitably, 
Johnston’s continued opposition to the nominee led to accusations of anti-
Semitism, to which the Senator responded, ‘I have never persecuted the Jewish 
race at any time’, claiming that, in South Carolina, ‘the Jewish people have 
supported me as near as 100 per cent as any race of people.’87 
Following Lyndon Johnson’s intervention, Chairman Eastland was 
persuaded to allow a vote on the Sobeloff nomination in Committee, on 29th June, 
despite Olin Johnston twice objecting.88 On 6th July, eight members of the 
Judiciary Committee voted to send the nomination to the Senate for a vote, with 
Johnston joined by only Chairman Eastland in opposition.89 As a means of 
accommodating disgruntled Southerners while drawing the Sobeloff debacle to a 
close, Lyndon Johnson allowed a lengthy debate to take place on 16th July.90 
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Making his final stand, Olin Johnston began by asking other Senators not to 
interrupt him during his speech, before addressing the press criticism that he and 
Eastland had endured for their handling of the nomination.91 Claiming to have a 
three-fold objection to the nominee, Johnston led with ‘tradition and every 
consideration of the rights of the state of South Carolina’, followed by Sobeloff’s 
involvement in the alleged conflict of interest, and concluding with the nominee’s 
philosophy concerning states’ rights, which ‘are repugnant to me and the 
overwhelming majority of the good people whom I have the honor to 
represent.’92 Turning to the disrespect shown to South Carolina with regard to the 
rotation of appointments, the Senator pointed out that Eisenhower had won 
more than one hundred thousand votes in the state in the 1952 Presidential 
Election, and argued that ‘the nomination now pending is an insult’ to most of the 
President’s South Carolinian supporters.93 In discussing the Shankroff charges, 
Johnston conceded that ‘the majority report states that the charges against the 
nominee are baseless’, but switched the focus of the argument to suggest that 
Charles Shankroff had been discredited as a witness when he had had a right to be 
heard, before launching into a lengthy and interminable discussion of the facts 
surrounding the alleged conflict of interest.94 
In asking Johnston to yield for questions, James Eastland engaged his 
Southern colleague in a familiar routine of using pointless queries to ensure an 
emphasis on certain points. In response to Eastland’s question, ‘we are in an era 
of judicial tyranny, are we not?’, Johnston replied, ‘There is no question about 
that in my mind.’95 Perhaps inevitably, the discussion turned to the issue of the 
Supreme Court, with Eastland wondering if Sobeloff ‘has the same philosophy as 
Chief Justice Warren and Associate Justice Black and Associate Justice [William O.] 
Douglas’, to which Johnston replied, ‘His philosophy of life is very closely aligned 
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with their philosophy of life.’96 The South Carolinian concluded by urging the 
Senate ‘to be practical’ by rejecting the Sobeloff nomination.97 Throughout the 
debate, Johnston was able to point to the solid support of Southern Democratic 
Senators from the other Fourth Circuit states, who had signed a petition 
protesting Sobeloff’s confirmation. He later wrote to Senators Sam Ervin and W. 
Kerr Scott of North Carolina, and Harry F. Byrd and A. Willis Robertson of Virginia 
to thank them for their ‘meritorious assistance’ in signing the petition.98 
Throughout their opposition to the nominee, both Johnston and Eastland had 
minimised their references to the segregation issue, but this did not prevent 
South Carolina’s unpredictable junior Senator, Strom Thurmond, from pointing 
out that Sobeloff was ‘a strong advocate of integration of races in the public 
schools.’99 
Following his complaint that the Judiciary Committee had failed to make 
satisfactory investigations into Sobeloff’s background, Johnston’s motion to send 
the nomination back to Committee was defeated by a vote of 63-20. Although the 
nomination was confirmed by the Senate shortly afterwards, by a vote of 64-19 – 
with fifteen Southern Democrats joined in opposition by four Republicans – the 
senior Senator won praise from his home state. 100 State Senator L. Marion 
Gressette believed that Johnston’s fight against Sobeloff ‘was an excellent job and 
will in the long run prove most helpful to our cause,’ while former state Senator 
Huger Sinkler felt that ‘the fight demonstrated both to the country and to Sobeloff 
himself that we are seriously concerned over the progressive encroachment of the 
Federal Judiciary.’101  
Reflecting on his year-long crusade to prevent Sobeloff from reaching the 
Fourth Circuit, Johnston wrote in a letter to attorney James H. Hammond that 
‘without additional support in the final stages it proved impossible,’ but added 
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that ‘possibly the fight against him, though, and the publicity given it, will make 
the people realise what his views are, and I sincerely hope that it may lead him 
toward the path of conservatism, although that seems unlikely.’102 To Huger 
Sinkler, he declared, ‘it is good to know that my people realise the efforts 
extended in the Senate. As you know, people do not often take the time to write 
letters of commendation, and I therefore doubly appreciate your courtesy.’103 In 
writing to acknowledge Johnston’s communication regarding the introduction of a 
new federal judgeship for South Carolina, Governor George Bell Timmerman Jr 
quipped, in his own handwriting at the bottom of the letter, ‘I hope Brownell 
doesn’t attempt to force a Marylander on us. GBT.’104 
To fill the second vacancy on the Fourth Circuit, Strom Thurmond renewed 
his attempt to engineer the appointment of Robert Figg, but his efforts received 
no support from Olin Johnston, whose lack of enthusiasm for Figg was influenced 
by sour memories of Figg’s role as Thurmond’s speechwriter during the latter’s 
challenge to his incumbency in 1950.105 Attorney General Herbert Brownell finally 
consented to the appointment of a South Carolinian judge in the form of Clement 
F. Haynsworth of Greenville.106 The full significance of Haynsworth’s nomination 
to the Fourth Circuit – and the extent of his role in the story of South Carolina and 
the Supreme Court – will be analysed fully in Chapter Six. 
Having established his credentials as a no-nonsense investigator of judicial 
nominees, Olin Johnston became the focus of the press following President 
Eisenhower’s selection of William J. Brennan to replace the outgoing Justice 
Sherman Minton on the Supreme Court. Despite calling for careful scrutiny of the 
nominee’s background, Johnston claimed that he was not planning to initiate a 
concerted opposition to Brennan on a scale similar to his crusade against Sobeloff, 
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maintaining simply that ‘I just don’t know anything about him one way or another 
... but the Supreme Court is so important we should be very careful on all these 
nominations.’107 The Brennan selection had resulted from Eisenhower’s 
programmatic method of sourcing judicial nominees, which in this case demanded 
a conservative Democratic judge from the East Coast, preferably younger than 
sixty-two years of age.108 With the upcoming Presidential Election in mind, 
Eisenhower was keen to target the Catholic vote by re-instating the ‘Catholic seat’ 
which had disappeared from the Court following the death of Justice Frank 
Murphy in 1949.109 
For Johnston’s supporters, Brennan’s faith would become the most 
controversial aspect of his nomination, with one writer declaring ‘never before in 
the history of our country have we been faced with such grave danger as there 
exists today ... I refer to ROMAN CATHOLICISM’, and another, who wished to 
remain anonymous, citing Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy’s unsuccessful 
campaign for the Democratic Vice Presidential nomination as an example of how 
‘the Roman Catholic church wants to control this country of ours, and make us 
slaves to the Pope.’110 As with the anti-Semitic comments he had received during 
the summer, Johnston declined to dignify the anti-Catholic views of his 
supporters. 
With the Sobeloff controversy having died down, Johnston’s reluctance to 
unleash hell on the comparatively inoffensive Supreme Court nominations of 
William Brennan and Charles Evans Whittaker proved that the South Carolinian 
knew how to pick his battles. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, already a 
notorious figure for his communist ‘witch-hunts’, asked to appear before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee so that he could question Brennan at length on the 
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manner in which the nominee had supposedly ‘used the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey as a privileged sanctuary from which to ... conduct guerrilla warfare against 
anyone who would dare attempt to expose individual communists.’111 The 
interrogation, which provoked tense exchanges with Chairman Eastland and also 
Senator O’Mahoney, failed to convince Senators of Brennan’s lack of suitability for 
the Court, and both Brennan and Whittaker were confirmed by unanimous voice 
vote on 19th March 1957.112 
It may seem ironic that Johnston pursued a major battle to prevent Simon 
Sobeloff from reaching the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals while showing little or 
no interest in the nomination to the Supreme Court of William Brennan, a man 
who would later prove to be one of the more uncompromising figures in the 
history of the Warren Court’s judicial activism. On the other hand, while Sobeloff’s 
role in ‘Brown II’ suggested a clear sympathy with the Supreme Court’s order to 
desegregate, there was little in Brennan’s judicial record to indicate that he would 
become one of the Court’s most consistent and influential liberal forces 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.113 Furthermore, the fact that Brennan’s 
selection resulted partly from Eisenhower’s preference for filling Supreme Court 
vacancies with judges not known to him personally – in contrast to the choice of 
Sobeloff, whose role as Solicitor General had him marked as an Administration 
insider – might well have minimised suspicion of one nominee and increased 
suspicion of the other.114 Few have contested Mark Silverstein’s claim that during 
the Eisenhower years, ‘the appointment of federal judges remained a low-key 
affair, with Senators typically unwilling or unable to invest substantial political 
capital in any attempt to challenge judicial nominations.’115 But Johnston’s 
behaviour throughout the Sobeloff controversy suggests that the state of South 
Carolina does not conform to this narrative. As Chapter Three will illustrate, the 
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senior Senator’s obstruction of Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals further re-enforces the importance of research objective (6) in illustrating 
South Carolina’s role in the intense politicisation of lower court, as well as 
Supreme Court, nominations. 
With two new Justices joining Earl Warren and John Marshall Harlan on 
the bench, President Eisenhower appeared to be re-shaping the Supreme Court 
with remarkable speed. Yet the occurrence of two landmark events during 1957 
would only increase the likelihood of Olin Johnston living up to his reputation as a 
formidable Southern presence on the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
 
 
Mallory and Little Rock 
 
The bitterness of the 1950 Senate campaign in South Carolina lingered on in the 
partnership of the state’s two Senators. Despite the cordial relations established 
in the late 1940s, when Johnston was the junior Senator and Thurmond served as 
Governor, the two men never developed a genuine friendship following the battle 
of 1950 and preferred to conduct their business separately whenever possible, 
but the relationship was characterised by a sense of mild antagonism rather than 
outright hostility. During the Senate elections of 1956, when both men were 
seeking re-election but running unopposed in the Democratic Party primaries in 
South Carolina, each ran a ‘nuisance’ candidate against the other in what The 
Charleston News and Courier described as ‘a skirmish to determine which of the 
men will emerge as the state’s number one political boss.’116 Former 
Congresswoman Liz Patterson recalls that her father, Olin Johnston, ‘would take 
people to the Senate dining room and Strom would come over and sit down and 
join them, and then Strom would leave and Daddy would pay the check for Strom 
and everyone. I do remember Daddy would really get sort of upset.’117  
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 Regardless of any ill feeling one may have developed over being 
hoodwinked into paying for the other’s dinner, Johnston and Thurmond remained 
united in their condemnation of the Supreme Court, particularly during the mid-
to-late 1950s, when South Carolina’s conservative political community responded 
to the Brown decision with discussions of ‘interposition’. Essentially a doctrine of 
resistance deriving from James Madison’s notion of each state retaining the right 
and duty to ‘interpose’ themselves between their citizens and the Federal 
Government in order to prevent unreasonable political interference, 
‘interposition’ was resurrected by James J. Kilpatrick, editor of The Richmond 
News Leader, and became the subject of much coverage in the nation’s press, 
particularly after Senator James Eastland’s visit to South Carolina in January 
1956.118 During his address before the state’s Association of Citizens’ Councils, 
Eastland was joined onstage by, among others, Johnston and Thurmond, 
Governor George Bell Timmerman, state Senator Edgar A. Brown, and also Fritz 
Hollings, who had been elected Lieutenant Governor in 1954.119 
The endorsement of interposition may have reassured the state’s 
concerned white conservative voters but the involvement of Thurmond, and, to a 
lesser extent, Johnston, in the creation of the Southern Manifesto of 1956 
suggested that both men saw sense in the insistence of Senator John Sparkman of 
Alabama that Democratic solidarity in the Senate remained the only realistic 
means of preventing the introduction of legislation which might compromise 
Southern state autonomy.120 The manifesto condemned the Supreme Court while 
providing a clear Southern statement of opposition to the Brown ruling, reflecting 
the views of ninety-nine Democrats and two Republicans, including the entire 
congressional delegations of all five Deep South states (Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina) and also Arkansas and Virginia.121 Richard 
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Russell’s claim that Thurmond played a highly significant role in producing the 
document is further suggested by the South Carolinian’s boisterous promotion of 
the manifesto among Senators, particularly his provocative, yet unsuccessful, 
attempt to goad racial moderate Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee to sign the 
document in front of reporters.122 
Scholars of Southern politics have recognised the significance of the 
Southern Manifesto in the story of Thurmond’s segregationist crusade against the 
Supreme Court, with Joseph Crespino claiming that the document ‘initiated for 
Thurmond a war on the Warren Court that became the most consistent theme of 
his politics for the next decade and a half’ and Tony Badger noting that 
Thurmond’s aim ‘was to stir up popular segregationist feeling by convincing 
wavering politicians and their constituents that the Supreme Court could, and 
should, be defied.’123 Yet the simmering cynicism of Olin Johnston is generally 
overlooked, despite the fact that his position on the Judiciary Committee would 
become a powerful weapon in a lengthy anti-Supreme Court campaign, in which 
Thurmond was only one participant. Furthermore, the war of South Carolina on 
the Supreme Court would ultimately transcend the issue of segregation. Although 
Thurmond’s comments on the Southern Manifesto – introduced on the Senate 
floor by Senator Walter F. George of Georgia on 12th March 1956 – included his 
familiar argument that ‘the white people of the South are the greatest minority in 
this country’, the struggle against the Court would in the coming years involve 
issues as diverse as the communist threat, crime and punishment, internal 
security and subversion, affirmative action, religion, obscenity and freedom of 
speech, all of which fuelled the efforts of Thurmond, Johnston and other 
conservative Senators to link the Southern reaction to Brown to their perception 
of a growing national reaction to the Supreme Court’s judicial activism.124 
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Throughout their crusade, they were frequently able to point to the stubborn pro-
civil rights liberalism of Northern Senators as an excuse for their limited gains. This 
was particularly the case during 1958, when both Senators were advising their 
supporters to manage their expectations, with Johnston telling one resident from 
Hammond, Indiana that to pass a bill to introduce a constitutional amendment 
requires ‘a two-thirds vote, which is the problem we Southern Senators have 
faced recently’ and Thurmond complaining to a married couple from Chappells, 
South Carolina that ‘I am afraid the odds will be more strongly against us in the 
new Congress.’125 
Nonetheless, their ‘nationwide’ cause was awarded some degree of 
legitimacy in the many supportive letters sent to them by Americans outside the 
South, and was given a boost during the summer of 1958, when a conference of 
state Chief Justices – of which the Deep South was represented only by Judge 
Taylor H. Stukes of South Carolina – introduced a resolution urging the Supreme 
Court to exercise judicial restraint in matters relating to federalism.126 In their 
report, the Chief Justices echoed the view of Olin Johnston that ‘there seems to 
be a tendency for the Supreme Court to get into the legislative field’ by declaring 
that ‘we are not alone in our view that the Court, in many cases arising under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, has assumed what seem to us primarily legislative 
powers.’127 
 Thurmond’s enthusiasm over the Southern Manifesto had been channelled 
on behalf of the entire Southern delegation, but his behaviour during the debate 
over the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was for many, not least the leader of the Senate’s 
Southern bloc, Richard Russell, an example of the South Carolinian’s willingness to 
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use the race issue to further raise his public profile. Despite agreeing with fellow 
Southerners that a filibuster would be unwise, Thurmond informed his 
constituents that he was ‘prepared to speak at great length and to the full extent 
of my physical capacity when the bill is brought before the Senate for 
consideration.’128 In the event, Thurmond set a record, which remains unbroken, 
by speaking against passage of the Act for twenty-four hours and eighteen 
minutes on 28th and 29th August 1957.129 Fellow Southern Senators, many of 
whom were insisting on the need to maintain solidarity after the damage done by 
Thurmond’s divisive ‘Dixiecrat’ presidential run in 1948, were outraged.130 Russell, 
who feared that Thurmond’s antics would compromise his negotiations over the 
bill with President Eisenhower, slammed the South Carolinian for pursuing 
‘personal political aggrandisement’, to which Thurmond remained indignant, 
arguing that ‘each Senator individually was free to fight the bill as he chose’.131  
 With the battle over the Civil Rights Act raging on in the Senate, two 
landmark events from 1957 would escalate South Carolina’s war on the Supreme 
Court. On 24th June, the Court handed down its decision in Mallory v. United 
States, which involved the conviction and death sentence of black South 
Carolinian Andrew R. Mallory for the rape and assault of a white woman. Finding 
that he had been arrested without probable cause and then interrogated for 
hours on end prior to arraignment, the Court overturned Mallory’s conviction, 
despite the existence of an apparently voluntary confession, and he walked 
free.132 Thurmond employed a predictable choice of words to illustrate his disgust 
over the decision, arguing that ‘the Supreme Court shows more concern for the 
rights of communists and criminals, including rapists and murderers, than it does 
for the protection of the innocent American citizens’, yet these and other remarks 
                                                             
128 Letter from Strom Thurmond to J.R. McVicker, 8th July 1957, Strom Thurmond Collection, Subject Correspondence Series, 
Mss.0100.18, Year 1957, Box 27, Supreme Court July 3-13, 1957. 
129 Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, p.114-5. 
130 See, for example, letter from Richard B. Russell to Olin D. Johnston, 7th June 1949; letter from Olin D. Johnston to Richard 
B. Russell, 9th June 1949, Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative Files, Box 17, Civil Rights. 
131 ‘Won’t Use Act To Punish Dixie, Ike Tells Russell’, The Washington Post-Times Herald, 11th July 1957, pA1; ‘Russell Leads 
Attack on Thurmond’, The Augusta Chronicle, 31st August 1957, p.1, Strom Thurmond Collection, Legislative Assistant 
Series, Mss.0100.15, Box 140, Richard Russell, August 1957-May 1964. 
132 Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, p.108. 
103 
 
expressed during the summer of 1957 formed only the tip of the iceberg with 
regard to the Senator’s personal interest in this case.133  
As a frequent re-offender, Andrew Mallory would unwittingly provide 
Strom Thurmond with years of future opportunities to condemn the liberal 
judicial activism of the Supreme Court. The following year, he read to the 
members of the Senate an editorial in The Washington Evening Star, which 
reported that police were again hunting Mallory on suspicion of housebreaking 
and assault.134 The same year, a so-called ‘anti-Mallory’ bill was passed by the 
House of Representatives, essentially as a means of allowing evidence to be 
entered even when obtained during a delay of arraignment, but this was stalled in 
the Senate.135 By the end of April 1960, when Mallory was facing a new trial for 
rape and burglary charges, the Southern fury over the Court’s original decision to 
set him free now included Senators Sam Ervin of North Carolina, Harry F. Byrd of 
Virginia and Olin Johnston of South Carolina, who collaborated in the introduction 
of legislation to permit trial judges to determine whether a confession was truly 
voluntary, in a decision which would be binding in any future process of judicial 
review.136 The ongoing controversy over the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
criminal justice cases only fuelled Strom Thurmond’s rage, and his attempt to use 
Mallory v. United States as one of the more potent weapons in his interrogation of 
Supreme Court nominee Abe Fortas, covered in Chapter Five, would once again 
emphasise the importance of Andrew Mallory in the story of South Carolina and 
the Supreme Court. 
 The second key event from 1957 that intensified the war on the Court was 
the decision of President Eisenhower to use federal troops to remove Little Rock 
Central High School from the hands of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, who was 
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using the National Guard to prevent the enrolment of nine African American 
students. Eisenhower’s dramatic gesture, which confirmed his willingness to 
ensure the integration of Southern schools through implementation of Brown, 
was met with a chorus of condemnation from Deep South politicians. After urging 
Governor Faubus to ‘proclaim a state of insurrection’, an appalled Olin Johnston 
declared in a letter to Leroy Collins, Governor of Florida, that ‘it is impossible for 
me to fully express my concern over the action taken by President Eisenhower to 
use brute force and troops armed with bayonets and guns at Little Rock.’137 
Johnston’s insistence that the Supreme Court was failing to protect the United 
States from communism was evident in his remarks in the Senate, not least when 
he declared, ‘Mr President, one wonders when the gentlemen of the high court 
will have a rendezvous with reality and recognise the communistic conspiracy in 
America for what it is: a clear and present danger. I recommend to the 
membership of the Supreme Court that no matter how heavy their workload, no 
matter how pressing the demands of their judicial duties, that they take time out 
and read and ponder and reflect on the contents of Mr J. Edgar Hoover’s 
bestseller, Masters of Deceit: The Story of Communism in America and How to 
Fight It.’138 
The outrage over Little Rock served to prolong the delay over W. Wilson 
White’s appointment as head of the Justice Department’s new Civil Rights 
Division, a post created by the 1957 Civil Rights Act, which would empower White 
to ensure the enforcement of voting rights. In outlining his opposition to White’s 
appointment, Strom Thurmond complained that, as Assistant Attorney General, 
the nominee had advised President Eisenhower to send federal troops to 
Arkansas, claiming that ‘Mr White is known in the South as one of those who 
badly bungled the affair in Little Rock. I do not understand how the Administration 
can believe that a man of this reputation will be able to inspire confidence and 
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respect with the Southern people in his work.’139 Observing that White’s 
appointment had remained unconfirmed for eight months, Richard Lyons 
commented in The Washington Post-Times Herald that ‘the Southerners ... have 
put their views on the record again for the folks back home.’140  
The remarkable intervention in the Little Rock integration crisis, combined 
with the grossly unpopular Mallory decision, served to remind Southern 
Democratic Senators of their disgust following the announcement of Brown in 
May 1954. The decision of the Justices in September 1958 to reject the on-going 
delay in the desegregation of Little Rock’s schools underlined the sharp ideological 
divide between North and South in the US Senate. Thurmond claimed that ‘no-
one will rejoice more from this decision than Nikita S. Khrushchev and his 
cohorts’, while Senators Jacob K. Javits of New York and Clifford P. Case of New 
Jersey praised the ruling, with Case arguing that the Court had ‘admirably restated 
the settled doctrine that interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court 
are the supreme law of the land.’141 For Southern Senators, President 
Eisenhower’s actions during the Little Rock affair suggested that the Supreme 
Court’s apparent crusade to destroy the Southern way of life by outlawing 
segregation in public places was now unstoppable. 
With conservative white voters handing out ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ leaflets 
all over the South, the region’s Senators stepped up their efforts to investigate the 
Supreme Court in the hope of finding information which could be used to discredit 
the individual Justices and also the NAACP.142 Richard Russell requested a 
complete breakdown of Thurgood Marshall’s record of cases before the Court, 
while his fellow Georgian, Herman Talmadge, compiled biographical details of all 
Justices serving as of May 1958, noting that five of them had never served on a 
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state Supreme Court or a US Court of Appeals.143 Talmadge’s curiosity even 
extended to enquiries into the origins of Earl Warren’s family name, whereby he 
was informed that the Chief Justice’s father, whose surname was originally 
Varran, came to the USA as an infant from Stavanger, Norway.144  
The condemnatory Southern rhetoric would escalate throughout 1957 and 
1958: having called for the impeachment of Supreme Court Justices who had 
‘curtailed the anti-communist campaigns of Congress’, Thurmond called for ‘total 
and unremitting war on the Supreme Court’s unconstitutional usurpations and 
unlawful arrogations of power’ in a speech before the Citizens’ Committee for 
Constitutional Government in Augusta, Georgia, adding that ‘the federal 
government does not have enough troops to police the entire South, and even if it 
did, race mixing still could not be forced upon a determined, organised and united 
people.’145 The outrage of his South Carolina colleague was just as evident, with 
Johnston pressing for passage of a new bill requiring the Senate to re-confirm all 
Supreme Court Justices every four years, and warning, in a manner which recalled 
his reservations over John Marshall Harlan, that ‘unless the Supreme Court is 
halted on its infamous road, some day it will rule that United States law and our 
beloved Constitution and Bill of Rights will be subservient to some United Nations 
agreement or rule.’146 
With a growing number of Senators becoming convinced that the Supreme 
Court was ignoring the Constitution by pursuing judicial activism, the late 1950s 
saw an increase in the number of bills being introduced in the Senate to curb the 
power of the Justices. For South Carolina’s Senators, this was nothing new, as they 
had been attempting to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court since 1955. 
One of their early attempts, essentially a means of preventing the enforcement of 
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Brown, involved a bill which would give final authority in school segregation cases 
to the district courts. These and other efforts were criticised by supporters of civil 
rights such as Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, who claimed that Johnston and 
Thurmond ‘want to make the Senate a Super Supreme Court to override the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment that equal protection shall be granted 
under the law to all citizens.’147 The Jenner-Butler bill, originally introduced in July 
1957 by Republican Senator William Jenner of Indiana, provided the first realistic 
opportunity for South Carolina to get behind a comprehensive effort to reform 
the power of the Supreme Court. The bill was favoured across the Senate, bringing 
together Southern segregationists and conservative Northern Senators concerned 
with communist subversion.148 At the same time, Southerners supported a House 
Resolution known only as ‘HR3’, introduced as a ‘pure states’ rights’ measure 
which civil rights advocates feared would allow Southern Bar Associations to 
disbar attorneys accepting race-related cases.149 As Stephen Engel has argued, the 
passage in the House of the aforementioned ‘anti-Mallory’ bill only encouraged 
Southerners to pursue further legislative initiatives aimed at the Supreme 
Court.150 
Under pressure from Thurmond, who threatened to attach the more 
aggressive HR3 to every remaining bill on the calendar unless a vote was allowed 
on the Jenner-Butler bill, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson agreed to bring the bill 
before the Senate following the Judiciary Committee’s favourable vote of 10-5.151 
The cunning Texan allowed Jenner to attach his legislation to another bill dealing 
with federal appellate procedure, safe in the knowledge that he had enough votes 
to defeat the latter bill. In the event, the Jenner-Butler bill failed by a vote of 49-
41.152 Shortly afterwards, Johnson was forced to adjourn the Senate to prevent 
passage of HR3 and managed to convince a sufficient number of Senators to vote 
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to return the bill to the Judiciary Committee the following day (by a vote of 41-
40), thus blocking its passage.153  
Despite Johnson’s success in defeating this legislation through his mastery 
of the Senate, the wide support for the Jenner-Butler bill and the near-passage of 
the notorious HR3 provided the first strong indication that the liberalism of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court now constituted a national concern – a claim which 
Johnston and Thurmond had been making for years. The war which began in a 
Charleston courtroom in 1951, when Thurgood Marshall had argued against the 
segregation of schools in Clarendon County, had now been played out in the US 
Senate for half a decade, during which the South Carolina Senators, through 
dogged determination, had contributed to a serious court-curbing agenda to the 
point where the South had very nearly succeeded in denting the awesome judicial 
power of the United States Supreme Court. By the beginning of John F. Kennedy’s 
Presidency in January 1961, Southern conservatives were chairing nine of the 
fifteen Standing Committees in the US Senate.154 With neither death nor 
retirement a likely prospect for any of the ageing Chairmen, Lyndon Johnson, who 
became Kennedy’s Vice President, was reported to have told Senate liberals that a 
desperate ploy of ‘killing off’ a number of elderly Southerners remained their only 
hope of introducing a new civil rights bill.155 
 
 
The Stewart Hearings 
 
By the beginning of 1959, both President Eisenhower and Chief Justice Warren 
were beginning to feel the strain in the continued Southern onslaught that had 
begun with Brown v. Board of Education almost five years earlier. In February, the 
President gave a clear indication of his antipathy toward South Carolina’s Senators 
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in a letter to Ralph McGill, editor of The Atlanta Constitution, in which he referred 
to Olin Johnston and Strom Thurmond as being ‘so entrenched in the prejudices 
and racial antagonism that they never show so much as a glimmer of readiness to 
see the other side of the problem.’156 The same month, Earl Warren tendered his 
resignation from the American Bar Association (ABA) in protest at the 
Association’s criticism of the Supreme Court, and a perceived failure to back the 
Court in the war over Brown.157 
Despite the President’s resentment of Johnston and Thurmond, there is 
evidence that the obstruction of Southern Senators had become a significant 
influence in Eisenhower’s selection process for Supreme Court Justices. In a letter 
to his new Attorney General, William P. Rogers, Eisenhower sounded sceptical of 
Rogers’s recommendation of his predecessor, Herbert Brownell, as a replacement 
for outgoing Justice Harold Hitz Burton, on the grounds that Southerners ‘would 
point out that *Brownell+ was Attorney General when the Supreme Court’s 
integration orders conforming to the decision of 1954 were promulgated.’158 If 
David A. Nichols is correct that Eisenhower and Brownell were ‘grooming’ Simon 
Sobeloff for a seat on the high court in 1956, the President’s comment to Rogers 
regarding Brownell suggests that Eisenhower had almost certainly re-considered 
this move in the wake of Johnston’s crusade against Sobeloff, and also the Little 
Rock crisis.159 Conscious of the fact that Hugo Black was the only remaining 
Southern Justice on the Court by the summer of 1958, the President added the 
name of Judge Elbert Tuttle, of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, to the shortlist 
of candidates, in addition to Kenneth Royall, who had served as Harry Truman’s 
Secretary of the Army, in that ‘he, too, is of Southern origin.’ Ultimately, 
Eisenhower decided against both Southern candidates: Tuttle’s support for Brown 
would have proved fatal if he were nominated, while Royall was passed over 
because ‘he is a Democrat and I do not want to further overbalance the Court as 
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between the two major parties.’160 The President settled on the selection of Judge 
Potter Stewart, of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, who, like the outgoing Justice 
Burton, was from the state of Ohio. 
By the time that Stewart was officially nominated, he had been serving on 
the Supreme Court on a recess appointment for three months, a situation that, 
according to The Philadelphia Inquirer, caused concern among Northern and 
Southern Senators that ‘Mr Eisenhower had robbed the Senate of some of its 
control over the nomination.’161 One particularly unhappy Northerner was 
freshman Senator Philip A. Hart of Michigan, who complained that recess 
appointments ‘hamper the Senate in performing its constitutional duty of 
confirmation’ in the sense that a Supreme Court nominee who has already served 
for several months can always argue that his service prevents him from answering 
questions relating to his judicial positions on issues currently before the Court.162 
Hart, who would later introduce a Senate resolution to discourage the use of 
recess appointments to the Supreme Court, also observed that the presidential 
practice of placing individuals in office months before the Senate is able to 
scrutinise and confirm them ‘had not been used for more than a century until Mr 
Eisenhower named Earl Warren as Chief Justice in 1953.’163  
Southern Democrats, led by Richard Russell, were only too happy to 
emphasise the recess appointment controversy, if only as a means of 
demonstrating that their concerns over Stewart’s views on segregation did not 
constitute the sole reason for their opposition. Nonetheless, Southern Senators 
began discussing the segregation issue far more openly than before. While 
Chairman Eastland expressed doubts that Stewart would offer fair rulings on ‘the 
greatest domestic question before the country today: racial integration,’ Russell 
complained that the nomination was part of a Justice Department scheme to 
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‘perpetuate some recent decisions of the Court in segregation rulings, which were 
partly based on amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Justice Department.’164 The 
Georgian offered little in the way of evidence, but, as both Michael Kahn and 
David A. Nichols have argued, Eisenhower remained committed to the 
appointment of judges who would support desegregation, and, in the process, 
constructed ‘a judicial edifice that would withstand Southern and conservative 
efforts to undermine Brown v. Board of Education.’165 This theory is further 
supported by remarks made by Stewart himself during his confirmation hearings: 
when asked for his views on the Brown ruling, he declared, ‘I would not like you to 
vote for me on the assumption ... that I am dedicated to overturning that decision. 
Because I am not.’166 
The Stewart confirmation hearings proved to be a landmark event, firstly, 
because of the willingness of Southern Senators, five years on from the 
announcement of Brown, to discuss the segregation issue openly during 
deliberations over nominations to the Supreme Court. Olin Johnston provided an 
example early on during the hearings: 
 
Senator Johnston (South Carolina): Let us get down to the question in my 
state, the public school question there. In what way was it changed in 1954 
– the law – in what way was it changed? How was the Constitution 
changed? The interpretation of what the Constitution meant? 
Mr Stewart: Well, as I understand that decision – as I understand that 
decision, it held that it was a denial of equal protection of the laws for a 
state in the public school system to discriminate against school children 
exclusively on the basis of race. To my knowledge – I may be mistaken – 
there never has been a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
contrary to that. I don’t know that I agree that the Constitution was 
changed by that decision.167 
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 Secondly, with Stewart continuing to respond carefully and awkwardly to 
questions on the same subject offered by Senator John McClellan of Arkansas, the 
hearings took a bizarre and confrontational turn. Senator Thomas C. Hennings of 
Missouri raised a point of order, claiming ‘I do not think it proper to inquire of a 
nominee for this court or any other his opinion as to any of the decisions or the 
reasoning upon decisions which have heretofore been handed down by that 
court.’168 When Chairman Eastland suggested that Hennings was attempting to 
‘gag’ members of the Committee, the hearings descended into chaos, with a 
North-South stand-off emerging quickly and dramatically: 
 
 Senator Hennings: Mr Chairman, I did not use the word “gag”. 
The Chairman: All right. It means that the Committee is censoring Senator 
McClellan in denying him the right to ask a question that he thinks is 
necessary in order for him to ascertain how to officially act in this matter. 
Senator Hennings: I did not interrupt him. 
The Chairman: You did not interrupt. If the Committee says he can’t ask 
such a question, if it so rules, of course, he is – 
 Senator Hennings: May I complete my statement? 
 Senator O’Mahoney: Will the Senator from Missouri yield to me? 
Senator Hennings: Please, I do not believe, Mr Chairman, that the word 
“gag” is an appropriate one. 
 The Chairman: All right. 
Senator Hennings: Many, many questions have been asked by members of 
the Committee of the gentleman who presented himself here – many 
proper questions. I do not believe it is gagging, as the Chair is pleased to 
use the word, when a court overrules a question in a trial. That is not 
gagging counsel. 
The Chairman: I know, but I don’t think that you can – 
Senator Hennings: I believe this Committee is proceeding in a lawyer-like 
fashion. 
The Chairman: If this Justice decides that the question is improper he can 
decide that.169 
  
 While the controversial nominations of the 1960s and beyond, covered in 
future chapters, often showcased a confrontation between a Senator and a 
nominee, the Stewart hearings were unique for the manner in which the nominee 
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sat patiently and waited while members of the Committee argued amongst 
themselves throughout a dispute which reportedly lasted for an hour, and very 
nearly had to be settled by a roll call vote proposed by Senator William Langer.170 
Although one of the less distinguished moments in the history of Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings, Hennings’s point of order was, for LA Scott Powe, a 
watershed moment in the history of Senatorial interrogation of nominees on their 
constitutional positions, in that the Supreme Court’s dramatically increasing 
significance in American life was now beginning to demand a more intense form 
of scrutiny from the Judiciary Committee.171 With Southerners now prepared to 
discuss Brown openly during confirmation hearings, future confrontations over 
Supreme Court nominations became inevitable, as Chapters Four, Five and Six will 
illustrate. 
 James Eastland delayed the Committee’s consideration of the Stewart 
nomination long enough for Johnston to compile a 12-page report that 
condemned the practice of recess appointments. As The Washington Post-Times 
Herald noted, it was not until the final sentence of the report that Senators 
opposed Stewart personally on the grounds that the nominee ‘thinks the Supreme 
Court has the power to legislate and to amend the Constitution of the United 
States.’172 Following Committee approval by a vote of 12-3, Stewart was 
confirmed by a vote of 70-17, with the opposition consisting of all Senators from 
the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Virginia, joined by Senator Spessard Holland of Florida.173 
Strom Thurmond spoke for many in the Southern bloc by speculating that Stewart 
would be ‘an improvement over the other occupants of seats on the Supreme 
bench; but when I make that statement, I must add that, in my opinion, he would 
                                                             
170 Unknown headline, The Washington Post-Times Herald, 10th April 1959, William P. Rogers Papers, Series VII: Scrapbook, 
1938-61, Box 66, Folder 3. 
171 L.A. Scott Powe, ‘The Senate and the Court: Questioning a Nominee’, Texas Law Review 54 (1975-6), pp.891-902; p.898. 
172 Unknown headline, The Washington Post-Times Herald, 30th April 1959, William P. Rogers Papers, Series VII: Scrapbook, 
1938-61, Box 66, Folder 3. 
173 ‘Roll Call Vote in Senate on Stewart Nomination’, The New York Times, 6th May 1959, William P. Rogers Papers, Series VII: 
Scrapbook, 1938-61, Box 66, Folder 3. 
114 
 
not have to be too good a lawyer to be an improvement.’174 Despite Philip Hart’s 
agreement with Southerners on the recess appointment issue, the Michigander 
ultimately voted to confirm, as did the moderate Estes Kefauver of Tennessee.175 
While the court-curbing bills and the issue of recess appointments had 
temporarily united Senators from all regions, the Stewart hearings provided a 
stark reminder that Brown v. Board of Education would remain a powerful source 
of intense disagreement between North and South. Thanks in no small part to the 
Southern influence on the Senate Judiciary Committee, the confrontational era of 
the Senate’s consideration of Supreme Court nominations had arrived. 
 
 
The Old Frontier 
 
For most of the 1950s, the war of South Carolina’s Senators on the US Supreme 
Court differed little from the war waged by most other Deep South Democrats on 
the very same target. With all Southern states showcasing a strong interest in 
reducing the power of the Justices in order to preserve their regional autonomy, 
Johnston and Thurmond formed only part of a collective Southern anti-Court 
crusade to assure the folks back home of an unwavering support for the 
maintenance of racial segregation. Although it would not be until the 1960s that 
the South Carolina Senators would truly stand out in the conflicts over judicial 
nominations, it is clear from Johnston’s crusade against Simon Sobeloff and 
Thurmond’s determination to talk himself hoarse when opposing the Civil Rights 
Act that the South Carolinian trait of resistance outlined in the Introduction was 
alive and well during the decade covered in this chapter. With the Sobeloff 
opposition, Johnston provided an indication of his later crusade to block the 
nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, covered 
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in Chapter Three, while the passion, provocation and stamina displayed by 
Thurmond in pushing the Southern Manifesto and fighting the Civil Rights Act 
would be evident once again in his determined opposition to the Supreme Court 
nomination of Abe Fortas, covered in Chapter Five. 
Despite their willingness to work together in a co-ordinated agenda of 
obstructionism, the South Carolina Senators’ attack on the Supreme Court 
nominees of the 1950s was, as with the attack of the other Southern states, 
limited by a watering down of segregationist rhetoric in order to build a 
formidable coalition and avoid Northern dismissal of Southern interests. More 
often than not, the need to establish further criticism would lead to accusations of 
a lack of judicial experience, which became relevant in the case of John Marshall 
Harlan, or a lack of ‘etiquette’ on the part of Eisenhower in making his 
appointments, which became a critical issue with both Simon Sobeloff and Potter 
Stewart. The insistence of Johnston, Thurmond and other Southerners that the 
Supreme Court, under Earl Warren’s leadership, was facilitating communist 
subversion became a powerful weapon in the fight over the court-curbing bills 
introduced throughout this era, which came close to compromising the Supreme 
Court’s power in the summer of 1958. 
Deep South Democrat Senators appeared to have achieved very little in 
using their powers of advice and consent in the nomination process for Supreme 
Court Justices during the 1950s. They failed to engineer any rejections, and their 
obstructionism failed to convince Eisenhower to select Supreme Court nominees 
considered acceptable to the South. Eisenhower’s commitment to naming Justices 
who would uphold the 1954 decision was painfully clear during John McClellan’s 
questioning of Potter Stewart over Brown. As The Washington Post-Times Herald 
reported, ‘Stewart said that coming from Ohio, he had not been “shocked” by the 
decision.’176 
On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to conclude that South 
Carolina’s crusade was entirely without success during this decade, for two 
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important reasons. Firstly, the insistence of Johnston and Thurmond that the 
Supreme Court posed a national, rather than regional, threat to American 
interests appeared to gain legitimacy before the end of the decade, with Northern 
Senators collaborating with the Southern bloc in supporting court-curbing bills, 
and also in joining their criticism of Eisenhower’s recess appointments. Secondly, 
although the Administration, the press, and Senators from Northern states 
remained unconvinced by the arguments of Southerners that their obstruction in 
the nomination process was not due solely to an interest in the segregation issue, 
it remains the case that Johnston and Thurmond were able to create a 
comprehensive anti-Supreme Court agenda during the 1950s, which would 
influence the emergence of the highly politicised Supreme Court nomination 
process during the following decade. Their strategy of linking the Court’s power to 
concerns over states’ rights, US sovereignty and communism would be expanded 
over the next decade, to include, as future chapters will explain, crime and 
punishment, prayer in schools, legislative apportionment, obscenity, voting rights 
and freedom of speech. This greatly-expanded range of political issues would give 
further potency to the continued Southern complaints over the Justices’ lack of 
judicial experience, and their continued criticism of the Court for not following the 
‘strict constructionist’ doctrine of applying only the actual words of the 
Constitution in line with their original meaning, as intended when drafted by the 
nation’s Founding Fathers. Although Eisenhower refused to nominate judges who 
would endanger the survival of Brown, his consideration of John J. Parker, John W. 
Davis, Elbert Tuttle and Kenneth Royall, and his agreement to appoint Clement 
Haynsworth to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, suggests that the President 
was forced to acknowledge and tolerate the pressure from Southern Democrats 
to name judges with judicial philosophies which would accommodate the 
segregationist agenda. As Chapter Three will show, the judicial nominations of his 
Democratic successor, John F. Kennedy, were also made in the shadow of the 
Southern segregationist influence. 
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The issue of race would remain at the heart of South Carolinian 
obstruction to future nominees to the Judiciary. Thurgood Marshall’s nomination 
to the Second Circuit, and later, his nomination to the Supreme Court, would 
prove a far bigger threat to South Carolina’s Senators than any of the judicial 
appointments made during the 1950s. Potter Stewart’s success in facing down 
Dixie suggested that increasing demands were being placed on Supreme Court 
nominees during the era of civil rights, but, as Chapters Three and Four will 
illustrate, the Stewart hearings ultimately gave little indication of the lengths to 
which Olin Johnston, Strom Thurmond and, later, Senator Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, 
were prepared to go in defending the Southern – and South Carolinian – way of 
life. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
Thurgood Marshall Faces Down Dixie 
 
 
 
When historians of the future write about weird proceedings in the Senate, 
this hearing will occupy a most peculiar chapter.1 
 
Philip A. Hart, 20th August 1962 
 
 
When Senator Philip Hart of Michigan made this statement, his comments were 
not solely for the benefit of future historians of US politics with an unusual 
passion for the process of judicial nominations. The statement was one of the 
more mild criticisms being aimed at Senator Olin D. Johnston for using his 
seniority on the Senate Judiciary Committee to delay and obstruct President John 
F. Kennedy’s appointment of Thurgood Marshall – black lawyer, civil rights hero 
and future Justice of the Supreme Court – to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Although he was unable to keep Marshall from the federal bench, the senior 
Senator from South Carolina managed to provoke a wave of criticism that united 
President Kennedy with various members of the US Senate from the Democratic 
and Republican parties, several national newspapers, and a great many black and 
white Americans throughout the United States. 
The Marshall Second Circuit affair provides a rare moment in which South 
Carolina’s obsession with the power of the Federal Judiciary was laid bare before 
the nation without the active participation of the state’s controversial junior 
Senator, Strom Thurmond. With Thurmond yet to take a seat on the Judiciary 
Committee and Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings – elected Governor in 1958 – yet to reach 
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Washington, DC as the state’s next Senator, it was left to Olin Johnston to stand 
between Thurgood Marshall and a position on the Second Circuit, even if this 
obstruction counted for little more than an assurance to white South Carolinians 
that Marshall’s argument before the Supreme Court in the Brown v. Board of 
Education case had not been forgotten. As Chairman of the sub-committee which 
would scrutinise Marshall’s appointment, Johnston would have the power to 
determine the scheduling of the hearings, to call witnesses, to decide on the 
relevance of submitted materials or particular lines of questioning, and, most 
importantly for South Carolina’s political establishment, to ensure the inclusion of 
Southern voices in the debate over Marshall’s suitability for the Federal Judiciary. 
As the previous chapter has explained, Johnston’s opposition to the nomination of 
Simon Sobeloff to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals represented the first hotly-
contested judicial nomination following the announcement of the Brown decision. 
With Marshall’s nomination to the Second Circuit, the mild-mannered Johnston 
adopted an altogether more blatant form of obstruction, and rarely had South 
Carolina’s scathing attitude toward the Supreme Court been so evident in the 
actions of one man acting alone. 
 While this chapter may or may not do justice to Senator Hart’s prediction, 
it will function as an illustration of research objective (2) by explaining the 
disproportionate influence of South Carolina’s political agenda on a national scale, 
and also research objective (5), by analysing the belligerent actions of the much-
overlooked Olin Johnston in the increasingly combative arena of the judicial 
nominations process. It should be remembered that although Marshall had been 
nominated for a Circuit Court, rather than a Supreme Court, position, the nation’s 
highest court remained the backdrop to this drama, for three reasons. Firstly, 
Johnston’s tactics were influenced to a great extent by South Carolina’s ongoing 
war on the Earl Warren-led Supreme Court of the 1950s and 1960s: while waiting 
to be confirmed by the Judiciary Committee, Marshall served on the Second 
Circuit on a recess appointment for a ten-month period, during which the 
Supreme Court handed down two of the most important rulings of the Warren 
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Court era. Both Baker v. Carr, which gave federal courts the power of intervention 
in matters relating to malapportioned legislatures, and Engel v. Vitale, which ruled 
teacher-led prayer in public schools to be unconstitutional, were met with 
condemnation from the South, where both decisions were viewed as dangerous 
developments in the Supreme Court’s repeated encroachment into the autonomy 
of the Southern states. The sheer magnitude of such rulings meant that the 
nomination of any prominent liberal to a position on the Federal Judiciary would 
inevitably be handled with extreme caution by Southern Senators.  
Secondly, it is clear that Johnston’s obstructionism was influenced in part 
by a concern that if Marshall was to be given an easy ride for a Circuit Court 
appointment, there may be a risk of Kennedy or a future President promoting him 
to the Supreme Court.2 If this was the case, Johnston’s fears proved well-founded: 
having faced down the quiet but determined Johnston to secure his Second Circuit 
appointment in 1962, Marshall would later face an onslaught of sustained 
provocation at the hands of the abrasive Strom Thurmond after President Lyndon 
Johnson selected him as the first African American Supreme Court nominee in the 
nation’s history, in 1967. Johnston’s lonely campaign during the Second Circuit 
hearings provided only the first stage in South Carolina’s resistance to Marshall’s 
career advancement. By 1967, the stakes were even higher, and, as Chapter Five 
will illustrate, both Thurmond and Fritz Hollings would make their own unique 
contributions to Marshall’s long journey to the Supreme Court. 
Thirdly, given that Johnston and Thurmond had placed such an emphasis 
on standards of qualification for Supreme Court nominees during the late 1950s, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, it was imperative that Johnston pursued 
these standards ruthlessly when scrutinising Marshall, who, in 1961, was only the 
second African American appointed to a federal judicial position, and the first 
since the announcement of the much-hated Brown decision in 1954. As with the 
Sobeloff episode covered in the previous chapter, the demands of South 
Carolina’s internal politics temporarily shifted Johnston’s attention from the 
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Supreme Court nomination process to the appointments being made to the lower 
courts, yet with the Supreme Court’s influence continuing to provide the impetus 
for his obstructionism. In this regard, this chapter will substantiate research 
objective (6) by highlighting not only the importance of lower court appointments 
in South Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court, but also the contribution of the 
state’s Senators to the intensification of the nomination process as it applied to 
the Courts of Appeal. 
 The chapter opens by providing, for the purposes of historical context, an 
outline of Thurgood Marshall’s role in the landmark case of Briggs v. Elliott – 
which would later form an essential component of the Brown decision – and also 
a brief but relevant account of Olin Johnston’s journey to the US Senate. There 
follows an in-depth account of the confirmation hearings, with a particular 
emphasis on Johnston’s role at the centre of South Carolina’s political 
development during the early 1960s, after which the chapter argues that the 
influence of the Southern members of the Judiciary Committee had become 
evident in the co-ordinated efforts of the Kennedy Justice Department to prepare 
nominees for the ordeal of facing down Dixie during their confirmation hearings. 
Concluding remarks will then be offered to situate the Marshall Second Circuit 
controversy in the wider context of the South Carolinian influence on the judicial 
nominations process. 
 
 
Home of the White Man’s Soul 
 
Of all the men and women who have sat before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
none has better known the experience of facing down Dixie than Thurgood 
Marshall, and few were better prepared for the cynicism, attempted smears and 
gruelling questions which Southern Judiciary Committee members were prepared 
to offer judicial nominees by the early 1960s. During his time as Chief Counsel for 
the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) Legal 
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Defense Fund, Marshall argued thirty-two cases before the US Supreme Court, 
winning on twenty-nine occasions.3 Each of these cases constituted a landmark 
decision in the Court’s history, establishing Marshall’s reputation as a hero of the 
civil rights movement: with Shelly v. Kraemer (1948), Marshall persuaded the 
Court to strike down the enforcement of racially-restrictive covenants, while in 
the cases of Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (both 
1950), he convinced all nine of the Court’s Justices to strike down racial 
discrimination in graduate education institutions.4 Although the ground-breaking 
Sweatt and McLaurin triumphs had given him the confidence to seek out a new 
case involving segregated education in schools, Marshall understood that each 
and every victory he scored for African American rights also constituted a hammer 
blow to the ‘Southern’ way of life. Psychologist Kenneth Clark, whose research 
into child psychology would prove vitally important in Marshall’s successful Brown 
argument a few years later, recalled travelling with Marshall by train to South 
Carolina in 1951. It was not Marshall’s first visit to the state, as he had already 
argued successfully for equal pay for black teachers there in 1944, and also for an 
end to the state’s all-white primary system in 1947, but Clark noticed Marshall’s 
demeanour change considerably as the train went deeper into the South, looking 
gradually more serious and offering little other than the solemn declaration that 
he was ‘tired of trying to save the white man’s soul.’5 
Nonetheless, Marshall’s visit to South Carolina in 1951 to argue against 
Clarendon County’s system of segregated schooling proved to be one of the 
defining moments of the civil rights era.6 Having found twenty black South 
Carolinian parents who were willing to attach their names to an NAACP legal brief 
despite the risk of losing their employment, Marshall planned only to criticise the 
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disparities between black and white schools in Clarendon County.7 Of the three-
judge panel hearing the case, one judge would prove to be sympathetic toward, 
even enthusiastic for, Marshall’s argument: Judge J. Waties Waring had 
established himself as a notorious figure in the South only a few years earlier 
when he had nullified the attempt of Olin Johnston and other senior Democrats to 
abolish the South Carolina primary system following the Supreme Court’s Smith v. 
Allwright decision.8 As if this act of defiance had not been enough, Waring had 
made no secret of his sympathy with Thurgood Marshall’s anti-segregation 
arguments when the latter came to South Carolina to challenge the all-white 
primary and the state’s treatment of black teachers.9 One particularly notable 
irony in the story of Thurgood Marshall and South Carolina is the manner in which 
Judge Waring inspired Marshall to question the constitutionality of segregation 
per se.10 Having once again defied the white Southern establishment by inviting 
Marshall to dinner at his home, Waring shared with Marshall his personal view 
that the original NAACP brief – dealing solely with the racial inequalities in 
Clarendon County’s school system – did not go far enough. Despite being startled 
by the judge’s suggestion that he make a case for the unconstitutionality of 
segregation itself, Marshall followed Waring’s advice, and, after redrafting his 
brief, argued in court that the entire system of segregated schooling had a 
corrosive effect on black children, causing lasting mental and emotional damage. 
South Carolina’s counsel, Robert M. Figg Jr, was able to neutralise 
Marshall’s argument by making the surprising concession that the quality of the 
state’s black schools was not on a par with schools for white children, and that the 
differences could and would be addressed during a period of state investment.11 
The other two members of the three-judge panel – South Carolinian George Bell 
Timmerman, and North Carolinian John J. Parker, who had been an unsuccessful 
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nominee for the Supreme Court in 1930 – sided with Figg, indicating an 
expectation that the state’s schools would be made ‘equal’ within six months. 
Waring remained supportive of Marshall on the bench: not only did he re-iterate 
Marshall’s arguments during the hearing, he also requested that Chief Judge 
Parker order repairmen to cease work on the street outside, as the sound of 
pounding jackhammers mysteriously started up every time Thurgood Marshall 
began speaking.12 Following the final presentations of the hearing, Waring 
returned home and complained bitterly to his wife about the manner in which the 
other two judges had dismissed Marshall’s argument, claiming he had told them 
that Governor James F. Byrnes – who, as explained in the previous chapter, had 
instructed Figg to off-set Marshall’s case by admitting to the disgraceful state of 
South Carolina’s black schools – was ‘no better and even worse than Thurmond.’13 
It is highly significant that Marshall was inspired, encouraged and even 
pushed to make his ground-breaking Briggs argument by a member of South 
Carolina’s white legal establishment. The fact that the same argument would be 
used by Marshall three years later to change the course of American history with 
Brown only makes Judge Waring’s courage in the face of enormous social and 
political pressure seem even more remarkable. Yet the judge would pay a heavy 
price for siding with Marshall in Briggs. His refusal to go along with Judge 
Timmerman and Chief Judge Parker led to an onslaught of personal abuse which 
finally drove him out of Charleston and into retirement.14 Following Waring’s 
replacement by the segregationist Judge Ashton H. Williams, Marshall’s case was 
rejected unanimously when the panel reconvened in March 1952 to hear the 
appeal. Their conclusion was that the state of South Carolina had improved the 
quality of its black schools sufficiently.15 Spectators had travelled miles to watch 
the NAACP hero face down the white legal establishment, and over five hundred 
of them had attempted, in ninety-degree heat, to squeeze into a courtroom which 
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would seat only seventy-five.16 Marshall, who was asked at one point by Chief 
Judge Parker to instruct the excitable crowd to settle down, later pointed out that 
this chaotic scene made a mockery of white Southern claims that black Americans 
were content to live under segregation.17 Despite being viewed as a messiah 
figure by the enormous black crowd, Marshall was reminded of the white 
Southern attitude toward his crusade at the close of proceedings, when one South 
Carolinian lawyer shouted out, ‘If you ever show your black ass in Clarendon 
County again, you’ll be dead.’18 
Although defeated in South Carolina, Marshall’s experience there provided 
the momentum for a bigger challenge to segregated schools that would have far 
greater implications. When, in 1953, he was given another opportunity to make 
the argument suggested to him by Judge Waring, it would be before the Justices 
of the US Supreme Court. The 1953-54 hearings grouped together Briggs and four 
other cases relating to schools, and resulted in the landmark Brown decision, 
which invalidated completely all systems of segregation in public schools in the 
United States. Although delighted by his triumph, the words offered by legendary 
lawyer John W. Davis as he shook Marshall’s hand and conceded defeat (quoted 
at the beginning of the previous chapter) almost certainly reminded Marshall that 
years of trouble lay ahead, with most of it in all probability originating in the 
Southern states.19 
 
 
Accommodating the South 
 
While the politicians of the South Carolina lowcountry, with its dense African 
American population, were unable to escape what V.O. Key has characterised as 
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the state’s pre-occupation with race issues, the enigmatic upcountryman Olin D. 
Johnston was able to win election as the state’s Governor in 1934 by focusing on 
New Deal and class-related matters.20 The existence of segregated unions ensured 
that the activism of a small number of black workers was successfully contained, 
resulting in little interest in race on the part of white upcountry mill workers 
during the 1930s, yet the apparent freedom of campaigning on a New Deal 
platform which neglected racial tensions within the mill communities would prove 
to be a temporary luxury for Governor Johnston.21 In the run-up to the 1938 
Senate election, President Franklin D. Roosevelt endorsed Johnston as his 
candidate as part of an attempted purge of New Deal critics ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith in 
South Carolina and Walter F. George in Georgia.22 Despite Roosevelt’s popularity 
in the state, his endorsement cost Johnston badly, with South Carolinians 
resenting the President’s interference in the campaign. Johnston’s support for the 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) was not appreciated in regions where 
voters remained hostile to workers’ rights, and despite winning the mill precincts 
overwhelmingly, his reluctance to pursue the race issue would cost him badly in 
the ‘black belt’ counties, where ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith maintained his support base 
with an uncompromising stand for white supremacy.23 
The growing intensity of the race issue during the 1940s, as evidenced by 
the rapidly-increasing membership of the NAACP, and the need for candidates to 
appeal to voters in all regions of the state, not least the deeply conservative 
counties of the lowcountry, forced Johnston to reconsider the extent to which he 
would use race in a future run for the Senate.24 In a re-match with the ailing Smith 
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in 1944, Johnston made the Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright decision a central 
theme in his campaign by leading the fight against the ruling of the nine Justices 
that the all-white primary system was unconstitutional.25 He had attempted 
during the 1938 campaign to dismiss the race issue by claiming that ‘every 
Southerner’ was opposed to the Costigan-Wagner anti-lynching bill ‘and it’s not an 
issue in this campaign,’ but his approach had changed markedly by 1944.26 
Johnston’s reluctance to promote his white supremacist credentials is quite 
evident in the various versions of a speech from that year’s Senate campaign, with 
a draft dated 14th June containing the claim that ‘I am not now, and have never 
been, in favour of social or political equality of the white and black races,’ while 
still making clear that ‘I do not intend to base my campaign to the high office of 
the United States Senate on this issue.’27 However, by 24th July – the day before 
polling day – the paragraph in question had been expanded considerably to 
include the claim that ‘as soon as the Supreme Court handed down its decision ... I 
immediately called a special session and recommended legislation that was 
passed by a unanimous vote of both the House and Senate which assured the 
people of South Carolina white Democratic government. Had it not been for my 
action, tomorrow you would be walking along with Negroes to the ballot box.’28  
Although the Governor’s stand against the Supreme Court proved popular 
with conservative voters, who elected him to the Senate the following day, his 
attempt to reform the state’s primary system was ultimately foiled three years 
later by none other than Judge J. Waties Waring of the US District Court in 
Charleston. In his ruling in Elmore v. Rice (1947), Waring declared that ‘it is time 
for South Carolina to re-join the Union. It is time to fall in step with the other 
states and to adopt the American way of conducting elections.’29 With South 
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Carolina’s newspapers condemning the ruling, and the Ku Klux Klan leaving 
burning crosses outside his home, Waring became the subject of an unsuccessful 
impeachment attempt led by Congressman L. Mendel Rivers.30 A brief preview of 
the Southern reaction to Brown seven years later was offered by Governor Strom 
Thurmond’s claim that he was ‘shocked’ by the Elmore decision.31 Johnston would 
later refer to the controversial Charlestonian as ‘the obnoxious Judge J. Waties 
Waring of Charleston, who ... left his party and our way of life.’32 
Alongside fellow New Deal liberal Southerners such as Lister Hill of 
Alabama, Johnston signed the Southern Manifesto without question.33 He also 
kept up, albeit very carefully, a relationship with conservative organisations such 
as the white Citizens’ Councils, formed as a means of community resistance in 
response to the Brown decision, regularly appearing at anti-desegregation rallies 
and other events across South Carolina, and responded courteously to letters 
from Council officials.34 The Senator’s handling of the judicial nominations made 
by President Dwight D. Eisenhower – particularly the Fourth Circuit nomination of 
Simon Sobeloff – provided an early indication of Johnston’s willingness to use his 
influence on the Senate Judiciary Committee to maintain his conservative 
credentials on the segregation issue. 
Eisenhower’s successor in the White House had declared an intention to 
promote black judges to the federal bench during his presidential campaign in 
1960, but John F. Kennedy hesitated before nominating Thurgood Marshall to fill a 
vacancy on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.35 While Marshall had the support 
of the Administration’s chief black advisor, Louis Martin, and also Kennedy’s 
considerable number of black supporters, the President was advised by his 
brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, that a Marshall appointment would 
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have to be achieved in defiance of Southern objections, which might prove 
politically costly if and when Southern support was required for the 
Administration’s legislative proposals.36 After Marshall refused a District Court 
appointment, Kennedy nominated him to the Second Circuit over the objection of 
his brother, only for the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the leadership of 
Chairman James Eastland of Mississippi, to put an immediate delay on 
confirmation hearings.37 Knowing that the Committee would hold up the 
nomination indefinitely, Kennedy gave Marshall a recess appointment on 5th 
October 1961, allowing him to serve on the Second Circuit on the condition that 
he would be scrutinised and confirmed when Eastland finally agreed to hold 
hearings.38 
The President re-submitted Marshall’s name on 15th January 1962, but the 
nomination was still in limbo on 1st April, when Justice Charles Evans Whittaker 
retired from the Supreme Court, giving the President and his brother the brand 
new dilemma of whether or not to offer the nomination of another black judge, 
this time for the nation’s most powerful court.39 The obvious candidate was Judge 
William H. Hastie, who had, in 1949, become the first black judge ever appointed 
to a US Court of Appeals when nominated by President Harry S. Truman.40 Despite 
particularly enthusiastic support from Robert Kennedy, Hastie eventually lost out 
to Deputy US Attorney General Byron White, as President Kennedy did not wish to 
risk another confrontation with Southern Senators following his unsuccessful 
attempt to create a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under 
the leadership of black economist Robert C. Weaver.41 Like Hastie, Weaver had 
been a member of Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘black cabinet’ in the 1930s, a group which 
– as Southern Senators would have recalled – gathered together prominent black 
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Americans into a loosely-co-ordinated group which would theoretically influence 
federal policies relating to race relations in the 1930s.42 Kennedy remained 
concerned that a Hastie nomination would jeopardise the support of senior 
Southerners such as Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert C. Byrd of West 
Virginia, whose influence was necessary to ensure the smooth passage of the 
Administration’s economic reforms through Congress.43 Furthermore, Kennedy 
was mindful of the fact that Marshall’s Second Circuit appointment had still not 
been approved by the Senate after six months, and the nomination of Hastie for 
the Supreme Court might be seen as a provocative act by Chairman Eastland. 
On 22nd February, Eastland handpicked three Senators to sit as a sub-
committee to scrutinise Thurgood Marshall’s nomination: Democrat John 
McClellan of Arkansas, Republican Roman Hruska of Nebraska, and, to chair the 
sub-committee, Democrat Olin Johnston of South Carolina.44 The appointment of 
Johnston as Chair proved critical in determining the course of events.  By now a 
senior member of the Judiciary Committee, the South Carolinian would no doubt 
have recalled that William Hastie had stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Marshall 
when making the NAACP’s case for the unconstitutionality of the all-white primary 
during the Supreme Court’s hearings for the Smith case.45 The pressure mounting 
on Johnston to pursue a war on the Court only grew throughout 1961, during 
which he received a string of letters from Southern voters, urging him to add his 
support to the campaign of The John Birch Society to impeach Chief Justice Earl 
Warren. Despite adopting a cautious tone in some of his responses by reminding 
his constituents that all impeachment proceedings must be brought by the House 
of Representatives rather than the Senate, Johnston was far more sympathetic in 
other letters, telling one impeachment enthusiast from Orangeburg, South 
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Carolina, that ‘I shall certainly bring your suggestion to the attention of the other 
members of the Senate from the Southern states, and I know that they will be 
glad to have your suggestion. I certainly agree that many of the recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court are contrary to our way of thinking.’46 
To complicate matters further, Johnston’s fixation with the power of the 
Supreme Court would only intensify during Marshall’s six months on a recess 
appointment: on 26th March 1962, the Court handed down its landmark Baker v. 
Carr decision, which made the unprecedented judgement that federal courts were 
entitled to intervene in matters relating to malapportioned legislatures. In a 
newsletter released four days later, Johnston denounced the Court’s opinion, 
arguing that ‘by allowing federal district courts to step into strictly legislative 
affairs, the nation’s entire election system may well be destroyed.’47 This outrage 
at the Court’s action seems unsurprising given the huge importance of Baker in 
the evolution of the relationship between the states and the Federal Government. 
Gordon Silverstein has equated the significance of Baker with the significance of 
Brown in that the Supreme Court, in both decisions, ‘commanded’ other 
institutions to act, providing two dramatic illustrations of the profound political 
power of the nine unelected Justices.48 Considered by Earl Warren to be the most 
important case of his tenure as Chief Justice, Baker dispensed with the notion of a 
‘political-question doctrine’ as a limit to judicial power, a development which 
Justice Felix Frankfurter feared would increase accusations of judicial activism and 
trigger an enormous political backlash.49 
Baker presented a particularly grave problem for South Carolina’s 
conservative political establishment. As explained in the Introduction, the 
legislators representing counties in the lowcountry region, with black majority 
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populations, maintained an ironclad control over South Carolina’s legislature 
thanks to the very principle of malapportionment which the Baker case had 
addressed. The announcement of the decision was inevitably met with 
condemnation by the state’s leaders, notably Senator Edgar A. Brown – long 
associated with the so-called ‘Barnwell Ring’ and described by V.O. Key as the 
state’s Prime Minister – who described Baker as ‘the political crisis of my time.’50 
The state embarked on a lengthy battle against the order to reconstruct its system 
of representation, refusing to accept the inevitability of a more democratic form 
of apportionment until the Supreme Court’s announcement of Stevenson v. West 
in 1975.51 
With Johnston and other outraged South Carolinians describing Baker in 
typically apocalyptic language, the Kennedy brothers openly embraced the Court’s 
ruling, with the President claiming at a press conference that ‘to have each vote 
count equally is, it seems to me, basic to the successful operation of a democracy,’ 
a comment which would have given Olin Johnston little incentive to schedule 
Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation hearings with any urgency.52 The frequent 
delays being imposed by Johnston at this time provide a useful example of how 
South Carolina’s internal politics were influencing political controversy at the 
national level with regard to the Supreme Court. By the end of April, Johnston was 
heavily involved in warding off a strong primary challenge from the state’s 
youthful and highly popular Governor, Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, and the ageing 
Senator did not wish to jeopardise re-election by appearing to show mercy to the 
notorious black lawyer who had spoken so eloquently against the Southern way of 
life during the Brown hearings. Furthermore, it was crucial for Johnston to address 
increasing white anxiety over frequent incidents of racial unrest on South 
Carolina’s streets: during 1960 and 1961, the sit-in movement came to South 
Carolina, with a large number of civil rights protests occurring throughout the 
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state, among them sit-ins at branches of S.H. Kress in Orangeburg, Columbia and 
Charleston, and also the ground-breaking ‘Friendship Nine’ protest at McCrory’s in 
Rock Hill, which made history when nine protesters chose to serve time in jail, 
rather than being bailed, in order to cause administrative inconvenience while 
saving the civil rights movement money.53 
While Governor Hollings was ensuring public safety through crowd control 
and the use of black police officers to maintain calm, Senator Johnston used his 
newsletters as a means of condemning civil rights protests such as the ‘Freedom 
Rides’, claiming that ‘the real courage does not exist ... in the actions of the 
Freedom Riders, but lies with the Southern people, both white and Negro, who 
have lived together quietly and peacefully and who have solved in harmony their 
differences and achieved progress through the years.54 This sentiment built on 
themes covered in ‘The Good Side of the South’, an article attributed to Johnston 
(but ghost-written by his Press Secretary, Thomas W. Chadwick) and published in 
September 1961 in The New York Times, which made the dubious claim that ‘in 
South Carolina ... there has not been one case where a Negro has been denied the 
right to register or vote since records have been maintained showing the race of 
voters.’55 Under pressure to win re-election in a tense climate of increased racial 
unrest – and with the Baker decision striking the biggest blow to the survival of 
South Carolina’s political culture since Brown – Johnston refused to grant 
Thurgood Marshall an opportunity to legitimise his selection before the sub-
committee, forcing him to continue serving on a recess appointment. 
Elsewhere in the US Senate, Marshall’s nomination received strong 
support from the two Republican Senators from the state of New York, Jacob 
Javits and Kenneth Keating. Aside from the fact that the state of New York fell 
within the boundary of the Second Circuit on which Marshall was serving, both 
Senators had personal reasons for supporting the nominee. Javits, who had 
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attended Marshall’s swearing-in ceremony on 23rd October 1961, had already 
established a track record of standing up to South Carolina’s Senators in the 
ongoing war over the Supreme Court: in May 1958, he had condemned proposals 
to reduce the Court’s power through the Jenner Bill, provoking an angry response 
from Olin Johnston, while more recently, he had debated Strom Thurmond in the 
December 1961 issue of The American Legion Magazine on the issue of whether 
judges should have five years’ experience on the federal bench before being 
nominated to the Supreme Court.56 Keating, who served on the Judiciary 
Committee alongside Johnston, contacted his South Carolinian colleague to urge 
him to schedule confirmation hearings as quickly as possible due to Marshall’s 
ongoing service on an unconfirmed appointment, and became sufficiently enraged 
by the frequent delays that he released a statement, criticising Johnston heavily 
and claiming that Marshall was being ‘victimized’. 57 Noting the civil rights 
opposition of a ‘majority’ of the sub-committee (singling out the Chairman, the 
‘Senator from South Carolina’, for special mention), Keating made the serious 
allegation that Judiciary Committee staff were being briefed to prepare material 
which could be used to attack Marshall during confirmation hearings – material 
which had not been shared with him (despite his representation of a state which 
falls within the Second Circuit boundary) nor with the other members of the full 
Committee. Keating claimed that he had ‘protested the delay and procedures to 
Senator Eastland ... but my protests have fallen on deaf ears.’58 His comments, 
criticisms and accusations were well-known and well-documented by the end of 
April, having been made on New York’s WNEW-TV station, and also reported in 
Charleston’s News and Courier.59 
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While Johnston did not respond to Keating’s charges, his frequent delays 
did suggest a very deliberate effort to keep Marshall’s appointment on ice until 
after the South Carolina Senate primary. Having set a date of 16th April, he 
delayed the hearings until 24th April, and then delayed them again until 1st May. 
On 1st May, neither Johnston nor McClellan showed up to the hearings, despite 
the fact that the date had been set by Johnston himself. McClellan was attending 
a session of the Senate Appropriations Committee and Johnston claimed to have 
been delayed on a train journey, but few were persuaded that their absence 
constituted anything other than the consistent Southern opposition to civil rights. 
In their absence, Senator Hruska sat and listened while Thurgood Marshall made a 
brief statement and the two Senators from New York, Javits and Keating, spoke in 
Marshall’s defence, with Keating asserting that ‘the controversy about Judge 
Marshall centres not about the man, but the results he has achieved.’60 
The question of whether or not Kennedy made a political gesture in order 
to persuade James Eastland to ensure Marshall’s safe passage through the 
confirmation hearings remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. One well-
documented anecdote involves Kennedy’s agreement to name Eastland’s college 
roommate, the segregationist Judge W. Harold Cox, as a federal district judge in 
Mississippi. Eastland’s alleged remark to Robert Kennedy – ‘tell your brother that 
if he will give me Harold Cox, I will give him the n*****’ – has never been 
substantiated despite being mentioned frequently in the existing literature.61 
Arthur Schlesinger believes that Eastland was ‘softened’ by Kennedy’s nomination 
of Cox, but Mark Tushnet has argued that Cox had been nominated prior to the 
decision to nominate Marshall.62 Juan Williams has claimed that Eastland simply 
assured Robert Kennedy that Marshall would be confirmed once Southern 
Senators had made as much political capital as possible out of the nomination.63 
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Regardless of the accuracy or detail of the story, Victor Navasky has argued 
persuasively that a notional Cox/Marshall trade-off symbolises the profound 
systemic problem which the Kennedy brothers had to endure with regard to 
judicial nominations. As explained in Chapter Two, the Southern bloc had become 
sufficiently immovable during the tenure of President Eisenhower – who was 
willing to accommodate the Southern influence and who in eight years did not 
name a single black judge to any federal position – that the Kennedys were 
ultimately doomed to nominate a string of undesirable segregationist judges as 
‘sweeteners’ for Southern Senators.64 
Kennedy’s prediction that the process of Marshall’s confirmation would be 
a marathon rather than a sprint proved accurate when Johnston proceeded to 
spend the rest of May campaigning against Fritz Hollings in South Carolina, 
refusing to deal with Marshall until he had secured re-nomination. Johnston, 
perhaps recalling Hollings’s willingness to use race-baiting tactics during his 
successful 1958 run for Governor, refused to allow his youthful opponent the 
opportunity to accuse him of giving the notorious Marshall an easy ride – a claim 
which might have played well with the conservative South Carolinian voters calling 
for Earl Warren’s impeachment.65 Aided by his seniority in the Senate, and his 
claim to have prevented the closure of Donaldson Air Force Base, Johnston’s hard 
work on the campaign trail during the months of May and June 1962, paid off 
handsomely when he defeated Hollings in a landslide victory, winning 216,918 
votes to 110,023, and a majority in all but one of the state’s counties, losing 
Calhoun County by only 34 votes.66  
With the Democratic nomination now secure, Johnston showed no greater 
sense of urgency in scheduling Marshall’s confirmation hearings, but did continue 
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to demonstrate his antagonism toward the US Supreme Court by joining with 
Senators James Eastland, John McClellan, and Herman Talmadge to introduce a 
constitutional amendment to nullify the Court’s Engel v. Vitale decision, which 
ruled teacher-led prayer in public schools to be a violation of the First 
Amendment.67 He would later find the time to preside as acting Chairman over 
Judiciary Committee hearings on the decision, which included testimony from 
Senator John Stennis of Mississippi, A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, Vance Hartke 
of Indiana, J. Glenn Beall of Maryland, and his South Carolina colleague, Strom 
Thurmond.68 Just in case a reminder was needed of South Carolinian attitudes 
toward the Supreme Court, Thurmond issued a newsletter on 30th June 1962, in 
which he argued against permitting the Court ‘to interpret God out of our national 
life.’ In observing that Karl Marx aimed ‘to dethrone God and destroy capitalism,’ 
Thurmond concluded solemnly that the Court, through the school prayer decision, 
was ‘helping Marx attain those objectives.’69 As with Baker v. Carr, the Engel 
decision only encouraged Southern Senators to be more vigilant in their duty to 
their constituents on the question of judicial nominations. 
 
 
The Long Game Gets Longer 
 
The three members of the Johnston sub-committee finally met on 12th July 1962 
to assess Thurgood Marshall’s Second Circuit nomination. Chairman Johnston 
employed a hostile strategy from the start by unleashing the Committee’s special 
counsel – L.P.B. Lipscomb of Mississippi – who interrogated Marshall at length 
regarding an obscure Texas District Court decision in which the NAACP had been 
found guilty of practicing law illegally. Senator Keating of New York pointed out 
that Marshall had not been associated with the case, and was joined in his 
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protests by Republican Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois. Johnston defended 
Lipscomb throughout the hearing, even insisting that he proceed to interrogate 
Marshall regarding another NAACP case held in Virginia, which drew further 
objections from Republican Senators, with both Dirksen and Keating protesting 
that it would be inappropriate to discuss cases still before the Supreme Court on 
appeal: 
 
Senator Keating: Well, Mr Chairman, may I make a comment, that we are 
not here concerned with investigating the NAACP. We are here concerned 
with the investigation of the qualifications of this nominee, as to his 
character, ability and integrity, to be a US circuit judge. 
Senator Johnston: That is true, but at the same time, the question is 
before this committee as to whether or not, in his activities and as a 
witness and attorney for the NAACP, just what he has done in that line. 
Senator Keating: Well, we could spend the rest of this session doing 
nothing but examining and investigating the NAACP, and I would hope that 
counsel would make more progress than he has up to the time or up to 
date. 
Senator Johnston: I think when he brings in the Virginia case and ties in 
the two, you will see the connection in the two cases.70 
 
Following further fruitless questioning from Lipscomb, Johnston decided to 
adjourn the hearings at noon without setting a date for the next hearing. The 
frustration of Marshall and others in the room was palpable: 
 
Senator Keating: Has the time been fixed, Mr Chairman for –  
Senator Johnston: No, it has not. The subcommittee is adjourned. 
Judge Marshall: Well, Mr Chairman, would it possibly be tomorrow? I 
wonder whether I should stay over or not. 
Senator Johnston: Well, not tomorrow. I can tell you that right now. 
Judge Marshall: Well, I would like to get back to my work. That is the only 
reason – 
Senator Johnston: It will not. We will notify you in advance. We will 
arrange it as early as possible. The committee is adjourned.71 
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Having defended the sub-committee lawyer’s interrogation of Marshall 
throughout the session, Johnston maintained a correspondence with Lipscomb 
and even encouraged him to undertake further investigations. After receiving a 
letter from a Mrs E. Sinclair Eaton of Gainesville, Florida, informing him of a 
television film relating to Marshall and the US Constitution, Johnston forwarded 
the letter to Lipscomb (without informing Mrs Eaton), telling him, ‘I thought you 
might be interested in looking into this matter.’72 
Perhaps sensing the support for Marshall which existed within the full 
Senate, Dirksen and Keating attempted to force a hearing to be scheduled on the 
afternoon of 8th August by obtaining permission from the Senate itself. Despite 
Dirksen’s seniority as Republican floor leader, this effort was shot down in flames 
when Johnston objected, claiming that one morning session would be sufficient, 
and also that the Judiciary Committee was required to meet during the afternoon 
to discuss President Kennedy’s plans for tighter drug control legislation.73 
Although Johnston’s veto over scheduling remained his trump card, the shambolic 
12th July hearing suggested he had very little in the way of credible ammunition to 
use against the nominee. He mysteriously informed The News and Courier two 
days later that the power to question Marshall ‘may soon be lifted’ from him by 
the full Judiciary Committee, leaving him powerless to scrutinise the nominee or 
prevent confirmation. Referring to this possibility as ‘the sharpest piece of political 
strategy in 1962’, the paper’s editorial concluded that ‘Sen. Johnston has to ask 
himself whether South Carolina voters would accept full committee action as 
straightforward, or see it as a political trick for the benefit of a fellow politician.’74 
With the state’s press noting the remarkably low voter turnout in the June 
primary, Johnston was now under pressure to ensure that the 75,000-100,000 
white voters who had stayed at home during the June primary would not defect 
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to the Republican Party in November, when he would face a strong challenge to 
his Senate seat from columnist W.D. Workman. 75 
 By mid-July, the Thurgood Marshall affair had stirred emotions among the 
South’s white conservatives. Many of them outlined their opposition to Marshall’s 
appointment in plain terms in letters to Johnston, with one Spartanburg, South 
Carolina resident assuring him that ‘the whole South will always love and respect 
you if you will help keep the Negroes and the Jews out of office’ and a Biloxi, 
Mississippi resident hoping for further delays while expressing the view that, in 
the event of Marshall’s confirmation, ‘let’s hope they’ll keep him in the East and 
North – JFK will probably put him on the US Supreme Court.’76 More surprising is 
the huge number of letters Johnston received from supporters advising him to 
cease delaying the hearings and simply accept the inevitability of Marshall’s 
confirmation. Many of these supporters were only too happy to remind Johnston 
that they had voted for him in the June primary, while other correspondents had 
proved even more crucial in securing the Senator’s re-nomination.  
In his response to former state Senator Calhoun Thomas, dated 9th August 
1962, Johnston stressed that ‘my victory in June would never have been what it 
was without the efforts you put out, particularly in Beaufort County, the home of 
my opponent’s campaign manager.’77 In his letter, Thomas had warned that the 
Senator would lose crucial black support in the November election if he continued 
to delay Marshall’s confirmation, declaring that ‘I have talked to a number of the 
Negro leaders in this vicinity. They understand what you are doing and your 
reason for your actions. They feel, though, that you are hurting yourself by this 
because it is not being understood by the mass of the Negro voters. They and I 
feel that you have very little to gain and will run a possible loss of a great many 
                                                             
75 Letter from Walter Brown to Strom Thurmond, 13th July 1962, Strom Thurmond Collection, Subject Correspondence 
Series, Mss.0100.18, 3 (United States Court and Supreme Court Judges), Year 1962, Box 19, Folder 1; ‘Voters Show Belief In 
Sen. Olin Johnston’, The Spartanburg Herald, 14 June 1962, p.4; ‘Johnston And Marshall’, The News and Courier, 17th July 
1962, p.8A, Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, News Clippings, Box 136, Marshall, Thurgood. 
76 Letter from Harry N. Johnson to Olin D. Johnston, 18th June 1962; letter from Mabel B. Sheldon to Olin D. Johnston, 9th 
July 1962, Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative Files, Box 101, Judiciary Committee, Appointments, 
Marshall, Thurgood, Folder 4. 
77 Letter from Boston Brice to Olin D. Johnston, 20th July 1962; letter from Olin D. Johnston to Calhoun Thomas, 16th August 
1962; Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative Files, Box 101, Judiciary Committee, Appointments, Marshall, 
Thurgood, Folder 4. 
141 
 
votes if you continue to delay an action.’78 Johnston conceded that Thomas’s 
letter contained ‘a mighty strong well-taken point’, but Thomas was not the only 
supporter making this argument: one Augusta, Georgia correspondent reminded 
Johnston that ‘the Negroes in South Carolina have been largely responsible for 
your going to the Senate in Washington and since Mr Marshall is qualified and had 
been cleared by the Justice Department before his nomination, we cannot 
understand your move in this matter.’79 
 The extent of the ongoing support for South Carolina’s senior Senator 
among the state’s 70,000 registered black voters – and the concern of the black 
population over Marshall’s nomination – should have been obvious to Johnston 
from the letters sent to him by black correspondents during the summer of 
1962.80 These included an endorsement for Marshall from the Rock Hill Chapter of 
the much-hated NAACP; a letter from John H. McCray of the South Carolina 
Progressive Democrats, explaining that ‘we South Carolina Negro voters won our 
status in the Democratic Party largely through the efforts and ability of Mr 
Marshall’, and a letter from C.B. Bailey – who met with Johnston as ‘the only 
Negro postal employee from South Carolina’ during a pay rise rally which the 
Senator attended in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Post Office and Civil 
Service Committee – advising that Johnston’s embarrassment of Marshall ‘will be 
of no advantage to you in the fall election, or in any other situation.’81 Further 
endorsements for Marshall (from both black and white sources) continued 
flooding in to Johnston’s office from outside South Carolina: by the end of the first 
week of July, he had been urged to confirm Marshall by the Managing Editor of 
the Birmingham (Alabama) World; the Treasurer of The Philadelphia Enquirer, and 
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the Chairman of the ‘Thurgood Marshall Confirmation Committee’ of the 
Washington Bar Association of the District of Columbia.82 
Given the outpouring of enthusiasm for Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation 
in Johnston’s correspondence, it seems surprising that the Senator opted to defy 
so many of his supporters by continuing to delay and inconvenience the nominee 
with his hostile tactics as sub-committee Chairman. On the other hand, his actions 
seem quite logical in the context of his correspondence with South Carolina’s 
conservative political establishment. Despite his sensational victory over Fritz 
Hollings in the June primary, Johnston remained aware of the unimpressive white 
turnout, and shared the concern of others in the South Carolina Democratic Party 
of the danger of potential white votes being secured by the Republican Party 
thanks to the appeal of W.D. Workman’s segregationist campaign. As in most 
Southern states, victory in the Democratic primary usually guaranteed election in 
November – given the lack of credible Republican opposition – resulting in the 
additional risk of white voters staying at home, viewing the November 1962 
Senate election result as a foregone conclusion. Since Johnston’s last election 
victory six years previously, the Republican Party, thanks in part to the efforts of 
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, had made inroads in the South by capitalising 
on white disillusionment with civil rights measures, and now, as South Carolina’s 
senior Senator, Johnston inevitably came under great pressure to ensure the 
continued dominance of the Democratic Party in the state, and do everything 
within his power to stamp out the flames of the burgeoning two-party system.83  
Senator Edgar A. Brown, President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina 
Senate, wrote to Johnston frequently during the second half of 1962, informing 
him optimistically that ‘we are making an all-out drive to get out a full vote which 
is the answer to the Republicans. If the same vote is polled in this election as was 
polled in the primary, you will beat Workman in the same proportion you beat 
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Fritz.’84 Johnston was reminded of his importance in resisting the Republican 
insurgency by Charles A. Lafitte, President of the Carolina Commercial Bank, who 
declared that ‘some of my good friends who have always voted Democratic with 
me have changed and will vote otherwise in November. The situation to me 
appears serious and I strongly urge you to immediately get busy in South Carolina 
and try to counteract some of this trend.’85 Congressman Charles E. Simons was 
particularly unnerved by enthusiasm for the Republican Party in his home county, 
warning Solomon Blatt, Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, 
that ‘we are having a terrible fight here in Aiken County as I am sure you are 
aware. Everywhere I turn I find strong Workman-Spence supporters, which has me 
very much concerned about our carrying Aiken County.’86 Johnston was 
dispatched to a rally at the Aiken High School Stadium, but Senator Brown advised 
Charles Lafitte that ‘Olin is not going to have time to cover every county and they 
are going to try to make Aiken a rousing one to break the ice in this Goldwater 
political atmosphere in our area.’87 
In addition to the growing anxiety over the Republican threat, there is 
evidence to suggest a lingering resentment over the manner in which President 
Eisenhower dismissed the recommendation of Strom Thurmond that he nominate 
South Carolinian Robert Figg (who had opposed Marshall in the Briggs v. Elliott 
case) to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, opting instead to appoint Marylander 
Simon Sobeloff. By the spring of 1962, Thurmond and Walter Brown, one of his 
most trusted political advisors, were pre-occupied with obtaining Johnston’s 
endorsement of Figg for a vacancy on the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of South Carolina, left by the death of Judge Ashton H. Williams. 
As Brown outlined in a letter to Thurmond, ‘as I see it, there cannot be a greater 
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travesty of justice than for Thurgood Marshall, who represented the NAACP 
before the Court, to be put on the Circuit Court of Appeals and for Bob to be 
denied even a district judgeship in South Carolina.’88 While understanding that 
Johnston’s lukewarm attitude toward Figg resulted from Figg’s role as Thurmond’s 
speechwriter during the latter’s challenge to Johnston in the bitter Democratic 
Party primary battle of 1950, Brown’s view neatly summed up the outrage which 
would have ensued in the Thurmond camp if Johnston had appeared willing to 
accept Marshall while at the same time appearing unwilling to accommodate Figg. 
 One other particularly striking aspect of the correspondence between the 
key members of South Carolina’s political establishment during this period is the 
manner in which Johnston and Thurmond were both being goaded into attacking 
the Supreme Court by other politicians in the state. Despite Thurmond’s years of 
aggressive ‘court-baiting’ since the mid-1950s, Walter Brown declared in his 11th 
April letter to Thurmond, ‘I would like to see you go after the Supreme Court with 
the same zeal and determination you have demonstrated in exposing the “no-
win” policies in the State Department’, while one month later, Edgar Brown was 
advising Johnston to ‘take a blast at Hugo Black and the Supreme Court on the 
anti-prayer decision’, perhaps as a means of capitalising on accusations that 
Alabamian Justice Black had ‘betrayed’ the South with his role in Brown v. Board 
of Education.89 The attitude of the state’s Democratic politicians toward South 
Carolina’s black population was evident in Edgar Brown’s letter to Johnston on 
14th June, in which he stated, ‘The “n*****” has more civil rights now than he can 
use, and if some of our friends would only realise that a citizen must be capable of 
exercising the rights which are inherently his before he can start a riot to obtain 
those rights we would be much better off.’90 And few would have been surprised 
by Strom Thurmond’s view, outlined in a letter to Ralph B. Kolb, Chairman of the 
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Sumter County Citizens’ Council, that ‘Marshall is nothing but a trouble-maker and 
in view of his activities on behalf of the NAACP he could never render a fair and 
objective decision.’91 
The anti-Court sentiments expressed by South Carolina’s political 
establishment drowned out the huge wave of enthusiasm for Thurgood Marshall’s 
Second Circuit appointment, which was quite apparent in the letters of support 
for Marshall sent to Johnston’s office throughout the year by black and white 
Americans alike. While a racially moderate public sphere may have begun to 
emerge in South Carolina by the early 1960s, the kingpins of the state legislature 
remained determined to keep an iron grip on the state’s political affairs, even 
after the announcement of Baker v. Carr. As Johnston’s correspondence suggests, 
many of the more liberal-minded voters continued to re-elect the senior Senator, 
but the pressure exerted by the state’s most powerful political figures ensured 
that Johnston’s seniority would continue to function as an extension of their 
racially conservative agenda on a national scale. 
 
 
Olin Draws a Breath 
 
By the middle of August 1962, Olin Johnston felt that he had delayed Thurgood 
Marshall’s confirmation hearings sufficiently. During the month, he would allow 
himself and his allies further opportunities to scrutinise Marshall, forcing the 
nominee to face down Dixie in three further hearings. 
 During the first August hearing, Senator Kenneth Keating maintained the 
onslaught of criticism he had been directing at Johnston for months, arguing that 
other recent nominees – specifically Robert J. Elliott of Georgia and the 
aforementioned W. Harold Cox of Mississippi – had not been investigated with the 
same rigour, nor were the activities of their law firms scrutinised in a manner 
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similar to Johnston’s focus on the NAACP.92 It was not long before the press 
picked up on the double standard argument. As James Marlow noted in The 
Nashua Telegraph, the Supreme Court nomination of Byron White was not even 
investigated by a sub-committee: ‘Although the full committee probably knew far 
less about White than it did about Marshall, a brief hearing was held April 11 and 
White got unanimous committee approval. That same day, the full Senate 
approved.’93 By the end of August, Johnston was being targeted by other public 
figures, including baseball legend Jackie Robinson, who threw accusations of 
racism at the sub-committee in his news column, and former First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who considered the hearings a worldwide embarrassment.94 At the 
second August hearing, Marshall’s critics persisted with the familiar tactic of 
linking the NAACP to communism. Losing patience, Keating and Democratic 
Senator John A. Carroll of Colorado announced that they would consider moves to 
discharge the sub-committee if Johnston allowed further pointless hearings to 
continue. ‘I do hope the two Senators that have spoken are not making that in the 
form of a threat to the sub-committee’ was Johnston’s terse response.95  
At a further hearing on 17th August, Marshall was challenged on his alleged 
remark that the NAACP had ‘the law, religion and God’ on its side. He denied 
making the remark but made his views on the South quite clear when he declared 
to the sub-committee that ‘anybody who takes a man out and lynches him, I 
believe is working with the devil.’96 The sub-committee’s use of the ‘law, religion 
and God’ remark proved to be as feeble as the other ‘evidence’ used against 
Marshall at earlier hearings, but material presented at the next session, held on 
20th August, at least managed to elicit a more newsworthy result. The hearings 
focused on a speech delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical 
Society on 28th December 1961 – published as an essay in the US News and World 
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Report on 5th February 1962 – by Dr Alfred H. Kelly, Professor of History at Wayne 
State University in Detroit, Michigan.  
In the speech and essay, Kelly, who had assisted with NAACP research into 
the school segregation cases, claimed that Marshall was prone to making racially-
charged jokes, offering one choice quote as an example: ‘When us colored folk 
take over, every time a white man draws a breath, he’ll have to pay a fine.’97 It is 
unclear how or when the three members of the sub-committee became aware of 
this potentially explosive remark. If Senator Keating was correct in the allegations 
made in his April statement, the speech may have been unearthed by a member 
of the Judiciary Committee staff. What can be confirmed is that Johnston was 
made aware of the speech as early as 9th July, when it was sent to him by a 
constituent, and reminded of it on 7th August, when excerpts were sent to him by 
Ralph B. Kolb, of the Sumter County Citizens Council.98 Among the remarks in the 
speech were the following reflections on the Brown case: 
 
The problem we faced was not the historian’s discovery of the truth, whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. It is not that we were engaged in 
formulating lies; there was nothing as crude and naïve as that. But we 
were using facts, emphasising facts, sliding off facts, quietly ignoring facts, 
and above all, interpreting facts in a way to do what Marshall said we had 
to do – ‘get by the boys down there’.99 
 
Johnston may or may not have agreed with Kolb’s view that the text of the 
speech ‘furnishes sufficient ammunition to forcibly bring before the nation the 
fraud involved in the Court’s decision in the schools cases.’100 He had, however, 
along with other Southerners, always questioned the legitimacy of the Brown 
decision’s reliance on ‘sociological’ sources such as Gunnar Myrdal’s An American 
Dilemma. The remark concerning the white man paying a fine for drawing a 
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breath would prove sufficiently offensive to conservative white Southerners to 
justify Johnston’s call for a further hearing, during which the sub-committee 
would hear from Dr Kelly personally. That request triggered one of the more tense 
exchanges of the hearings:  
 
Senator Johnston: I will call the sub-committee together, the three of us, 
and I will lay this before them to see what they want to do. I think that is 
the logical thing for me to do as one member here of the committee, and 
that is what I am going to do. 
Senator Hart: Mr Chairman, if I could, neither Senator Keating nor I are 
members of this sub-committee. 
Senator Johnston: You are visitors. I am glad to let you make a statement, 
but just remember you are not on the sub-committee.  
Senator Keating: But we are on the full Committee. 
Senator Johnston: But you are not on the sub-committee. 
Senator Keating: It will be in the hands of the full Committee unless this 
meeting is quickly closed. This is a ridiculous procedure and an unlawyer-
like procedure, and it will be my intention to raise the problem before the 
full Committee. 
Senator Johnston: You have a perfect right to do that, but as far as the 
sub-committee, we want to get the facts before the full committee. I don’t 
know what the man who wrote the articles in the newspaper will come 
and say.101 
 
Having decided he had had enough, Keating claimed that he would make a 
request to Chairman Eastland for the sub-committee hearings to be terminated 
and a vote taken on Marshall in the full Senate, taking the matter to the Senate 
floor if necessary.102 Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, who by now had added his 
voice to Keating’s objections, defended the nominee by claiming that Marshall’s 
‘reputation in American jurisprudence is established. We will indict ourselves if we 
fail to acknowledge it.’103   
Despite his reluctance to antagonise Southern Senators, President 
Kennedy was finally moved to use his influence to draw the hearings to a close. 
Given that the one-year anniversary of the recess appointment was approaching – 
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meaning that Marshall would stop getting paid if he remained unconfirmed – 
Kennedy had already taken action to ensure that Marshall would not have to work 
without a pay cheque.104 At a press conference, Kennedy said that confirmation 
had been ‘too much delayed’ and expressed confidence that the Senate would not 
adjourn without taking action on Marshall’s appointment.105 However, even the 
intervention of the President of the United States did not deter Chairman 
Johnston from pursuing one final hearing, on 24th August, during which Dr Kelly 
was questioned on Marshall’s ‘pay a fine’ quote. To those who knew Marshall 
personally, Kelly’s claim that the remark was ‘mordant humour, given exclamation 
by a man possessed of a powerful sense of humour’ would have seemed quite 
plausible.106 Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong have claimed that Marshall 
would typically use humour to unsettle well-to-do white people in his company, 
such as Chief Justice Warren Burger. When Burger and Marshall were both on the 
Supreme Court some years later, Marshall would address Burger with the 
idiosyncratic greeting, ‘What’s shakin’, Chiefy-baby?’ Another anecdote has an 
amused Justice Marshall responding ‘yowsa yowsa’ to a man mistaking him for an 
elevator operator in the Supreme Court building.107 While Johnston may have 
been unconvinced by Kelly’s explanation, the nation’s press remained undisturbed 
by the idea of Thurgood Marshall having a ‘mordant’ sense of humour, with Mary 
McGrory commenting in The Atlanta Constitution that ‘nobody has ever said this 
quality would be unbecoming in a federal judge.’108 The Washington Post argued 
that Marshall’s remark ‘could have been only a jest’ while ridiculing the ‘flimsiness 
of Senator Johnston’s opposition’, asking the reader, ‘is a notoriously prejudiced 
Senator to be allowed to defeat the appointment of a well-qualified Negro to the 
federal bench simply by endlessly stringing out his hearings?’109 
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After Kelly’s testimony failed to yield any negative material to be used 
against the nominee, Lipscomb read from a section of Newsweek magazine, which 
recorded Marshall as declaring, ‘We’ve negotiated too quietly and too reasonably 
for too long. We’ve made up our minds to harass the legal hell out of the school 
boards. From here on out, we’re going to be unreasonable, un-decent, and un-
everything else.’ The inclusion of this quote on the record brought protests from 
Marshall’s exasperated supporters: 
 
Senator Keating: Is this – might I enquire whether this is offered as proof 
of the facts stated? 
Senator Johnston: This is offered as being printed in Newsweek of 
September 18, 1961, for whatever it is worth. 
Senator Hart: What’s it worth? What’s it worth, then, in light of the 
problem facing the Committee? 
Senator Johnston: This is a very prominent magazine, and I think a lot of us 
read it, and I know I read it, and try to keep up with what’s going on in the 
world, like a lot of other people do. 
Senator Keating: I might comment it is in line with some of the other legal 
antics which have taken place in these hearings. 
Senator Hart: Mr Chairman, if this concludes the hearing – 
Senator Johnston: Yes, this concludes the hearing, is that right? 
Senator Hart: Amen and thank heaven, and let’s not berate or review the 
chronology.110 
 
Having drawn criticism from the nation’s press and been pressurised to 
desist by the President and several outspoken Senators, Johnston finally 
announced that he did not intend to question Thurgood Marshall further, but 
caused another tense exchange with Hart and Keating with his insistence that the 
hearings be printed before the sub-committee reached a decision.111 As if to signal 
the end of Johnston’s crusade, The New York Times noted that Senator Keating’s 
move to end the sub-committee hearings and bring the nomination to the Senate 
floor for a vote ‘would enable Senator Johnston to tell South Carolinians that he 
had done all in his power to resist the nomination.’112  
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Despite Strom Thurmond’s gloomy prediction that ‘if the nomination 
reaches the floor, there will be a fight’, Marshall was confirmed by a Senate vote 
of 54-16.113 The sub-committee had voted privately to reject Marshall following 
the conclusion of hearings, with only Senator Hruska supporting the nominee. 
When the full committee took a vote, Johnston and McClellan were joined by 
Chairman Eastland and Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina in opposing Marshall, 
and the four dissenters were joined by fourteen other Southern Democrats when 
the full Senate voted.114 Thurgood Marshall’s appointment had finally been 
legitimised, but, as he would discover before the end of the decade, his days of 
facing down Dixie were far from over. 
 
 
Masters of the Ritual 
 
As with Johnston’s prioritisation of the Sobeloff appointment to the Fourth Circuit 
over the selection of William Brennan for the Supreme Court, the Senator 
evidently considered the Marshall Second Circuit nomination far more important 
than President Kennedy’s choice of Arthur J. Goldberg to fill the Supreme Court 
vacancy left by the retirement of Justice Felix Frankfurter.115 Unlike the drawn-out 
confrontation over Marshall’s appointment, the Goldberg hearings lasted only one 
day, during which the nominee charmed the Judiciary Committee, having been 
briefed in advance by Jim Adler, a former law clerk to Chief Justice Warren and 
also Justice Charles Evans Whittaker.116  
As explained in the previous chapter, President Eisenhower’s letter to his 
Attorney General in September 1958 highlighted an acknowledgement of the 
strong Southern influence within the Senate Judiciary Committee. The existence 
of a Justice Department briefing paper, prepared for Goldberg prior to his 
Committee hearings in 1962, offers further compelling evidence that the Kennedy 
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Administration also acknowledged the Southern influence as a highly significant 
potential roadblock to the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. Extracts 
from this paper provide great insight into the Administration’s expectation of the 
content and style of Judiciary Committee questioning during this period. Given the 
tense nature of Potter Stewart’s confirmation hearings in 1959, also covered in 
the previous chapter, Justice Byron White – Kennedy’s first Supreme Court 
appointee – recommended that Goldberg be given a transcript of the Stewart 
hearings as a guide to what might be expected.117 
Having identified Chairman Eastland and Senator Ervin as ‘chief 
questioners’, the briefing paper offered a series of hypothetical yet ‘ritualistic’ 
questions for which ‘pavlovian answers’ were expected.’118 As part of its highly 
detailed advice, the paper explained that a question asking ‘do you think that the 
courts should cite as authority for decisions, books or documents written by 
individuals which have never been part of the record in the case?’ would be aimed 
essentially at the infamous Footnote 11 of the Brown decision, referring to 
Myrdal’s An American Dilemma. Noting that ‘this question was asked of both 
Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart and both had trouble with it’, the paper 
advised an answer which emphasised the value of ‘relevant constitutional and 
statutory provisions’ whilst noting that ‘the Court did not, in our view, cite Myrdal 
as precedent, but your questioner’s opinion will be otherwise.’119 The paper 
pointed out that the Committee’s line of questioning could easily place a nominee 
in a difficult position: denying that Myrdal was cited as precedent ‘will simply 
initiate a detrimental sideshow’, but, on the other hand, accepting that Myrdal 
was used as a precedent would be interpreted as criticism of the Brown 
decision.120 Goldberg was advised against offering evasive answers when the 
Brown decision was raised, and reminded that the brief he had filed on behalf of 
the CIO for the Brown case might be seized upon by members of the 
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Committee.121 The paper also reminded Goldberg of a speech he had given before 
the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee in 1961, condemning racial 
segregation in private clubs, which might also be scrutinised by the Committee, 
particularly as the Supreme Court had dealt with a number of ‘sit-in’ cases during 
the past term.122 
Significantly, the paper referred to both Baker v. Carr and Engel v. Vitale as 
areas of concern for Committee members, and suggested that Goldberg offer 
diplomatic responses in order to demonstrate a sound knowledge of the cases in 
question.123 With such meticulous preparation, Goldberg faced the Committee 
with confidence and was confirmed by a voice vote in the Senate with only one 
objection: South Carolina’s Senator Strom Thurmond demonstrated his state’s 
consistent scepticism of the Kennedy Administration’s judicial nominees.124 
Thurmond’s opposition notwithstanding, the existence of a detailed and well-
researched Justice Department briefing paper, intended to advise nominees on 
how to face the Senate Judiciary Committee, illustrates the extent to which 
marathon judicial hearings had become an institution by the end of 1962, thanks 
in no small part to the Southern segregationist influence. As with the Sobeloff 
controversy discussed in the previous chapter, Olin Johnston’s obstruction of 
Thurgood Marshall’s Second Circuit appointment serves as a reminder of the 
prominent role of South Carolina in the swift development of judicial nomination 
hearings into confrontational events of increasing public interest. In line with 
research objective (1), future chapters will showcase the state’s leading role in the 
intensification of hearings to determine the suitability of nominees for the high 
court during the Johnson and Nixon Presidencies. 
Following Marshall’s confirmation, Johnston continued to receive letters of 
criticism from Marshall’s supporters, many of which came from the state of New 
York. Perhaps taking the protests of their Senators as their cue, New Yorkers 
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expressed varying degrees of outrage over Johnston’s handling of the Marshall 
nomination, one declaring ‘I am white and I’m deeply ashamed of some of my 
kind, you included’; another stating ‘your constituents in South Carolina may be 
proud of your efforts ... as for me, I think they are disgusting’, and one New York-
based Southerner asking Johnston ‘not to add to the stigma under which the 
South labors as the alleged hospitable home of bigotry.’125 It is unlikely that 
Johnston would have been moved by these sentiments. Having already blamed 
the state of New York for inciting racial unrest through forced integration, he had 
reminded Southerners of his views on the state in a speech given in Alabama in 
May when he argued that ‘as soon as you develop a strong two-party system in 
the South you are going to get the same minority vote baiting that you have in 
cities like New York,’ while also using the opportunity to take aim at his New York 
critics: ‘How would you like living on the civil rights issue with Jacob Javits, 
Kenneth Keating, Barry Goldwater or another Eisenhower?’126 
It was with pep talks such as these that Johnston succeeded in winning re-
election against the formidable challenge of Republican W.D. Workman in 
November’s Senate election.127 With his victory over Workman, by 178,712 votes 
to 133,930, Johnston secured himself another six-year term by easing Democratic 
fears of a Republican insurgency, albeit temporarily. Through his rough treatment 
of Thurgood Marshall, he was able to maintain segregationist credentials and 
maximise white conservative turnout while at the same time minimising the civil 
rights issue to give the impression of being the more moderate of the two 
candidates.128 He was able to emphasise his loyalty to the Democratic Party as a 
means of discouraging a voter exodus to the Republicans, while at the same time 
distancing himself from President Kennedy, who had angered many white 
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Southerners by sending federal troops to the University of Mississippi in October 
1962 to ensure the admission of black student James Meredith amid scenes of 
violent resistance and chaos.129 He still managed to win the endorsement of the 
Kennedy administration, thanks to his seniority on Senate committees, and also 
managed to convince a sufficient number of South Carolina’s registered black 
voters to stick with him despite his treatment of Marshall.130 In Charleston, he was 
supported by approximately nine out of ten registered black voters.131  
Recalling Johnston’s success in attracting black support over the more 
conservative Strom Thurmond during the 1950 Democratic primary, John H. 
McCray was quick to attribute the Senator’s 1962 victory to the black vote: ‘Take 
25,000 Negro votes away from Sen. Johnston in the last general election and Mr 
Workman would now be on his way to the US Senate in Washington.’132 The logic 
of supporting Johnston simply for being the more moderate candidate was 
evident even in the letters of criticism which the Senator continued to receive up 
until the election, with one pro-Marshall student telling him ‘you have my support 
against Workman ... I consider you the lesser of two evils.’133 Nonetheless, 
Johnston’s victory did not make him complacent. Frank E. Jordan, in his famous 
history of South Carolina’s elections from 1896 to 1962, argued that ‘although 
Johnston was successful against W.D. Workman, that race [from 1962] concluded 
the story of the one-party system.’134 As the following chapter will explain, the 
state of South Carolina would soon become a hotbed of dramatic Republican 
Party growth, thanks in no small part to the influence of Johnston’s colleague, the 
unpredictable Strom Thurmond.135 
The question of whether or not Olin Johnston succeeded in discouraging 
John F. Kennedy from promoting Thurgood Marshall to the US Supreme Court will 
                                                             
129 Bartley and Graham, Southern Politics, p.97; ‘Johnston Labels GOP Votes Protests Against President’, The News and 
Courier, 8th November 1962, Edgar A. Brown Papers, Mss.0091, Johnston, Olin D., Box 30, Folder 390. 
130 Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, p.102-3; ‘Influence of Negro Vote Grows’, The News and Courier, 17th 
January 1963, p.1, Edgar A. Brown Papers, Mss.0091, Johnston, Olin D., Box 30, Folder 390. 
131 Bartley and Graham, Southern Politics, p.98. 
132 ‘Johnston’s Victory Attributed To Negroes, The News and Courier, 3rd December 1962, Edgar A. Brown Papers, Mss.0091, 
Johnston, Olin D., Box 30, Folder 390. 
133 Letter from Thom Hiers to Olin D. Johnston, 4th September 1962, Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative 
Files, Box 101, Judiciary Committee, Appointments, Marshall, Thurgood, Folder 1. 
134 Jordan, Primary State, p.83. 
135 Grantham, Life and Death, p.169; Bartley and Graham, Southern Politics, p.123. 
156 
 
never be answered. Following Kennedy’s murder in Dallas on 22nd November 
1963, the new President, Lyndon Johnson, opted to set up a Commission to 
investigate Kennedy’s assassination. Even under such traumatic conditions, 
Johnson was reminded of the ongoing Southern hatred of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren only one week after Kennedy’s death: both James Eastland of Mississippi 
and Richard Russell of Georgia advised Johnson to appoint Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, rather than Warren, as head of the new Commission, with Russell even 
refusing to serve on the Commission if it meant serving alongside Warren.136 The 
new President would also be forced to address South Carolina’s ongoing 
obsession with judicial nominations by filling the District Court vacancy which 
Kennedy had neglected, in addition to a second vacancy which had appeared 
following the announcement of Judge Timmerman’s retirement in September 
1962.137 The increasing restlessness of South Carolina’s politicians for the 
appointment of their two new judges is evident in a note sent by Edgar Brown to 
Olin Johnston twelve days after Kennedy’s assassination, which read: ‘Am I right in 
the grapevine information which I have received that no further appointments are 
going to be announced until after the mourning period? Also, if you will be a little 
confidential, are our two agreed upon?’138 
Having obstructed the confirmation of Simon Sobeloff to the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1955 and 1956, and Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation as the 
new judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1961 and 1962, Olin Johnston 
had ensured national recognition of South Carolina’s response to the Brown 
decision through the federal nominations process. What makes the Marshall 
episode more significant than the gestures made by South Carolina’s Senators 
during the period covered in Chapter Two is the manner in which a stark example 
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was offered of a Southern Senator using his seniority to respond to state concerns 
on a national scale. With a far more challenging re-election effort to face in 1962 
than his most recent contest in 1956 (the year of his sustained objection to 
Sobeloff), it is difficult to deny that Johnston’s behaviour throughout the Marshall 
controversy was influenced entirely by the political situation in South Carolina, yet 
the nationwide scale of his actions was evident in a national chorus of 
condemnation which included a President, several Senators, a sporting hero, a 
former First Lady, and several influential African American political activists. With 
the Potter Stewart hearings suggesting the potential for an intensifying Supreme 
Court nomination process, the Sobeloff and Marshall appointments showcased 
South Carolina’s leading role in the growing political importance of lower court 
nominations. 
Furthermore, Johnston’s obstruction of Marshall’s Second Circuit 
appointment offered a fascinating suggestion of future events in the story of the 
state’s war on the Supreme Court. Firstly, his masterful understanding of South 
Carolina’s electorate – and his success in appealing to conservative white voters 
with a gesture guaranteed to antagonise African Americans without compromising 
his share of the black vote – would be evident twenty-five years later, when his 
successor, Fritz Hollings, found himself in a similar situation when supporting the 
controversial Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork. Hollings’s position 
throughout the lengthy deliberations over Bork’s nomination, covered extensively 
in Chapter Seven, suggested that little had changed for South Carolina’s Senators 
in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices. The condemnation of Bork 
by black South Carolinians, in addition to a multitude of liberal interest groups, did 
not prove sufficiently compelling for Hollings to vote against confirmation, and so, 
as with Johnston’s determined stand against Marshall, the need to retain a 
sizeable share of the white conservative vote ultimately eclipsed the growing 
demands of South Carolina’s black community. 
Secondly, the leading role of South Carolina in opposing Marshall’s Second 
Circuit appointment offered a highly significant prologue to the tensions created 
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by Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1967, which will be examined 
in depth in the following chapter. As will be explained, the arrival of Fritz Hollings 
in the Senate marked the beginning of a lengthy partnership between Hollings and 
Strom Thurmond, which would last for thirty-six years. In Thurmond and Hollings, 
the state of South Carolina would be represented by two very different Senators, 
with Thurmond defecting to the Republican Party in 1964 and becoming a major 
force in the burgeoning US conservative movement, and Hollings building on his 
work as Governor by maintaining a moderate ideology, addressing more directly 
the needs of South Carolina’s black voting bloc, which grew significantly following 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Yet, as Chapter Five will explain, the 
nomination of Thurgood Marshall to become the first African American on the 
nation’s highest court marked the beginning of a highly conservative 
Thurmond/Hollings record on Supreme Court nominations, throughout which 
these very different men appeared to agree far more than they disagreed.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
Between Thurmond and Thurgood:  
The Arrival of Senator Hollings 
 
 
 
We have all agreed that the Supreme Court decision of 1954 is not the law 
of the land. But everyone must agree that is the fact of the land ... As we 
meet, South Carolina is running out of courts ... We of today must realise 
the lesson of one hundred years ago, and move on for the good of South 
Carolina and our United States. This should be done with dignity. It must be 
done with law and order.1 
 
Ernest F. Hollings, 9th January 1963 
 
 
In declaring these words to the South Carolina General Assembly, outgoing 
Governor Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings signalled the beginning of the end for the state’s 
resistance to civil rights.2 In a bid to avoid the violent protests over the 
desegregation of the University of Mississippi which had taken place in October 
1962, Hollings had overseen the safe enrolment of Clemson University’s first black 
student, Harvey Gantt, and, in contrast to scenes of black protesters subdued by 
fire hoses and German Shepherds in Birmingham, Alabama, he had ensured the 
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maintenance of law and order during South Carolina’s sit-in protests.3 Yet the skill 
shown by Hollings in preparing South Carolina for a transition to integration ‘with 
dignity’ counted for little in the Governor’s own career: prevented by state law 
from running for a second consecutive term as Governor, he had made a bold 
challenge to Senator Olin D. Johnston’s incumbency in the 1962 Democratic Party 
primary and been thrashed by the veteran Senator, losing all but one of the 
state’s forty-six counties, paying a heavy price for his friendship with the liberal-
minded President John F. Kennedy.4 
This chapter considers the beginning of Fritz Hollings’s conservative yet 
restrained influence on the process of judicial nominations, and how his approach 
contrasted significantly with Strom Thurmond’s open hostility in the state’s 
ongoing war on the Supreme Court. Hollings, following a second, successful, run 
for the Senate in 1966, would face a serious dilemma over whether or not to 
support the confirmation of the first African American nominee for the US 
Supreme Court. Thurgood Marshall was already a nationally-known figure, 
particularly after his appointment as US Solicitor General by President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1965. His controversial relationship with the state of South Carolina 
had already been played out in the courts in the form of Briggs v. Elliott and 
Brown v. Board of Education, and also before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
where, as explained in the previous chapter, Olin Johnston had provoked universal 
condemnation for using his seniority to delay President Kennedy’s nomination of 
Marshall to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Significantly, Hollings had been far more closely involved in the events 
surrounding the Brown case than either Johnston or Thurmond.  In December 
1952, as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Hollings had 
authored the necessary legislation to substantiate Governor James F. Byrnes’s 
pledge to ‘equalize’ the quality of the state’s school system, in order to comply 
with instructions from the three-judge panel that had presided over the Briggs 
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arguments.5 Prior to his election as Lieutenant Governor, Hollings had been asked 
by Byrnes to accompany South Carolina’s counsel, John W. Davis, at the Brown 
hearings, during which Davis argued that South Carolina had sufficiently improved 
the standard of its black schools. Through his involvement in the Brown case, 
Hollings claimed to have developed a friendship with Thurgood Marshall which 
would last until Marshall’s death, aged 84, on 24th January 1993. His dilemma over 
Marshall’s Supreme Court nomination, which threatened to alienate his black 
supporters in South Carolina, serves to illustrate the influence of persistent 
regional issues on the politics of the US Senate, and, at the same time, the 
potential consequences for state politics when Senators are forced to make 
difficult choices in their role in the judicial nominations process. 
The Marshall Supreme Court nomination signposted a new phase in South 
Carolina’s crusade against the Court, with Strom Thurmond taking his place on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and escalating the Southern attack on any liberal 
nominee seeking confirmation. From 1967, the task of facing down Dixie would 
prove to be an even greater physical and emotional ordeal for each nominee, as 
the Committee hearings continued to showcase not only the ongoing Southern 
tension over the race question, but also the growing significance of the Supreme 
Court nomination process in US politics. Although Fritz Hollings aimed to bring 
South Carolina through a peaceful process of desegregation, his judgement in the 
nomination of Supreme Court Justices would threaten to jeopardise the liberal 
record he had achieved as the state’s Governor. Thurmond, meanwhile, in his role 
as chief antagonist, would take the confirmation process out of the judicial realm 
and into the murky world of personal animosity, once again with the state of 
South Carolina at the centre of events. 
 This chapter will highlight the aim of research objective (1) by arguing that 
South Carolina has played the most important (yet overlooked) role in the 
development of Supreme Court nomination hearings into political, and 
confrontational, public events. There will also be an emphasis on research 
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objective (2) in the portrayal of South Carolina as the best example of a state with 
a political agenda that achieved disproportionate importance on a national scale 
in the judicial nominations process, while research objective (4) will be evident in 
the chapter’s focus on both Southern political history and Supreme Court 
nominations – two worlds which have rarely, if ever, been studied together. 
Beginning with a brief outline of Fritz Hollings’s arrival in the Senate following the 
death of Olin Johnston, this chapter analyses the beginning of Hollings’s notably 
conservative voting record on Supreme Court nominations, while at the same 
time looking in depth at Strom Thurmond’s theatrical performance during the 
Marshall confirmation hearings. The chapter also considers the adjustment of 
South Carolina’s political leaders to changing circumstances in race relations, with 
the passage of 1965’s Voting Rights Act forcing the state’s political establishment 
to confront the rapid growth of a considerable African American voting bloc. 
 
 
Enter Fritz 
 
Governor Hollings’s dramatic farewell speech to the General Assembly – 
significant for urging acceptance, rather than condemnation, of the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 ruling that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional – 
led to a great deal of media discussion on the theme of an emerging ‘New South’.6 
Earl Mazo noted in The Charleston News and Courier that ‘Negro enrolment – and 
turnout on election day – is increasing at a considerably faster rate than the 
white’, due in no small part to Thurgood Marshall’s triumph in arguing against the 
state’s white primary system in 1947.7 The New York Times acknowledged the 
peaceful desegregation of South Carolina’s universities, colleges, schools, lunch 
counters and hotels, with a Professor of Education at South Carolina State College 
suggesting that many white politicians would welcome the rapidly increasing black 
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registration and turnout, as a significant rise in black participation would 
ultimately relieve them of the burden of running on a racist platform.8 Yet, despite 
the relative calm of South Carolina’s civil rights protests during the early 1960s, 
the state’s Democratic political establishment remained aware that an enormous 
increase in Republican votes during the 1962 Senate elections had resulted largely 
from the appeal of segregationist campaigns waged by W.D. Workman in South 
Carolina and James D. Martin in Alabama.9 These unusually strong Republican 
challenges to long-serving Southern Democrats Olin Johnston and Lister Hill 
provided much encouragement for the Republican Party in its ongoing effort to 
win over the Southern states, but the South Carolina Democratic Party would 
continue to fight for political control of its territory regardless of increasing 
Republican popularity and growing momentum in the civil rights movement. 
For Strom Thurmond, the Republican Party encroachment of the early 
1960s presented an altogether more positive set of possibilities. Aware that his 
base of support comprised a more conservative variety of white voter, Thurmond 
felt a greater kinship with conservative Republicans such as W.D. Workman and 
Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona than the ‘liberals, intellectuals, would-be 
socialists, and bloc-vote appeasers’ in the national Democratic Party, whom he 
had been forced to tolerate since his first election to the Senate.10 Whereas 
Johnston and Hollings would spend the remainder of their careers fighting to 
convince Southerners to stick with the Democratic Party in the face of the other 
party’s gradual and ultimately successful takeover, Thurmond believed that until a 
Republican such as former Vice President Richard Nixon was sent to the White 
House, there was simply no hope of ensuring the appointment of reliable 
conservative judges to the US Supreme Court or any other position in the Federal 
Judiciary. His sensational defection to the Republican Party in September 1964 
ushered in a new era for the state of South Carolina, providing the minority party 
with an enormously influential figure to spearhead its rapid development into a 
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formidable electoral force in Southern politics.11 In maintaining his considerable 
political following despite the change of party affiliation, Thurmond would 
become a valuable asset to the Republican election campaigns of Barry 
Goldwater, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, making a sizeable contribution to 
the successful long-term Republican effort to convince the South that the 
Democratic Party no longer represented conservative white interests.12 As a 
Republican Senator and a new arrival on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Thurmond would now have the opportunity to oppose liberal judicial nominees on 
his own terms, without being kept in check by the Southern Democratic caucus. 
The defiant stand taken by the South Carolina Democratic establishment 
did little to convince Thurmond to re-consider his party defection. His failure to 
see eye-to-eye with national Democratic figures had been quite evident for many 
years, not least in his refusal to support any Democratic presidential candidate 
since 1944, and his willingness to defy influential party figures such as Lyndon 
Johnson and Richard Russell.13 By complete contrast, Olin Johnston’s loyalty to the 
Democratic Party had paid off handsomely, with the mild-mannered senior 
Senator achieving even greater seniority on his Senate committees during the 
early 1960s. A telephone call between Johnston and President Lyndon Johnson on 
26th December 1963 provides a clear indication of the new President’s attitude 
toward Thurmond’s true political allegiance, despite the fact that the call was 
made nine months before his defection. The fact that the President was happy to 
defer to Johnston’s preferences for two new judicial nominations (rather than 
Thurmond’s choice of his former speechwriter, Robert Figg, now Dean of the 
University of South Carolina Law School) serves as a reminder of Thurmond’s 
failure to build a productive working relationship with Johnson during the latter’s 
tenure as Senate Majority Leader: 
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LBJ: They say that you want that Hemphill boy, don’t you? 
Johnston: Oh yeah, he’s alright. 
LBJ: Uh, and they, somebody told me you want a fella named Simons. 
Johnston: Simons would be alright, uh – 
LBJ: They tell me that, that, the Head of the Law School, though, is not too 
hot. 
Johnston: Well, he’s not. You can’t appoint him. 
LBJ: Well, that’s who Strom wants. That’s who Strom wants appointed. 
Johnston: He’s too old. 
LBJ: Strom wants him appointed. 
Johnston: I know. 
LBJ: He says he’s his number one choice. 
Johnston: Yeah, but uh, you’ll find with him that, see, they don’t appoint 
usually when they’re over sixty. 
LBJ: Sixty-two. 
Johnston: Is that right? 
LBJ: Yeah, that’s what the *indecipherable] ... but they make exceptions, 
they made one, they made one in Texas, sixty-four. 
Johnston: Oh yeah? 
LBJ: But uh, I want, I don’t want, I don’t want to appoint anybody that you 
don’t want ‘cause you’re a Democrat.14 
 
As a loyal party man, Johnston stood by the President and set out on the 
campaign trail in the face of growing Republican popularity in the run-up to the 
1964 Presidential Election, despite his opposition to that year’s Civil Rights Act. 
However, despite his success in holding back a Republican encroachment into the 
South during his 1962 Senate campaign, the famous Johnston ‘pep talks’ proved 
ineffective in preventing Barry Goldwater from winning South Carolina and the 
other four states of the Deep South in his unsuccessful presidential bid.15 Lyndon 
Johnson’s landslide victory over Goldwater provided little consolation for the 
South Carolina Democratic Party. Johnston’s daughter, Liz Patterson, recalls her 
father’s disappointment on election night: ‘That broke his heart, when South 
Carolina went for Goldwater. They have a picture of Daddy from when the results 
came in, and you can just tell he’s really broken-hearted. Daddy campaigned a lot, 
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but not enough probably.’16 One likely reason for his failure to campaign as 
vigorously in 1964 was a battle with cancer, which required an operation to 
remove a carcinoid tumour from his right colon in January 1965.17 Following a 
second operation in early April, Johnston received a letter from Senator Edgar A. 
Brown, in which the leader of the state Senate claimed, ‘We have all been greatly 
concerned about your condition and have been thinking and praying for you 
throughout this tragic period in your life. Do what the doctors say, get well, and I 
am sure there are a lot of good years ahead for you.’18 One week later, Johnston 
lapsed into a coma and died, aged 68, at Providence Hospital in Columbia, South 
Carolina.19 
 It was the responsibility of Governor Donald S. Russell to appoint a 
replacement for Johnston until a special election could be held for South 
Carolinians to elect a new US Senator. Deciding that he wished to go to the Senate 
himself, Russell resigned the Governorship and allowed his successor, Robert E. 
McNair, to appoint him as Johnston’s replacement, a move that received a mixed 
reaction in the state. The Spartanburg Herald-Journal reported that while South 
Carolinians had much respect for Governor Russell, and little doubt about his 
ability to represent the state in Washington, DC, some eyebrows were raised by 
the swift and opportunistic manner in which he had seized a Senate seat occupied 
until recently by one of the state’s most popular political figures, particularly as he 
had done so without consulting Gladys Johnston, widow of the late Senator, and 
without asking any of Johnston’s employees to join his staff.20 Since his loss to 
Johnston in 1962, Fritz Hollings had returned to practicing law, but was only too 
happy to make a political comeback by challenging Russell in the Democratic 
primary, held on 14th June 1966. Having already defeated Russell during the 
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gubernatorial race of 1958, Hollings entered into a re-match with relish, believing 
his opponent to be ‘brilliant and accomplished, but he was not a very good 
politician ... He didn’t seem to enjoy mixing it up with the voters. By contrast, I 
really enjoyed barnstorming the state. I was on a “Fritzkrieg”, as The New York 
Times put it.’21  
One key difference between the 1958 gubernatorial contest and the 
Senate primary re-match of 1966 was the increase in voter registration among 
South Carolina’s African Americans following passage of the landmark Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. By 1971, the percentage of voting-age African Americans in 
South Carolina had more than doubled since 1960.22 The significance of a growing 
number of black South Carolinian voters was quite evident in a remarkable debate 
which took place on 30th April 1966 in Orangeburg, during which the Chairmen of 
the Democratic and Republican parties debated one another at the predominantly 
black South Carolina State College. In reporting the event, The New York Times 
claimed that the Goldwater campaign, and the defection of Thurmond to the 
Republican Party, would ensure black support for the Democrats in that year’s 
elections, but ultimately, ‘the Democrats’ assurance and the Republicans’ 
concession that most Negroes will vote Democratic this year focuses both parties’ 
attention on white voters, who still make up 80 per cent of the electorate.’23  
To ensure white conservative support in his challenge to Donald Russell, 
Hollings arranged for his supporters to distribute a photograph of Russell shaking 
hands with black civil rights leader Reverend I. DeQuincey Newman as a means of 
damaging Russell’s credibility as a segregationist. Unknown to most white South 
Carolinians was the fact that Newman and Hollings were friends, and that 
Newman had given Hollings the photograph to use in his campaign, employing his 
usual tactic of backing the more moderate candidate during the primary 
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elections.24 In taking full advantage of the discontent felt by many over Russell’s 
‘self-appointment’, Hollings’s ‘Fritzkrieg’ proved enormously popular, and he 
scored a convincing victory over Russell to become the Democratic Party’s 
nominee for the special Senate election, winning by 196,405 votes to Russell’s 
126,595.25 In the special election, held on 8th November 1966, Hollings managed 
to defeat a strong challenge from Republican Marshall Parker to become South 
Carolina’s choice to replace Olin Johnston, in a victory of 223,790 to 212,032 
votes.26  
Republicans may have failed to solidify the white vote in South Carolina, 
but the party did succeed, unwittingly, in unifying black voters behind the 
Democratic ticket.27 With black South Carolinians now accounting for an 
estimated 20 per cent of the voting turnout in 1966, the need for Fritz Hollings to 
continue developing his skills in winning over black voters while at the same time 
maintaining sufficient segregationist credentials to secure white conservative 
support would only continue, offering a useful illustration of James C. Cobb’s view 
that, during the mid-to-late 1960s, Southern politicians ‘walked a tightrope in 
trying to convince white voters that their interests remained paramount’ in order 
to overcome the concerns of some whites that the region’s politicians were 
becoming too attentive to the growing black vote.28 
 
 
Strom Warning 
 
The likelihood of Strom Thurmond mellowing as he reached sixty years of age was 
reduced considerably by a string of Supreme Court decisions during the 1960s. 
While many of the more controversial opinions handed down by the Justices since 
the 1940s – notably, Smith, Brown and Baker – were condemned by Southerners 
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for threatening the ‘Southern’ way of life, the 1960s saw the Supreme Court tackle 
a series of cases dealing with the state of South Carolina specifically, including 
Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) and Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964), both of 
which upheld the rights of protesters in the state capital, in addition to South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), which nullified the state’s challenge to the ‘pre-
clearance’ provisions of the Voting Rights Act.29 It is unlikely that Thurmond was 
consoled by an emerging conservative trend on the part of Justice Hugo Black, 
historically one of the more liberal members of the Court. Having already 
dissented in Bouie v. City of Columbia, Black – a native of Alabama who received 
death threats for ‘betraying’ the South through his role in Brown – dissented once 
again in the Katzenbach case, viewing as patronising the inclusion in the VRA of a 
provision which empowered the Federal Government to approve Southern voting 
registration procedures.30 The South’s attempt to resist the VRA failed, and, as 
one study has argued, ‘the increased African American voter registration and 
turnout almost immediately eliminated the white supremacist rhetoric that had 
been a hallmark of the state’s political leaders.’31 In time, even the likes of Strom 
Thurmond would be forced to make concessions to the state’s growing African 
American voting bloc. 
The on-going Southern effort to curb the power of the Supreme Court 
continued to appear in the correspondence between South Carolinian voters and 
their Senators. Within one month of taking office, Fritz Hollings was reminded of 
the passionate South Carolinian desire to curb the power of the Court in various 
letters sent to his office, to which he responded, ‘there are currently many bills 
under consideration by the 90th Congress to restrict the power of the Supreme 
Court, and I intend to look these bills over carefully with an eye towards revising 
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the Supreme Court to a greater degree of efficiency and curtailing the number of 
poor decisions which have recently been handed down.’32 Thurmond, in a letter 
sent a few days after the announcement of Katzenbach, complained to a 
constituent of the failure of his frequent attempts to introduce a judicial 
qualification bill in Congress. He claimed he would now sponsor a constitutional 
amendment to create a ‘Court of the Union’, to be composed of the Chief Justices 
of the highest courts of all fifty states, which ‘would be empowered to hear and 
determine cases of appeal from the Supreme Court which affect the rights 
reserved to the states or to the people.’33 Despite the strong likelihood of this idea 
being blocked, as with all of his previous attempts to restrict the power of the 
nine Justices, Thurmond had lost none of his rage. Having become South 
Carolina’s senior Senator following Johnston’s death, he would now adopt a more 
militant approach in his war on the Court by using his position on the Judiciary 
Committee. 
In his new strategy, Thurmond would encounter one of his biggest 
obstacles in Lyndon Johnson, a Southern President with a clear legislative agenda 
aimed at improving civil rights for African Americans. Unlike most Presidents, who 
have made nominations to the Supreme Court upon the death or retirement of a 
serving Justice, Johnson was happy to simply create his own vacancies. During the 
summer of 1965, he persuaded Justice Arthur J. Goldberg to accept the position of 
US Ambassador to the United Nations as a means of creating a space on the Court 
for his close friend and confidant, Abe Fortas.34 Thanks to the Justice 
Department’s very business-like preparation of nominees for facing the tough 
questions offered regularly by Southerners on the Judiciary Committee, Fortas 
sailed through his confirmation hearings.35 In praising the nominee for winning 
unanimous approval from the Committee, Johnson told Fortas by telephone, ‘I 
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want to congratulate you. Damned if you don’t show them all up.’36  The close 
friendship between Johnson and Fortas appeared to raise no alarm bells among 
Southern Democrats, who offered no resistance to the nomination. The 
opposition of Strom Thurmond, whose public comments on Fortas suggested an 
intense personal dislike of the nominee, was joined by only Carl Curtis of Nebraska 
and John J. Williams of Delaware.37 As with his unexplained opposition to 
President Kennedy’s nomination to the Court of Arthur Goldberg three years 
earlier, it seemed that Thurmond was prepared to oppose any nominee who did 
not express a clear willingness to uphold the autonomy of the states, offering in 
support a track record of legal hostility toward civil rights. Cynics might even have 
concluded that Thurmond’s opposition during this period was guaranteed to any 
nominee failing to express this willingness in a Deep South accent. With Abe 
Fortas now on the Supreme Court, Thurmond had lost the battle but not the war. 
As will be shown in Chapter Five, he would get another chance to face down his 
nemesis. 
 
 
A Coloured Man with the Name of Marshall 
 
While President Johnson was able to put Abe Fortas on the Court as a long-term 
means of protecting his Great Society programmes, his plan to appoint the first 
African American Supreme Court Justice was, in itself, a long-term project. David 
A. Yalof has argued that Johnson appointed Thurgood Marshall as Solicitor 
General in 1965 as a first step in getting him onto the Supreme Court, yet Johnson 
denied any connection with a future appointment.38 Bob Woodward and Scott 
Armstrong have claimed that the President persuaded Marshall to take the 
position of Solicitor General by telling him, ‘I want folks to walk down the hall at 
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the Justice Department and look in the door and see a n***** sitting there.’39 As 
with the carefully-engineered vacancy left by Arthur J. Goldberg’s move to the 
United Nations, Johnson was able to create another vacancy for a new Supreme 
Court Justice only two years later. His promotion of Ramsey Clark to the post of 
US Attorney General would create a serious conflict of interest, in that Clark’s 
father was a serving Supreme Court Justice. As the President hoped, the 
appointment of the younger Clark as head of the Justice Department forced 
Justice Tom C. Clark’s retirement, allowing another convenient space for Johnson 
to fill on the Supreme Court.40 
When news broke of Justice Clark’s retirement, Strom Thurmond wrote a 
letter to the President, requesting that he give ‘earnest consideration to filling the 
impending vacancy on the Supreme Court with an appointee who has had prior 
judicial experience, preferably at the trial level.’ Regardless of whether or not 
Johnson interpreted the letter as a thinly-veiled Southern warning against 
appointing Thurgood Marshall, he would most likely have been amused by 
Thurmond’s next paragraph, in which he stated, ‘I realise that appointments to 
the Supreme Court are entirely within the prerogative of the President of the 
United States, and I hope you will not construe this letter as interference in that 
domain. It is meant only as a friendly suggestion.’41 At a press conference on 13th 
June 1967, the President made no attempt to disguise his pride in nominating 
Thurgood Marshall to replace Tom Clark, declaring, ‘I believe it is the right thing to 
do, the right time to do it, the right man, and the right place.’42  
Marshall had gone to South Carolina to argue against segregated schools in 
1951, and ended up changing the course of history with the Brown case in 1954. 
He had successfully faced down South Carolina’s Olin Johnston on his way to the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and ended up becoming the nation’s first African 
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American Solicitor General. Strom Thurmond, now the voice of South Carolina on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, was determined to make Marshall’s journey to 
the US Supreme Court as difficult and uncomfortable as possible. Responding 
immediately to the President’s announcement, the Senator complained that ‘this 
appointment to the Supreme Court will unquestionably tip the scales 
overwhelmingly in favour of the so-called liberal viewpoint on the Court.’43 He 
elaborated on this argument in letters to his constituents, telling a married couple 
from Florence, South Carolina, that ‘in many instances on basic constitutional 
questions, the vote is now 5 to 4 for the liberal viewpoint. The Justice that 
Marshall is being named to replace is usually found voting with the 4 on issues of 
this nature, and I fear that the appointment of Marshall will make the future line-
up to be 6 to 3. This means that it will require two conservative appointments 
before Court decisions will reflect true adherence to both the letter and the spirit 
of the Constitution.’44  
In his correspondence during the summer of 1967, Thurmond maintained 
the argument that Marshall would provide one extra liberal vote on the Court 
with his ‘completely erroneous’ interpretation of the Constitution.45 His responses 
to constituents during the month of June often included a statement 
acknowledging similarity between the correspondent’s views and his own, such as 
‘I am glad that you agree with my observations’; ‘I am pleased to know of your 
agreement with me’ or ‘I am very glad that we are in agreement on this issue’.46 
However, his statements of agreement began to disappear from his responses in 
late June, when some of the letter-writers adopted an overtly racist message. 
These included a New Yorker who expressed hope that the Senator would ‘VOTE 
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NO ON THE SEATING OF A NEGRO TO THE SUPREME COURT’; a Washington, DC 
resident who considered the Marshall nomination ‘an INSULT to every white 
citizen in the US!’; a South Carolinian who asked, ‘is there such a dearth of white 
lawyers in the US (qualified ones) that we come to this?’ and also a Texan 
correspondent, wondering what the Court will become ‘with a n***** there’, 
adding her view that ‘the white man does not owe the n***** one cotton pickin’ 
thing.’47 To each of these messages, Thurmond expressed only his appreciation of 
the writer’s views, and an assurance of his opposition to the nomination.  
The only occasion on which Thurmond acknowledged agreement with an 
openly racist letter was his response to New York-based ‘research historian’ 
Edward R. Cusick, who wrote to the Senator on 13th and 26th June to argue that 
the masonic lodge to which Thurgood Marshall belonged was ‘an illegitimate and 
clandestine Grand Lodge.’ Addressing the Senator as ‘Brother Thurmond’, Cusick 
pointed out that fellow ‘regular’ Masons included Southern Senators John Stennis 
of Mississippi and Sam Ervin of North Carolina, in addition to former South 
Carolina Governor and Senator, Donald Russell. In mentioning the retirement of 
‘Brother Thomas Clark’, Cusick referred to the long history of a masonic presence 
on the Supreme Court: ‘To think a coloured man with the name of Marshall who is 
a clandestine may sit on the bench which was so glorified and honoured as it was 
by Brother John Marshall!’48 Noting Thurmond’s listing in the Royal Arch Mason 
magazine as a member of a ‘regular’ masonic fraternity, Cusick requested that he 
inform other Masons in the Senate of Marshall’s membership of one of the 
‘coloured or Negro’ lodges which were condemned in 1898 by The Grand Lodge of 
South Carolina. To emphasise his concern, Cusick enclosed a bulletin entitled 
‘Important for Regular Masons!’, which pointed out that ‘none of the 40 regular 
Masonic Grand Lodges in the United States, all being recognised by the Mother 
Grand Lodge of England, has ever extended any recognition to any of the coloured 
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or Negro Grand Lodges in the United States,’ adding ‘(PLEASE let other regular 
Masons read this).’49 Whether or not Thurmond discussed the issue of Marshall’s 
‘illegitimate’ masonic affiliation with his ‘brothers’ in the Senate is not known, but 
it is significant that he would openly express agreement with Cusick’s argument 
when failing to acknowledge agreement with other racist sentiments expressed to 
him in letters during this period. 
 Meanwhile, some very different letters were arriving at the office of South 
Carolina’s junior Senator. One particularly remarkable aspect of the Marshall 
Supreme Court controversy that has not been documented in the current 
literature is the fact that, throughout his confirmation hearings, Marshall 
maintained a written correspondence with Fritz Hollings. Knowing that he would 
have to vote for or against the nominee following the close of the hearings, 
Hollings wrote to Marshall on 19th June 1967, telling him that ‘early this morning 
the Reverend Martin Luther King stated on television that he believed it was the 
citizen’s moral right and duty to violate laws that he believed were unjust. I would 
appreciate you letting me know your agreement or disagreement with this 
statement or belief.’50 Marshall provided a detailed response: 
 
 Dear Senator Hollings: 
 
You ask whether I agree with the statement that ‘it was the 
citizen’s moral right and duty to violate laws that he believed were unjust.’ 
That proposition misconceives, I believe, the nature of our ‘government of 
laws and not of men.’ I believe that in our democratic society the ways to 
challenge an unjust law are (1) by intelligent use of the vote in order to 
spur elected officials to change the law, and (2) by action in the courts if its 
validity is doubtful. In sum, the citizen has a fundamental duty not to 
disobey the law while seeking to accomplish desired change through 
normal political and legal processes. 
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This does not mean that I discount the value of dissent. It was the 
design of the Framers that there should be no impairment of the rights of 
speech and assembly, and the responsible exercise of those First 
Amendment rights provides an avenue to peaceful change. But I cannot 
accept the view – implicit in the statement you asked me to comment 
upon – that any man stands above or beyond the law. 
 
 I appreciate this opportunity to express my views. 
 
       Sincerely 
       Thurgood Marshall51 
 
Perhaps because this first letter did not satisfy him, or perhaps because 
Marshall’s candour led him to ask more specific questions, Hollings turned to the 
subject of recent Supreme Court decisions in his next letter. Despite not being a 
member of the Judiciary Committee, Hollings had more compelling reasons than 
other freshman Senators to investigate Marshall’s nomination, particularly given 
the very careful balancing act which he had performed as Governor by appearing 
conservative on civil rights while at the same time guiding South Carolina though a 
peaceful process of desegregation. His next letter would highlight the importance 
of the Supreme Court’s power in the minds of South Carolinian voters, particularly 
with regard to the impact of recent Court decisions relating to crime and 
punishment: 
 
 Dear General Marshall: 
 
I do not mean to besiege you with letters or pre-empt your 
hearings before the Judiciary Committee but in that I am not a member of 
the Committee, I would appreciate your letting me know whether or not 
you agree with the philosophy of the majority opinion in the following 
cases: 
 
1. Miranda vs. State of Arizona – June, 1966 
2. Walker vs. City of Birmingham – June, 1967 
3. Reitman vs. Mulkey – May, 1967 
4. Berger vs. State of New York – June, 1967 
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It is quite apparent with the recent trend of the Court, a man’s 
competence as an attorney should not only be weighted but also his basic 
concept of the Constitution. I respect your ability as an attorney and in 
addition to my first inquiry of June 19, I would also appreciate your 
response to this. 
 
     Sincerely 
     Ernest F. Hollings52 
 
 Marshall was less forthcoming in his next response. In refusing to 
comment on specific cases due to a likelihood of the issues involved in those four 
cases returning to the Supreme Court, Marshall highlighted a pattern that would 
re-emerge frequently during his confirmation hearings: 
 
 Dear Senator Hollings: 
 
I apologise for not responding sooner to your letter of June 21; I 
was out of town over the weekend. 
 
I am sure you will understand when I say that you place me in a 
difficult position by asking me if I agree with the majority opinions in some 
recent cases. Should I become a member of the Court, I would of course be 
called upon to pass [sic] on similar issues to those decided in the cases you 
cite, and indeed, to determine the application of those cases. Therefore, I 
think it would be improper for me to express specific agreement or 
disagreement with specific cases. 
 
I have, however, enclosed the briefs for the United States in 
Westover v. United States (a companion case to Miranda), Walker v. City 
of Birmingham, and Reitman v. Mulkey. 
 
     Sincerely 
     Thurgood Marshall 
     Solicitor General53 
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Ultimately, Marshall’s second response provided Hollings with the 
ammunition he required to justify voting against confirmation. While he may have 
struggled to reach a decision during the week following Johnson’s announcement, 
the existence of a draft of a speech, dated 20th June 1967, suggests that Hollings 
was preparing himself to justify his reasons for opposition at least three weeks 
prior to the commencement of confirmation hearings, and at least two months 
before the nomination would reach the Senate floor. The speech contains his 
confession that ‘when the President recommended Marshall for the United States 
Supreme Court this week, I thought it was a good opportunity to vote for a 
competent Negro ... But I hesitated.’ After mentioning his correspondence with 
the nominee, Hollings declared that ‘it is obvious from his answers that Mr 
Marshall has no idea of restricting himself to interpreting the Constitution and 
statutory law. Rather, he, like some of the other brethren on the Court, [is] 
prepared to re-write the Constitution. I think this is one of the greatest dangers 
facing the Republic and while I was prepared to vote for him on other scores, he 
flunked the main exam. I voted no.’54 
Hollings was able to use his correspondence with Marshall as a means of 
assuring his supporters that he was taking the nomination very seriously. Despite 
having declared ‘I voted no’ in a draft of a speech dated 20th June, he claimed in a 
response to a constituent from Bishopville, South Carolina, dated 29th June, that, 
‘before I make a final decision, I want to make certain that *Marshall’s+ philosophy 
does not conform with some of the recent opinions of the Court, and particularly 
the recommendation of anarchy by Martin Luther King. Rather than awaiting the 
Committee hearings, I have written directly to the Solicitor General, and my vote 
will depend on his response and the Committee hearings.’55 At the same time, the 
Senator seemed reluctant to tell his constituents that he had known Marshall for 
many years. An earlier draft of the letter to the Bishopville resident, dated 23rd 
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June, includes the statement, ‘I stated to the press that I knew Mr Marshall to be 
a competent attorney because I had tried cases against him’, but this line had 
been removed by the time the letter was sent to the constituent six days later.56 
 The argument in favour of Hollings casting a dissenting vote was laid 
before him in a letter from fellow Charlestonian and former state Senator Huger 
Sinkler, dated 20th June 1967 – the same day on which the Senator drafted his 
comments regarding his ‘hesitation’. Sinkler claimed to be ‘seriously concerned 
about the effect that a favorable vote [for Marshall] would have on your race in 
1968 ... the sure way to beat you is to tie you with Johnson, and an issue of this 
sort would be just what your opposition is looking for. I have talked to several of 
your friends on this subject and I think definitely the consensus share my views.’ 
Sinkler advised that ‘you don’t have to be extreme about it and your decision can 
rest on the solid ground of qualifications and philosophy. Perhaps this is what 
your inquiry into Marshall is intended to develop but in any event, it is my 
judgment that a vote for Marshall would have a serious effect upon your race in 
1968.’57 
Sinkler’s argument seemed logical given the nature of the expanding 
Southern electorate. Despite the surge in African American voter registration from 
1965, Earl Black and Merle Black have pointed out that, throughout the 1960s, 
‘three new whites were enrolled in the Deep South for every two new blacks’, 
offering a range of compelling reasons for Southern whites to vote in greater 
numbers, including rising levels of education, greater party competition, the 
politicisation of working class white women, and, possibly, a measure of racist 
counter-mobilisation.58 Although the Voting Rights Act succeeded in triggering the 
creation of a greatly expanded black Southern electorate, the impact of the ‘black 
vote’ was ultimately blunted by an equally impressive increase in white voter 
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registration, which would ensure the survival of a sizeable white voting majority in 
South Carolina. 
Whether Hollings genuinely hoped that his correspondence with Marshall 
would convince him to support the latter’s confirmation, or whether he hoped to 
use the correspondence simply as a means of sticking to his original position of 
dissent, the Sinkler letter outlines the position which the Senator would ultimately 
adopt. It would be left to the growing number of South Carolina’s black voters to 
decide whether or not they would be as sympathetic to Hollings’s position as his 
friends in the conservative political establishment. 
 
 
The Other Man From Maryland 
 
As Fritz Hollings continued to assure his constituents that he would cast a 
responsible vote on the Marshall nomination, Judiciary Committee member Sam 
Ervin of North Carolina was ordering his staff to begin researching Marshall’s 
background, while Strom Thurmond prepared a multitude of obscure questions in 
a bid to test, and, wherever possible, ridicule, the nominee’s legal knowledge.59 
When Marshall’s hearings commenced, on 13th July 1967, it was John McClellan of 
Arkansas who took the lead in interrogating the nominee, with most of his 
questions relating to the landmark Miranda v. Arizona, one of the four cases cited 
by Fritz Hollings in his second letter to Marshall. With the Miranda decision, the 
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four margin, had ruled that evidence used in a 
criminal prosecution would be considered inadmissible if the defendant was not 
made aware of a constitutional right to an attorney and a right against self-
incrimination, with a firm acknowledgment of the defendant’s understanding of 
those rights. McClellan made clear at the outset that his questions ‘do not go to 
the legal ability or training of the nominee, but they do deal with a critical 
condition in this country’, namely the problem of crime and disorder in the 
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streets.60 In responding to McClellan’s questions regarding his position on the 
Miranda ruling, Marshall maintained, as in his correspondence with Hollings, that 
he was not able to give his views on matters which would soon be under 
consideration by the courts.61 McClellan eventually became agitated by Marshall’s 
refusal to provide a straight answer: 
 
Senator McClellan: Do you subscribe to the philosophy that the Fifth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel requires that counsel be present 
before the police can interrogate the accused? 
Judge Marshall: That is part of the Miranda rule. 
Senator McClellan: Yes. 
Judge Marshall: And as I say, I can’t comment, because it is coming back 
up. 
Senator McClellan: I have to wonder, from your refusal to answer, if you 
mean the negative. 
Judge Marshall: Well, that is up to you, sir. But I have never been 
dishonest in my life. 
Senator McClellan: I did not say that. But you lead me to wonder why I 
cannot get the answer.62 
 
 Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, who had defended Marshall throughout 
his troubled Second Circuit confirmation hearings in 1962, made the first of many 
interjections, and took the opportunity to make a supportive statement of the 
nominee for the record.63 Hart and other Marshall supporters would have cause 
to interject over several days of hearings. On 14th July, Marshall went head-to-
head with North Carolina’s Sam Ervin, who was distinctly unimpressed by the 
nominee’s description of the US Constitution as a ‘living document’. In taking up 
McClellan’s Miranda-based attack, Ervin pressed Marshall on the original meaning 
of the words in the US Constitution, making specific reference to the wording of 
the Fifth Amendment. Recognising this line of questioning as simply another 
means of probing his views on the Miranda decision, Marshall stuck to his original 
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line of defence by asserting that he was unable to comment on issues which were 
due back for review in the Supreme Court. Eventually, Ervin felt it necessary to 
address Marshall’s evasiveness with a direct reference to the potential negative 
consequences of the hearings: 
 
Senator Ervin: I will tell you, Judge, if you are not going to answer a 
question about anything which might possibly come before the Supreme 
Court some time in the future, I cannot ask you a single question about 
anything that is relevant to this inquiry. 
Judge Marshall: All I am trying to say, Senator, is I do not think you want 
me to be in the position of giving you a statement on the Fifth 
Amendment, and then, if I am confirmed and sit on the Court, when a Fifth 
Amendment case comes up, I will have to disqualify myself. 
Senator Ervin: If you have no opinions on what the Constitution means at 
this time, you ought not to be confirmed. Anybody that has been at the 
bar as long as you have, and had as distinguished a legal career as you 
have, certainly ought to have some very firm opinions about the meaning 
of the Constitution. 
Judge Marshall: But as to particular language of a particular section that I 
know is going to come before the Court, I do have an opinion as of this 
time. But I think it would be wrong for me to give that opinion as of this 
time. When the case comes before the Court, that will be the time. I say 
with all due respect, Senator, that is the only way it has been done 
before.64 
 
 The style of questioning employed by Senators Ervin and McClellan during 
the Marshall Supreme Court hearings demonstrates usefully the Southern tactic of 
trying to expose a nominee’s sympathy with liberal Supreme Court decisions by 
pushing them into debates over the wording of various sections of the US 
Constitution. Given Marshall’s refusal to answer a specific question on Miranda, 
Ervin continued to press him on the wording of the Fifth Amendment, which 
includes a specific provision, relevant to the Miranda ruling, that no person ‘shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’65 While Ervin 
insisted that he was not asking Marshall to comment on any particular case which 
had come before the Court, and claimed that he was merely questioning the 
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nominee’s views on the wording of a particular section of the Constitution, 
Marshall eventually made light of Ervin’s tactics and re-asserted that he was not in 
a position to comment on any issues likely to come before the Court in the future: 
 
Senator Ervin: Judge, how can the words ‘no person shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself’, apply to anything except 
testimony given in a court? 
Judge Marshall: I would say, Senator, that we know, you and I, that you 
are talking about a matter which was in the Miranda cases, and there will 
be many more cases dealing with the Miranda ruling and the use of 
confessions. Those cases are now in the Supreme Court or on their way to 
the Supreme Court. 
Senator Ervin: Well, Judge, I would respectfully suggest that I am talking 
about fifteen words which have been in the Constitution since June 15, 
1790. Am I to take it that you are unwilling to tell me what you think those 
words, which have been in the Constitution since 1790, mean? 
Senator Hart: Would the Senator yield just briefly? 
Senator Ervin: Yes. 
Senator Hart: It would be interesting to know from the record how many 
cases have been litigated since 1790 over those very fifteen words. It 
would be an enormously long hearing. 
Senator Ervin: Yes, sir. 
Judge Marshall: It certainly would.66 
 
 Despite the fact that the Southern tactic clearly held no credibility with 
Senator Hart and others, it did at least allow Southern Senators the opportunity to 
portray the nominee’s refusal to answer questions on specific cases as a refusal to 
answer questions on the wording of the US Constitution. In offering the claim that 
the nominee before them appeared to have no views on what the Constitution 
means, Southern Senators were also making the unspoken accusation that the 
nominee would not adhere to the basic principles of that document if confirmed. 
In the event, Ervin not only implied his reluctance to confirm Marshall, but also 
pointed out that he had received more straightforward answers from Potter 
Stewart during the latter’s tense 1959 hearings.67 By the end of the second day, 
Marshall had already received indications from both McClellan and Ervin that 
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neither would approve his appointment, with the former complaining of a lack of 
sufficient information to confirm, and the latter criticising Marshall for apparently 
having no views on the wording of the Constitution.68 Meanwhile, Strom 
Thurmond remained silent, and continued to remain silent throughout a third day 
of hearings, held on 18th July, during which Ervin questioned Marshall on issues 
relating to the Voting Rights Act, including the Supreme Court’s Katzenbach 
case.69 
 The Committee reconvened for a further session on 19th July, which 
opened with a remarkable exchange between Thurgood Marshall and Chairman 
James Eastland of Mississippi, who added an even stronger Southern flavour to 
the hearings: 
 
The Chairman: Now, you have been in a lot of institutions in the Southern 
states. 
Judge Marshall: Yes, sir. 
The Chairman: Are you prejudiced against white people in the South? 
Judge Marshall: Not at all. I was brought up, what I would say, way up 
South in Baltimore, Maryland. And I worked there for white people all my 
life until I got into college. And from there most of my practice, of course, 
was in the South, and I don’t know, with the possible exception of one 
person that I was against in the South, that I have any feeling about them.  
The Chairman: Now, if you are approved, you will give people in that area 
of the country, and the states in that area of the country, the same fair and 
square treatment that you give people in other areas of the country? 
Judge Marshall: No question whatsoever. 
The Chairman: Senator Thurmond. 
Senator Thurmond: Thank you, Mr Chairman.70 
 
 With Eastland handing over to Strom Thurmond, the hearings took an 
extraordinary turn, resulting in one of the most unique confrontations in the 
history of the Supreme Court confirmation process. Having prepared thoroughly 
for the hearings, Thurmond would unleash an arsenal of carefully-worded and 
mind-bogglingly complex questions, which would build in intensity in a sustained 
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effort to frustrate and confuse the nominee. Beginning with a fairly 
straightforward line of inquiry, Thurmond asked Marshall if he knew who had 
drafted the Thirteenth Amendment, despite the fact that the Thirteenth 
Amendment did not constitute a significant part of any case which Marshall had 
ever been involved in.71 While it was clearly the case that an advanced level of 
legal expertise was required in order to satisfy Thurmond, it was apparent from 
the very first question that the relevance of each topic he opted to raise was at 
best questionable with regard to the nominee’s suitability for a seat on the 
Supreme Court.  
The Senator turned to the question of the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. With 
Marshall maintaining that he had not researched, nor been called upon to 
research, any of these issues since the early 1950s, Thurmond proved relentless, 
moving swiftly from a discussion of theories prevalent in the Republican Party 
during the 1860s regarding the constitutionality of the 1866 Act, to a question 
regarding the significance of Congress copying the Act’s enforcement provision 
from the fugitive slave law of 1850.72 Whatever his concern may have been over 
Marshall’s suitability, it is significant that none of the questions related to the 
nominee’s experience or judicial background. When a law professor from the 
University of Alabama wrote to Thurmond following the conclusion of the 
hearings, to request material on Marshall’s work on civil rights cases, the Senator 
admitted that such material was not included in the preparation he had done in 
advance of the hearings.73 
 The questions reached new levels of obscurity and complexity when 
Thurmond asked, ‘What constitutional difficulties did John Bingham of Ohio see, 
or what difficulties do you see, in congressional enforcement of the privileges and 
immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2, through the necessary and proper 
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clause of Article I, Section 8?’74 Following Marshall’s confession that he did not 
understand the question, Thurmond simply repeated the question word-for-word. 
At this point, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts interjected in order 
to bring clarity to Thurmond’s line of inquiry: 
 
Senator Kennedy: Could we just have some further clarification so all of us 
can benefit? I really don’t understand the question myself. I was just 
wondering if the Senator, so we could all benefit from both the question 
and response, if we could have some further clarification of the question, 
because I really am confused as to what actually you are driving at, and I 
would like to hear the answer of the person that is called upon to answer. 
Senator Thurmond: Well, I repeated the question twice. Would you like 
me to repeat it again? 
Senator Kennedy: I thought rather than repeating the question maybe 
there was some other way that you could arrive at it. 
Senator Thurmond: I don’t think I can make it any plainer, if you know the 
answer. 
Senator Kennedy: I see. 
Senator Thurmond: It is just a question of whether you know the answer. 
Senator Kennedy: I see. Could you tell us how the Solicitor is – 
Senator Thurmond: Well, I could tell you that Article IV, Section 2, did not 
set forth the powers vested in the United States. That’s the answer. 
Senator Kennedy: That’s the answer. I see.75 
 
 Senator Kennedy’s remark provoked an outbreak of laughter, prompting 
Chairman Eastland to call the room to order, but Thurmond was not deterred in 
his humourless crusade.76 When Marshall managed to provide an answer to 
Thurmond’s question on the 1866 abolition of the Slave Codes, Thurmond asked 
‘is there anything else you wish to add?’77 From this point, the question-and-
answer session fell into a pattern of Thurmond asking a question which Marshall 
was unable to answer, whereby he would simply move on, occasionally pausing to 
ask Marshall if he understood a particular question. Each time Marshall was able 
to provide an answer, Thurmond asked him if he wished to add anything further, 
as if to imply that the answer had been unsatisfactory: 
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Senator Thurmond: What provision of the Slave Codes in existence in the 
South before 1860 was Congress desirous of abolishing by the civil rights 
bill of 1866? 
Judge Marshall: Well, as I remember, the so-called Black Codes ranged 
from a newly-freed Negro not being able to own property or vote to a 
statute in my home state of Maryland which prevented these Negroes 
from flying kites. 
Senator Thurmond: Is there anything else you wish to add? 
Judge Marshall: No, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: Now, on the 14th Amendment, what committee 
reported out the 14th Amendment and who were its members? 
Judge Marshall: I don’t know, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: Why do you think the framers of the original version 
of the first section of the 14th Amendment added the necessary and proper 
clause from Article I, Section 8, to the privileges and immunities clause of 
Article IV, Section 2? 
Judge Marshall: I don’t know, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: What purpose did the framers have, in your 
estimation, in referring to the incident involving former Representative 
Samuel Hoar in Charleston, South Carolina, in December 1844, as showing 
the need for the enactment of the original version of the 14th 
Amendment’s first section? 
Judge Marshall: I don’t know, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: Why do you think the framer said that if the privileges 
and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment had been in the original 
Constitution, the war of 1860-65 could not have occurred? 
Judge Marshall: I don’t have the slightest idea. 
Senator Thurmond: Why do you think the equal protection clause of the 
original draft of the first section of the 14th Amendment required equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property only? 
Judge Marshall: I don’t know. 
Senator Thurmond: Did you understand that question? 
Judge Marshall: Yes, sir.78 
 
 Thanks in part to Senator Kennedy’s intervention, Marshall’s ploy of 
remaining calm and admitting that he did not understand most if not all of 
Thurmond’s well-prepared but occasionally inexplicable questions simply exposed 
the emptiness of the Senator’s plan to prove the nominee unqualified. Even if 
Marshall had, for example, been able to name the committee which reported out 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to the names of all of the committee 
members, his detailed answer might have embarrassed Thurmond and amused 
others in the room, but it would have demonstrated only an impressive academic 
knowledge, rather than legal ability or judgement. When Marshall did provide a 
detailed answer to Thurmond’s question on the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment – issues relevant to several cases he had 
been involved in throughout his career – the Senator still insisted on making his 
inquiry into whether or not Marshall had anything else to ‘add’.79 
 Eventually, Thurmond’s style of attack backfired when he turned to the 
subject of constitutional interpretation, asking Marshall, ‘Do you think that the 
Supreme Court must adhere to the original understanding of the Constitution as 
set forth by its framers, or may it ignore the intent of the framers and hold that a 
provision of the Constitution means whatever the Court chooses to have it mean 
at the moment?’80 The question failed to back Marshall into a corner, and instead 
gave him an opportunity to challenge the premise of the question while at the 
same time asserting his true belief that the Constitution is a ‘living’ document 
which can be interpreted differently over time:  
 
Judge Marshall: I don’t agree with the end of your statement that the 
Supreme Court has a right to interpret the Constitution any way they see 
fit at that moment. 
Senator Thurmond: So you do agree that they are bound to adhere to the 
original understanding of the Constitution as set forth by its framer? 
Judge Marshall: As set forth by its framers, and I am not trying to get 
around the question. My point is that I take the position, which I think is 
contrary to what you intend in your question, that this is a living 
Constitution, and its – you can’t expect the Court to apply the Constitution 
to facts in 1967 that weren’t in existence when the Constitution was 
drafted. That I think is how it differs.81 
 
At the conclusion of Thurmond’s interrogation, Senator Hart made a brief 
statement, announcing that ‘I think all of us were impressed by the research that 
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Senator Thurmond has done. The questions he raised were interesting. I will have 
to get his answers before I know what the answers are to most of them. I did learn 
that there was a Michigan Senator I never heard of before who said something a 
hundred years ago which time has proved probably would have been wrong.’82 
Hart’s dry humour may have lightened the mood in the room temporarily before 
Chairman Eastland called Michael D. Jaffe, general counsel for the conservative 
Liberty Lobby organisation, to make a statement in opposition to Marshall’s 
confirmation. In making the case that Marshall was unqualified to sit on the 
Supreme Court, Jaffe reminded others in the room of the remarks made by Dr 
Alfred Kelly, which, as explained in Chapter Three, had become controversial 
during Marshall’s 1962 Second Circuit hearings. He also pointed out that, 
following those hearings, the late Senator Olin Johnston had declared in the 
Senate that ‘in studying the background of Thurgood Marshall, we discovered 
that, although he had practiced law in the state of New York, he had never been 
licenced to conduct this practice in that state ... The practice of law without a 
licence by Thurgood Marshall certainly denotes a careless attitude towards the 
law of the land.’83  
With Strom Thurmond committed to proving Marshall’s ignorance and Olin 
Johnston appearing to contest Marshall’s qualifications from the grave, Fritz 
Hollings felt tremendous pressure to vote against Marshall’s confirmation in the 
Senate. He continued to mention his correspondence with the nominee in his 
letters to supporters, telling one concerned Anderson, South Carolina resident of 
‘letters I have written the Solicitor General asking for his position on recent 
Supreme Court decisions’, adding that he had stated publicly that ‘if the Solicitor 
General could not find it within himself to disagree with these recent [Supreme 
Court+ decisions *then+ I did not feel I could vote for his confirmation.’84 
 
                                                             
82 Ibid., 19th July 1967, p.179. 
83 Ibid., 19th July 1967, p.179-83. 
84 Letter from Ernest F. Hollings to Walter T. Cardwell, 21st July 1967, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative 
Files and Constituent Correspondence, Box 105, Judiciary, Judges, Selection and Appointment, Supreme Court, Marshall, 
Thurgood. 
191 
 
 
Figure 1. Thurgood Marshall at his confirmation hearings, 24
th
 July 1967. 
 
Senator McClellan presided over the final day of confirmation hearings, in 
the absence of James Eastland, on 24th July 1967. The development of Supreme 
Court nomination hearings into major political events of huge public interest was 
evident at the beginning of the hearing, when McClellan asked Marshall if he was 
bothered by the presence of photographers. A black and white photograph from 
this hearing, published in The Washington Post – showing a nonchalant Marshall 
gazing across the room through a cloud of cigarette smoke, his eyes giving away 
no indication of his thoughts on those facing him – is reminiscent of photographs 
of jazz musicians from the 1950s and 1960s, notably Julian ‘Cannonball’ 
Adderley.85 Having spent more than two decades facing down Dixie before the 
nation’s press, Marshall declared that he had no objections to the photographers, 
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whereby the acting Chairman proceeded to question him at length on the use of 
wire-tapping.86 Thurmond, having used up his arsenal of complex questions on 
obscure footnotes in the history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
grilled Marshall on the manner in which Supreme Court Justices might be 
impeached, finding that the Solicitor General was not shy in expressing his views 
on this subject: 
 
Judge Marshall: I don’t believe Congress has the right to impeach any 
judge if in the opinion of some Congressmen they wrongly interpret the 
Constitution. 
Senator Thurmond: I am not speaking of some Congressmen. You know 
that impeachment would have to originate with the House, they would 
have to bring the impeachment proceedings. The Senate would sit as a jury 
and act upon the proceedings. So you would have the House originating 
the proceedings and the Senate acting by a two-thirds majority to convict 
on the impeachment. But I just wondered what your thinking was, if a 
Supreme Court member does not follow the Constitution, if you felt he 
ought to be impeached. 
Judge Marshall: I have no position on that because I can’t conceive of a 
situation you are talking about. If you mean that a Supreme Court justice, 
or indeed the Supreme Court itself, interprets the Constitution differently 
from the way Congress wants it interpreted, that Congress has a right to 
impeach, I don’t believe that. 
Senator Thurmond: I was afraid you would take that position. I have no 
more questions.87 
 
 With his unique onslaught of questions finally at an end, Strom Thurmond 
had succeeded spectacularly in leaving his mark on the history of the US Supreme 
Court nomination process. But the reactions of Senators Hart and Kennedy during 
the hearings suggested little likelihood that other Senators from outside the South 
would be swayed into opposing Marshall’s confirmation. Even among the 
Southern delegation, some Senators were looking to the future, among them Fritz 
Hollings, who remained painfully aware that the Southern brand of 
obstructionism aimed at Thurgood Marshall by both Johnston and Thurmond 
during two separate sets of controversial Senate Judiciary Committee hearings 
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was looking increasingly out-of-date. By the summer of 1967, black Americans 
were voting in greater numbers; many were taking to the streets and speaking of 
‘black power’, and the US Supreme Court would soon be welcoming its first 
African American Justice. 
 
 
Flunking the Hollings Test 
 
On the very same day that his Senate Judiciary Committee hearings concluded, 
Marshall sent to Hollings three news clippings to illustrate the manner in which he 
had distanced himself from the philosophies of several key figures in the civil 
rights movement. The clippings consisted of articles from the Newark, New Jersey 
Star-Ledger, The Chattanooga Times and the Youngstown, Ohio Vindicator, all 
reporting an interview in which Marshall had repudiated Martin Luther King’s 
advice to black Americans that they refuse to fight in Vietnam. He had also 
dismissed ‘black power’ by declaring, ‘I could do without Stokely Carmichael’, and 
disputed the meaning of the term by claiming that ‘from the time the NAACP was 
organised, it was urging Negroes to vote, and if that’s not black power, I don’t 
know what is. But throwing Molotov cocktails is not black power. That’s black 
anarchism.’88 Hollings acknowledged receipt of the clippings with a polite 
response, but the information proved too little, too late for South Carolina’s junior 
Senator.89 In responding to concerned constituents who expected him to confirm 
the appointment, Hollings once again commented on his correspondence with 
Marshall, declaring, ‘I wanted to know Mr Marshall’s position on four 
fundamental points and wrote him, but he refused to answer ... Of course, this 
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refusal puts a Senator at a loss to judge the qualifications. I therefore decided to 
vote not to confirm.’90 
 The correspondence relating to the Marshall Supreme Court appointment 
which arrived at Hollings’s office during his first summer as a US Senator exposes 
the political divide in South Carolina during this particular period. In writing to 
express their support for the Marshall appointment, several Hollings supporters 
made clear their preference for Hollings’s brand of racial progressivism over the 
persistent racist posturing of Strom Thurmond. One Marshall enthusiast from 
Columbia claimed that ‘with you in Washington, South Carolina has the best 
opportunity it has ever had to be the most outstanding state in America ... but if 
you follow the same selfish ideas of our other Senators, you will find that South 
Carolina will remain on the bottom.’91 Hollings received a particularly poignant 
letter from a Mr Samuel B. Hudson, a Georgetown resident writing ‘in quest of an 
answer to a twelve-year old Negro boy’s question, “Do we ever win?”’ In making 
the case that ‘this boy knows the accomplishments of Judge Marshall’ and ‘how 
hard he has struggled to prepare himself and ... become the best constitutional 
lawyer of his time’, the writer implored Hollings to ‘send an open letter to all 
Negro boys of South Carolina’, even if only to prevent these boys from joining 
black nationalist groups as a reaction to the racism of white politicians. He 
claimed that ‘this boy understands Senator Thurmond’s position for there is a long 
list of racist-type statements from him’, and added that the boy ‘is worried 
because your vote of “NO” would make the Senatorial delegation of South 
Carolina 100% against the progress of the Negro, and the Negro of South Carolina 
in particular.’92 
Having been informed in an office memo that Mr Hudson was in fact the 
Assistant Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) – set up as part of 
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President Johnson’s War on Poverty – and also ‘a responsible Negro with some 
political influence’, Hollings composed a lengthy response, arguing that ‘the main 
point I would make to you and your twelve-year old friend is that you do not 
lessen your faith or enthusiasm for the belief that regardless of colour in America, 
you can reach the top’, adding that ‘our twelve-year old friend should realise that 
it is Mr Marshall’s cause rather than his race that I disapprove.’93 The significance 
of Hudson’s seniority in the OEO would not have been lost on Hollings: in 1967, 
Hollings was involved in intense negotiations with OEO Director R. Sargent Shriver, 
to obtain a $17,000 contribution for a food stamp office being set up by black 
leaders in Williamsburg County, South Carolina.94 Meanwhile, in response to a Mr 
James W. McPherson – described in an office memo as ‘the biggest vote-getter’ in 
the predominantly black city of Orangeburg – Hollings claimed that ‘it boils down 
to a question: Will the appointee judge the law or attempt to make new law? But I 
wanted to give him every opportunity to dispel this concern. He refused.’95 
These and Hollings’s other responses showcase his careful political 
judgement on the Marshall question. In using Marshall’s refusal to give a 
satisfactory answer to his questions as a reason to vote against confirmation, 
Hollings claimed that he admired Marshall for ‘the fact that he took his grievances 
to the courts rather than to the streets’ while also making clear that Marshall’s 
race played no part in his decision.96 Significantly, he argued that Marshall’s ‘legal 
ability, of course, is eminently more distinguished than that of Chief Justice 
Warren prior to his appointment, and I do not hesitate to state that I would vote 
for Mr Marshall before I would vote for Chief Justice Warren’, which reads as a 
reminder to South Carolinians that their real enemy was in fact the man who had 
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presided over the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown, rather than the man who 
made the winning argument.97 In making such statements, Hollings aimed to 
convince South Carolinians that he remained committed to the state’s war on the 
Supreme Court but also that he remained unopposed to the cause of black 
advancement in the era of civil rights – a balancing act quite evident in the early 
draft of his comments from 20th June.98 Perhaps more significantly, some of 
Hollings’s letters included the claim, ‘I did not ask silly questions’, even when the 
Judiciary Committee hearings were not mentioned by the writer he was 
responding to.99 As if Hollings’s recognition of Marshall’s qualifications and 
achievements was not enough, the inclusion of his ‘silly questions’ comment was 
clearly an attempt to distance himself from another distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina. 
Thurmond, meanwhile, was receiving a mixed reaction to his extraordinary 
interrogation of Marshall during the hearings. Having read Thurmond’s questions 
in a newspaper, a ‘Mrs Arthur B. Ward’, from Darien, Connecticut, wrote to the 
Senator to ask, ‘can you honestly say you could answer those questions, and that 
you would have asked those questions of a white, conservative Southerner? I 
don’t believe it – like the South’s “fair” voter registration forms!’100 Thurmond’s 
response suggested a certain degree of tetchiness: 
 
 Dear Mrs. Ward: 
 
 Your card of recent date has been received. 
 
Yes, I can answer the questions I posed to Mr. Marshall since I did 
extensive research for these hearings. Although I would not expect the 
average person, the average lawyer, or the average judge to be capable of 
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answering these questions, I would expect intelligent answers from a 
lawyer who has devoted his entire practice to the area of constitutional 
law concerning the 13th and 14th Amendments. 
 
I feel that Mr. Marshall has displayed a great lack of comprehension of his 
own area of expertise. I intend to vote against confirmation of his 
nomination. 
 
 With best wishes, 
      
       Sincerely, 
       Strom Thurmond101 
 
 In reporting on the hearings, Fred P. Graham noted in The New York Times 
that ‘the hearings cast some doubt over Mr Marshall’s mastery of constitutional 
history, but none at all on his dignity as a man ... They also proved to many 
observers the need for new ground rules to avoid questioning that does no more 
than punish a future Supreme Court justice.’102 When a constituent sent this 
article to Thurmond, the Senator responded that he did not consider Graham’s 
views ‘to be a fair evaluation of the hearings. The questions I asked were ones 
which were on some rather obscure constitutional principles. However, Mr 
Marshall is noted as one of the foremost attorneys in the area of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and I expected him to be knowledgeable enough to provide answers 
to my questions.’103 While Mrs Ward and others may have been unconvinced by 
Thurmond’s laughable claim that Marshall ‘lacked comprehension in his own area 
of expertise’, one resident of Spartanburg wrote to congratulate the Senator on 
his questioning, expressing the view that, ‘I am quite sure the press expected you 
to question Marshall on the race issue, and planned to conjure up their usual 
biased reporting of the confrontation. Your line of questioning reflected not only a 
knowledge of constitutional law, but was a credit to yourself and to the stature of 
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the entire South.’104 As Thurmond had known all along, he clearly represented a 
very different brand of voter from the more moderate South Carolinians who had 
supported Olin Johnston, and, more recently, Fritz Hollings. 
 
 
Marshall Sorta Gets Sworn In 
 
Senator Eastland announced that the Judiciary Committee had approved the 
Marshall nomination by a vote of 11-5, with Senators Eastland, McClellan, Ervin 
and Thurmond voting against confirmation, along with Senator George Smathers 
of Florida.105 When the nomination finally reached the Senate floor on 30th August 
1967, Marshall was confirmed by the US Senate on a vote of 69-11.106 Thurmond, 
Ervin and Eastland were joined in their opposition by eight Southern Democrats: 
Allen Ellender and Russell Long of Louisiana, Lister Hill and John Sparkman of 
Alabama, Herman Talmadge of Georgia, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, Spessard 
Holland of Florida, and, of course, Fritz Hollings of South Carolina.107 The claim of 
Juan Williams that President Johnson managed to persuade twenty Senators not 
to vote may explain why several Southerners abstained, including Richard Russell 
of Georgia, James Eastland and John Stennis of Mississippi, and John McClellan of 
Arkansas.108 For Hollings’s supporters, many of whom were disappointed that he 
chose to side with the South Carolina political establishment, some salt may have 
been rubbed into the wound by the fact that a significant number of Southern 
Senators chose, in a sign of their acknowledgement of the changing Southern 
electorate following passage of the Voting Rights Act, to support Marshall’s 
confirmation. In addition to the support of Republicans John Tower of Texas and 
Howard Baker of Tennessee, Marshall won the support of Southern Democrats 
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William J. Fulbright of Arkansas, Albert Gore of Tennessee, Ralph Yarborough of 
Texas and William B. Spong of Virginia.109 
Marshall was sworn in privately as an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court on 1st September 1967, with the oath administered by Alabamian Justice 
Hugo Black, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan.110 A resident of Massachusetts 
wrote to Strom Thurmond a few days later over his concern that Marshall had told 
a reporter that he ‘sorta got sworn in.’111 The writer asked ‘What did he mean? 
Did he or did he not take the oath to support the Constitution? Was he sworn in 
or was he not?’ Thurmond responded that he had been informed by ‘reliable 
sources’ that all aspects of the procedure involved in Marshall’s swearing-in had 
been completely legal, adding, ‘as to what he meant by his statement, I am afraid 
you would have to ask him that.’112 
In his 2008 memoir, Fritz Hollings described his vote against Marshall’s 
confirmation as ‘the most difficult decision in my political career.’ Although his 
explanation that ‘the South looked upon Johnson’s appointment of Marshall as 
nothing more than a political down payment for the black vote’ sounded eerily 
similar to the arguments being made by Southern politicians forty years earlier, he 
did concede that ‘I knew if I voted to confirm him, my political career would be 
over.’ In mentioning that Marshall’s son, Thurgood Jr, later worked on the staff of 
the Commerce Committee on which he served, Hollings concluded, ‘I am sure that 
he and his father understood my vote. As I look back at my years in the Senate, 
that is the one vote I regret.’113 He did not mention the correspondence which 
took place between them, nor did he reflect on the fact that his dissenting vote 
aligned him unwittingly with Strom Thurmond’s aggressive and opportunistic style 
of questioning. Despite being convinced that the Marshall controversy could have 
resulted in fatal consequences for his career, Hollings has never discussed the 
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issue of where the pressure was coming from to oppose Marshall’s confirmation. 
As with the letters being sent to Olin Johnston during his sustained opposition to 
Marshall’s Second Circuit appointment, the content of Hollings’s correspondence 
during the summer of 1967 suggests once again that South Carolina’s racially 
moderate voices were ultimately shouted down by the state’s dominant political 
establishment, with the anti-Court sentiments of lowcountry politicians only 
increasing following the Court’s order to reconstruct malapportioned legislatures 
in the Baker v. Carr decision. 
Furthermore, Hollings has said little regarding the reaction of the state’s 
black community to his vote against Marshall. As The New York Times reported in 
September 1967, Hollings was criticised at a meeting of black leadership figures in 
Columbia, with Vernon Jordan, of the Voter Education Project (VEP), declaring, 
‘Fritz Hollings must understand one thing: The Negro vote giveth, and it taketh 
away.’ Wiley A. Branton, Special Assistant to Attorney General Ramsey Clark and 
Director of the VEP, ‘drew shouts of “No” from the audience when he asked, “Did 
Senator Hollings vote for you when he voted against Thurgood Marshall?”’114 Far 
from suggesting that black South Carolinians had short memories, Hollings’s re-
election victory in November 1968 served as yet another indication of the 
frequent sacrifices made by black Southern voters when siding with the more 
moderate of the two candidates on offer in each round of elections. 
 As Governor of South Carolina, Hollings had led the way in guiding the 
South through a complex and delicate process of desegregation, but his vote 
against Thurgood Marshall’s Supreme Court nomination – in which he was joined 
by ten other Southern Democrats, all of whom were elected prior to the start of 
the 1960s – implied that nothing had changed in the outlook of South Carolina’s 
Senators since Olin Johnston cast his dissenting vote against the confirmation of 
Earl Warren as Chief Justice in March 1954.115 By the end of the summer of 1967, 
there was ample evidence to suggest that Senators Thurmond and Hollings 
represented very different South Carolinian voters, yet, throughout the course of 
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deliberations over the Marshall Supreme Court nomination, neither Senator was 
able to make a positive gesture to re-assure the state’s sizeable black community. 
While each demonstrated very different attitudes toward the nominee as a 
human being, both men ultimately voted for the same outcome. Despite the 
enormous changes occurring in South Carolina, and the political skill shown by 
Hollings in shepherding the state through an acceptance of Brown and the 
enrolment of black students in traditionally white Southern universities, the South 
Carolinian trait of resistance to federal interference in the Southern way of life 
was still perfectly intact in the troubled development of Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings into significant political events of growing public interest. 
Thurmond’s passion for his new opportunity to interrogate Supreme Court 
nominees face-to-face as a member of the Judiciary Committee recalls W.J. Cash’s 
description of the Southern man’s ‘love of self-assertion and battle – a chance to 
posture and charge and be the dashing fellow’, and his style of attack would reach 
truly obnoxious proportions in the events covered in the next chapter, where his 
role on the Committee proved crucial in the failure of Lyndon Johnson’s attempt 
to elevate Justice Abe Fortas to the position of Chief Justice following Earl 
Warren’s retirement.116 
 Other than allowing further national exposure for South Carolina’s war on 
the Supreme Court, the struggle over the confirmation of the nation’s first African 
American Justice appeared to signal another defeat for the state’s Senators. On 
the other hand, Thurmond had offered a graphic demonstration of a unique brand 
of dogged determination which would ultimately prevail in the case of Abe Fortas.  
The Fortas episode would confirm that the South Carolinian war on the Supreme 
Court could be effective in scoring significant victories but only when working in 
tandem with other potent political forces. Chapter Five will also analyse 
Thurmond’s role in Richard Nixon’s election victory in 1968, which would finally 
allow Southern conservatives the tantalising opportunity to encourage the 
appointment of judges who rejected Thurgood Marshall’s notion of a ‘living’ 
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Constitution and employed the ‘strict constructionist’ approach of interpreting the 
document exactly as it was written. In the meantime, with Thurmond escalating 
his attack and Hollings continuing to carve out a unique conservative record on 
judicial nominations which would last for nearly four decades, the influence of 
South Carolina in the Supreme Court nomination process had reached 
unprecedented heights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
Fortas ... The Word That Rang in Everyone’s Ears 
 
 
 
Now, Mr Chairman, for the reader of the record, he will be completely 
fogged up by that exchange. All that happened was that some people were 
pleased that the Justice did not agree that, whatever the crime rate is, it is 
a consequence of Supreme Court decisions. As I look over the room, 
everybody looks nice and clean and fine and fresh.1 
 
Philip A. Hart, 19th July 1968 
 
 
With his concern for future historians once again evident, Senator Philip Hart of 
Michigan used this idiosyncratic choice of words to clarify the comments made by 
Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina regarding unwelcome 
‘demonstrations’ during hearings to determine the suitability of Justice Abe Fortas 
for the position of Chief Justice of the United States. Having sat through Olin D. 
Johnston’s interminable stalling tactics during Thurgood Marshall’s Second Circuit 
hearings, and also Thurmond’s barrage of carefully-worded and occasionally 
inexplicable questions during Marshall’s Supreme Court hearings, Senator Hart 
observed the escalation of Thurmond’s attack during the Fortas Chief Justice 
hearings, with his preambles, questions and diatribes merging occasionally into 
one barely coherent tirade. Unable to conceal his amusement at the reaction of 
some in the room to Fortas’s blunt response to Thurmond’s staggeringly lengthy 
and complex framing of one particularly straightforward question, Hart clarified 
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for the record that the ‘demonstration consisted of mild scattered applause for a 
statement that I would have applauded myself’, preventing future historians from 
misreading the ‘demonstration’ as the work of anti-establishment youths, whose 
protests against the raging war in Vietnam would characterise the USA of the late 
1960s.2 
 The failure of the 1968 Fortas nomination proved to be pivotal in the 
development of Supreme Court confirmation hearings into controversial, heavily-
politicised events of increasing public interest. The existing literature has 
examined in depth the significance of the Fortas affair, with particular attention 
given to the failure of Lyndon Johnson’s judgement during the final, troubled, year 
of his Presidency, and also the role of Thurmond as chief antagonist in the crusade 
to prove Fortas unsuitable for the highest judicial position in the nation. Yet there 
are other reasons why the full significance of Thurmond’s leading role in the 
Fortas episode has not been fully realised in the current literature. Scholars such 
as Thurmond’s recent biographer, Joseph Crespino, have discussed the 
importance of judicial politics in fashioning the conservative movement of the late 
twentieth century, but none of the existing studies have analysed Thurmond’s 
behaviour in the context of South Carolina’s long-standing war on the Supreme 
Court. From Olin Johnston’s campaign to defy the Court’s Smith v. Allwright 
decision in 1944 to the dilemma of Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings in opposing the 
nomination of the Court’s first African American Justice, the full extent of South 
Carolina’s war on the Court has remained an overlooked characteristic of post-war 
conservatism. For Mark Silverstein, the Fortas rejection marked the beginning of 
the ‘modern’ era of conflict in the Supreme Court nomination process, 
highlighting ‘a new generation of Senate Republicans *who+ understood that 
highly visible public battles to bring the Court back to the “silent majority” could 
produce real electoral dividends that would outweigh the consequences of any 
breach of timeworn patterns of Senate decorum and behaviour.’3 One might add 
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that several Southern Democrats – pre-eminently those from South Carolina – had 
been pioneering this practice for years prior to the events of 1968. 
Thurmond was able to engineer a Senate rejection of Fortas’s nomination 
as part of a sustained attack on the liberal jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
under the leadership of outgoing Chief Justice Earl Warren, but in this instance, his 
actions represented a tactical shift from an obstructive role to an interventionist 
role in the nomination process. As Thurmond himself was fond of telling his 
constituents, he had opposed the confirmation of every individual nominated to 
serve on the Supreme Court since the beginning of his service in the Senate in 
1955. But his opposition to Fortas involved not only resistance to the nominee’s 
confirmation, but also a concerted political effort to infiltrate the process of 
selection by using his growing influence as a member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. For Thurmond, the complex political situation within the Senate 
during the summer of 1968 allowed an opportunity to prevent the outgoing 
Lyndon Johnson from replacing Warren, with a view to getting the vacancy filled 
by the incoming President. 
The Fortas affair also forms a crucial aspect of Strom Thurmond’s political 
significance following his 1964 defection to the Republican Party. Rather than 
following his previous tactic of opposing the Court in collaboration with the 
Southern Democratic bloc led by Georgia’s Richard Russell, this time Thurmond 
allied himself with Republican presidential hopeful Richard Nixon, and developed 
an effective partnership with Michigan’s recently-elected Republican Senator, 
Robert P. Griffin. Ultimately, the role played by Thurmond in Abe Fortas’s 
rejection was part of his growing influence in the Republican Party, which proved 
critical in the gradual Republican takeover of the South, culminating in a political 
dominance over the region which remains in place to this day. 
For this reason and others, this chapter highlights the importance of 
research objective (3) in avoiding the study of Supreme Court nominations as 
‘one-off’ events. The Fortas affair does provide evidence of at least one occasion 
on which Thurmond achieved genuine political influence in the nomination 
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process despite, or perhaps in part as a result of, his truly obnoxious and 
provocative behaviour in confronting the individuals chosen by Presidents to serve 
on that most powerful political institution. On the other hand, as previous 
chapters have shown, the persistent influence of South Carolina’s Senators in the 
appointment of Supreme Court Justices transcends the issue of whether or not a 
nominee was rejected. As will become clear, the Fortas controversy represents 
one of several landmark events in the state’s war on the Court, suggesting that 
analyses of nomination hearings as ‘one-off’ events fail to take account of the 
consistency in state, and regional, agendas, and also tend to obscure the long-
term escalation of the tensions which defined and shaped the development of the 
nomination process throughout this era. 
 The chapter opens with a brief examination of the relationship between 
President Lyndon Johnson and the two Senators from South Carolina, and some 
consideration of how this relationship was permanently broken by Olin Johnston’s 
death and Strom Thurmond’s party defection. Fortas’s confirmation hearings are 
covered in depth, before the chapter analyses the extent to which Thurmond’s 
crusade put South Carolina at the centre of a key victory in the rise of the US 
conservative movement. Perhaps more importantly for the thesis, this chapter will 
highlight research objective (1) by showcasing South Carolina’s vital contribution 
to the development of Supreme Court nomination hearings into highly political, 
and controversial, public events. An emphasis on research objective (2) will be 
evident in Thurmond’s critical backing of Richard Nixon’s presidential campaign, 
which highlights, once again, South Carolina’s politics on a national scale through 
the state’s extraordinary influence in judicial appointments. Finally, the chapter 
will reflect on the grim conclusion of the Johnson Presidency in order to highlight 
the shift in the South Carolina Senators’ agenda, which is covered in further detail 
in the following chapter. 
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Squeezed in the Middle 
 
Following the announcement that Chief Justice Earl Warren had informed 
President Johnson of his intention to retire from the Supreme Court, Strom 
Thurmond spoke for many in the South when he claimed that Warren had done 
‘more harm to the American way of life than any other one man holding public 
office in the history of our country.’4 In contrast to the deferential tone of his 
letter to Lyndon Johnson following the retirement of Justice Tom C. Clark the 
previous year, Thurmond told the press in plain terms that as Johnson had 
announced on television that he would not stand in the 1968 Presidential 
Election, he should now refrain from making any further nominations to the 
Supreme Court. While his letter from the previous year had offered ‘friendly 
advice’, Thurmond now declared that he was ‘unalterably opposed to a lame duck 
president attempting to fill the vacancy on the Court to designate a new Chief 
Justice,’ making clear his intention to ‘strongly oppose any attempt by President 
Johnson to do so.’5 
He would soon be joined in his outlook by Republican Senator Robert P. 
Griffin of Michigan, who declared that ‘never before has there been such obvious 
political maneuvering to create a vacancy so that a “lame duck” president can fill 
it.’6 The combined indignation of Thurmond and Griffin would no doubt have 
increased if either man had been able to prove that Johnson and Warren were in 
talks over who should become the new Chief. Keen to ensure that Johnson, rather 
than a potential Republican successor, name his replacement, Earl Warren 
proposed that the President bring back Arthur J. Goldberg, who had resigned from 
the Court two years earlier to become Ambassador to the United Nations.7 
Johnson opted instead to elevate Justice Abe Fortas, his long-time counsel and 
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presidential advisor, to the Chief Justiceship. To complicate matters further, the 
President also nominated Texan Homer Thornberry, another loyal Johnson man, 
as a replacement Associate Justice, to step in when Abe Fortas became Chief. 
Given the ambiguity over whether or not Warren had in fact submitted a formal 
resignation – as opposed to simply informing the President of an ‘intention’ to 
retire – an incredulous Thurmond resented the possibility that Johnson had 
engineered a situation whereby Southerners would be stuck with Warren if they 
refused to confirm Fortas.8 By Thurmond’s logic, if Warren was still serving, then 
there was no vacancy for a new Chief Justice, and if Fortas was still serving, then 
no vacancy existed for an Associate Justice – a situation that enabled him to 
refuse to recognise the Thornberry nomination and make Fortas his target.  
Thurmond’s hostility toward the Supreme Court was only exacerbated by 
the announcement in May of the Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County decision, which ruled that an Eastern Virginia school board’s admissions 
policy did not comply with the legal requirements of a desegregated school 
system, providing further evidence for some Southerners of the Court’s on-going 
bias against the South, fourteen years on from Brown v. Board of Education.9  In 
declaring to his supporters that he was ‘very much opposed to *Fortas’s+ 
appointment and will do whatever is necessary, including taking part in a 
filibuster, to block this nomination’, Thurmond outlined clearly a determination, 
after fourteen bitter years of tolerating Earl Warren, to prevent the Supreme 
Court from falling into the hands of another dangerous liberal Chief Justice.10 
By contrast, Fritz Hollings’s position on the Fortas nomination appeared 
ambiguous. In response to constituents urging him to join Thurmond’s opposition, 
Hollings claimed that ‘the proposed filibuster is for political shenanigans and does 
not involve the Fortas qualifications. Long before I came to Washington, the 
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Senate confirmed Justice Fortas for the Supreme Court. His qualifications were 
considered then, but no-one suggested a filibuster. A filibuster is proposed now 
on the basis that the President, having only six months left in his term, is a “lame 
duck” and therefore has no right to appoint. He not only has the right but the 
duty.’11 Having already hailed Johnson’s recent appointment of General William 
Westmoreland as US Army Chief of Staff, Hollings protested that he could not 
claim the very next week that the ‘lame duck’ Johnson had no right to make any 
more appointments.  He maintained that ‘if the Republicans thought Fortas 
should be filibustered against because of his qualifications, they could have well 
done so on August 11, 1965, when he was confirmed for the Supreme Court. They 
didn’t then, and I won’t join in their shenanigans now.’12  
Although he may have been successful in preventing South Carolinians 
from confusing him with Strom Thurmond, the state’s junior Senator faced further 
challenges in negotiating his position on the Fortas nomination, just as he had 
experienced one year earlier when arriving at the difficult decision to oppose the 
appointment of Thurgood Marshall. His declaration in The News and Courier that 
he would vote against Fortas and Thornberry prompted former state Senator 
Calhoun Thomas, of the Beaufort County Democratic Committee, to remind 
Hollings that ‘in Beaufort County, we are going to have to depend on a large 
Negro vote in your behalf, if you are going to make a real showing in this county. 
Right now, I am of the opinion that the Negroes are extremely lukewarm as to 
your race for re-election ... You may not be aware of it, but there is a lot of 
resentment toward you, because of such positions taken by you in respect to 
these nominations.’13 In his brief response, Hollings outlined his belief that 
Democratic control of South Carolina could be maintained through adopting a 
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conservative position on the Supreme Court. As he explained to Thomas, ‘I can’t in 
conscience confirm the Warren philosophy. I made this crystal clear in the 
primary, and I believe my position on the Supreme Court would help build me as a 
stronger Democrat, and, in turn, build a stronger party in our state.’ In referring to 
the continued defection to, or at least sympathy with, the Republican Party, 
Hollings added that ‘our strongest Democratic candidate, Mendel Rivers, curses 
these things outright and supports the candidate of the other party. I am 
squeezed in the middle and do my best, and I do appreciate your concern.’14 
While Hollings’s dismissal of the ‘lame-duck’ argument constituted a 
deliberate move to distance himself from Thurmond, the similarity of their 
political outlook on other issues was quite evident in the letters and news releases 
sent out by each Senator during the summer of 1968. In response to letters from 
concerned South Carolinians, urging them to reject gun control legislation, both 
Senators released communications that combined the threat posed by the 
Supreme Court with a personal endorsement of the right to bear arms. In his 
letters, Thurmond would frequently follow up a statement of his willingness to 
filibuster the Fortas nomination with a declaration that ‘I believe that the states 
have the prime responsibility to legislate controls on firearms.’15 In response to a 
letter from Jack C. Hawe, Chief of Police in the city of Santa Barbara, California, 
who offered information on gun control while condemning ‘the permissiveness 
and extreme liberal attitudes that prevail in our democracy’, Thurmond claimed 
that the information would assist him in blocking Fortas’s nomination on the 
Senate floor, adding, ‘I want you to know that I am truly appreciative of the 
tremendous task facing law enforcement personnel at this particular time.’16  
Hollings, true to his reputation for a folksier style of communication, 
opened his 20th June newsletter by declaring: 
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Last Christmas was the best ever. I gave my 17-year old son a 12-gauge 
Browning automatic, and we went hunting together. It’s difficult to get on 
the same frequency with these teenagers. We did on these hunts, and I 
wouldn’t want to pass any law that would mar this pleasure. Moreover, I 
can understand the home owner, the store owner, and the bus driver 
wanting a weapon. With militants and the church leadership 
recommending civil disobedience ... and with the Supreme Court decisions, 
the average man has lost confidence in the law.’17  
 
One reason for the increasing South Carolinian concern over law and order 
was the violence witnessed during the Orangeburg Massacre, which, on 8th 
February 1968, brought to a sudden end the relatively peaceful nature of South 
Carolina’s civil rights movement when a tragic outburst of police gunfire killed 
three students and injured twenty-eight others during a protest at the segregated 
All-Star Bowling Lane.18 Described by Governor Robert E. McNair as ‘one of the 
saddest days in the history of South Carolina’, the massacre proved to be, for civil 
rights activist Reverend I. DeQuincey Newman, ‘an indication that despite all that 
might be considered progress in terms of interracial co-operation, beneath the 
surface South Carolina is just about in the same boat as Alabama and 
Mississippi.’19 With the continued Southern resentment over the Court’s Miranda 
v. Arizona decision, and the growing public hysteria over outbreaks of racial 
violence in the streets, it was inevitable that the law and order issue would 
become a significant aspect of the Fortas hearings, particularly as both Thurmond 
and Nixon were discussing the issue frequently throughout the latter’s 
presidential campaign.20 Following Thurmond’s statement in an interview during 
the 1968 Republican convention in Miami that ‘the number one issue in this 
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campaign is law and order’, NBC’s David Brinkley remarked that the American 
voter was ‘free to interpret the true meaning of that phrase however he likes.’21 
 
 
‘Oh, My ...’ 
 
Lyndon Johnson’s reputation as a master of congressional politics was built largely 
on his understanding of the wants and needs of individual Senators, and the skilful 
use of such wants and needs as political carrots. With barely six weeks to adjust to 
the demands of the Presidency following John F. Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson 
received a letter from Robert McNair, then South Carolina’s Lieutenant Governor, 
pointing out the concern of the General Assembly and the South Carolina Bar 
Association over the on-going delay in filling two judicial vacancies for the state’s 
Eastern District.22 It was not until April 1964, when Johnson became impatient 
over the passage of a Civil Service payment bill – to be overseen by Olin Johnston 
in his capacity as Chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee – that 
he began talking seriously about nominating the two South Carolinian judges. But 
the President had inadvertently waded into a muddle of competing interests that 
highlighted the complex political situation in South Carolina during the early 
1960s. 
The growing distance between Johnston and Thurmond was evident in 
Thurmond’s on-going effort to promote Robert Figg, now serving as Dean of the 
University of South Carolina Law School, for one of the two outstanding Eastern 
District vacancies. While a consensus existed that one vacancy would go to 
Johnston’s friend, Congressman Robert W. Hemphill, it was assumed within the 
Thurmond camp that Johnston’s sour memories of the 1950 Senate contest would 
lead him to withdraw his tepid support for Figg and choose instead to endorse 
Congressman Charles E. Simons as a means of denying Figg the second vacancy. 
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By October 1963, Thurmond was growing impatient with the delay, telling state 
Senator John C. West that ‘I will not give consideration to any nomination to fill 
the Timmerman seat until the Senate also has before it a nomination to fill the 
Williams seat, which has been vacant since early in 1962’, adding his view that ‘it 
is in the interest of all South Carolinians that the “advice” as well as the “consent” 
of the Senators be sought and heeded ... particularly in view of the sensitive and 
important issues now being decided by the federal courts.’23 While Thurmond was 
happy to accept Simons, his former law partner, as his second preference, he had 
become embarrassed by Simons’ support for Olin Johnston during the 1962 
Senate primary. Given that Simons had supposedly switched his allegiance from 
Fritz Hollings to Johnston after finding out that the latter might object to Robert 
Figg’s nomination and therefore support him for one of the two vacancies, 
Thurmond was advised by Walter Brown that ‘if Olin turns down Bob and accepts 
Simons, then a lot of people in South Carolina will conclude there was a political 
deal on this judgeship.’24 
But it was Olin Johnston who would reach an agreement with President 
Johnson over the two judgeships. Knowing how badly the South Carolina 
Democrats wanted to see Hemphill and Simons confirmed, the President 
telephoned Johnston to urge the swift passage of the pay bill, telling the Senator, 
‘alright now, Olin, I’ll tell you, we’ve gotta do this in a hurry because I’m losing the 
best men I’ve got in the government.’ After assuring him that ‘I’ll get your judges 
up there simultaneously and I’ll call you and then I’ll call Strom, and they’ll be who 
you want’, an irate Johnson pressed the Senator to use his influence on the 
Judiciary Committee to ensure a swift confirmation for the two judges: 
 
LBJ: Alright, you get ‘em to have permission to let you waive the hearing 
on these judges so you can get ‘em confirmed quick. 
Johnston: Good. I’ll do everything – 
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LBJ: Now, if you don’t, they tell me that the NAACP is liable to come in and 
protest. 
Johnston: Well, we’ll get ‘em right through. 
LBJ: They, they, they, they, they say your boy Simons is not qualified. 
Johnston: Well, I think he is. 
LBJ: Well, I know he is if you want him, and, and you don’t want that 
Professor and that’s why I’m naming *Simons]. 
Johnston: Yeah. 
LBJ: So you just get, you get that, hell, I put you on that Committee, uh, uh, 
as leader to help old man McCarran and help us with some of our plans. So 
you just get John McClellan and Sam Ervin and some of your buddies and 
tell them that dammit, you want a sub-committee and you want it to meet 
and report ‘em right quick. 
Johnston: Well, we’ll do everything we can. 
LBJ: Alright. 
Johnston: Good. 
LBJ: I can count on you now to get that pay bill out in a week or so? 
Johnston: I’ll do it. 
LBJ: Alright, goodbye.25 
 
 Later the same day, the President was irritated to find that the two 
nominations had been announced in the press before he could make them official. 
He again telephoned Johnston, whose ‘surprised’ response – ‘Oh, my’ – may or 
may not have convinced Johnson of the Senator’s view that newspapermen were 
getting ahead of themselves: 
 
LBJ: They quote you and Thurmond both saying they’re quite imminent 
and all about what’s gonna happen and now they’re jumping on me and I’ll 
get all, uh –  
Johnston: Well, I think the news has gone a little far on it. 
LBJ: Well let me read you what the, the press boys are asking us about, 
and we’re telling them we don’t know a damn thing about it: ‘President 
Johnson today was reported on the verge of nominating Hemphill and 
Simons’. All that does is just notify anybody who wants to protest and raise 
hell – 
Johnston: Well – 
LBJ: – which they’re doing. 
Johnston: – you won’t get anything coming from me, names, any 
particular people. 
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LBJ: ‘Senator Olin Johnston issued a statement quoting the President as 
saying he would release his nominations if possible tomorrow’ – 
Johnston: Well – 
LBJ: – ‘for two long-vacant judgeships. Johnston said the President 
promised one nomination would go to Hemphill, a congressman since ’57, 
and Senator Thurmond agreed the nominations were imminent, and said 
the other nominee would be Simons, 47, a lawyer in Aiken’. 
Johnston: I haven’t talked to Thurmond anything about it either. 
LBJ: ‘Simons is a former law partner of Thurmond’.   
Johnston: Mm-hm.26 
 
 With his on-going concern over the best men in his government ‘quitting 
like flies’, Johnson again reminded Johnston to ensure passage of the civil service 
pay bill, before making a much calmer and more business-like call to Strom 
Thurmond, with whom he had never enjoyed a particularly cordial relationship: 
 
LBJ: Strom. 
Thurmond: Mr President, how are you? 
LBJ: Fine. Bill Moyers already talked to you, I find out, I ju ... while I was 
calling you, he called you from the other office. 
Thurmond: Uh, he just called me and said that you’re gonna send the 
judgeships up tomorrow. 
LBJ: We’re gonna try to get both of them out tomorrow. I’d , I’d wait ‘til, 
uh, uh, well, I guess y’all can go ahead and say so, we’ll ... uh, we’ll, uh, 
notify ‘em and uh, uh ... I think ... uh, they’re ... I think we’ll try to get ‘em 
out by the twelve o’clock meeting.  
Thurmond: Fine. 
LBJ: OK, Str – 
Thurmond: Thank you very much, Mr President. 
LBJ: Right, Strom. ‘Bye. 
Thurmond: ‘Bye. Goodbye.27 
 
 Shortly after the call, Thurmond sent a telegram to Lieutenant Governor 
McNair to confirm the President’s agreement to name the two nominees.28  
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 Following Olin Johnston’s death, Thurmond’s defection to the Republicans 
and Barry Goldwater’s victory in South Carolina in the 1964 Presidential Election, 
Lyndon Johnson’s relationship with South Carolina’s Senators would never again 
be quite so straightforward. Only four years after playing second fiddle in the 
nominations of Hemphill and Simons, Strom Thurmond’s influence over the 
process of judicial nominations was transformed. As South Carolina’s senior 
Senator, he now held a place on the Senate Judiciary Committee as a Republican 
Senator during the party’s rapid expansion in the Southern states. Following 
Johnson’s announcement in a television address on 31st March 1968 that he 
would neither seek nor accept the Democratic Party nomination for that year’s 
Presidential Election, Republican hopes for taking back the White House were 
encouraged further by the escalation of the war in Vietnam, growing concerns 
over crime and disorder in the streets, and a developing white conservative 
resentment over civil rights legislation, particularly in the South. Tennessee 
Republican Bill Brock, who was elected to the Senate in 1970, remembers the 
1960s as a critical period for the South, with the region’s transition to the 
Republican Party becoming evident in the growing number of successful 
Republican candidates: ‘The elections of John Tower in Texas, Howard Baker in 
Tennessee, and myself, along with a number of other Southern Senators and 
members in the 1960s, created an excitement with Republicans in general, and 
President Nixon, in particular. All felt that the South posed an enormous new 
opportunity for party growth.’29 
The role of South Carolina in this transition was led by, but not exclusive 
to, the towering figure of Strom Thurmond, who used his influence to build on the 
hard work of white upcountry activists in revitalising the state’s Republican Party 
during the 1950s and 1960s.30  Many of the state’s other politicians, including 
former Governor James F. Byrnes, had supported Republican Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s presidential campaigns in the 1950s, and Thurmond was followed 
into the Republican Party by Congressman Albert Watson and former 
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Congressman Arthur Ravenel Jr in the early 1960s. Although Byrnes opted to 
remain a Democrat, he gave his private blessing to Thurmond when the latter 
discussed his plans to defect in 1964, and criticised the ‘punishment and 
humiliation’ inflicted on Albert Watson by senior Democrats, who stripped away 
Watson’s congressional seniority after he endorsed Barry Goldwater’s presidential 
campaign.31 South Carolina’s Democratic establishment may have fought tooth 
and nail to maintain Democratic control over the state, but many in the party 
fought equally hard to maintain a South Carolinian tradition of independence – a 
trait which, ironically, led many to endorse Republican Party candidates before 
eventually defecting to that party themselves. 
As a result of this transition, South Carolina became a crucial state in the 
expansion of the US conservative movement, with the Abe Fortas Chief Justice 
nomination providing an early example of the ‘culture wars’ which would fuel 
conservative mobilisation during the latter part of the twentieth century.32 For 
Thurmond, who had gnashed his teeth in frustration when Fortas was confirmed 
as an Associate Justice three years earlier, the 1968 hearings would provide, for 
the first time ever, an opportunity for him to confront a serving Justice of the 
Supreme Court. Although Hollings would play no part in the hearings, the 
nomination once again placed him in a difficult position. With his 
acknowledgement of being ‘stuck in the middle’ as a conservative Democrat 
during the state’s dramatic shift toward the Republican Party, Hollings would 
continue to distance himself from his South Carolina colleague by taking 
advantage of the fact that, unlike Thurmond, he had not been in the Senate when 
Fortas was first confirmed for a seat on the Court. While Hollings’s portrayal of 
filibuster plans as Republican ‘shenanigans’ recalled the late Olin Johnston’s 
spirited resistance to the development of the state’s emerging two-party system, 
the role of Thurmond and South Carolina in the process of conservative 
mobilisation cannot be overstated. The importance of this episode in the history 
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of the state’s troubled relationship with the Supreme Court was never more 
evident than in Thurmond’s explosive behaviour during Fortas’s infamous 
confirmation hearings. 
 
 
The Hearings 
 
While an unimpressed Thurgood Marshall had faced down his Southern 
adversaries through a haze of cigarette smoke, and the combative Robert Bork 
would respond to his critics twenty years later with a fierce, devil-may-care 
attitude, Abe Fortas was a quiet man whose temperament was ill-suited to the 
ordeal of Supreme Court nomination hearings. His voice, barely audible in Lyndon 
Johnson’s crackly telephone recordings, was often so quiet during the hearings 
that the ageing Senator John McClellan of Arkansas complained that he could not 
hear Fortas’s responses to his questions. With his reserved, soft-spoken persona, 
the Tennessean was a perfect foil to the boisterous Lyndon Johnson, but his 
cerebral, academic approach was never likely to sit well with a Senate Judiciary 
Committee characterised by the cigar-chewing cynicism of Chairman James 
Eastland, the simmering bulldog demeanour of Sam Ervin, and especially the 
unfiltered theatrics of Strom Thurmond. Having been prepared for the hearings by 
the Department of Justice, Fortas knew to expect questions regarding his long 
friendship with Johnson, whom he had first met while serving as general counsel 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration in the 1940s. 
After heading Johnson’s successful legal strategy during the fight over the 
contested Senate election in Texas in 1948, Fortas had become one of Johnson’s 
most trusted political advisors.33 The relationship between the two men became a 
vital ingredient in Johnson’s rise to power, with Bruce Allen Murphy noting that 
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‘together, they had learned how to operate the wheels of government and 
together they got on the treadmill to the top.’34 
Despite the obvious concerns over the relationship between the President 
and the man who was nominated to become Chief Justice of the United States, 
the members of the Judiciary Committee were initially more pre-occupied with 
the question of whether or not a vacancy did in fact exist on the Supreme Court. 
On the first day of hearings, 18th July 1968, Attorney General Ramsey Clark – who 
had been appointed by Johnson as part of an elaborate scheme to prompt the 
retirement of his father, Justice Tom Clark, so that Johnson could make Thurgood 
Marshall the first African American Supreme Court Justice – had the unenviable 
task of clarifying to members of the Senate Judiciary Committee the issue of 
whether or not Chief Justice Warren had in fact resigned, or whether his 
resignation would become effective only when Fortas was confirmed as his 
replacement.35 Some of the Southern members on the Committee, who had 
loathed Warren quite openly since the announcement of Brown in 1954, were 
particularly keen to confirm that the current Chief Justice genuinely intended to 
leave the Supreme Court. Chairman Eastland inquired as to whether Warren’s 
resignation was ‘irrevocable’, while North Carolina’s Sam Ervin read from a 
newspaper report suggesting that Warren would remain as Chief Justice if Fortas 
was not confirmed.36 Thurmond also expressed an interest in the issue, albeit in 
the form of his typically confrontational style of questioning: 
 
Senator Thurmond: In a news conference held by Chief Justice Warren, he 
stated that he could serve on and would be willing, I believe, to do so. Did 
you see that statement by him? 
Attorney General Clark: I have read his statement, yes. I have seen 
newspaper clippings on it. 
Senator Thurmond: Therefore, does it not come down to this. Chief Justice 
Warren is virtually saying to the Senate, ‘You confirm Justice Fortas or I will 
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continue to serve.’ And if that is the case, how can there be a resignation 
of Chief Justice Warren? How is there a resignation if he can continue to 
serve? Either there is a resignation, or there is not a resignation. I ask you 
which is it? 
Attorney General Clark: Well, there is no resignation. The question is 
whether his retirement is effective. If so, when it will be.37 
 
The very suggestion that a deal had been made by the Johnson 
Administration and the Chief Justice in order to encourage Fortas’s confirmation 
provoked sufficient suspicion on the part of the Southern Committee members for 
the hearings to become lengthy, controversial, and unpleasant for the nominee. 
The danger of this issue alienating Southern Senators would be exacerbated 
further by a press conference given by Earl Warren, in which the apparently 
outgoing Chief Justice only added to the ambiguity over his resignation, prompting 
Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia to announce that he was ‘reconsidering his 
position in light of Warren being able to choose his successor.’38 
Before long, Senators were debating the potential problems of the 
unusually close relationship between Fortas and Johnson.39 During the second day 
of hearings, 12th July, Michigan’s junior Senator, Republican Robert Griffin, put 
forward his opposition to Fortas in bold terms when he claimed that ‘the 
argument has been advanced that if a “crony” – nominated because he is a 
“crony” – is “qualified”, he should be approved. I reject such a view because it 
demeans the Senate and the Supreme Court.’40 Republican Senator Everett 
Dirksen of Illinois, who, as the most influential Republican leader in the Senate, 
enjoyed an amicable and productive relationship with Lyndon Johnson, responded 
to the arguments of others in his party by claiming that he found the ‘lame duck’ 
term to be ‘offensive’, adding that most if not all of President Harry S. Truman’s 
Supreme Court nominees were also cronies, including Justice Harold Hitz Burton, 
who had sat next to Truman in the Senate, and Chief Justice Fred Vinson, with 
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whom Truman had regularly played poker.41 Nonetheless, Griffin proved fearless 
in expressing his opposition to the nominee, making clear that ‘I do not condemn 
Mr Fortas because he has been Mr Johnson’s personal lawyer and his advisor 
throughout much of his personal career ... But, Mr Chairman, I do raise the 
question whether Mr Fortas should be rewarded with the position of Chief Justice 
of the US Supreme Court because he performed such services as a friend of 
Lyndon Johnson.42 Michigan’s senior Senator, the inimitable Democrat Philip Hart, 
expressed regret that his Senate colleague felt so strongly in his opposition to 
Fortas, declaring, ‘I just happen to think that America can be a little proud of itself 
that there is a man like Abe Fortas in our land, and that this nation affords to such 
an individual full opportunity to advance. But, having said that, I know that Bob 
will not say Amen, so I have no more to say.’43 Three days later, President Johnson 
discussed his concerns over the Republican opposition with Everett Dirksen in a 
telephone call, urging his ally, ‘don’t let them filibuster this.’ Although he 
responded with ‘I won’t’, Dirksen admitted that ‘I couldn’t straighten out Strom, 
and neither could Jim Eastland.’44 
As with the events of Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation hearings, covered 
in the previous chapter, Thurmond had little to say during the initial phase of the 
hearings, almost as though he considered John McClellan and Sam Ervin to be 
warm-up acts. When the nominee finally appeared before the committee, on 16th 
July 1968, he was introduced by Democratic Senator Albert Gore, from Fortas’s 
home state of Tennessee.45 Kicking off by enquiring into the nominee’s 
relationship with the President, and then asking Fortas for his view on whether 
the Supreme Court should ‘bring about social, economic or political changes’, 
James Eastland’s line of questioning appeared to have changed little since he 
assumed the chairmanship of the Committee in 1956.46 John McClellan picked up 
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this line of interrogation, before Sam Ervin began a lengthy and in-depth dialogue 
with the nominee on various aspects of constitutional law. By the following day’s 
hearings, Ervin was pursuing a familiar line of inquiry by grilling the nominee on 
the Miranda decision – in which the Court had underlined the necessity of 
suspects being made aware of their constitutional rights – with Fortas’s 
uncomfortable responses sounding eerily similar to those of Marshall: 
 
Senator Ervin: The thing that puzzles me, and it is beyond my power of 
comprehension, is that if the Constitution means what it was meant to 
mean in the Miranda case, why one of the smart judges who had sat on 
the Court during the preceding one hundred and seventy-six years did not 
discover that. 
Justice Fortas: Senator, again, much as I would like to discuss this, I am 
inhibited from doing it.47 
 
When Thurmond’s chance to question the nominee finally came, on 18th 
July, he preceded his interrogation with the declaration that, ‘in the last decade 
and a half, the Court has made so many decisions affecting the lives of the 
American people in very fundamental ways that it would seem to me that the 
Senate, as representatives of the people, is entitled to consider these views.’48 
While this brief statement may have been intended as a pre-emptive strike 
against the same voices that had condemned the behaviour of Thurmond and Olin 
Johnston as Judiciary Committee members during previous hearings, the words 
used gave no warning of what was to follow. Without wasting time on the 
technicalities of the US Constitution, Thurmond cut straight to one of the most 
controversial issues in the South following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 
namely, the issue of state control over voting procedures. In targeting the Court’s 
Katzenbach v. Morgan decision (1966), which recognised, and ruled as 
constitutional, the power of Congress to enforce the equal protection guarantees 
of the Voting Rights Act, Thurmond was not shy in referring to the use of literacy 
tests in Southern state voting regulations: 
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Senator Thurmond: Under the reasoning of the majority in the Morgan 
case, are not the states prevented from exercising an otherwise 
constitutional legislative prerogative, such as the requirement of literacy in 
the English language, merely because the Congress declares otherwise? 
Justice Fortas: Senator, with all deference, I must ask you to understand 
and to excuse me from addressing myself to that question. I do so only 
because of my conception of the constitutional limitations upon me ... as a 
Justice of the Supreme Court, I am under the constitutional limitation that 
has been referred to during these past two days, and must respectfully ask 
to be excused from answering.49 
 
 Having been briefed by the Justice Department on how to conduct himself 
during the hearings, Fortas continued to provide diplomatic answers which 
acknowledged, albeit apologetically, the limitations of his ability to offer his views 
on the issues under discussion.50 In attempting to portray Fortas’s non-committal 
responses as an outright refusal to clarify his views, Thurmond segued happily into 
the issue of Fortas’s close relationship with Lyndon Johnson: 
 
Senator Thurmond: You have expressed your views to the President when 
he has called you down there, and over the telephone, haven’t you? 
Justice Fortas: No, sir. Never. 
Senator Thurmond: And he got the benefit of your views on these matters, 
did he not? 
Justice Fortas: Never. 
Senator Thurmond: Why shouldn’t a Senator have the benefit of your 
views? 
Justice Fortas: I have never, never been asked by the President. Nor have I 
expressed my views on any pending or decided case. Never, Senator, 
never.51 
 
 This line of questioning succeeded in provoking more definite responses 
from Fortas, but Thurmond would soon return to the subject of literacy tests. In 
yet another parallel with the Marshall hearings – during which the Senator asked 
the nominee repeatedly if he understood the question, and also inquired into 
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whether or not he had ‘anything to add’ to his more detailed answers – Thurmond 
began a routine of hurling questions at Fortas and following up the nominee’s 
non-committal answers by asking repeatedly, ‘and you refuse to answer the 
question?’ 
 
Senator Thurmond: Mr Justice Fortas, if Congress were to pass a law 
prohibiting literacy tests for voting in all states – and I gather you believe 
such tests to be unwise – would it be your opinion that, if this matter came 
before the Court, the proper questions would be whether this was 
appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, even if 
such legislation were constitutional in the absence of congressional 
action? 
Justice Fortas: I am afraid I have to make the same answer, if I have 
followed that correctly, Senator. 
Senator Thurmond: You refuse to answer the question? 
Justice Fortas: Yes, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: What is your answer? 
Justice Fortas: I said, yes, sir, for the same reason. 
Senator Thurmond: Mr Justice Fortas, in all but a very few states, a person 
must be 21 years of age in order to vote. Suppose Congress passed 
legislation, not an amendment to the Constitution, lowering this to 18, 
based on findings that certain racial groups have a greater percentage of 
persons in the 18-to-20 age bracket. Is there anything in the reasoning of 
the majority in the Morgan case which would prevent congressional action 
overriding the state’s judgements on this matter? 
Justice Fortas: For the same reason – because of constitutional limitations 
upon me – I must decline to address myself to that. 
Senator Thurmond: So you refuse to answer that question? 
Justice Fortas: I have so stated. Yes, sir.52 
 
 With Fortas following successfully the same calm and collected approach 
demonstrated the previous year by Thurgood Marshall, Thurmond eventually 
became agitated, with his comments bordering on sarcasm: 
 
Senator Thurmond: Would you consider your dissent in Fortson v. Morris 
to be an example of translating a personal preference into a constitutional 
requirement? 
Justice Fortas: I most certainly would not, but I should not say that. I must 
stand on the constitutional position. I cannot respond to that, Senator. 
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Senator Thurmond: I thought you did respond. 
Justice Fortas: I am sorry. It was inadvertence. 
Senator Thurmond: Well, maybe we need more inadvertent answers here 
this morning. 
Justice Fortas: It is pretty hard not to make them, Senator, as I am sure 
you will understand. I just repeat – this is not a pleasant role for me.53 
 
 With the Senator offering no sympathy for the nominee’s situation, 
Thurmond moved swiftly on to a range of other cases from the Warren Court era, 
from the controversial Miranda to the much-hated Baker v. Carr (1962) and to the 
lesser-known case of Berger v. State of New York (1967), which had been flagged 
up by Fritz Hollings in one of his letters to Thurgood Marshall the previous 
summer. Despite having told a supporter that ‘I have decided that my questions 
should be limited to the record which Justice Fortas has made since coming to the 
Court’, Thurmond could not resist raising the case of Mallory v. United States 
(1957), which, for him, constituted perhaps the most blatant example of the 
Justices’ ‘concern for the rights of Communists and criminals, including rapists and 
murderers.’54 The inclusion in the hearings of questions relating to the Mallory 
decision, the background to which was covered in Chapter Two, is significant if 
only because, in the words of Jim Newton, ‘the facts *of the case+ were so clear 
that even the Court’s conservatives joined the opinion, and Fortas had absolutely 
nothing to do with it.’55 The confession of black South Carolinian Andrew Mallory 
for the rape of a white woman – and the Justices’ subsequent decision to throw 
out his conviction due to a lack of probable cause – had been mentioned 
frequently by Thurmond in speeches and newsletters over the years, and on this 
occasion, he remained unperturbed by the fact that the case was decided eight 
years before Fortas took his seat on the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Thurmond’s 
questions on Mallory cascaded violently into the infamous thundering rant which 
has, over time, become the defining moment of the Fortas hearings: 
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Senator Thurmond: Does not that decision – Mallory – I want that word to 
ring in your ears – Mallory – the man happened to have been from my 
state, incidentally – shackle law enforcement? Mallory, a man who raped a 
woman, admitted his guilt, and the Supreme Court turned him loose on a 
technicality. And who I was told later went to Philadelphia and committed 
another crime, and somewhere else, another crime, because the courts 
turned him loose on technicalities. Is not that type of decision calculated 
to encourage more people to commit rapes and serious crimes? Can you, 
as a Justice of the Supreme Court, condone such a decision as that? I ask 
you to answer that question.56 
 
 Thurmond’s obsession with the Court’s prevention of what he saw as the 
justified punishment of a black male for the rape of a white woman recalled the 
rage of his boyhood hero, Coleman Blease, who regularly endorsed the lynching of 
African Americans as a means of defending the honour of Southern white women. 
Blease had infamously declared, ‘whenever the Constitution comes between me 
and the virtue of the white women of the South, I say to hell with the 
Constitution!’57 Like Blease, Thurmond defended the honour of Southern white 
women, but never endorsed lynching and never dismissed the Constitution. 
Rather, he employed the very opposite tactic of speaking of the Constitution as a 
sacred document in order to hold judicial nominees to account. While Blease 
preached from the stump, Thurmond’s aggression was channelled into an 
institutional process of interrogating the individuals responsible for determining 
the outcome of judicial questions relating to race, crime, civil rights, and other 
issues which remained as relevant in the South Carolina of the 1960s as they had 
been when Blease occupied Thurmond’s Senate seat during the 1920s. 
Reporters noticed Fortas glance over at Chairman Eastland, who was 
apparently reading and did not look up.58 As with the previous year’s hearings on 
the nomination of Thurgood Marshall, the Mississippi Senator seemed happy to 
allow Thurmond off the leash. 
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Justice Fortas: Senator, because of my respect for you and my respect for 
this body, and because of my respect for the Constitution of the United 
States, and my position as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, I will adhere to the limitation that I believe the Constitution 
of the United States places upon me and will not reply to your question as 
you phrased it. 
Senator Thurmond: Can you suggest any other way in which I can phrase 
that question? 
The Chairman: Let us have order. 
Justice Fortas: That would be presumptuous. I would not attempt to do so. 
Senator Thurmond: Would you care to make any comment at all on this 
question? 
Justice Fortas: Not as phrased, no, sir. 
Senator Thurmond: Well, as phrased differently, would you care to make 
any comment? 
Justice Fortas: No. No, Senator.59 
 
As with his record-breaking filibuster against the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
Thurmond’s outburst over Mallory would confuse, rather than satisfy, many who 
were ordinarily to be found on the Senator’s side. As Fritz Hollings later 
commented, his colleague’s theatrical interrogation of Fortas ‘had left even some 
of his own staffers shaking their heads.’60 
The correspondence sent to Thurmond’s office following the Mallory rant 
suggested a very mixed reaction. While one writer declared that ‘I am ashamed 
for myself and my country that you are a United States Senator’ and another 
claimed that ‘I think your actions concerning Justice Fortas are reprehensible’, 
former South Carolinian Congressman – and fellow defector to the Republican 
Party – Arthur Ravenel Jr, offered ‘just a quick line to tell you what a great job 
you’re doing on Abe Fortas – give him hell – he deserves it.’61 Another writer 
requested a copy of ‘Senator Thurmond’s recent speech’, to which Thurmond 
responded with the unintentionally amusing clarification that ‘the discussion of 
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the Mallory decision was not in a speech but rather in the form of my questioning 
of Justice Fortas in the Judiciary Committee.’62 
 On the very same day that Thurmond was making political history with his 
Mallory outburst, South Carolina’s junior Senator was offering a more dignified 
explanation for his opposition to the Fortas nomination. In a lengthy speech in the 
Senate, Hollings linked Fortas to Chief Justice Warren and the ‘Warren 
philosophy’, but at the same time condemned Republican filibuster plans. 
Significantly, he opted not to mention his fellow Senator from South Carolina even 
once during the speech, and instead claimed that those behind the filibuster plans 
chose Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan and the Republican presidential 
candidate, Richard Nixon, as the leaders of their ‘manifesto’.63 As with his cautious 
statements on Thurgood Marshall, covered in the previous chapter, Hollings’s 
Senate speech on Fortas provides an indication of his well-developed skill in 
occupying tricky political positions. Having received several letters urging him to 
support Thurmond’s filibuster efforts, Hollings was careful not to mention, let 
alone criticise openly, his fellow South Carolinian, while at the same time 
managing to distance himself from the filibuster plans by emphasising the 
relevance of party politics. Similarly, he was careful to keep up a united South 
Carolinian front by linking Fortas repeatedly to the much-hated Earl Warren while 
at the same time refusing to recognise the ‘lame duck’ description of the 
incumbent Democratic President.64 By Hollings’s logic, the defeat of the Fortas 
nomination was in the best interests of South Carolina, but the shabby political 
tactics of certain Republican Senators were in the best interests of no-one, even 
though they were aimed at the same outcome. Perhaps inevitably, his complex 
position left him open to criticism, particularly as Republican Marshall Parker, who 
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had lost narrowly to Hollings in the 1966 special election following the death of 
Olin Johnston, was keen to use the Fortas affair to criticise Hollings during a 
second run against him in 1968. Claiming that ‘this is another case where Hollings 
is talking out of both sides of his mouth’, Parker remarked that ‘Hollings has 
attacked Supreme Court decisions on many issues and now he won’t do enough to 
change them by helping block the nomination.’65 
 Thurmond’s outburst over the Mallory case played a critical role in the 
development of Supreme Court nomination hearings into major public events, but 
it was not the only notable exchange to take place during the lengthy Fortas Chief 
Justice hearings. On the following day, 19th July, Thurmond continued to question 
Fortas on matters relating to law and order. One of the questions proved to be 
remarkably straightforward, yet Thurmond preceded it by quoting an incredibly 
lengthy extract from a speech entitled ‘Law, Order and the High Court’, which 
Chief Justice John C. Bell of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had given ten days 
earlier. In what must have been an excruciating experience, Fortas waited 
patiently for nearly ten minutes for Thurmond to complete the extract, after 
which the Senator asked if the nominee agreed ‘that the recent decisions of a 
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, which shackle the police and 
courts and make it terribly difficult to protect society from crime and criminals, 
are among the principal reasons for the turmoil and near-revolutionary conditions 
which prevail in our country and especially in Washington?’66 Finally, Fortas was 
able to respond, and his polite one-word answer – ‘No’ – provoked an outburst of 
applause from some in the room, leading Chairman Eastland to call for order.67 An 
unimpressed Thurmond commented, ‘I understood there had been recruiting 
actions to bring people here today which would try to cause such a 
demonstration, Mr Chairman, but I did not believe it until I now see what is 
happening in the back of the room’, prompting Senator Philip Hart to clarify for 
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the record – as stated fully at the beginning of this chapter – his observation that 
‘everybody looks nice and clean and fine and fresh’:68 
 
The Chairman: We are not going to have demonstrations at these 
committee hearings. 
Senator Hart: The demonstration consisted of mild scattered applause for 
a statement that I would have applauded myself. 
The Chairman: But you did not, Senator. 
Senator Hart: Happily, I can speak for the record. My impression of the Bill 
of Rights is that it was intended to handcuff government. That is the whole 
purpose of the Bill of Rights. It might mean one thing – if you cannot hit 
somebody over the head or hold him for as long as you want – for a 
policeman but we are all better because you cannot. 
Senator Thurmond: Mr Chairman, I have not yielded, but I will be glad to 
yield to the Senator from Michigan if he wishes to say any more. 
The Chairman: Proceed. 
Senator Thurmond: Would you care to say anything further? 
Senator Hart: Yes. But I will resist the temptation, just the way Justice 
Fortas has.69 
 
The outbreak of applause, along with the comments of Philip Hart, 
suggested strongly that some were rooting for Abe Fortas in his showdown with 
Strom Thurmond, but the Senator’s personal goal of preventing Fortas’s 
confirmation was still within reach. Despite concluding his interrogation by 
assuring Fortas that his questions ‘have not been the result of personal ill will 
toward you’, Thurmond would soon find a new and surprisingly effective angle in 
his war against the Supreme Court, ensuring that his plan to make Abe Fortas the 
prize casualty would ultimately be fulfilled.70 
 
 
‘Pornography’ Sounds Bad 
 
Maintaining his view that no vacancy existed for an Associate Justice while Abe 
Fortas continued to serve on the Court, Thurmond skipped the 20th July hearing, 
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during which Homer Thornberry was questioned. He re-appeared on 22nd July but 
declined to question Thornberry on the grounds that ‘Chief Justice Warren has 
never submitted a firm resignation. The President of the United States has never 
made a firm acceptance. So in my opinion, there is no vacancy.’71 Following 
objections to Fortas’s confirmation from Michael D. Jaffe of Liberty Lobby, who 
had also opposed Marshall’s confirmation the previous year, the Committee heard 
from James J. Clancy, attorney for the executive board of the National 
Organisation for the Citizens Council for Decent Literature, Inc., who condemned 
the Justices’ inconsistent rulings on the issue of obscenity and placed Abe Fortas 
at the centre of the Supreme Court’s supposedly liberal attitude toward ‘obscene’ 
materials.72 In highlighting a range of ‘sex paperback books’ considered by the 
Justices in 1966, with titles such as Lust School, Orgy House, Flesh Pots, Passion 
Priestess, Sin Warden and Flesh Avenger, and also a 14-minute striptease film by 
the name of 0-7, which Fortas had considered not to be obscene in the 
Schackman v. California decision of 1967, Clancy requested that ‘the individual 
Senators view and consider these materials before they cast their votes in this 
matter.’73 
 Thurmond questioned Clancy with enthusiasm. In commenting on the fact 
that the Justices appeared to reach very different conclusions when studying the 
materials, despite all of them applying the same judicial tests, Clancy explained 
that the 0-7 film was ruled as obscene by Justices Warren, Brennan, Harlan and 
Clark, ‘but when it came to still photographs of the same type of activity, for 
example, a woman thrusting her vagina forward, or showing an invitation to 
sexual intercourse in still, Justice Brennan said that it was not obscene.’74 
Thurmond appeared more interested in the impact of the Court’s handling of such 
material on the issue of accessibility: 
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Senator Thurmond: Now, as long as the publishing houses who produce 
this smut material can get decisions like were handed down by the 
Supreme Court, will not this encourage them to go even further and 
further, and produce even more obscene material if it is possible to do so ? 
Mr Clancy: Yes, sir. They have already done that. Not only that. They have 
gone further in the area of exhibition, as I have mentioned. Previously, 
these films would be sold in certain locations. Now they are going into the 
liquor, into the bars. You will see signs in Los Angeles which say "Girlie 
Films." In a bar, they have a little projector, and will throw these films on 
the wall. This has replaced the topless situation. This is one use of the 
film.75 
 
 Clancy’s testimony proved to be sufficiently compelling for Thurmond to 
undertake further investigations, the result of which became evident the following 
day, when members of the Judiciary Committee were given the opportunity to 
question Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher. Having accused 
Christopher of being sent to the hearings as a deliberate Justice Department move 
to defend the nominee, Thurmond raised the provocative question of whether 
Fortas had effectively exercised his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment by 
‘refusing’ to answer the Committee’s questions, which Christopher denied.76 But 
Thurmond’s real agenda became clear when he declared to Christopher that he 
had sent a member of his staff to find out if obscene material was available to 
purchase on the streets of Washington, DC. Making full use of the exhibits before 
him, Thurmond’s line of questioning once again reached theatrical proportions 
when he asked: 
 
Isn’t that disgraceful? Hand that down, let him see that. And here is 
another one entitled Friendly Females. Now, the last three that we just 
handed you were picked up by a member of my staff today, Tuesday, the 
23rd of July, 1968 ... Mr. Christopher, how much longer are the parents, the 
Christian people, the wholesome people, the right-thinking people, going 
to put up with this kind of thing? How much longer should they do it?77 
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In arguing that the Justices were facilitating the distribution of obscene 
materials in various five-to-four decisions, Thurmond turned his questioning into a 
lengthy and impassioned plea for decency: 
 
Senator Thurmond: Does it shock you that this material is so readily 
available in the city in which you live and in most of the cities of the 
nation? 
Mr Christopher: No, I am not surprised by it, Senator.  
Senator Thurmond: You are not surprised by it, in view of the decisions by 
the Supreme Court permitting it to be sold? 
Mr. Christopher: Were you asking a question, Senator? 
Senator Thurmond: You say you are not surprised because the decisions of 
the Supreme Court permit it to be sold, or do you think the material is 
alright for the public to buy?  
Mr Christopher: I just answered, Senator, that I was not surprised to see 
that magazines like this were on sale at newsstands. 
Senator Thurmond: I ask you why, upon what your answer is based. Why 
are you not surprised at this filthy, obscene material which you are now 
looking at, or were just a moment ago? 
Mr. Christopher: Because it has become commonplace in our society, not 
only in the United States, but elsewhere for there to be magazines of a 
girlie character. 
Senator Thurmond: And why is it commonplace? Because the Supreme 
Court has made it commonplace, hasn't it? 
Mr. Christopher: No, I think the Supreme Court is only following the 
Constitution as best they know how to do so, sir.78 
 
 It is perhaps ironic that Thurmond’s forceful condemnation of materials ‘of 
a girlie character’ overshadowed the valid, if not altogether powerful, arguments 
of James Clancy regarding the Justices’ inconsistent interpretation of what 
constitutes obscene material. The recurring problem of how to define obscenity 
was never more evident than in the Jacobellis v. Ohio decision of 1964, which 
included Justice Potter Stewart’s declaration, ‘I know it when I see it’, a phrase 
which became so infamous that Stewart later predicted it would be engraved on 
his tombstone.79 Justice Hugo Black later commented that ‘I understand that 
“pornography” sounds bad. It really sounds bad. But I never have seen anybody 
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who can say what it is.’80 While it was easy for Thurmond to prove that ‘this filthy, 
obscene material’ was easily accessible, it was difficult for the Justice Department 
or anyone else to defend the Court’s obscenity decisions because, as Senator 
George Smathers of Florida explained to President Johnson by telephone, so few 
of these cases included written opinions.81 He might have added that the vague 
and amusing statements of the individual Justices on the issue of obscenity could 
hardly be held up as examples of judicial restraint or sound constitutional theory, 
nor could they be used to offset Thurmond’s laughable claim that ‘the effect of 
the Fortas decisions has been to unleash a floodtide of pornography across the 
country.’82 
Thurmond’s role in the Fortas debacle was once again underlined on 3rd 
August, when a bruised Abe Fortas made a speech before the American College of 
Trial Lawyers, during which he made the claim that when Justices are called to 
account for their views, the independence of the Judiciary is threatened. As James 
A. Thorpe has explained, ‘Thurmond was not mentioned by name [but] the text of 
*Fortas’s+ speech left little doubt that the Justice was referring to the line of 
questioning followed by the Senator and the Committee.’83 With the nation’s 
press also emphasising Thurmond’s role at the centre of the Fortas hearings, it 
became inevitable that the political relationship between South Carolina’s senior 
Senator and the Republican nominee for President, Richard Nixon, would come 
under scrutiny. Nixon had been invited to South Carolina by Harry Dent, Chairman 
of the state’s Republican Party and Thurmond’s former advisor, as far back as 
February 1966, to build on Barry Goldwater’s victory in the five Deep South states 
in the 1964 Presidential Election.84 During the Republican National Convention in 
Miami, at which Thurmond made his controversial ‘law and order’ comments, a 
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story by Drew Pearson emerged, in which it was claimed that Nixon gave 
Thurmond an assurance that, once elected President, he would guarantee the 
nomination of Supreme Court Justices ‘agreeable to the South’, and that 
Thurmond would ‘corral Southern delegates’ in return for an assurance that Nixon 
would not appoint a liberal Northerner as his running mate.85 The article, 
published in various newspapers, made light of South Carolina’s on-going war on 
the Court by pointing out that ‘Thurmond is passionately interested in the 
Supreme Court [and] feels that the worst blot on American history in this century 
was the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling of 1954.’86 
Although Thurmond denied that a deal had taken place, he would later 
become quite candid about his discussions with Nixon in letters to constituents, 
telling one resident of Great Falls that ‘I have discussed the matter of appointing 
men who are dedicated to the Constitution to the Supreme Court with Richard 
Nixon. I am confident that his election would mean much sounder appointments 
to the Supreme Court than we have had recently.’87 Whether or not an official 
agreement was reached, it was obvious to Thurmond and other Republicans that 
if the Fortas nomination could be debated throughout marathon hearings and 
then defeated, there was every possibility that there would be insufficient time 
for the ‘lame duck’ Johnson to make another nomination, meaning that a ‘sound’ 
conservative appointment could then be made by the incoming President Nixon. 
 Yet Thurmond was unimpressed by Nixon’s inconsistent stand on the 
Fortas nomination during the summer of 1968. Despite criticising the Supreme 
Court regularly, the Republican candidate refused to offer unequivocal support for 
Republican efforts to prevent Fortas’s confirmation. At a meeting of Southern 
delegations, Nixon reminded the audience that he had urged Johnson not to make 
the appointment, and offered his view that a Chief Justice ‘should represent the 
mandate of the future and not the Johnson mandate of the past’. However, he 
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then declared his interest in nominees ‘who are for civil rights’ but who also 
understand the importance of law and order, adding, ‘I think we need that kind of 
balance on the courts.’88 Despite being knee-deep in pornographic material in his 
on-going condemnation of Abe Fortas, Thurmond was keen to ensure that the 
Fortas affair did not compromise Nixon’s electability. In a letter to Nixon’s future 
Attorney General, John Mitchell, the Senator made the case that ‘in my judgment, 
it hurts Nixon, particularly in the South, when he takes a stand and then the next 
day appears to back off from it. With regard to the Fortas matter, he should stick 
to his original statement that it is a matter for the Senate to decide.’89 He also 
passed on the message to his supporters that ‘Richard Nixon has said that this is a 
matter for the Senate and has not attempted to influence this matter. With a 
majority of the Republicans and some Democrats, *Fortas’s+ nomination will be 
stopped.’90 
The Republican candidate’s cautious ‘Southern strategy’ on the campaign 
trail and the Senator’s intensifying anti-obscenity drive proved to be a winning 
combination. With Nixon’s ground-breaking presidential campaign kick-starting 
the Republican political takeover of the Southern states, and Thurmond’s ‘anti-
smut’ campaign highlighting an issue which galvanised conservatives and 
influenced the rise of modern Religious Right, the Nixon-Thurmond partnership 
formed an unstoppable political force in US politics, with Abe Fortas becoming, 
perhaps unwittingly, a symbol of liberal America gone out of control.91 
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The Beginning of The End 
 
With an imminent Senate filibuster, the Fortas affair was already a major political 
event. On the other side of the Atlantic, in London, The Times reported that 
‘Senator Ernest Hollings (Democrat, South Carolina) says that 16 Southern 
Democrats are ready to oppose the nomination [and] with the 18 Republicans 
claimed by Senator Robert Griffin, of Michigan, this would be enough to thwart 
any attempt to block a filibuster.’92 The Republican determination to obstruct 
Fortas’s nomination would only develop further momentum after Senator Gordon 
Allott of Colorado alleged that Fortas had played a part in amending an 
appropriations bill to provide for Secret Service protection of presidential 
candidates.93 While the charges appeared to lack concrete evidence, the 
allegation did remind Senators of the unusually close relationship between the 
nominee and the President. Far more serious was the revelation, leaked to the 
press by Bob Griffin, that Fortas had been paid $15,000 to teach a law school 
course at American University’s Washington College of Law.94 
Inevitably, Fortas was asked to re-appear before the Committee. Facing 
the dilemma of whether to appear for further hearings and therefore look as 
though he was there to answer for wrongdoing, or simply not appear at all and 
therefore risk looking as though he had something to hide, Fortas opted for the 
latter move, which dealt a blow to his credibility and offended members of the 
Committee.95 As Thurmond commented in a letter to a constituent, ‘in my 
judgment, had any member of the Executive Department been able to testify in 
such a way to help Justice Fortas, they would surely have done so. Instead, they 
allowed damaging evidence to go unrefuted. While their failure to appear does 
not “prove” the allegations, I believe it is reasonable to infer that it indicates they 
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were in no position to contradict the charges.’96 In the absence of anyone offering 
to respond to the accusation of financial impropriety with regard to American 
University, Thurmond was free to demand further hearings as part of his anti-
obscenity crusade. President Johnson tried to pressurise James Eastland to wind 
up the hearings, but Eastland claimed that Thurmond’s determination to block a 
vote on the nomination in order to call further witnesses made it impossible for 
him to get the nomination out of Committee.97  
During a press conference, a frustrated Lyndon Johnson compared the 
Fortas affair to the struggle over the controversial nomination of Louis Brandeis in 
1916, thus making the unspoken suggesting that anti-Semitism was the cause of 
the obstructionism of several Southern Senators.98 Significantly, both Thurmond 
and Hollings were accused of anti-Semitism in letters sent to their respective 
offices by Fortas supporters.99 One correspondent received a response from Alan 
Banov, Special Assistant to Senator Hollings, who explained that Hollings was ‘very 
concerned’ over accusations of anti-Semitism. Banov argued that ‘Senator Hollings 
is not and has never been anti-Semitic.  He has long had many close Jewish friends 
and supporters, including myself ... There are many reasons for opposing the 
appointment of Fortas, and the Senator’s own rationale is clearly delineated in his 
speech. That speech ... cannot by any measure of imagination be construed as 
anti-Semitic. I, as a Jew, wanted to make that clear to you in this letter.’100  
The injection of anti-Semitism accusations into the Fortas affair recalled 
Olin Johnston’s defence against the same charge during his opposition to Simon 
Sobeloff’s nomination to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, as covered in 
Chapter Two.101 However, on this occasion, there were unexpected and further-
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reaching implications. According to Bruce Allen Murphy, Hollings was telephoned 
by a Jewish leader who made a half-hearted attempt to request the Senator’s 
support for Fortas’s confirmation. The Senator turned him down, but was then 
asked if he could arrange for fifty F-4 Phantom jets to be sent to Israel. When the 
news reached Lyndon Johnson that Jewish leaders were now bargaining for arms 
to Israel rather than corralling support for Fortas – whose devoutness as a Jew 
was questioned, particularly as he had ‘married outside his faith’ – one 
presidential aide made the desperate, but apparently serious, suggestion that 
prominent Jews might be won over by a picture of Fortas in a yarmulke.102 
Meanwhile, Thurmond remained unfazed by Johnson’s suggestions of anti-
Semitism, and responded simply by announcing that ‘if President Johnson would 
take the necessary time to review four films – Flaming Creatures; 0-7; 0-12, and 0-
14 – or any of them, it would be interesting to know if he still favors Mr Fortas’s 
appointment.’103 Thurmond had certainly been proactive in showing the material 
to other Senators. Following James Clancy’s testimony before the Committee, the 
Senator had been arranging regular screenings of the material, dubbed the ‘Fortas 
Film Festival’ – a move that Johnson claimed to Eastland was making Senators 
look ridiculous.104 
In a final bid to save Fortas’s nomination, Philip Hart prepared a letter to 
Chairman Eastland, with the intention of generating a sufficient number of 
signatures to persuade the Mississippi Senator to conclude the hearings. When he 
came up one signature short, Hart was unable to persuade anyone, including 
Committee members Thomas Dodd of Connecticut and Hiram Fong of Hawaii, 
and, significantly, Republican leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois, to sign the letter.105 
When Bob Griffin informed Thurmond of the American University payment 
allegations, the South Carolinian wasted no time in calling Dean B.J. Tennery of 
Washington School of Law to testify before the Judiciary Committee.106 During his  
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Figure 2. Cartoon from The State, 13
th
 September 1968. 
 
lengthy interrogation of Dean Tennery, Thurmond learned that the donations that 
paid for Fortas’s seminars came from several high-profile business leaders, who 
‘could easily become involved in any number of suits which might reach the 
Supreme Court.’107 In the words of Bruce Allen Murphy, ‘the new set of hearings 
was now Strom Thurmond’s show ... it was Thurmond who would become Abe 
Fortas’s prosecutor. And destroying the nomination to him meant destroying the 
man himself.’108 This view of Thurmond was very much in the American public 
consciousness by September 1968, when a cartoon in The State showed the 
Senator kneeling on a casket, wielding a hammer, with the caption ‘A Coupla 
More Nails Should Do It.’109 
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An additional nail was provided by Everett Dirksen – Johnson’s critical 
Republican ally in the Senate – who eventually withdrew his support, conceding 
that the ‘dirty movies’ had damaged Fortas’s credibility.110 Nonetheless, Jim 
Newton has argued persuasively that the Fortas episode threatened to reveal 
Dirksen’s waning influence over his party in the Senate, while Murphy has cited, in 
particular, ‘the upstart Griffin’s challenge to *Dirksen’s+ authority.111 As Lyndon 
Johnson was discovering, the Senate was now a strikingly different institution to 
the one he had taken over as Majority Leader in 1955. 
Concerned that his chances of building a filibuster-proof majority were 
ebbing away with alarming speed, Johnson resorted to vintage bargaining 
methods as a last-minute effort to whip up support for Fortas’s confirmation. As 
illustrated above by the example of his nominations of Robert W. Hemphill and 
Charles E. Simons to South Carolina’s Eastern District, the President was masterful 
in his understanding of the wants and needs of individual Congressmen, 
particularly when it came to the requests of Southerners for nominations of 
favoured individuals to positions of influence. Having offered to arrange the 
appointment of a Postmaster as a favour to Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, the 
President turned his attention toward a federal Court of Appeals appointment in 
Alabama, intended to encourage the support of Senator Lister Hill.112 Although 
Johnson’s tactics had proved effective on countless occasions, his gestures proved 
woefully insufficient to save Abe Fortas in the complicated political climate of 
1968. The sudden renewal of the President’s support for Arkansas’ milk industry 
did not prevent Senator John McClellan from casting a negative vote against the 
nominee on the Judiciary Committee, while Lister Hill was talked out of supporting 
Fortas by his old friend, fellow Alabamian Justice Hugo Black, whose rivalry with 
Abe Fortas on the Supreme Court has been well-documented.113 
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The death rattle sounded when Johnson’s long-time friend and mentor, 
and leader of the Southern Democratic bloc in the Senate, Georgia’s Richard 
Russell, fell out with the President when he grew tired of Johnson’s repeated 
failure to nominate an old Russell family friend to Georgia’s Southern District.114 
Interpreting Johnson’s reluctance to nominate Alexander Lawrence as an arm-
twisting tactic to ensure Russell’s support for Fortas, the Georgian became so 
enraged that he told the President by letter that ‘in view of the long delay in 
handling and the juggling of this nomination, I consider myself released from any 
statement I may have made to you with respect to your nominations’, after which 
he telephoned Bob Griffin to offer his support against Fortas’s confirmation.115 In 
announcing his opposition to Fortas, Russell referred to the $15,000 payment for 
the American University lectures as ‘an exorbitant and unreasonable honorarium, 
even had it come from the resources of the school, but the evidence developed 
the fact that this money was raised by Fortas’s former law partner from a handful 
of the wealthiest clients of this firm, who have some interest, direct or indirect, in 
almost every decision touching the economy of the country.’116 Whereas Russell 
had slammed Thurmond’s infamous 1957 filibuster, he was now turning his back 
on Lyndon Johnson by siding with the precise arguments made by Thurmond 
during his interrogation of Dean Tennery. The friendship between Johnson and 
Russell would never be repaired.117 
When a motion to bring the Senate filibuster to a close and move the 
Fortas nomination to a vote failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority, Abe 
Fortas wrote to the President and formally requested that his name be withdrawn 
from consideration.118 Johnson reluctantly complied, making Abe Fortas the first 
unsuccessful nominee for a seat on the US Supreme Court since President Herbert 
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Hoover’s ill-fated nomination of John J. Parker in 1930.119 With Homer 
Thornberry’s nomination now a moot point, Fortas would continue to serve on 
the Court, as an Associate Justice, while the President resumed the process of 
selecting a new Chief Justice from scratch. In addition to the question of who 
would be selected, there was now a much more serious question concerning 
which President should make the nomination. 
Mark Silverstein has attributed the failure of the Fortas nomination in part 
to the decline of the ‘whales and minnows’ system of seniority in Congress. The 
congressional elections of the 1960s had brought to the Senate a new breed of 
‘minnow’ Senators – with modern political perspectives of US society, and a closer 
relationship with special interests – which would reduce considerably the impact 
of the seniority held by ‘whales’ such as Richard Russell and Everett Dirksen. This 
argument suggests that the Fortas affair signposted the decline of a rigid 
hierarchical Senate, resulting in the emergence of a volatile and unpredictable 
process for confirming judicial nominations.120 The fact that Lyndon Johnson, with 
his traditional understanding of the structure of Congress, ‘simply could not 
imagine that a band of renegade young Republican Senators would consider 
defying Everett Dirksen or that Richard Russell was no longer the behind-the-
scenes master of the Senate’ offers yet another in the long list of reasons for the 
failure of Fortas’s nomination to become Chief Justice of the United States.121  
On the other hand, there is little to suggest that the rigid hierarchical 
structure of the Senate had ever compromised the dogged determination of 
Senators from South Carolina. As previous chapters have shown, the Southern 
‘whale’ Richard Russell proved no more effective in keeping Olin Johnston and 
Strom Thurmond in check during the years leading up to the Fortas debacle, with 
the South Carolinians exercising little restraint – and little regard for what 
Silverstein describes as the ‘timeworn patterns of Senate decorum and behaviour’ 
– when obstructing the nominations of Simon Sobeloff (to the Fourth Circuit), 
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Thurgood Marshall (to the Second Circuit, and later, the Supreme Court), and Abe 
Fortas, as Associate Justice, in 1965.122 Joseph Crespino has noted that when 
Thurmond arrived in the Senate in 1955, he ‘chafed at the Senate custom of 
newcomers lying low’ and soon developed a frosty relationship with Lyndon 
Johnson, then Democratic Majority Leader, and his filibuster against the 1957 Civil 
Rights Act serves as a particularly potent reminder of his failure to show 
deference to Russell as leader of the Southern bloc.123 It is unlikely that Lyndon 
Johnson would have been surprised by Everett Dirksen’s admission that neither he 
nor James Eastland could ‘straighten out Strom’ during the escalation of tensions 
during the Fortas hearings.124 
It could be argued, however, that the Senate ‘whales’ were able only to 
minimise dissent rather than stamp it out completely.  In this regard, the fact that 
South Carolina elected particularly cantankerous Senators who were largely 
unmoved by, if not immune to, the influence of the Senate’s traditions of seniority 
and hierarchy does not suggest a failure on the part of Russell, Dirksen, or Lyndon 
Johnson. Some Southern Senators proved more open to the influence of 
Presidents than others, as evidenced by Johnson’s cordial relationship with James 
Eastland, and his success in convincing Eastland, John Stennis and John McClellan 
to miss the final vote on Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in 1967. The events of 
each controversial nomination suggest that the behaviour of South Carolina’s 
Senators may have been accepted by Presidents and Senate ‘whales’ as inevitable, 
constituting a level of damage worth accepting if it meant avoiding the 
proliferation of dissent elsewhere in the Senate. It is notable that no Senator from 
any other Southern state pursued a public one-man crusade against a judicial 
nominee throughout this era. 
The emergence of a new wave of Republican Senators who did not identify 
as ‘minnows’ clearly did contribute to the outcome of the Fortas affair, but South 
Carolina’s role in the breakdown of Senate seniority, at least with regard to 
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judicial nominations, had begun long before the mid-1960s. In fact, it may even be 
argued that the traditions of seniority and hierarchy might actually have 
facilitated their uncompromising behaviour. As part of the ‘whales and minnows’ 
system, Presidents would deal first and foremost with the Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee when attempting to speed action on their nominations and 
ensure safe passage to confirmation for their nominees. As a Deep South 
Democrat who shared the segregationist ideologies of the South Carolina 
Senators, James Eastland allowed Johnston and Thurmond free reign in waging 
war on the Court while at the same time maintaining cordial relationships with 
Presidents through his own dignified and diplomatic conduct as Chairman of the 
Committee. Had either Johnston or Thurmond assumed the position of Chairman 
during the period 1954-1970, it is highly unlikely that their actions would have had 
explosive consequences for the process of judicial nominations. 
Strom Thurmond had long possessed the necessary drive, determination 
and ability to take advantage of complicated circumstances in a changing political 
environment, and his victory in the Fortas debacle proved that a Supreme Court 
nominee could be rejected after nearly forty years of successful confirmations. It 
also ensured, in spectacularly provocative Southern anti-Supreme Court rhetoric, 
that the role of South Carolina in the process of judicial nominations was far more 
evident in 1968 than at any time since the state’s delegation had condemned the 
Brown decision in 1954. Despite declaring ‘I feel that this is a great victory for our 
country’ in letters to constituents, Thurmond did not appear satisfied by his hard-
won effort, telling the Senate, ‘I suggest Mr Fortas now go a step further and 
resign from the Court for the sake of good government.’125 As Chapter Six will 
illustrate, this proved to be a very prescient comment. 
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No Ordinary Time 
 
Given Thurmond’s highly influential role in the Fortas affair throughout the 
summer of 1968, it seems fitting that Richard Nixon was campaigning in South 
Carolina in the days leading up to President Johnson’s official withdrawal of 
Fortas’s nomination for Chief Justice. During stops in Greenville and Spartanburg, 
Nixon remained focused on his strategy of winning over the South, without adding 
his voice to the Republicans’ gloating over Fortas. As The New York Times 
reported, ‘under the watchful eye of Senator Strom Thurmond ... the Republican 
presidential nominee stuck to the themes that stir the Southland – law and order, 
the Vietnam War, the alleged collapse of American prestige abroad, and the need 
for a change in Washington.’126 On 5th November 1968, Nixon was elected 
President of the United States. Although his victory over the Democratic 
candidate, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, constituted only 511,944 votes, 
the Republican ‘Southern strategy’ had paid off handsomely, with Nixon winning 
the states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma and Florida, with the remaining Deep South states being won over by 
former Alabama Governor George Wallace’s segregationist campaign, and 
Humphrey winning only Texas and West Virginia.127 
On the same day that Nixon triumphed in the nation, Fritz Hollings won re-
election in South Carolina against a second challenge from Marshall Parker. 
Having beaten Parker by 11,753 votes in 1966, he increased his majority to a more 
convincing 155,280 votes two years on. Although Parker had attempted to 
characterise Hollings’s caution over Fortas as ‘talking out of both sides of his 
mouth’, the Senator had succeeded in cultivating a masterful demonstration of 
South Carolinian independence during his first two years in the Senate, revealing a 
liberal tendency in his support for the state’s textile industry but also a 
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conservative streak in his opposition to the Supreme Court nominations of 
Thurgood Marshall and Abe Fortas. With his well-crafted defiance of the 
Democratic establishment, and a well-developed understanding of the 
expectations of South Carolina’s conservative white voters, Hollings neutralised 
Parker’s attempt to link him with the liberal figure of Hubert Humphrey. Yet, at 
the same time, Hollings did benefit from Humphrey’s popularity among black 
South Carolinians: The New York Times noted that while African Americans were 
particularly ‘angered’ by Hollings’s opposition to Thurgood Marshall, there 
remained ‘considerable enthusiasm for Mr Humphrey in the Negro community in 
South Carolina, and some leaders have dropped opposition to Mr Hollings to 
ensure that no votes are lost for the Vice President.’128 
Although the failure of the Fortas nomination proved to be the last of 
several traumatic events during the final year of Lyndon Johnson’s Presidency, the 
outgoing President had not yet given up. Returning to the suggestion made by Earl 
Warren nine months previously, the President began giving serious consideration 
to naming Arthur Goldberg as an interim Chief Justice in a recess appointment as 
part of a last-ditch attempt to take Warren out of the equation and prevent 
Richard Nixon from naming Warren’s successor. Ironically, Johnson had lured 
Goldberg away from the Court in 1965 with the United Nations offer in order to 
create a vacancy for Abe Fortas. Goldberg was now enthusiastic to accept the post 
of Chief Justice, but Johnson soon re-considered the plan to nominate him when 
an aide discovered a statement, in which the President had criticised recess 
appointments.129 Nonetheless, the President continued weighing up his chances 
of making another nomination. Briefly, he flirted with the idea of bringing back 
former Justice Tom Clark, who had vacated the Supreme Court the previous year 
in order to avoid a conflict of interest with the newly-appointed Attorney General, 
his son, Ramsey Clark. Following the suggestion of Johnson’s friend Willard 
Deason that the nation would have ‘a glow in its heart at the thought of the son 
now stepping down in deference to the father’, Johnson telephoned Everett 
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Dirksen, whom he still believed to be his only realistic point of contact among 
Senate Republicans, and floated the idea of Clark’s return, stressing that the 
appointment of the elder Clark as Chief Justice would be an attractive prospect for 
Southern Democrats and would also remove accusations of opportunism aimed at 
Republicans:130 
 
LBJ: It would unify the country and wouldn't look like you all are playing 
politics trying to get a Justice. You're going to get Black, he's eighty-four, 
and he can't go on, and nobody on the Court really wants him to act 
because they don't know the stability there, they've got a problem. 
Dirksen: Yeah. 
LBJ: You've got Douglas, who's got a bad heart. You've got, uh, Harlan, 
who's got eye trouble. So you got three right there. 
Dirksen: That's right. 
LBJ: But a lot of folks feel that the Griffin effort was a pure political effort, 
particularly in the light of what you said. And he said nobody should serve, 
that the lame duck shouldn't appoint anybody. 
Dirksen: Yeah, right. 
LBJ: Now, if we took Clark, who just retired on account of his son and sent 
him up there as Chief, instead of letting Warren go on acting ... uh, the 
Southerners all urge me to name Clark as Chief because of his crime record 
and so on and so forth. McClellan and Eastland and them thought that he 
would be good. 
Dirksen: Yeah. 
LBJ: I would have to get me a new Attorney General.131 
 
Despite suggesting that he would support a Clark nomination, Dirksen 
soon became sceptical of his party accepting any Johnson nominee, regardless of 
qualifications or suitability. James Eastland confirmed to White House Assistant 
Mike Manatos that a ‘flat Republican policy of opposition’ had indeed taken 
hold.132 Having spent little time celebrating his victory in the Fortas affair, 
Thurmond was now turning his attention to the opposition of a new batch of five 
nominees for the lower courts, including Texas judge and long-time Johnson 
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associate, Barefoot Sanders.133 On 10th December 1968, The New York Times 
published Thurmond’s claim that Johnson’s request for Congress to return for a 
‘special session’ was motivated not so much by the President’s interest in ratifying 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in July, but his determination to get 
Arthur Goldberg back onto the Supreme Court.134  
On the very same day, Johnson revealed to Chief Justice Warren – who 
was likewise inclined to prevent Nixon naming his successor – the true extent of 
the Republican pressure on him to avoid making a further appointment.135 He 
claimed that Dirksen had offered Republican support for the ratification of the 
NPT in return for a guarantee that Goldberg would not be installed in a recess 
appointment, and also that Thurmond had offered to drop his opposition to 
several judicial nominees, including Barefoot Sanders, if Johnson would agree not 
to name an interim Chief Justice before Nixon’s inauguration on 20th January 
1969.136 Regarding Goldberg, the President told Warren that: 
 
I would be willing to name him if he could be appointed but I haven’t got 
that evidence yet and I don’t wanna have a tragedy as we did in the case of 
Abe ... People like Griffin and people like Fulbright and others who 
opposed Abe have said they would accept Arthur, but I have never felt that 
Russell and the Southern bloc and the Republican bloc would ever let him 
be confirmed, and Dirksen in effect told me that.137 
 
Johnson’s concern over the Southern bloc was no doubt influenced in part 
by the fact that his friendship with Richard Russell had still not been healed, and 
never would be. Neither Goldberg nor Clark was nominated as an interim Chief 
Justice. At the request of President-Elect Nixon, Earl Warren agreed to continue 
serving as Chief Justice until June 1969, allowing the new President plenty of time 
to make a careful selection of a ‘strict constructionist’ nominee, the like of which 
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he had promised throughout the campaign.138 The intensity of the Republican 
determination to deny Lyndon Johnson the Chief Justice appointment was 
underlined three days after Richard Nixon’s inauguration, when, in yet another 
victory for Thurmond, the new President withdrew the nominations of Barefoot 
Sanders and the other four lower court judges.139 In announcing that he would 
‘ordinarily’ have made another nomination but finally decided not to – as 
Warren’s continued service would be in the best interests of government for the 
time being – a tired and dejected Lyndon Johnson noted that ‘these are not 
ordinary times.’140 
Having fought the Supreme Court for over a decade and failed to stop the 
nomination of a single judge, Thurmond’s anger, energy, and theatrical style had 
finally been used to such devastating effect that it influenced the Senate in 
rejecting a Supreme Court nominee for the first time in thirty-eight years, leaving 
the Johnson Administration reeling. For two reasons, his victory in the Fortas 
affair signposted a turning point in South Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court.  
Firstly, his tactics shifted from a defensive/obstructive role to an outright attempt 
to determine the selection of a new Chief Justice: not content simply to stop Abe 
Fortas from succeeding Earl Warren, Thurmond continued hammering the 
Johnson Administration in a bid to ensure that his political ally, Nixon, would make 
the next appointment. Secondly, the Court’s record of exercising raw judicial 
power in a wide range of policy areas over the preceding decade allowed 
Thurmond to broaden and deepen his attack. By shifting the focus away from race 
and ‘the Southern way of life’ and emphasising constitutional interpretation, 
crime and punishment, and decency and obscenity, the South Carolinian was able, 
for the first time since 1955, to make a convincing case for the use of senatorial 
‘advice and consent’ to restrict the power and political influence of the US 
Supreme Court. The exploitation of Johnson’s mistake in trying to promote Fortas 
may be written off as political opportunism, but Thurmond’s tactics proved 
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considerably more successful than those employed in the 1950s, when 
Southerners were unable to convince their fellow Senators that the non-
controversial Eisenhower nominees offered an equally dangerous threat. The fact 
that the Southern objections rested so heavily on regional interests in a period 
prior to the Court’s rulings in Baker, Engel, Miranda and Schackman proved to be 
a further obstacle in overcoming their limited numbers in the Senate. The defeat 
of Fortas and the subsequent Republican success in preventing Johnson from 
naming the new Chief constituted a ground-breaking victory for conservative 
America. This triumph would now be built on after the inauguration of the new 
Republican President, who remained keen to develop his relationship with the 
South following the region’s huge influence in his 1968 election victory. 
Thurmond’s role in the Fortas rejection, and his influence in securing the 
Republican presidential victory, suggested strongly that South Carolinian voices 
would now be heard in the selection process for Richard Nixon’s nominations to 
the Supreme Court.141 
Fritz Hollings’s first two years in the Senate, and his role in facilitating the 
peaceful integration of South Carolina, provided ample evidence of a strong 
political contrast with Strom Thurmond.  But the Fortas affair demonstrated the 
difficulty in finding a meaningful ideological difference between the two Senators 
when it came to South Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court. While Hollings 
claimed on 18th July 1968 that ‘the Warren Court has not followed the principle of 
judicial restraint ... It has substituted the principle of judicial activism’, Thurmond, 
two months later, outlined the view that ‘judicial activism is one of the most 
dangerous legal concepts to appear on the scene in this century. The Supreme 
Court is supposed to interpret the law rather than create new law by amending 
the Constitution as it did in the Miranda case.’142 
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Within a very short space of time, Hollings had established a conservative 
record on the nomination of Supreme Court Justices that he would develop 
throughout his lengthy career in the Senate. As he explained in a 1968 newsletter 
when discussing the Court’s judicial philosophy, ‘Since the Justices do not run for 
office, how do the people “get at” the judges? How can this wrong be righted? 
The only way is for the United States to withhold confirmation.’143 These words 
suggested strongly that Hollings understood only too well that the Supreme Court 
nomination process was, and remains today – years after the speeches, legislative 
efforts and provocative interrogations pursued by Thurmond and Olin Johnston – 
the ultimate political arena for questioning, challenging and scrutinising the power 
of the US Supreme Court. Hollings’s role in the nominations of Robert Bork and 
Clarence Thomas, covered in Chapter Seven, highlights the fact that the world of 
judicial selection remained an effective outlet for demonstrating conservative 
credentials in order win re-election as a Southern Democrat Senator for nearly 
forty years in an increasingly conservative Deep South state. His consistent 
conservatism in the nominations process throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
would be influenced in part by memories of his leading role in President Nixon’s 
nomination of South Carolinian Clement F. Haynsworth to the Supreme Court, 
which is discussed fully in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 
Nixon Stands With South Carolina 
 
 
 
This is what I have called my “Haynsworth Test”. I pass it along to my 
colleagues for what use they choose to make of it in the future. I have tried 
to exercise my individual judgment in advising and consenting to 
presidential nominees to the Supreme Court in a responsible manner. These 
guidelines, I now leave behind. A fitting epilogue, I hope, to an 
unforgettable era in the history of the Supreme Court.1 
 
Marlow Cook, 15th May 1970 
 
 
In one of the more overlooked speeches in the history of the US Senate, 
Republican Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky spoke for many Southerners when 
he claimed that Senators had effectively created a ‘new standard’ of qualification 
when considering President Richard Nixon’s nomination of Judge Clement F. 
Haynsworth for a vacancy on the Supreme Court. With his conservative legal 
record drawing criticism and opposition from African American groups and 
organised labour, Haynsworth was certainly one of the more controversial figures 
nominated to the nation’s highest court. Yet it was the decision of sceptical 
Senators to focus on accusations of Haynsworth’s ethical impropriety which 
provoked an angry response from conservatives such as Cook, who claimed that 
the Southern nominee was guilty of nothing other than being Southern. In 
reminding his colleagues that no charges of ethical impropriety were ever proved 
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during the deliberations over Haynsworth’s nomination, Cook claimed in his ‘new 
standards’ speech that Haynsworth’s rejection constituted ‘a low point in the 
history of the United States Senate’, and slammed his colleagues for their 
supposed anti-Southern prejudice.2 
 For two Southern Senators in particular– Strom Thurmond and Ernest 
‘Fritz’ Hollings – the Haynsworth nomination held special significance. In addition 
to selecting a nominee considered by both men to be a capable judge with an 
impeccable track record of conservatism, President Nixon had also chosen a judge 
from their home state of South Carolina. The existing literature suggests 
agreement among scholars that Haynsworth was chosen as a calculated move to 
‘repay’ the South for Nixon’s 1968 election victory and also encourage support for 
the re-election effort of 1972, but the fact that Nixon’s first Southern nominee 
happened to be a South Carolinian only re-enforces the influence of Strom 
Thurmond in bringing Nixon to the White House.3 After fifteen long years of 
resisting the progress of the civil rights movement by opposing judicial nominees 
considered hostile to the Southern way of life, South Carolina’s Senators would 
finally, in 1969, be granted an opportunity to install one of their own on the 
Supreme Court. 
The Haynsworth affair showcased a dramatic change in the role 
established by each of the two Senators in the nomination process in the years 
prior to 1969. As Chapters Four and Five have illustrated, Thurmond was the chief 
antagonist in the Marshall hearings of 1967 and the Fortas Chief Justice hearings 
of 1968, and, with his leading role in denying President Lyndon Johnson the 
opportunity to replace the outgoing Earl Warren, the South Carolinian could claim 
a small, indirect influence in Nixon’s eventual appointment, in the spring of 1969, 
of ‘strict constructionist’ Judge Warren Burger as the new Chief Justice of the 
United States. By contrast, Fritz Hollings had maintained a low profile in the 
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255 
 
process, choosing the wording of his public statements carefully and ensuring that 
each position taken would not harm his political future as a Deep South Democrat. 
With the Haynsworth nomination, Hollings’s role would experience a significant 
development: as with Thurmond during the Fortas hearings, Hollings shifted from 
a defensive/obstructionist position to a more interventionist role in the process, 
with the intention of establishing a sound conservative ideology on the Court 
while also guaranteeing South Carolinian representation on that body for the first 
time since 1943, when Justice (later Governor) James Byrnes had departed the 
Court to head President Franklin Roosevelt’s Office of Economic Stabilization.4 
As noted in Chapter One, a large number of previous studies have focused 
on the failure of controversial nominations from the presidential point of view.  
Richard Watson’s views on Herbert Hoover, Mark Silverstein’s comments on 
Lyndon Johnson, and John Maltese’s reflections on Richard Nixon would appear to 
suggest that if a scholarly consensus does exist regarding the question of 
responsibility when a Supreme Court nomination fails, it is that the President is 
usually the one to blame, either because his selection was made poorly or 
because he was unable to marshal a sufficient army of supporters to ensure 
confirmation.5 Rarely, if ever, has a scholarly work examined the failure of a 
Supreme Court nomination by focusing on the intentions, actions and ideologies 
of the two Senators from the nominee’s home state, and never has a previous 
study examined such a failure within the context of that state’s history in the 
nomination process. 
With Nixon’s nomination of Haynsworth unleashing a more outspoken 
Fritz Hollings – happy to dive head-first into a heated debate over a controversial 
nominee – Strom Thurmond would begin something of a mellowing process 
during the first term of the Nixon Presidency. With President Ronald Reagan 
eventually building on Nixon’s Court strategy by nominating a string of 
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conservative strict constructionist judges, with whom the ageing Republican 
Senator had no quarrel, Thurmond would never again, after 1968, find a reason to 
unleash his inner rage as a participant in the nominations process. Thanks to his 
dedicated participation in the conservative movement of the late twentieth 
century, he had finally succeeded in establishing a nomination process that 
produced the very brand of Supreme Court Justice he had always longed for. 
There would be a far less happy outcome for Fritz Hollings’s involvement in the 
Haynsworth nomination: the nominee’s rejection, by only five votes, left a sour 
taste in the junior Senator’s mouth, and Hollings would remind his fellow Senators 
of the injustice inflicted on Haynsworth eighteen years later during the tense 
debate over the nomination of Robert Bork. He appeared to have mellowed very 
little when recalling the episode in his memoirs in 2008, concluding that ‘the 
country was denied the services of a first-rate jurist on the Supreme Court. Bare-
knuckled politics had triumphed over substance.’6 
This chapter considers in depth the crucial role of South Carolina’s 
Senators in re-inventing the process of nominating, scrutinising and confirming 
Justices of the Supreme Court during a turbulent period in US history. Beginning 
with an assessment of the Supreme Court nomination process in the wake of the 
Abe Fortas controversy, this chapter chronicles South Carolinian involvement in a 
proactive, interventionist method of attempting to influence the process, along 
with an assessment of how Thurmond’s role in the Fortas affair unwittingly shifted 
the limelight to Fritz Hollings. The impact of the Fortas controversy, and the link to 
South Carolina via Thurmond, highlights the importance of research objective (3) 
by again suggesting that the Supreme Court nomination process is best studied 
through a long-term approach. In highlighting research objective (1), the chapter 
will continue to emphasise the fact that South Carolina, of all the states, has made 
the most important contribution to the politicisation of the Supreme Court 
nomination process.  As Mark Silverstein and Joseph Crespino have both noted, 
controversial issues relating to the Supreme Court were vital to the electoral 
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success of Thurmond and other Republican Party politicians from the mid-1960s, 
and this chapter serves as yet another reminder of South Carolina’s prominent 
role in that story.  What makes this story somewhat unique is the fact that the 
primary sponsor of the Haynsworth nominaton was not the Republican 
Thurmond, but his Democratic ‘partner’ in the Senate, Fritz Hollings. 
 Following an in-depth examination of the events of May 1969 – perhaps 
the zenith of South Carolina’s involvement in the nominations process – the 
Haynsworth confirmation hearings are covered in depth, before the chapter 
considers the impact of the Haynsworth disaster on perceptions of the state of 
South Carolina during this period. Some further reflections are offered to illustrate 
the two very different paths of influence pursued by Thurmond and Hollings in 
future years. 
 
 
The Floodgates 
 
As the previous chapter has illustrated, President Lyndon Johnson’s attempt to 
elevate Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justiceship was wrecked by a Republican 
Senate filibuster amid accusations of opportunism, cronyism and greed, with 
Senators Strom Thurmond and Bob Griffin bringing the Johnson Presidency to a 
tragic and bitter end by denying Johnson the opportunity to name a replacement 
for Chief Justice Earl Warren. The success of the Thurmond/Griffin attack was 
emphasised by the fact that the Fortas affair provoked an outbreak of debate 
amongst scholars and politicians over the role of the Senate in the confirmation of 
Supreme Court Justices.7 Among the early examples of the debate is a pair of 
                                                             
7 In addition to the Griffin and Hart articles discussed in this section of the chapter, examples include Luis Kutner, ‘Advice 
and Dissent: Due Process of the Senate’, DePaul Law Review 23 (1973-4), pp.658-690; John D. Felice and Herbert F. 
Weisberg, ‘The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region in Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 1953-
1988, Kentucky Law Journal 77 (1988-9), pp.509-530; James E. Gauch, ‘The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court 
Appointments’, The University of Chicago Law Review 65:1 (1989), pp.337-365; Albert P. Melone, ‘The Senate’s 
Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality’, Judicature 75 :2 (1991-
2), pp.68-79; William Bradford Reynolds, ‘The Confirmation Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent’, Judicature 
75:2 (1991-2), pp.80-2; Mark Silverstein, ‘The People, The Senate and the Court: The Democratisation of the Judicial 
Confirmation System’, Constitutional Commentary 9 (1992), pp.41-58; P.S. Ruckman Jr, ‘The Supreme Court, Critical 
258 
 
articles published in Prospectus in the aftermath of the Fortas debacle, in which 
the two Senators from Michigan – the aforementioned Griffin, Republican, and 
Philip Hart, Democratic Senator and member of the Senate Judiciary Committee – 
put forward two opposing arguments over the Senate’s role in the nominations 
process. Griffin, in his article, ‘The Broad Role’, outlined his opposition to the 
Fortas nomination by opening with Alexis de Tocqueville’s comment that ‘if the 
Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad citizens, the union 
may be plunged into anarchy or civil war’, before arguing that only a ‘broader and 
more purposive interpretation’ of the Senate’s power to ‘advise and consent’ on 
judicial nominations to the Supreme Court will ensure the ‘quality’ of the nine 
Justices.8 The imitable Hart, who had continued to support Abe Fortas’s 
confirmation as Lyndon Johnson’s Democratic coalition in the Senate was falling 
apart, argued in his article, ‘The Discriminating Role’, that the ‘broader’ role of the 
Senate had never prevented the confirmation of ‘mediocrities whose names are 
better left unremembered.’9 While Griffin believed that the Senate’s power of 
advice and consent, as covered by Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution, ‘is 
not only real but is at least as important as the power of the President to 
nominate,’ Hart declared, with characteristic understatement, ‘I appear to be 
advocating that the Senate continue to muddle along as it has done in the past: 
approving most appointments, but occasionally being cantankerous.’10 The 
friendly debate between the two Michiganders illustrates clearly the polarising 
effect of the Fortas rejection on the Senate’s role in the nomination process, with 
Senators adopting markedly different perspectives on their personal and 
professional responsibilities in consenting to, or denying, a presidential selection 
of a Supreme Court Justice. 
The significance of South Carolina during this pivotal era in the history of 
Supreme Court nominations was once again evident during the remarkable month 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process’, The Journal of Politics 55:3 (1993), pp.793-805; and, crucially, the 
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of May 1969, during which four highly important developments occurred. The 
first, and arguably most dramatic, was the resignation of a sitting Justice of the 
Supreme Court. Thurmond had declared to the Senate the previous October his 
recommendation that Justice Abe Fortas resign from the Court ‘for the sake of 
good government’ following the failure of his nomination to become Chief Justice. 
Seven months after facing down Dixie in his now-legendary confirmation hearings, 
Abe Fortas did indeed submit his resignation from the Court, on 14th May 1969, 
following the revelation that he had been accepting a $20,000 retainer from Wall 
Street financier Louis Wolfson.11 The allegation, published in Life magazine on 4th 
May following an investigation aided by the Justice Department under the 
leadership of Nixon’s Attorney General, John Mitchell, caused a storm in 
Washington, DC. Lengthy impeachment proceedings were avoided when Chief 
Justice Warren persuaded Fortas to resign, marking yet another victory for 
Thurmond and the Nixon Administration.12 
 The second event provided another example of Thurmond’s growing 
confidence. Having experienced success in preventing an undesirable liberal 
nominee from reaching the Chief Justiceship, Thurmond attempted, in May 1969, 
to use his influence to remove a serving Justice by calling for the impeachment of 
William O. Douglas – long associated with the Court’s liberal bloc – by criticising 
Douglas’s role as Chairman of the ‘overtly political’ Center for the Study of 
Democratic Institutions, and his role as director of the Parvin Foundation, 
established by multi-millionaire Albert Parvin supposedly as ‘a front for gambling 
enterprises and persons of anti-democratic character.’13 In a clear indication that 
he was using Fortas’s resignation as an opportunity to push for the removal of 
another liberal Justice in order to award Nixon another vacancy, The New York 
Times reported that ‘Mr Thurmond charged that the case of Abe Fortas, who 
recently resigned as an Associate Justice, and the controversy over Justice 
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Douglas’s connection with the Parvin Foundation “are intertwined.”’14 On the very 
same day that he made this claim, Thurmond explained in a letter to Claude 
Ragsdale Jr that ‘Fortas should never have been appointed by Lyndon Johnson to 
be Associate Justice and I am glad that we stopped him becoming Chief Justice in 
that he is now off the Court altogether. Douglas should also get off.’15 Never one 
to drift unexpectedly into modesty or self-doubt, Thurmond claimed in another 
letter that ‘I am more convinced than ever that my position was correct in 
strongly opposing *Fortas+ and helping to defeat him.’16 Smelling blood, some 
conservatives also targeted Justice William Brennan, another well-established 
liberal force on the Court, for a real estate investment he had made with Fortas 
and some lower court judges. Brennan responded by giving up all activities 
outside his duties on the Supreme Court, including not only the real estate 
investment but also his future speaking plans, and a part-time teaching post at 
New York University.17 
With the third notable event to take place during May 1969, Thurmond 
reaped the benefits of his hard work in preventing the confirmation of Abe Fortas. 
President Nixon’s appointment of Judge Warren Burger as the new Chief Justice of 
the United States received acclaim from Southern members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, with John McClellan of Arkansas claiming that Burger’s 
record on the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ‘commends 
itself to the endorsement of the American people and American jurisprudence’, 
and Sam Ervin of North Carolina arguing that the appointment ‘affords us the 
guarantee that we will have to return to constitutional government in the United 
States as far as the Supreme Court is concerned.’18 Adding his voice to the chorus 
of praise, which culminated in a unanimous vote of approval by the Committee, a 
                                                             
14 ‘Thurmond Urges Douglas To Quit’, The New York Times, 30 May 1969, p.11. 
15 Letter from Strom Thurmond to Claude Ragsdale Jr, 28th May 1969, Strom Thurmond Collection, Subject Correspondence 
Series, Mss.0100.18, 3 (United States District, Circuit, and Supreme Court Judges), Year 1969, Box 28, Folder 1. 
16 Letter from Strom Thurmond to Thomas J. Robertson, 9th May 1969, Strom Thurmond Collection, Subject 
Correspondence Series, Mss.0100.18, 3 (United States District, Circuit, and Supreme Court Judges), Year 1969, Box 28, 
Folder 1. 
17 Woodward and Armstrong, The Brethren, p.17-8. 
18 ‘Burger Nomination is Lauded by Conservative Members of Senate Judiciary Panel’, The New York Times, 22nd May 1969, 
p.37. 
261 
 
delighted Thurmond told a constituent that ‘the President has made an excellent 
choice in Judge Burger as Chief Justice. Hopefully, with him in this vital position, 
we will see a marked improvement in the direction of the Court.’19  Aside from 
being the first occasion on which he seemed genuinely satisfied with a 
presidential nomination of a Supreme Court Justice since his arrival in the Senate 
in 1955, the Burger appointment marked the culmination of Thurmond’s 
determination to infiltrate the process of selection in a bid to influence the future 
direction of the Court. The role of South Carolina’s senior Senator in the process 
of Supreme Court nominations, as he had come to see it, was no longer a simple 
matter of preventing the confirmation of nominees with dangerous liberal 
ideologies: by 1968, his influence in the process had advanced markedly through 
his invaluable contribution to Richard Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy’ and his 
prominent role in galvanising conservative forces during a period of civil unrest. 
With Earl Warren gone and Warren Burger in place, the impact of Strom 
Thurmond and the South Carolinian Republican movement in influencing the line-
up of the US Supreme Court was undeniable. 
The fourth and final reason for the significance of May 1969 was the 
manner in which South Carolina’s junior Senator, Fritz Hollings, rather than 
Thurmond, influenced Nixon’s selection of a South Carolinian judge for the 
Supreme Court. With Fortas’s departure requiring Nixon to fill another vacancy, 
Hollings saw an opportunity to mention the name of Clement Furman 
Haynsworth, of the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, during a meeting 
with the President at the White House on 28th May.20 Given the junior Senator’s 
low-key involvement in the nominations process prior to May 1969, it might have 
seemed more logical that Thurmond, with his rapidly inflating confidence, would 
have influenced Nixon’s selection of a South Carolinian nominee, particularly as he 
had pursued with such vigour the rejection of Fortas, the impeachment of 
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Douglas, and the appointment of a ‘strict constructionist’ in the form of Burger. 
Yet, the Nixon Administration welcomed Fritz Hollings’s recommendation and 
promotion of Judge Haynsworth: with a South Carolinian Supreme Court nominee 
linked to the charismatic Hollings rather than the abrasive Thurmond, the 
Administration hoped to avoid resurrecting Drew Pearson’s accusations of the 
political ‘deal’ which allegedly took place between Nixon and Thurmond during 
the previous year’s Republican National Convention in Miami. As covered in 
Chapter Five, Pearson claimed that Nixon had guaranteed Thurmond the 
appointment of Supreme Court Justices ‘agreeable to the South’ if Thurmond used 
his influence among Southern delegates to secure Nixon’s nomination.21 Hollings 
believed that, despite Thurmond’s role in Nixon’s election victory, his 
controversial reputation had become problematic for the Republican Party, 
claiming in his memoirs that ‘we had some fine judges in South Carolina, but 
Thurmond at this point was no help in influencing the decision process. His 
zealousness over the years had alienated even some fellow Republicans. They 
worried that he was hurting the image of the GOP.’22 
Nonetheless, Thurmond was not shy in sharing with Nixon his own 
preference for a South Carolinian nominee, namely, former Governor Donald S. 
Russell, who, as discussed in Chapter Four, had appointed himself to the late Olin 
D. Johnston’s Senate seat prior to his defeat at the hands of Fritz Hollings in the 
Democratic primary contest of 1966. Thurmond’s logic was that the appointment 
of a conservative Democrat such as Russell would actually prove more useful to 
the growth of the Republican Party in South Carolina than the appointment of the 
Republican Clement Haynsworth. As John Spratt, then President of the South 
Carolina State Bar, recalls: 
 
[Thurmond] knew that the Republican Party, if it was going to succeed in 
South Carolina, didn’t need more country club Republicans and aristocratic 
types, they needed down-to-earth people, like he was. So he didn’t come 
out for [Haynsworth]. Instead, he came out for Donald Russell. And Donald 
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Russell was a wonderful guy, smart as he could be ... He was smart, he was 
very conservative, and everybody in the Senate had the highest regard for 
him, Democrat and Republican.23  
 
The disagreement between Thurmond and Hollings over the best 
candidate to fill the Fortas vacancy in 1969 suggests that the party dimension was 
more relevant than ever before in influencing the attitudes of South Carolina’s 
Senators in the nomination of Supreme Court Justices. With each man keeping an 
eye on the dramatic development of the two-party system in their state, the 
Republican Thurmond’s endorsement of the segregationist Democrat Russell was 
made in order to build on the Republican presence in South Carolina, while the 
Democrat Hollings’s decision to throw his weight behind the conservative 
Republican Clement Haynsworth seemed a logical tactic in preventing the 
defection of white conservative voters from the Democratic Party to the 
Republicans. Hollings later claimed that the Administration’s preference for 
Haynsworth was due not solely to his Republican Party affiliation, but also 
because of a belief in the White House that Thurmond’s involvement ‘would 
complicate its efforts to promote a judge from South Carolina to the Supreme 
Court.’ As Hollings recalls: 
 
It appeared that they got the message to him to be circumspect, lie low 
and essentially confine himself in the Senate to written comments other 
than a few perfunctory remarks. I would handle the nomination ... I re-
assured my Democratic colleagues of Haynsworth’s character and went 
out of my way to make it clear that he was not Thurmond’s man.24 
 
The fact that Hollings ‘went out of his way’ to convince his colleagues that 
there was no link between Thurmond and Haynsworth suggested that Thurmond’s 
‘achievements’ as the antagonist of the Supreme Court nomination process had 
come at a price for the senior Senator’s popularity. By June 1969, it seemed that 
Thurmond’s influence in the process had peaked: he was reportedly 
‘embarrassed’ that his choice of a South Carolinian judge was passed over for the 
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preference of Fritz Hollings, and he would be reduced to a back seat role in the 
process of Clement Haynsworth’s confirmation.25 He would prove even less 
successful in his attempted impeachment of Justice Douglas. As Harry Ashmore, 
former editor of the Arkansas Gazette, pointed out, the Senator’s ‘charges’ 
against Douglas did not seem credible given that Judge Burger had recently 
presided over a conference held by the Center for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions – the very same ‘overtly political’ institution to which Douglas 
belonged – and had also had his air fare and hotel expenses covered.26 Few others 
took the accusations against Douglas seriously. Senator Edward M. Kennedy of 
Massachusetts argued in the Senate that Thurmond could not cite ‘one example 
here on the floor, where he can be challenged, during all the thirty years Justice 
Douglas has been on the Supreme Court, where he has had to disqualify himself 
from a case that came up because of prior kinds of activities.’27 In addition to 
previewing the contentious issue at the heart of the Clement Haynsworth 
nomination, the controversy over Justice Douglas’s supposed ethical impropriety 
prompted him to resign from the Parvin Foundation on 21st May, but the 
attempted impeachment only encouraged the ageing Roosevelt appointee to 
remain on the Supreme Court for another six years, by which time he was 
wheelchair-bound and on the verge of senility.28 
Thurmond would remain on the side-lines while Hollings led the campaign 
for Haynsworth’s confirmation, but Nixon’s hope of a Southern Supreme Court 
nomination free from controversy would prove short-lived. Hollings, like his 
predecessors, Thurmond and Johnston, would now become the face of South 
Carolinian controversy in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices. 
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The Gathering Storm 
 
In the words of John P. Frank, ‘there can’t be an older “Old South” than Judge 
Haynsworth.’29 Born in Greenville, South Carolina, in 1912, Clement Haynsworth 
was the fifth generation in a direct succession of Haynsworth lawyers. After 
graduating from Harvard, he joined the family law firm back in Greenville, which 
developed into one of the major law practices in the South Carolina upcountry. 
Having overcome a speech impediment to become a highly successful corporate 
lawyer and ‘business-getter’, Haynsworth remained with the family firm, spending 
three years serving in World War II, before being nominated to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1957, 
shortly after the Simon Sobeloff controversy, covered in Chapter Two.30 As the 
senior Senator from South Carolina, and a member of the Judiciary Committee, 
Olin Johnston received many endorsements for Haynsworth’s confirmation from 
prominent South Carolinians, including the President of the South Carolina Bar 
Association; the Secretaries of the Spartanburg, Anderson and Greenwood County 
Bar Associations; the Managing Director of the Hotel Greenville; the President of 
Her Majesty Underwear, and the Chairman of the Daniel Construction Company, 
Charles E. Daniel.31 
With his appointment under consideration by a three-man sub-committee 
chaired by Johnston from 7th March 1957, Haynsworth corresponded with the 
Chairman for several days, assuring Johnston on 11th March that ‘I shall be only 
too happy to inform you of any detail of my personal and public life which may be 
of interest to you.’32 Following his confirmation, Haynsworth wrote again to 
Johnston on 8th April to show appreciation ‘for your kindness in calling me on the 
telephone on Thursday to report the action of the Senate in confirming my 
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appointment to the Court of Appeals.’33 When Mississippi’s James Eastland, 
Chairman of the full Committee, contacted South Carolina’s then-junior Senator, 
Strom Thurmond, with a request that he return his ‘blue slip’ – the device by 
which Senators indicate to the Chairman their approval or disapproval of a 
nominee – Thurmond responded, ‘Mr Haynesworth *sic] was not my choice for 
the position but I intend to vote for his confirmation.’34 Shortly after, Eastland 
received a letter from Bernard Segal, of the American Bar Association’s Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, advising the Chairman that ‘we consider Mr 
Haynsworth qualified for this appointment, and this is the present unanimous 
view of the Committee.’35 As the new judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Haynsworth sat alongside John J. Parker, whose nomination to the US 
Supreme Court had been rejected in 1930.36 Given that Abe Fortas’s nomination 
to become Chief Justice was withdrawn by Lyndon Johnson at Fortas’s request, it 
remained the case that no nomination for the Supreme Court since Parker’s had 
been rejected by the US Senate.37 
According to Hollings, when he reminded President Nixon that he had met 
Clement Haynsworth at an investment meeting in Haynsworth’s home town of 
Greenville, the President recalled, ‘Oh, that little fella that stuttered.’38 After 
Nixon requested that Hollings outline Haynsworth’s qualifications by letter, 
Hollings complied the very same day, enclosing a biographical sketch and 
informing the President that ‘Judge Haynsworth has inspired us all to greater 
service. His decisions reflect a thorough understanding of legal principles, and his 
outstanding analyses of complex legal questions would instil stability in the 
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nation’s highest Court.’39 Nixon was won over by Hollings’s assurance of 
Haynsworth’s conservative ideology, the nature of which would later lead to an 
amusing exchange during the confirmation hearings. When the phrase ‘strict 
constructionist’ came up during questioning, the aforementioned Senator Philip 
Hart of Michigan commented that although he was uncertain as to what a ‘strict 
constructionist’ was, he assumed Haynsworth to be one. The nominee remarked, 
‘I have been said to be one. I don’t know – I don’t know what it is and I certainly 
do not know that I am one ... The term has not been defined to me by anyone, 
sir.’40 Two days on from Hollings’s letter to Nixon, the Senator received a note 
from Haynsworth, thanking him for the endorsement. While acknowledging that 
‘Supreme Court appointments are so rare, the available choice so broad, and the 
uncertainties of political affairs so great that anyone would be foolish to 
acknowledge the slightest expectation,’ Haynsworth was barely able to contain his 
excitement, adding that ‘if the President is looking for experienced judges, 
however, I am in the rather enviable position of having as much as twelve years’ 
experience as an appellate judge, while so far avoiding attaining a state of very 
advanced years.’41 
By 21st August 1969, when Richard Nixon formally nominated Haynsworth 
to replace Abe Fortas on the Supreme Court, the line-up of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee gave Hollings a good reason to feel confident that the nominee would 
ultimately be confirmed by the US Senate.42 In 1969, the Fourth Circuit – 
comprising the states of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and 
South Carolina – had four Senators as members of the Judiciary Committee: 
Millard Tydings of Maryland, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, Sam Ervin of North 
Carolina, and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. John Frank has argued that 
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‘because of an almost family quality of the bar of the Fourth Circuit, these 
Senators had a special feeling of knowing their judges, and Senator Tydings, early 
to question Haynsworth, was very much of that family.’43  
Before long, however, Hollings became aware of the lukewarm feeling 
toward the nominee elsewhere in the Senate, particularly as several prominent 
Democrats appeared to know so little about him. The remarks of Democratic 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana (‘I don’t know anything about 
the fellow’) and also Philip Hart (‘I don’t know a thing about him’) encouraged 
Hollings to argue that while Haynsworth favoured a ‘strict constructionist’ 
interpretation of the Constitution, he was also a ‘moderate’ who ‘had followed 
what the Supreme Court says the law is.’ By linking Haynsworth to two positions 
which some would have believed to be mutually exclusive, Hollings’s opening 
gambit proved ineffective, with The New York Times reporting liberal concerns 
regarding the nominee’s sympathy with the segregationist cause, but also 
conservative complaints that Haynsworth was not sufficiently conservative.44 
 Significantly, one of the first Senators to oppose Haynsworth openly was 
Republican Jacob Javits of New York, who had shown more enthusiasm than most 
in resisting the actions of South Carolinian Senators in the recent past. As outlined 
in Chapters Two and Three, it was Javits who had stood up to Strom Thurmond 
and Olin Johnston when the pair tried to curb the power of the Supreme Court in 
the 1950s, and was also one of the more outspoken figures during Johnston’s 
determination to block the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1962. In a letter to President Nixon, sent before the 
Haynsworth nomination was announced, Javits cited a series of civil rights cases 
which, given Haynsworth’s position in each, illustrated to the Senator ‘an 
approach to the problem of racial segregation which, if injected into the Supreme 
Court at this time ... could only be viewed as a staggering blow to the cause of civil 
rights.’45 Of particular concern to Senators was Haynsworth’s decision to uphold 
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Virginia’s ‘freedom of choice’ statutes relating to segregated schools, in a ruling 
which was later struck down by the Supreme Court in the Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County decision in 1968.46 One week later, Hollings received a 
further indication that Haynsworth’s record on civil rights would prove a tough sell 
to Northern Senators: Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), wrote to the Senator on 22nd 
August to argue that Haynsworth’s sympathy with ‘the system of racially 
segregated public education that was upset by the Brown case ruling of May 17, 
1954’ was illustrated by the fact that his decisions on civil rights cases had been 
reversed by the Supreme Court on four occasions, and his views ‘repudiated’ by 
the Justices on one other occasion. Echoing Javits’s concerns, Wilkins claimed that 
Haynsworth’s ‘elevation to the Supreme Court will retard the progress toward 
improved racial conditions in the nation’, and urged Hollings to vote against 
confirmation.47 
 Before long, George Meany, head of the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), was expressing his own opposition 
to Haynsworth on the basis of the nominee’s supposed hostility to organised 
labour. While Hollings may have been correct that the AFL-CIO – then engaged in 
a struggle against membership losses as companies were outsourcing their jobs to 
the South – had sent investigators to South Carolina to ‘dig up dirt’ on the 
nominee, he later conceded that the union’s opposition to Haynsworth was a 
‘wake-up call’ which shook his initial confidence in the success of the 
nomination.48 Just in case Hollings was not sufficiently alarmed by the negative 
reaction to the nominee’s civil rights record and the active opposition of the 
largest union federation in the United States, a third hammer blow landed on 7th 
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September, when Republican Senate leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois died 
suddenly of a heart attack, delaying the hearings for a week.49 Having lost the man 
whom Hollings genuinely believed would guarantee the success of the 
nomination, the South Carolinian was dismayed when Dirksen was replaced as 
Minority Leader by Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.50 As Hollings later 
recalled, ‘Hugh Scott, he just said Philadelphia and labor just don’t like Thurmond 
... He wouldn’t handle it.’51 Furthermore, the AFL-CIO position meant that Hollings 
could not rely on the support of the new Senate Minority Whip, Bob Griffin of 
Michigan, who would be seeking re-election in 1972 in a heavily-unionised state.52 
 Despite the huge setbacks, Hollings seemed enthusiastic about taking on 
the considerable challenge of convincing Senators to throw their support behind 
the controversial South Carolinian nominee. Working closely with Attorney 
General John Mitchell and also William Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General for 
the Office of Legal Counsel, Hollings and Haynsworth pursued a charm offensive 
with wavering Senators.53 According to John Spratt, ‘every day, Clement 
Haynsworth would show up at Fritz’s office and Fritz would give him his marching 
orders, and say “I’ve called so-and-so, I’ve done this, I’ve done that, you go see 
them, they expect you.”’54 At a press conference, Hollings began laying the 
groundwork for a defence of Haynsworth’s civil rights record by arguing that the 
nominee had ruled that the North Carolina Dental Association could not exclude 
black dentists from their membership.55 In introducing the nominee to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on 16th September, Hollings began by acknowledging the 
growing opposition to Haynsworth by declaring, ‘I find that in presenting him, I 
must defend him. I do so with pride, because I first suggested him to President 
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Nixon last May.’56 The Senator later admitted that ‘I felt as though I was 
presenting an indicted defendant rather than the Chief Judge of the US Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.’57 
Following Hollings’s introduction, Chairman James Eastland kicked off the 
questioning by referring to the concerns of some on the Judiciary Committee that 
Haynsworth should have recused himself from the case of Darlington 
Manufacturing Company v. NLRB, which had involved a company with business 
connections to a vending machine firm by the name of Carolina Vend-A-Matic, in 
which Haynsworth owned one-seventh of the stock.58 The doubts over his ethical 
impropriety were further suggested by the case of Brunswick Corp. v. Long, which 
became a talking point following revelations that Haynsworth had purchased one 
thousand shares in the Brunswick firm, supposedly while he and the other judges 
of the Fourth Circuit were considering the case.59 While no charges of ethical 
impropriety were ever proved, the persistence of some Senators in discussing the 
two cases inevitably planted seeds of doubt, allowing prominent Haynsworth 
opponents such as George Meany to claim that the nominee lacked ‘the legal 
ethics of straightforward honesty.’60 
With the ‘Fourth Circuit’ Senators, Tydings and Ervin, giving the nominee 
every opportunity to make his case, and Eastland concluding that ‘I will not make 
a final determination on the confirmation of the nominee before us based on the 
criticism that has been levelled at him’, the first day of hearings concluded with 
little discussion of how Haynsworth’s confirmation would affect the jurisprudence 
of the Supreme Court.61 This changed on the following day, 17th September, when 
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Philip Hart’s questioning of the nominee on his judicial philosophy was 
interrupted by Sam Ervin in one of the few highlights of the hearings: 
 
Senator Ervin: If the Senator will pardon me for committing an 
unpardonable sin, I am glad at long last the Senator from Michigan agrees 
with me that a Senator has a right to ascertain the view of a nominee for 
the Supreme Court. 
Senator Hart: I am ascertaining whether he agrees with Earl Warren. 
Senator Ervin: And I would like to say that I am glad to have a convert to 
my philosophy. However, I never did get one of the previous nominees to 
ever reveal any of his political or constitutional philosophy. And I was told 
at the time that it was highly improper for me to seek to ascertain it. 
Excuse me. I won’t interrupt you anymore.62 
 
Ervin’s interjection no doubt amused Senators who recalled his and Hart’s 
differing views on previous nominees, but his remarks may also have highlighted 
the fact that the Southern members of the Judiciary Committee were apparently, 
for the first time, on the defensive. Shortly after a further round of questions from 
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, it was the turn of Senator Birch Bayh 
of Indiana, who subjected the nominee to a gruelling interrogation, returning to 
the theme of judicial ethics with regard to Haynsworth’s interest in Carolina Vend-
A-Matic.63 When Attorney John P. Frank appeared before the Committee to clarify 
the issue of whether or not Judge Haynsworth had behaved unethically, Senator 
Bayh pursued the Carolina Vend-A-Matic issue further: 
 
Senator Bayh: Let me ask you why in the well-documented information 
you have given us, there was little or no reference to the canons of judicial 
ethics? Why were the canons not significant enough to be considered in 
your brief? 
Mr Frank: Because I did not deal with the canons. Because I think for 
purposes of the federal courts they are simply immaterial. They merely are 
reflective of, in this highly general language of, what is in the code anyway, 
and the rule for the federal judges is adequately, I think, covered by the 
statutes and the cases and I don’t think the canons really add anything 
other than a confirming note or echo.64 
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 Unconvinced by Frank’s rather awkward form of diplomacy, Bayh was 
determined to oppose the confirmation of Clement Haynsworth with the same 
energy and dedication displayed by Strom Thurmond in his fight against Abe 
Fortas. Following George Meany’s statement on the AFL-CIO’s opposition to 
Haynsworth on 18th September, Bayh resumed his questioning of the nominee on 
23rd September, going into depth in a lengthy interrogation, with Sam Ervin failing 
to ease the tension by quoting a line from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s A Psalm 
of Life: ‘Time is fleeting, and our hearts, though stout and brave, still, like muffled 
drums, are beating funeral marches to the grave.’65 
 
 Senator Bayh: What is that supposed to mean? 
Senator Ervin: It means that apparently we are going to be in the funeral 
march to the grave before we get through this proceeding. 
Senator Bayh: I hope not. I am concerned and I suppose I should ask the 
question if you had to do it over again whether you would still maintain 
that kind of relationship with Carolina Vend-A-Matic. You feel that there is 
absolutely nothing that was improprietous here? 
Judge Haynsworth: I don’t know what you mean by that kind of 
relationship. I was a stockholder, as I have said. 
Senator Bayh: Stockholder, Vice President, and your wife is secretary, and 
you were on the board of directors and you own $450,000 worth of stock. 
You are doing business with one of the litigants. 
Judge Haynsworth: Well now, Senator –  
Senator Bayh: A significant amount of business of the corporation was 
done with textile companies, and the case involved was a textile case. This 
is what concerns me. It is a matter of appearance.  
Judge Haynsworth: Senator, I was a director until 1963. I was an inactive 
Vice President. We have been into all of this.66 
 
One can only imagine how South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond felt as he sat 
in silence listening to Birch Bayh’s interrogation. Nonetheless, the senior Senator 
complied with the Administration’s wishes and limited himself to a tiny number of 
interventions during the hearings, speaking up to ask John Frank, and later Judge 
Harrison Winter, Haynsworth’s colleague on the Fourth Circuit, if either of them 
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believed that Haynsworth had ever behaved unethically.67 During the testimony of 
Clarence Mitchell and Joseph Rauh, of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
on 25th September, Thurmond made one further intervention, declaring that ‘I 
have no questions of these witnesses, but I want to inquire at what time are we 
going to recess for lunch and at what time are we going to come back?’68 
 
 
Damage Control 
 
In his 1991 study of the Haynsworth nomination, John Frank claimed that Birch 
Bayh was selected as the leader of the anti-Haynsworth campaign by a coalition of 
groups gathering in opposition to the nominee. Having initially approached Philip 
Hart to lead the campaign, they settled on Bayh after Hart declined the 
responsibility, on the grounds that he had been one of Abe Fortas’s most 
enthusiastic backers in the Senate the previous year.69 Bayh’s rigorous questioning 
of Haynsworth during the Judiciary Committee hearings – which concluded with 
seven members voting against the nominee – culminated, on 8th October, in the 
production of his ‘bill of particulars’, which outlined a total of twenty arguments 
for why Haynsworth should not be confirmed. These ranged from the allegation 
that Haynsworth had cast the deciding vote in the Darlington decision, favouring 
Carolina Vend-A-Matic (‘Charge 3’), to the fact that the judge had sat on six cases 
involving customers of Vend-A-Matic (‘Charge 7’), and the accusation that he had 
used his office to promote the vending business (‘Charge 16’), in addition to a 
detailed graph showing the sudden and massive increase in gross annual sales for 
Vend-A-Matic since Haynsworth became a judge on the Fourth Circuit.70 The full 
list of charges was sent to Hollings’s office, along with a formal letter of 
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explanation from Bayh, who wrote in pen at the bottom, ‘Fritz – I haven’t relished 
this matter, but the facts should be out in the open. Birch.’71 
Horrified by the ‘bill of particulars’, and convinced that Bayh was simply 
pursuing payback for the Republican treatment of Fortas the previous year, 
Hollings called a press conference, during which he conceded that ‘an aura has 
been created that a judge is on the run’ but insisted that the charges were ‘grossly 
exaggerated,’ and that ‘no actual conflict of interest had been proved.’72 On the 
Senate floor, Hollings, in a bid to offset charges brought by a fellow Democrat, 
was now calling on a group of Republican Senators to help him defend the 
Haynsworth nomination, including Marlow Cook of Kentucky Howard Baker of 
Tennessee, Roman Hruska of Nebraska, Barry Goldwater of Arizona, and even his 
South Carolina colleague, Strom Thurmond.73 In addition to challenging Bayh to a 
televised debate on the charges being levelled at Haynsworth, Hollings produced 
his own document, responding in detail to each of the twenty charges in Bayh’s 
bill while also noting the ‘calculated’ nature of the accusations.74 
His response ensured that a comprehensive defence of the nominee would 
go on record as a rebuttal of Bayh’s charges, but his attempt to drag Bayh in front 
of television cameras proved less straightforward. In a letter dated 9th October, 
Hollings formally challenged the Indiana Senator to a televised debate, pointing 
out that he would be contacting various TV networks to arrange a suitable time.75 
True to his word, Hollings sent a telegram to the President of News at the 
Columbia Broadcasting Corporation (CBC); the President of the American 
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Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) News, and the Vice President In Charge of News 
at the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC).76 
In his response, sent on the same day, Birch Bayh suggested that he was in 
no mood to be provoked, advising Hollings that ‘in light of the serious nature of 
our responsibility to advise and consent to the nomination of a Justice who will sit 
on the Supreme Court for life and dispense justice for all of our citizens in that 
capacity ... we should do our best to debate this matter in a deliberate and 
dispassionate manner on the floor of the Senate.’77 The following day, an agitated 
Hollings responded by pointing out that ‘it was you who took the debate from 
senatorial processes to the headlines and TV tube and now there is no alternative 
because both public opinion and Senate opinion is formulating.’78 Hollings 
remained unconvinced that Bayh would even face him in the Senate, let alone in a 
television studio. As he recalled in his memoirs, ‘Bayh refused to stay on the floor. 
He would make a charge and then leave.’79 Referring to an offer from Meet The 
Press to stage a televised debate, Hollings claimed in his 10th October 
correspondence with Bayh that he had accepted the invitation ‘because I believe 
that an answer to your charges is the only way that we can protect the reputation 
of the United States Senate and of the Court.’80 
The very same day, an unfazed Bayh tried a different tack: 
 
Dear Fritz: 
 
I have just received your telegram relative to our debating the 
Haynsworth matter on national television. In re-reading it a second and 
third time, I still feel very much as I did in response to your first inquiry. 
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Fritz, so many different sources have been responsible for various 
statements and allegations throughout this entire distasteful affair that I 
am returning your wire without disclosing its contents in the hopes that 
someone other than yourself was the author. 
 
I have too much respect for you and for the service you have 
performed and will continue to perform for your state in the Senate to let 
others goad us into this type of personal acrimony. 
 
     Best regards, 
     Birch Bayh81 
 
 In his terse response, Hollings began by claiming ownership of the words in 
his telegram before complaining to Bayh that ‘I don’t get this pedestal of personal 
acrimony that you have assumed. You attack Judge Haynsworth in a nine-page 
“bill of particulars”, then when someone wants to defend him and go down the 
list of charges, you assume the “don’t let’s get personal” attitude.’ He urged Bayh 
once again to ‘please reconsider your position.’82 In the final communication from 
Bayh’s office – undated, and scrawled in Bayh’s own hand rather than typed – the 
Senator from Indiana informed his South Carolina colleague that ‘one thing you 
should know is that I did not disclose your last letter. In fact, a member of the 
press walked into my office with a copy of it ... before I had even received it. 
Where it originated, I don’t know!’83 When Clement Haynsworth wrote to Fritz 
Hollings the following month to show his appreciation for the Senator’s energetic 
support for his confirmation, he commented that ‘you performed superbly, your 
only failure being your futile attempt to entice Senator Bayh into a debate in 
which you would have demolished him.’84 
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Figure 3. Cartoon from Raleigh (NC) News and Observer, 9
th
 October 1969. 
 
An increasingly bullish attitude toward Bayh may have been an indication 
that the Senator from South Carolina was beginning to sense defeat during the 
month of October, albeit in the unlikely form of newspaper cartoons. An 
illustration from the Raleigh (NC) News and Observer showing Haynsworth sitting 
before the members of the Judiciary Committee while an angry-looking Birch Bayh 
clenched his fist and asked, ‘Judge Haynsworth, it is true that you owned three 
boxes of Oaties Cereal when you ruled in their case?’ offered a clear example of 
press ridicule of the perceived triviality of Bayh’s charges but nonetheless 
highlighted the manner in which the Indianan’s fight against the nominee had 
infiltrated the public consciousness.85 Far more serious was an illustration by 
Herblock in The Washington Post, which showed Haynsworth as a schoolboy 
carrying a book bag with Carolina Vend-A-Matic stock falling out of it, with 
Attorney General John Mitchell standing beside him, claiming, ‘But your honor, 
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my client hasn’t done anything wrong – and he promises to stop doing it.’86 
According to John Spratt, ‘Fritz said he knew then it was all over.’87 
The Nixon Administration faced repeated calls to withdraw the 
nomination, some from Republican Senators, and one from Haynsworth himself, 
which was refused by Attorney General Mitchell.88 As a means of counter-attack, 
the Administration urged Republican Chairmen in the South to begin arguing that 
the Haynsworth opposition was motivated solely by the fact that he hailed from 
the South. Harry Dent, who had served on Thurmond’s staff before becoming one 
of Nixon’s crucial Southern political strategists, approached eight Washington, DC 
correspondents from Southern newspapers to convince them to pursue a 
‘Southern angle’ in their coverage.89 In Hollings’s view, the efforts of the Southern 
writers who happily played up the supposed anti-Southern bias of the Haynsworth 
opposition, such as James J. Kilpatrick, failed to dilute the impact of Herblock’s 
‘Vend-A-Justice’ cartoons, which he condemned on the Senate floor.90 
With the ethics question, the civil rights record and the alleged hostility to 
organised labour, Clement Haynsworth had unwittingly created a smorgasbord of 
controversy that was guaranteed to unite a diverse coalition of Senators in 
opposing him. Before long, it became apparent to Hollings and the Nixon 
Administration that they had underestimated the ability of organised labour and 
the NAACP to influence the Senate in what Joel Grossman and Stephen Wasby 
have referred to as a ‘desperate effort to save the Court’s prevailing liberal 
policies from destruction.’91 As each day went by, Hollings experienced a variety 
of reactions from Senators of both parties: Republican Wallace Bennett of Utah 
concluded that ‘the charges against the judge are political and based on revenge 
rather than factual, and I have decided to vote for his confirmation’, while 
Democrat Daniel Inouye of Hawaii stated flatly, ‘as you know, I have publicly 
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announced that I intend to vote against Judge Haynsworth’s nomination’ and 
Republican Ted Stevens of Alaska declared solemnly that ‘I think you should know 
that I have a persistent doubt developing concerning Judge Haynsworth.’92 There 
was a lukewarm feeling even among conservative Republicans, such as Lee Jordan 
of Idaho, who expressed privately his concern that Haynsworth was in fact Strom 
Thurmond’s ‘stalking horse for the Supreme Court’.93 As Senator Marlow Cook 
would later point out in his ‘new standards’ speech, ‘*Haynsworth’s+ South 
Carolina residence was construed as conclusive proof that he was a close friend of 
the widely-criticised senior Senator from that state’ despite the fact that 
Haynsworth and Thurmond barely knew each other, and despite Hollings’s effort 
to work closely with the Nixon Administration as a means of minimising 
Thurmond’s role in the process of confirmation.94 
In a desperate bid to defend the nomination, President Nixon called a 
press conference on 20th October, during which he asserted that Haynsworth had 
never gained personally from any of his rulings. The President claimed that he did 
not believe that a judge’s philosophy constituted an appropriate basis for 
rejecting a nominee for the Supreme Court, before concluding that ‘it is not 
proper to turn down a man because he is a Southerner, because he is a Jew, 
because he is a Negro, or because of his philosophy.’95 This statement, an obvious 
reference to the troubled nominations of Louis Brandeis in 1916 and Thurgood 
Marshall in 1967, suggested the extent to which Nixon believed the ‘Southern’ 
element to be relevant to those leading the opposition to Clement Haynsworth, 
but the President’s decision to address these issues ultimately failed to save the 
nomination. Many moderate Republicans, who were already unhappy with the 
Administration’s failure to screen Haynsworth adequately prior to the 
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announcement of his nomination, soon became resentful that they were being 
pressurised to support a controversial nominee.96 
Speculation in the press over Haynsworth’s prospects was mixed: David 
Lawrence wrote, in an article published in The Richmond News Leader, that an 
organised effort was being made to block Haynsworth’s confirmation ‘because he 
is from the South’, while other newspapers, including the The Charlotte Observer, 
predicted a grim outcome, and others, such as The Washington Post and South 
Carolina’s The State, expected confirmation by a narrow margin.97 By the final day 
of the Senate debate, 21st November, Hollings had become so despondent that his 
comments bordered on sarcasm. Referring to himself as ‘the undistinguished 
Senator from South Carolina’, he declared that ‘with two people on the press 
gallery, with everybody waiting around for the last two hours to go home, with 
every Senator for the last two weeks having made up his mind, suffice it to say 
that we could continue to try to make it look like we are making a record.’98 The 
harrowing experience of the Haynsworth affair, which has clearly informed 
Hollings’s opinion on how the Supreme Court nomination process was 
transformed during the late 1960s, was summed up by the Senator in his memoirs 
when he asked, ‘What good person wants to put himself and his family through 
the horrific treatment that has become a routine part of the Senate’s “advice and 
consent” process?’99 One might add that the same question might have been 
asked following the South Carolinian treatment of Thurgood Marshall and Abe 
Fortas. 
The rejection of Clement Haynsworth’s confirmation, by a vote of 45-55, 
allowed Southern Senators to capitalise on the complaints which many had been 
making throughout the course of deliberations in the Senate, namely, that the 
attack on the nominee constituted an attack on the South. A sense of disgust at 
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the supposed anti-Southern bias was evident in the correspondence sent to Strom 
Thurmond’s office, with one writer asking the Senator, ‘how many more times will 
the South get slapped in the face before the people wake up?’ and a resident of 
Ware Shoals complaining that ‘all of South Carolina is sick and angry about the 
treatment given Haynsworth. It was an insult to every South Carolinian, and every 
Southerner ... This is as bad as “Reconstruction”. We need another HAMPTON to 
save us – and we are looking to you, Senator Thurmond, to be that Hampton.’100 
While Thurmond no doubt appreciated being compared to the civil war hero and 
former Governor, Wade Hampton, he sounded inconsolable in a letter to Clement 
Haynsworth, in which he claimed that ‘the lamentable failure of the Senate to 
confirm your nomination was the greatest disappointment I have had since I have 
been in the Senate.’101 
In a newsletter, dated 1st December 1969, Thurmond compared 
Haynsworth to the last rejected Supreme Court nominee – Haynsworth’s former 
colleague on the Fourth Circuit, North Carolinian John J. Parker. Certainly there 
were remarkable similarities between the two men, in that Parker’s record on civil 
rights and his opposition to the ‘yellow dog contract’ also ensured the resistance 
of an unlikely coalition of the NAACP and the AFL.102 However, it was the fact that 
Parker was from the South that provided the ultimate cause for a comparison, 
with Thurmond arguing that Haynsworth, like Parker, ‘was born and bred to a 
more exacting tradition of law and history than liberals would accept.’103 
Predictably, Thurmond was not the only one to point to the eerie similarities 
between Clement Haynsworth and John J. Parker. Shortly before the Haynsworth 
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nomination was defeated in the Senate, James J. Kilpatrick had made the same 
comparison, speaking of a South ‘where defeat is an old companion’.104 
Nonetheless, the ‘anti-South’ arguments failed to catch on simply because 
many remained unconvinced that such a bias existed. Southern Republican 
Senator Bill Brock recalls, ‘I was not aware of any resentment or bitterness 
towards the South from Senators from other regions during this period ... There 
certainly was concern about [Republican] gains, but those were the concerns of 
those whose interests lay in maintaining a majority for Democrats in the 
Senate.’105 Ironically, Brock’s view that the opposition to Haynsworth was 
motivated by party concerns rather than regional prejudice provides a further 
comparison with the Parker rejection: some Senators were resentful of Nixon’s 
attempt to appoint a South Carolinian judge as part of a Republican ‘Southern 
Strategy’ in 1969, in the same way that, in 1930, several Southern Democrats 
were prepared to vote against the North Carolinian Parker in order to prevent 
Republican President Herbert Hoover from building on his success in winning the 
state of North Carolina in the 1928 Presidential Election.106 Furthermore, given 
that South Carolina was the only Deep South state won by Nixon in 1968, it may 
have been Haynsworth’s association with that particular state, rather than the 
South as a whole, that alienated wavering Senators. 
The efforts of the Administration to minimise Thurmond’s role in the 
Haynsworth nomination had failed to erase memories of the Senator’s influence 
in the election of Richard Nixon, and his leadership of the successful campaign to 
deny Abe Fortas the Chief Justiceship. Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland 
summed up the relevance of the Fortas rejection on the fate of Clement 
Haynsworth when he claimed that: 
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The Fortas affair cast over the Court a shadow of suspicion and mistrust 
from which the Court has not fully emerged. This aura hangs most 
noticeably over Mr Fortas’s vacant seat, the very one to which Judge 
Haynsworth has been nominated. We must recognise that the ultimate 
decision in the present matter cannot realistically be insulated from this 
spectre.107  
 
With his successful campaign against Fortas in 1968, the formidable, 
uncompromising Thurmond may unwittingly have sabotaged a golden opportunity 
to engineer the appointment of a conservative South Carolinian Supreme Court 
Justice in 1969. 
Fritz Hollings remained outspoken following Haynsworth’s rejection. In a 
letter to W.C. Boyd, the Senator played down his feud with fellow Democrat Birch 
Bayh and instead complained bitterly that the Republicans were responsible for 
derailing Haynsworth’s nomination: 
 
Daily we had their leader, Scott of Pennsylvania, and the Republican Whip, 
Griffin of Michigan, shouting for the President to withdraw the 
appointment. In the month-long debate, our leader, Mike Mansfield, by 
contrast, never said one word against Haynsworth and only made his 
decision known the afternoon before the vote. It so happens that the 
Attorney General of the United States commented to me only last week 
that the Republicans defeated Clement and all you have to do is ask 
Clement. I handled the appointment. I know this better than anyone.108 
 
To the President of Dan River Mills in Greenville, the Senator claimed that 
‘Clement was a good product, but we just couldn’t sell. You will remember my 
desperation in August and September. I could see the gathering storm and then 
Senator Dirksen died and we had to move fast. The Administration sat back as if 
they knew how to handle the situation and we never got back in the ball game.’109 
When Hollings went public with his criticism, he received a stinging rebuke from J. 
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Drake Edens, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, who claimed that 
‘Senator Hollings has been demagoguing and has been demagoguing from the 
beginning’, adding that Hollings had succeeded in influencing only one vote for 
Haynsworth, ‘and I’m not sure he was responsible for that.’110 Edens pointed out 
that while Strom Thurmond had remained in Washington, DC to defend the 
Haynsworth nomination, Hollings had spent three weeks on a ‘junket’ to India, 
adding, ‘I don’t know if Senator Hollings was in India to round up votes for Judge 
Haynsworth ... but if he was, the Indian delegation didn’t show up in our corner on 
Friday.’111 Hollings has continued to insist that the nomination would have 
succeeded had Everett Dirksen lived, despite Dirksen’s failure to corral support 
among Republican Senators for Lyndon Johnson’s attempt to promote Abe Fortas 
to the Chief Justiceship the previous year.112 
Although Hollings’s disappointment after many weeks of intensive 
campaigning on behalf of the Nixon Administration may have put him in an 
indignant mood, his view that the Administration was to blame for the 
Haynsworth debacle was shared by Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, who argued 
in a letter to Robert Stoddard, Mayor of Spartanburg, South Carolina, that ‘the 
South stood solidly behind the President on the Haynsworth vote. If he had done 
his homework on his side of the aisle, he would have prevailed.’113 Furthermore, 
history has not been kind to Richard Nixon’s role in the Haynsworth affair: John 
Maltese has argued that the lobbying effort on behalf of Haynsworth degenerated 
into ‘strong-arm tactics that ultimately did more harm than good.’114 Nixon’s 
enthusiasm in backing Haynsworth before the nation’s press – despite allegedly 
nominating him without consulting the American Bar Association or the 
Republican National Committee or any Senator other than Fritz Hollings – implied 
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that he may have been less concerned with Haynsworth’s suitability as a Supreme 
Court Justice, and more focused on rewarding the South and continuing to build a 
strong Republican Party in that region.115 
With the Haynsworth nomination in ruins, Thurmond claimed in his 1st 
December newsletter that ‘knowledgeable people have confidence that the 
President will nominate another conservative, hopefully one from the South.’116 
This hope appeared to have some credibility: on 21st November, Nixon wrote to 
Hollings to thank the Senator for his ‘vigorous support’ of the Haynsworth 
nomination and to point out that ‘the Court needs men of Judge Haynsworth’s 
philosophy to restore the proper balance to this great institution, and I propose 
that we continue our effort to provide the Court with such men.’117 Few, including 
an already disappointed Hollings, could have anticipated Nixon’s next selection of 
a nominee to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court. 
 
 
The Astonishing and Puzzling Senator Hollings 
 
The rejection of Clement Haynsworth only re-enforced a belief among 
conservative white Southerners that the Supreme Court was no place for any 
judge who might prove sympathetic to the plight of the South. To make matters 
worse for those Southerners, the Haynsworth controversy occurred just as the 
Supreme Court was hammering the final nails into the coffin of Southern 
segregation. On 29th October 1969, the Justices handed down the critical decision 
in Alexander v. Holmes County School Board, which ordered the complete and 
immediate desegregation of Mississippi’s schools.118 Brown v. Board of Education 
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(1954) had provided for desegregation ‘with all deliberate speed’, allowing 
considerable heel-dragging on the part of state officials, and Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County (1968) had been open to interpretation with 
regard to the speed of transition from segregation to a unitary system, but the 
Alexander ruling, thanks largely to the insistence of the ageing Justice Hugo Black, 
ensured no ambiguity in the order for school districts to desegregate throughout 
the South.119  
The condemnation of Alexander by Mississippi’s Senator James Eastland 
was joined by Strom Thurmond, who claimed that ‘the Nixon Administration stood 
with the South in this case ... but the Court has chosen to override both the state 
of Mississippi and the Justice Department. I hope something can be done to 
overcome the effects of this pernicious ruling.’120 Despite a march of over three 
thousand white residents of Greenville and Darlington counties to the South 
Carolina State House in protest at the school desegregation ruling, the state’s 
Governor, Robert E. McNair, showed no indication that he would reverse the 
careful transition to racial order which had begun under his predecessor, Fritz 
Hollings.121 Announcing that he would oppose any attempt to close down public 
schools, the Governor declared that ‘we don’t want federal troops in South 
Carolina. We’ve built a reputation for obedience to the law.’122 Sixteen years on 
from Brown, the issue of segregated Southern schools continued to rage in the 
Senate following the Alexander ruling, with Fritz Hollings using a debate with 
South Carolina’s old nemesis, Jacob Javits of New York, to re-iterate his claims of 
an anti-Southern bias following the Haynsworth rejection. As Charleston’s News 
and Courier reported, ‘Hollings said that 200,000 Negro children are attending 
segregated schools in New York, but that the Federal Government’s efforts have 
been directed only against the South. “They’ve developed busing,” Hollings said, 
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“to mix children – where? In North Carolina and South Carolina. Not in New York. 
Not in Chicago.”’123  
The resurgence of Southern tension over the segregation issue in the years 
1969 and 1970 was only exacerbated by President Nixon’s nomination of 
segregationist Judge G. Harrold Carswell of Florida, in his second attempt to name 
a Southerner to replace Abe Fortas on the Supreme Court. Unlike the Haynsworth 
episode, during which no Senator had questioned the nominee’s competence as a 
judge, some serious questions were raised regarding Carswell’s legal ability, 
particularly given his lack of published work and the fact that his opinions were 
rarely, if ever, cited by other judges.124 There was, however, ample evidence of a 
consistent anti-civil rights record, which served only to unite the very same 
organisations which had opposed Haynsworth: in his lengthy statement of 
opposition, George Meany of the AFL-CIO claimed that ‘the Administration’s sole 
guide in making its selection was its Southern political strategy.’125 With a track 
record of defending white supremacy and a painfully lukewarm rating from the 
American Bar Association, Carswell was not helped by the now-legendary ham-
fisted defence offered by Republican Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska, who 
claimed that ‘even if he is mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people 
and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little 
chance? We can’t have all Brandeises, Cardozos and Frankfurters, and stuff like 
that there.’126 Peter Fish has argued that Nixon, in naming Carswell, responded to 
the Senate’s rejection of Clement Haynsworth with a ‘spite’ nomination, defined 
as ‘an ill-disguised strategy of vengeance against the upper chamber – a strategy 
intended … to force the Senate into a posture of ironic acceptance of a second-
choice nominee possessing professional credentials widely perceived as inferior to 
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those of the original nominee.’127 The consequences of Nixon’s antagonistic 
strategy would be catastrophic.128 
Having taken a back seat during the Haynsworth confirmation hearings, 
Thurmond was now free to air his opinions on the new nominee, telling one 
constituent that ‘Judge Carswell is a comparatively young man and should be on 
the Court a long time. I am pleased that President Nixon turned South again to fill 
this vacancy.’129 In a news release, the Senator was quick to address the growing 
criticism of the nominee, making the predictable argument that, ‘although they 
will not admit it, the people who have raised arguments against Judge Carswell’s 
confirmation are opposed to him primarily on the basis of his being from the 
South.’130 By complete contrast, Hollings had very little to say. Given that he had 
been outspoken throughout the deliberations over Haynsworth, and openly 
critical of the Nixon Administration in the wake of Haynsworth’s rejection, the 
state’s press took a great interest in his sudden silence. Speculative articles began 
to appear in The News and Courier, beginning with an observation on 22nd March 
that ‘Senator Hollings’ hesitation on whether he’ll vote for or against confirmation 
of Judge G. Harrold Carswell as a Supreme Court nominee is, to put it mildly, both 
astonishing and puzzling.’131 
Shortly after, Hollings gave an interview in which he made the 
extraordinary suggestion that if Carswell was not confirmed, he would 
recommend to President Nixon that he re-nominate Clement Haynsworth.132 If 
the Fish assessment is correct, namely, that Nixon hoped that Carswell would be 
confirmed because Senators did not feel they could get away with a second 
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rejection, it seems ironic that Hollings thought it possible that the Carswell 
nomination would be received so poorly by Senators who had opposed Clement 
Haynsworth that it might actually endear Haynsworth to them if he were 
nominated a second time. Nonetheless, there was little enthusiasm for Hollings’s 
position in South Carolina’s newspapers: The News and Courier urged Hollings to 
back Carswell and, in The State, it was believed that ‘the Senator’s indecision on 
Carswell might produce damage that could take years to repair.’133 The sense of 
frustration was also evident in letters from Hollings’s South Carolina constituents, 
some of whom joined with the state’s press in urging him to make his position 
known.134 
 Privately, Hollings was holding out little hope of a second Haynsworth 
nomination. In a detailed letter to Fulton B. Creech on 24th March 1970, he 
claimed that ‘I have withheld taking a public position on Carswell until after the 
debates because this was exactly the trouble I found myself in, handling the 
Haynsworth nomination. Everybody had committed before they listened to the 
facts. I did not want to be guilty of the same thing.’ Describing Carswell as 
‘nothing to get enthused about’, the Senator declared, ‘I am proud of the South 
and, when we put our foot forward, it should be our very best foot. Carswell can’t 
even carry Haynsworth’s law books.’ Regarding the upcoming vote in the Senate, 
Hollings claimed, ‘in confidence, I will probably vote for him but I am not proud of 
the vote. I don’t believe he is a racist or any of these charges generally about him. 
I just believe that he is a mediocre lawyer and judge and that if I had a case, I 
would not associate him in it. Therefore, I see no reason why I should promote 
him to the highest court.’135 Hollings discussed the possibility of re-submitting 
Haynsworth in a letter to the Senior Vice President of the Fidelity Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, pointing out that ‘re-submitting the name of a Supreme 
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Court nominee is not without precedent’, citing President Andrew Jackson’s 
successful re-nomination of Roger Taney in 1835, but added that he did not 
believe ‘that this is a realistic consideration about Clement Haynsworth in our 
present political climate.’136 To another constituent, he declared, ‘I have given 
some thought to this, but concluded that to re-nominate him would serve to 
resurrect the same charges by his opponents. I would doubt that the Judge should 
be expected to undergo this again.’137 
Hollings eventually endorsed Carswell in a brief, lukewarm statement in 
the Senate, in which he claimed that his initial silence had ‘opened a Pandora’s 
box of editorial nonsense in many of the South Carolina newspapers’ before 
stating his intention to vote for Carswell’s confirmation.138 Following Carswell’s 
rejection the same week, by a vote of 45-51, Hollings received another letter of 
thanks from President Nixon, who commended him ‘for standing by this fine jurist 
despite the heated campaign of misrepresentation and scurrility that ultimately 
cost him his confirmation.’139 With his Southern Supreme Court strategy shot 
down in flames for a second time, Nixon nominated Minnesotan Judge Harry A. 
Blackmun to fill the Fortas vacancy. Thurmond remained supportive of the 
President, and the new nominee, claiming in a statement to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that ‘Judge Blackmun is a man of high ethical conduct and 
competence, as were Judge Haynsworth and Judge Carswell.’140 In an interview 
reported in the The Sarasota Herald Tribune, Thurmond referred to the Carswell 
rejection as ‘a black day in the history of the United States’, yet, despite his view 
that ‘it will be impossible to get a judge from the South with strict constructionist 
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views appointed to the Supreme Court’, the Senator concluded optimistically that 
he was confident in President Nixon naming a Southern judge before the end of 
his Presidency.141 
By complete contrast, Hollings portrayed Blackmun’s confirmation as 
further evidence of an anti-Southern prejudice. As with President Eisenhower’s 
appointment of Marylander Simon Sobeloff in 1955, which denied South Carolina 
representation on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Haynsworth rejection 
was interpreted by Hollings as another, far more significant, insult to his state. 
Complaining of ‘the double standard employed by my colleagues in the Senate as 
a body, apparently, on whether or not a judge is from South Carolina or 
Minnesota’, Hollings concluded that ‘apparently, if one is from South Carolina, the 
standards or qualifications ... are higher than would be required of a Minnesota 
judge.’142 While the Senator could have made a convincing argument by 
articulating the view later outlined by John Massaro, that ‘the clamor surrounding 
Haynsworth’s sense of propriety was primarily employed to conceal ideological 
considerations’, he opted instead to ‘regionalise’ his comments by speaking of a 
victimised South – an argument which sounded to some like ‘sour grapes’ but was 
nonetheless guaranteed to play well with the folks back home.143 Blackmun, 
following his confirmation by a unanimous Senate, would ultimately disappoint 
conservatives with his record on the Court, not least with his authorship of the 
majority opinion in Roe v. Wade in 1973, which would establish a constitutional 
right to an abortion, making the mild-mannered Minnesotan an unlikely hero of 
the women’s movement.144 
On 15th May 1970, Marlow Cook declared to the Senate that ‘with the 
confirmation of Harry A. Blackmun by the Senate this week, I believe we have 
come to the end of an era in Supreme Court history ... To the extent that the 
recent controversial period has eroded respect for our legal institutions, it has 
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been a disaster.’145 The Senator from Kentucky re-asserted that Clement 
Haynsworth had not in fact violated the judicial code, and echoed Hollings’s 
complaints of a double standard when pointing out that Judge Blackmun had also 
presided over cases involving firms in which he owned stock, yet no objections 
had been raised by Senators. Cook’s response to the Senate’s treatment of 
Haynsworth was to offer five criteria to be used when considering future 
nominees: 1. Competence; 2. Achievement; 3. Temperament; 4. Judicial integrity, 
and 5. Non-judicial record. Cook may not have foreseen the troubles which lay 
ahead for the nomination process in the 1980s and 1990s, but his ‘Haynsworth 
test’ does provide another indication of the significance of Haynsworth’s rejection 
during a tumultuous political period, and the influence this episode would have on 
subsequent nominations. 
The ‘new standards’ speech was largely the work of Cook’s Senatorial aide, 
Mitch McConnell, who used the text as the basis for his article, ‘Haynsworth and 
Parker: A New Senate Standard of Excellence’, published in the Kentucky Law 
Journal. He later served as a Deputy Attorney General during the Presidency of 
Gerald Ford before winning election to the Senate in 1984. As Senate Minority 
Leader from 2007, McConnell led Republican Senators during the heated 
confirmation battles over President Barack Obama’s nominations of Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court, and became Senate Majority 
Leader in January 2015. McConnell’s authorship, as a young man, of Marlow 
Cook’s ‘new standards’ speech indicates that his recent experiences in the politics 
of Supreme Court nominations derive from a lengthy involvement in the process, 
dating back to a very critical period. 
The replacement of Abe Fortas with Harry Blackmun did little to soothe 
the Southern resentment over the treatment of Clement Haynsworth. The South 
Carolinian’s rejection became an issue during the 1970 elections, with Republicans 
criticising Democratic candidates for their opposition, whether real or imagined. 
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In the Tennessee Senate election, Republican Congressman Bill Brock succeeded 
in defeating three-term incumbent Democratic Senator Albert Gore, partly 
through reminding Tennesseans of Gore’s opposition to Haynsworth.146 Over in 
South Carolina, James B. Edwards, Chairman of the Republican Party in the First 
Congressional District, alleged, unsuccessfully, that Haynsworth’s confirmation 
had been opposed by the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Lieutenant 
Governor John C. West.147 The moderate Lieutenant Governor would succeed 
Robert McNair in the Governor’s Mansion after defeating his Republican 
opponent, Congressman Albert Watson, whose Thurmond-endorsed 
segregationist campaign was damaged badly when two school buses were tipped 
over in defiance of a segregation order.148 West later commented that ‘the 
Southern elections of 1970 were the first elections with racial overtones where 
the moderates won.’149 In a further suggestion of a changing South Carolina, three 
African American candidates won election to the State House.150 
President Nixon later considered, albeit briefly, the nomination of Albert 
Watson to the United States Court of Military Appeals, but backed down after 
receiving warnings from Republican leaders that a Watson nomination would fare 
no better than those of Haynsworth or Carswell. According to The New York 
Times, the opposition to Watson began when Strom Thurmond issued a 
statement announcing that the nomination had received ‘tentative approval’ from 
President Nixon.151 The failure of Watson’s run for Governor, and the refusal of 
Senators to even consider his nomination for a judicial position, only confirmed 
the toxic nature of Thurmond’s influence in the Senate by 1971. Just as he would 
adopt more moderate positions on the race issue during the 1970s, the Senator’s 
role as antagonist in the nomination process for Supreme Court Justices would 
transform peacefully into that of a quiet elder statesman. Having functioned as an 
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obstruction to the liberal and moderate appointments of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Thurmond would now perform the function of shepherding conservative judges 
through an increasingly partisan nominations process, acting as a crucial sounding 
board for Ronald Reagan throughout his Presidency.152 Perhaps the most striking 
example of Thurmond’s transformation appeared during the highly controversial 
hearings into the nomination of Judge Robert Bork in 1987, by which time 
Thurmond had become the most senior Republican Senator on the Judiciary 
Committee. Those who recalled his angry dismissal of the protestations of 
Marshall and Fortas might have been struck by his objection, twenty years later, 
to a question from Alabama’s Senator Howell Heflin on Roe v. Wade, on the 
grounds that it required Bork ‘to express an opinion on a matter that may come 
before the Supreme Court, and I would think that would be improper.’153 
Following his resignation as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Abe Fortas 
returned to private practice, appearing before his old colleagues on the Supreme 
Court on several occasions, the first of which was recalled vividly by Justice Harry 
Blackmun. As Laura Kalman has recalled, Blackmun and Fortas made eye contact. 
Standing before the man who had replaced him on the Supreme Court, Fortas 
appeared to acknowledge Blackmun with a nod. A curious Blackmun later asked 
Fortas if he recalled that moment, to which the soft-spoken Tennessean 
responded, ‘I’ll never forget it.’154 It was by no means the only unforgettable 
moment in an extraordinary life, which would come to an end on 5th April 1982, 
when Fortas died from a ruptured aorta, aged 71. Clement Haynsworth – who 
would remain on the Fourth Circuit until his own death, aged 77, on 22nd 
November 1989 – would not be the final victim claimed by the nomination 
process for the Supreme Court. The inimitable Fritz Hollings would ensure, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and into the 1990s, that the state of South 
Carolina would continue to play a very unique role in that complicated process. 
With the Haynsworth fiasco, the state’s rapid and volatile political development 
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had been laid bare before the rest of the nation. The attitude of the state’s 
Senators toward the nomination process was perfectly compatible with the 
conservative backlash embodied by Richard Nixon’s election victory, yet the drive 
for a ‘strict constructionist’ appointment was woefully at odds with the efforts of 
other Senators to protect the liberal gains of the past three decades. Furthermore, 
the unusual prominence of South Carolina in Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy’ only 
poisoned the Haynsworth nomination for many others. 
The events of 1968-70, as covered in this and the previous chapter, only 
confirm the importance of South Carolina in the Supreme Court nomination 
process throughout the era of civil rights. Aside from the fact that the Haynsworth 
rejection was influenced to a great extent by the outcome of the Fortas Chief 
Justice nomination, it is clear that both rejections constitute merely two episodes 
in a twenty-five year period, during which the state was transformed. From Olin 
Johnston’s defence of white supremacy in the fight against Smith v. Allwright in 
the mid-1940s to the triumph of John West in ‘the first elections with racial 
overtones where the moderates won’ at the start of the 1970s, South Carolina’s 
confrontational relationship with the Supreme Court had sparked a war of many 
battles. The Rock Hill protests, the peaceful desegregation of Clemson, the 
Orangeburg Massacre, and the troubled gubernatorial election of 1970 provide a 
modest number of incidents for scholars of ‘massive resistance’ to explain the 
story of South Carolina’s comparatively quiet period of racial transition, but it 
remains the case that the state’s politicians acted as persistent pugilists in the US 
Senate.155 From 1954 until 1970, the distinguished upper chamber of Congress 
became a battlefield in which South Carolina’s Senators fought the appointment 
of Simon Sobeloff to the Fourth Circuit; established a record-breaking filibuster 
against civil rights legislation; obstructed Thurgood Marshall’s rise to the Second 
Circuit and, later, to the Supreme Court; triggered the landmark Senate rejection 
of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice, and, finally, failed to engineer the appointment of 
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one of their own to the nation’s highest court. The war waged by South Carolina 
culminated in – to borrow Marlow Cook’s words once again – a truly 
unforgettable era in the history of the Supreme Court. 
Yet this is a story with a lengthy epilogue. As Chapter Seven will explain, 
the conservative attitude of South Carolina’s Senators toward the Supreme Court 
nomination process did not disappear from view following the Haynsworth 
debacle. Although unhappy that the South Carolinian judge had been rejected, 
Strom Thurmond’s contentment with the conservative nominees offered by 
Republican Presidents would continue throughout his remaining years in the 
Senate, while Hollings’s lingering bitterness was palpable in his attitude toward 
subsequent nominations. Chapter Seven will conclude the story of South Carolina 
and the Supreme Court by assessing the remarkable consistency evident in the 
voting record of the enigmatic Hollings. As will become clear, his approach toward 
nominations remained strangely unaltered despite the enormous changes taking 
place in South Carolina, many of which he had initiated as the state’s Governor 
prior to arriving in the Senate. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
Dynamic Conservatism: 
Fritz Hollings and the Nomination of Supreme Court Justices, 
1971-2005 
 
 
 
We are conservative, in the sense that we seek to conserve those principles 
of government, and of free enterprise, which have been tried and proved … 
We in South Carolina see no conflict between such conservatism and 
progress; indeed, we think they go hand in hand toward bringing us a 
better life, and it is our mission to put forward a dynamic conservatism as 
an asset, not a liability.1 
 
Ernest F. Hollings, 20th January 1959 
 
 
With his insistence that racial segregation would be maintained in South 
Carolina’s public schools, Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, in his inaugural address as 
Governor, revisited one of the campaign promises that had ensured his election in 
November 1958.2 As with all of Hollings’s public statements on the segregation 
issue from the 1950s and early 1960s, the inaugural address provides insight into 
the complexities of his lengthy career as a Southern politician. His argument that 
educational opportunities would be ensured only through the maintenance of 
segregation is remarkable if only for the fact that, as Governor, Hollings would 
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preside over the highly symbolic desegregation of Clemson University.3 In his 
memoirs, Hollings claimed that a visit to an elementary school for African 
American children early in his career inspired him to reform the state’s education 
system as Governor: ‘given what I had just seen, I realised that minority education 
was separate but certainly not equal.’4 While Hollings had advocated resistance to 
the Supreme Court in January 1959, arguing that education, as a practical matter, 
‘can only be done in the segregated pattern’, the outgoing Governor would argue 
in his farewell address of 1963, shortly after overseeing the peaceful integration 
of Clemson, that acceptance of Brown for Board of Education ‘is a hurdle that 
brings little progress to either side. But the failure to clear it will bring us 
irreparable harm.’5 
Within the existing literature, the significance of Fritz Hollings as a 
Southern political figure is attributed to three aspects of his career. Firstly, his role 
in guiding South Carolina through a period of political transition via a co-ordinated 
acceptance of desegregation has been recognised by several scholars of Southern 
politics. Tony Badger has claimed that a measure of ‘self-congratulation’ is 
warranted for Hollings’s contribution, while Robert Mickey has argued that ‘a 
peaceful, if token, desegregation’ was achieved through Hollings’s success in 
negotiating with federal officials and repressing the state’s white supremacist 
forces.6 Secondly, Hollings’s role in introducing a comprehensive system of 
technical training is considered a highly significant development in South 
Carolina’s history, with Jack Bass and W. Scott Poole praising his skill in convincing 
the state legislature to help him finance the creation of ‘a willing, inexpensive and 
trained workforce’, a process which constituted, in the words of James C. Cobb, 
‘one of the pioneering responses to the need for a flexible but effective industrial 
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training program.’7 Finally, Hollings’s survival as a Democratic Senator over a 
thirty-eight year period in an increasingly conservative state provides one of the 
more significant examples of Nicol Rae’s characterisation of Southern Democrats 
as an ideologically flexible faction, focused primarily on local and regional 
concerns.8 For the purposes of this chapter in analysing Hollings’s involvement in 
the Supreme Court nomination process, perhaps the most notable remark from 
his 1959 inaugural address is the argument outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter. His claim ‘to put forward a dynamic conservatism as an asset, not a 
liability’ can be read as a bold statement of intent, in the sense that a combination 
of conservatism and progress was present throughout his Senate career, and can 
also be offered as an explanation for his survival as a Southern Democrat despite 
the Republican Party’s dominance in South Carolina by the time of Hollings’s 
retirement in 2005. 
With his Brylcreemed hair, boyish good looks and verbal eloquence, the 
dynamic young Governor was an obvious contender for a United States Senate 
seat, and it remains significant that most of the literature which recognises 
Hollings’s importance has overlooked his lengthy career as a Senator. Nicol Rae 
has noted the significance of Hollings’s aborted presidential run in 1984, and also 
his support for Robert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination in 1987, yet the South 
Carolinian was not among the many Southern Democrats interviewed by Rae over 
the course of his research. Similarly, John P. Frank, who has produced the most 
comprehensive study of the Clement Haynsworth nomination, noted the 
significance of Hollings in recommending and promoting Haynsworth, yet he did 
not interview the Senator, nor did he obtain access to his personal papers. With 
most studies of Southern political history focusing on state-level activities, black 
protest movements, massive white resistance, and other political activity prior to 
the early 1970s, the existing literature has focused almost entirely on Hollings’s 
four years as Governor. 
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Hollings was one of the more distinctive characters in the US Senate, not 
least through the rich, stirring tones of his voice, which contrasted markedly with 
the deep, ‘slow-as-molasses’ baritone of Olin D. Johnston, and especially with the 
unyielding nasal bark of Strom Thurmond.9 The inimitable Hollings voice was used 
to devastating effect through slang, such as his references to ‘ponying up’ sums of 
money; terms such as ‘shenanigans’ and ‘accoutrements’, and also the occasional 
Malapropism. One example is his questioning, as a member of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, of Attorney General Janet Reno during hearings into 
violence on television in 1993, during which he singled out the anarchic animated 
show, Beavis and Butthead. The Senator from South Carolina declared, ‘We’ve got 
this, what is it, Buffcoat and Beaver, or Beaver and something else, that they had – 
I haven’t seen it, I don’t watch it, but whatever it is, it was at seven o’clock – 
Buffcoat – and they put it on now at ten-thirty, I think. They’ve pleaded guilty, and 
they’ll do it as long as you and I have hearings.’ In a remarkable showcase of his 
heavy Charleston accent, Hollings argued that ‘we just can’t have hearings like 
we’ve had now for forty yee-ahs and get no-wee-ah.’10 On other occasions, his 
idiosyncratic comments resulted in a number of gaffes. Hollings offered an 
apology to Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio for referring to him as ‘the 
Senator from B’nai Brith’, and responded to the claims of Japanese leaders that 
Americans are ‘lazy’ by reminding them that the atomic bomb was ‘made in the 
United States and tested in Japan.’11 
Politically, Hollings’s complex ideology was characterised by 
contradictions. Alongside the concern shown for the plight of African Americans 
living in poverty, as indicated by his ‘hunger tour’ of 1969-70, was a lengthy battle 
for fiscal conservatism evidenced by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced 
Budget Act of 1985, his collaboration with Republican Senators Phil Gramm of 
Texas and Warren Rudman of New Hampshire.12 Hollings’s brand of ‘dynamic 
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conservatism’ often led him to vote against a majority of his fellow Democrats in 
the Senate: he was one of only two Democratic Senators to vote in favour of 
Robert Bork’s confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice in 1987, and one of only 
two Democrats to vote against the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which 
aimed to ensure the provision of unpaid leave for employees requiring time off 
due to medical or family-related circumstances.13 
While Hollings has been very candid in discussing his passion for balancing 
the federal budget, he has been far less vocal on the issue of his voting record in 
the nomination of Supreme Court Justices. In tracing Hollings’s journey as a 
Senator by examining his involvement in the Supreme Court nomination process, 
this chapter will highlight one of the crucial yet neglected aspects of his career as 
a Southern politician. Hollings utilised the nominations process as a means of 
displaying his conservative credentials to his South Carolina constituents in a 
manner that illustrates his attention to the local and regional concerns highlighted 
by Nicol Rae. Despite his willingness to distance himself from Thurmond, 
Hollings’s voting record in the nomination process highlights the often overlooked 
fact that the two Senators were products of the same South Carolinian political 
tradition, and shared many ideological similarities which were in place long before 
Hollings arrived in the Senate. Only four years prior to Hollings’s declaration that 
‘we in South Carolina see no conflict between such conservatism and progress; 
indeed, we think they go hand in hand toward bringing us a better life’, Thurmond 
had outlined his belief in ‘forward-looking moderation’, stating that ‘Some call it 
conservatism. Some condemn it as reactionary, but I believe it to be a sound 
approach to most of the problems which we have faced in the past and which we 
must face in the future.’14 
In offering this lengthy and rather curious epilogue in the story of South 
Carolina and the Supreme Court, the chapter will analyse in depth Fritz Hollings’s 
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conservative nomination record in a manner which highlights once again the 
need, as outlined in research objective (3), to assess the politics of judicial 
nominations as a continuous developmental process, rather than in the form of 
‘one-off’ events. In assessing Hollings’s position on the nominations of Lewis 
Powell and William Rehnquist (1971), and later, Robert Bork (1987) and Clarence 
Thomas (1991), a case will be made that the conservative Hollings record proved 
to be a vital component of his success in winning re-election as a Southern 
Democrat Senator in the South Carolina of the late twentieth century. The view of 
scholars that Hollings ultimately established a track record of forward-looking 
racial moderation has obscured the extension of his conservative ideology 
throughout his years in the Senate: as will be explained, his record in the 
nominations of Supreme Court Justices frequently tested the patience of his 
African American supporters, but did prove effective in solidifying his support 
among white conservatives. 
The chapter concludes by offering a brief analysis of South Carolina’s war 
on the Supreme Court, pointing once again the need of research objective (4) to 
draw together the study of Southern politics with the history of the Supreme 
Court nomination process. The significance of this particular theme is then 
explored in greater depth in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
Both Sides of His Mouth 
 
As illustrated in Chapters Four and Five, the positions taken by Hollings on the 
Supreme Court nominations made by President Lyndon Johnson proved to be far 
more complex than those adopted by Olin Johnston and Strom Thurmond. His skill 
in choosing his targets carefully and refusing to associate himself too closely with 
any particular group or institution reflects not only the South Carolinian trait of 
independence, but also a mastery of diplomacy which would ensure his survival 
during an unpredictable era of racial violence and political transition. Perhaps 
 304 
 
unsurprisingly, it was during his turbulent four-year term as Governor that 
Hollings developed the ability to navigate his way through a complex political 
landscape. On the one hand, this would involve expressing a commitment to the 
continuation of racial segregation as well as frequent condemnations of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), including 
the view that ‘if the Supreme Court can declare certain organisations as 
subversive, I believe South Carolina can declare the NAACP both subversive and 
illegal.’15 On the other hand, Hollings would ensure the safety of black protesters 
and prepare the state for the desegregation of Clemson while at the same time 
maintaining cordial relationships with white conservatives engaged in ‘massive 
resistance’. 
An example of the Hollings brand of diplomacy was evident in the 
Governor’s communications with the white Citizens’ Councils, which were set up 
in response to the Supreme Court’s order to desegregate public schools. In public, 
Hollings maintained his support, stating that ‘the Citizens’ Councils, by mobilizing 
the best leadership at the community level, can help to restore decency in 
government and maintain peace and security for all people, both white and 
Negro.’16 On 2nd December 1960, Hollings was asked by Ralph B. Kolb, Chairman of 
the South Carolina Citizens’ Council, to stand with the Governors of Mississippi, 
Alabama and Georgia in ‘strengthening the position’ of Louisiana’s Governor 
Jimmie Davis during the crisis over the integration of William Frantz Elementary 
School in New Orleans.17 In his brief response, Hollings claimed to offer ‘sympathy 
and support’ for Governor Davis, to which an unsatisfied Kolb replied, ‘we do not 
believe a routine expression of sympathy and support generally, under conditions 
now existing in Louisiana, is sufficient.’18  
Hollings proved particularly diplomatic following the election of arch 
segregationist Ross Barnett as Governor of Mississippi in November 1959. On 19th 
                                                             
15 Badger, ‘From Defiance’, p.135. 
16 Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie, p.223-4. 
17 Letter from Ralph B. Kolb to Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, 2nd December 1960, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 14, Citizens’ Council, c.1959-1963. 
18 Letter from Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings to Ralph B. Kolb, 3rd December 1960; letter from Ralph B. Kolb to Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, 
5th December 1960, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Gubernatorial Papers, Box 14, Citizens’ Council, c.1959-1963. 
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December, he received a letter from Mrs Bessie S. Britton, a Kingstree, South 
Carolina resident and Citizens Council member, expressing concern over a 
‘rumour’ that Hollings had declined to introduce Barnett at a Council meeting in 
South Carolina, to be held in the New Year. A notably frank and detailed draft was 
composed, in which Hollings claimed that:  
 
South Carolina is fortunate to be free of undue problems in racial 
relationships. I can best serve all South Carolinians at this time in helping 
to preserve this stability and way of life by maintaining separate status as 
Governor without identification with any groups, regardless of how worthy 
may be their purposes in the field of race relations. I have high personal 
respect and admiration for the objectives of the Citizens Councils and am 
greatly appreciative of their work in maintaining good relations between 
the races in our state.19  
 
By 28th December, however, when the response was sent to Mrs Britton, it 
was much shorter and read very differently, with Hollings declaring, ‘I am sorry I 
will not be able to attend the Citizens’ Council meeting on January 29 due to other 
commitments. I can’t tell from your letter what the rumor is, but assure you that 
my inability to attend is not because of an attitude against the Citizens Council, 
which I have always supported.’20  
Around the same time, Hollings was contacted by Farley Smith, Executive 
Secretary of the Association of Citizens’ Councils, who expressed concern that 
Hollings did not seem to approve of the Association’s invitation to Governor-elect 
Barnett.21 As a ‘suggestion’ of how Hollings could respond to Smith, a draft was 
composed in the Governor’s office, outlining that ‘I have the greatest admiration 
for Governor-elect Barnett of Mississippi and I feel that your selection of him as a 
speaker is an excellent one. However, I am of the opinion that you are making a 
mistake in having this meeting at this time and I sincerely feel that the Citizens’ 
                                                             
19 Letter from Bessie S. Britton to Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, 19th December 1959; draft of response to Bessie S. Britton, 
undated, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Gubernatorial Papers, Box 14, Barnett Conference, 1961.  
20 Letter from Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings to Bessie S. Britton, 28th December 1959, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Gubernatorial 
Papers, Box 14, Barnett Conference, 1961. 
21 Letter from Farley Smith to Ernest ‘Fritz’ Hollings, 1st December 1959, Ernest F. Hollings Collection, Gubernatorial Papers, 
Box 14, Barnett Conference, 1961. 
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Council should not get in a running fight with the NAACP.’22 By 7th December, 
when Hollings’s response was sent to Smith, it had been reduced to only one line, 
reading, ‘I have never had the pleasure of meeting Governor Barnett and told you 
of my limited knowledge when you and Mr Dinkins were in Columbia.’23 
Hollings’s decision not to align himself with Barnett ultimately proved to 
be an astute move. When Barnett advocated open resistance to the admission of 
black student James Meredith to the University of Mississippi in September and 
October 1962, and expected other Southern Governors to back him, Hollings 
reverted to his usual diplomacy. As Hollings recalled years later, Barnett 
telephoned him and requested that he arrange for motorcades from cities in 
South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama to head to Oxford, Mississippi to undertake 
a united Southern resistance to federal orders to integrate the university. 
According to Hollings, ‘I told Ross at the time, I said, that would be a very 
dangerous thing. I can't think of anybody following me in a motorcade, for a 
showdown to Oxford, Mississippi, that wouldn't include every kook, red-neck, 
crack-pot, Ku Klux Klanner, and everything else that you could find and they'd all 
follow me out and expect me to do something when I got there ... He didn't like 
that at all, got rather angry about it at the time.’24 Publicly, however, Hollings was 
forced to give consideration to the feelings of many of his white conservative 
constituents. The New York Times quoted him as claiming, ‘it is a very sad thing ... 
the people of South Carolina are 100 per cent in sympathy with the people of 
Mississippi.’25 As with the draft of his letter to Farley Smith, criticising the decision 
to hold the Citizens’ Council meeting, rather that criticising Barnett himself, 
Hollings was careful to claim solidarity between the people of South Carolina and 
the people of Mississippi, rather than solidarity between himself and Barnett.  
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Unlike the erratic Barnett’s mismanagement of the Oxford crisis, Hollings 
had avoided a large-scale outbreak of violence during the sit-in protests in Rock 
Hill, South Carolina by replacing the town’s white officers with black officers sent 
in from elsewhere in the state.26 Despite having claimed in a telegram to President 
Eisenhower that owners of private diners were not obliged to serve anyone who 
walks into their premises, the Governor, in his own words, did not want ‘the little 
minority kids at the stools to be crowded by the white punks with peg-legged 
britches and ducktail haircuts who were waiting to dive and grab a seat as soon as 
the little black child got up to go to the bathroom.’27 While avoiding making public 
his concern for the safety of ‘the little minority kids’, Hollings did write to Farley 
Smith to thank the Association of Citizens’ Councils for their co-operation in 
promoting law and order in Rock Hill during the sit-in protest, telling Smith, ‘You 
have done a fine service for the people of Rock Hill and the people of South 
Carolina.’28 Even in his legendary farewell speech in January 1963, Hollings 
maintained the same style of diplomacy by emphasising the importance of law 
and order over personal emotion, rather than making an open, and unthinkable, 
call for the acceptance of racial integration in public places.29 
As a result of the political manoeuvring necessitated by the complex 
management of his state, black South Carolinians have been divided on Hollings’s 
term as Governor. The legendary NAACP activist Modjeska Simkins claimed in 
1976 that she still opposed Hollings, recalling a protest at South Carolina State 
College in Orangeburg in 1960: 
 
They didn’t have enough space in the jail. They put them in an enclosure, a 
wired-in enclosure around the jail. It was a cold, freezing day – well, I 
won’t say it was freezing, but it was very bitter cold. And some of those 
                                                             
26 Hollings and Victor, Making Government Work, p.77. 
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children were water-hosed. They rolled on the ground with the force of 
the hose. And Hollings was Governor. He did nothing about it.30 
 
Alternatively, James Clyburn, another active participant in South Carolina’s 
civil rights movement before his appointment as a ‘minority advisor’ to Governor 
John C. West in 1970, and election to the US House of Representatives in 1992, 
offers a more balanced appraisal: 
 
I think he’s a very shrewd politician. I guess every time I went to jail, he 
was Governor. But he never stood in the doorway of progress. This 
‘massive resistance’ never took place in South Carolina as it did in 
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, simply because people like Fritz 
Hollings took a different tack.31 
 
In his memoirs, Hollings neglected to mention the wire enclosure, and 
instead recalled the Orangeburg protest with his usual folksiness, joking that 
‘Clyburn needles me about that episode; he says I hosed him down but didn’t kill 
him’, and also tells a touching story of how Clyburn met his future wife, Emily, in 
the courthouse after the arrests.32 
 Following his election to the Senate in November 1966, Hollings would be 
required to refine his instincts in the complicated political arena of providing, or 
withholding, senatorial consent to presidential nominations for the US Supreme 
Court. The Haynsworth episode, discussed in the previous chapter, demonstrates 
the Senator’s perception, and acceptance, of how judges were viewed by the 
conservative white voting majority in South Carolina during the era of civil rights. 
The shift from an ambiguous position on two liberal nominees to a policy of open 
endorsement of a conservative nominee is consistent with the style of diplomacy 
practiced by Hollings while Governor. In making the case for Haynsworth, the 
Senator was able to play down the effects of the nominee’s little-known decisions 
by emphasising his sound constitutional judgement, while in the case of Marshall 
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and Fortas, Hollings knew from the outset that he would never be able to ‘sell’ a 
liberal judicial philosophy to Southern conservatives, nor would he ever be able to 
play down the impact of Brown or Miranda or any other landmark Supreme Court 
decision which either man had been involved in. His re-election victory in 
November 1968 suggested that his votes against the Marshall and Fortas 
nominations had been handed skilfully and diplomatically, but, as this chapter will 
suggest, the sense of defeat felt by Hollings following the Haynsworth affair would 
influence his unique and often puzzling behaviour over the course of subsequent 
nominations. 
When the dust had finally settled following the Haynsworth and Carswell 
rejections, Hollings may not have shared Strom Thurmond’s optimistic prediction 
of another Southern Supreme Court nominee before the end of the Nixon 
Presidency, but the announcement in September 1971 that Justice Hugo Black, 
the Court’s only Southerner, was to retire, provided the President with an air-tight 
justification for naming a third Southern judge. The Los Angeles Times noted that 
Nixon was considering as many as seven Southerners for the vacancy, noting that 
the President was also seeking out ‘a nominee who believes in a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution.’33 According to former White House counsel 
John W. Dean, Nixon told Attorney General John Mitchell that Black’s replacement 
must be a Southerner, and ‘must be against busing, and against forced housing 
integration. Beyond that, he can do what he pleases. He can screw around on, you 
know, economics and et ceteras.’34 With his selection of the inoffensive Virginian 
Democrat Lewis F. Powell, a former President of the American Bar Association, 
Nixon finally succeeded in naming a Southerner with impeccable legal credentials 
and little or no controversy, race-related or otherwise, to his name. Yet, the 
Powell nomination would become overshadowed by Nixon’s selection of William 
Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, to replace 
Justice John Marshall Harlan II, whose retirement became known only one week 
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after Hugo Black’s announcement. Following the nominations of Powell and 
Rehnquist on the same day, 21st October 1971, Senators braced themselves to 
scrutinise two Nixon nominees at once.35 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was sufficiently alarmed by 
Rehnquist’s conservatism that it broke a time-honoured tradition of never 
formally opposing a nominee for public office, and called openly for Rehnquist’s 
rejection.36 During confirmation hearings, Hollings’s nemesis, Senator Birch Bayh 
of Indiana, asked the nominee if he had ever challenged or harassed black or 
Hispanic voters at polling booths in his home state of Arizona, which Rehnquist 
denied.37 In addition to writing to Judiciary Committee Chairman James Eastland 
to protest his innocence, Rehnquist submitted a sworn affidavit to contradict 
accusations of harassment made by six witnesses. John W. Dean, who claims 
responsibility for influencing Nixon’s choice of Rehnquist, has conceded that a 
‘lack of vetting left *Rehnquist+ ill-prepared to fend off attacks. Even during the 
hearings themselves, the White House was half-asleep.’38 Before long, Judiciary 
Committee member John V. Tunney of California announced his opposition to 
confirmation, arguing that: 
 
[Rehnquist’s] justification of a vast expansion of the Subversive Activities 
Control Board, his defense of unrestricted governmental surveillance, his 
rationale for preventive detention, all of these demonstrate that he is 
quite the reverse of a ‘strict constructionist’. He, instead, seems quite 
willing to read into the powers of the Executive branch an unrestricted 
latitude which threatens the very basis of individual freedoms.39 
 
Noting Rehnquist’s relative youth and the fact that ‘he could still be 
serving on the Court in the year 2000’, Tunney claimed that the nominee was ill-
suited to serve on the Supreme Court during a period of ‘profound social and 
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political changes in this country’ and complained that ‘it is singularly inappropriate 
for those who favor Mr Rehnquist’s nomination to attempt to hold Mr Powell 
hostage in their endeavour.’40 The controversy over the Rehnquist selection 
meant that, finally, the President was able to get a Southerner confirmed to the 
Court without inconvenience, as one editorial noted: ‘The curious thing about the 
entire exercise is that Powell, who has come in for virtually no criticism, almost 
certainly is just as conservative as Rehnquist.’41 
 In seeking to defend the Rehnquist nomination by offsetting the 
unexpected accusations of racism, Hollings requested the views of fellow South 
Carolinian Ben Holman, former director of the Community Relations Service, a 
wing of the Justice Department created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to manage 
community conflicts brought about by racial tension. In his response, Holman 
explained that Rehnquist ‘has been highly supportive of our cause and on several 
occasions sought to broaden our statutory mandate’, adding that, ‘as a black man 
sensitive to the various forms of racist behaviour, I can assure you that Bill 
Rehnquist will judge minorities fairly if he is confirmed to the Court.’42 Armed with 
a weapon to use against Rehnquist’s critics, Hollings took the time to quote ‘the 
black man who heads the Community Relations Service’ in letters to constituents, 
and also quoted Holman in a speech on the Senate floor, requesting that the 
complete letter be printed for the record.43  
In other communications to his constituents, Hollings emphasised that he 
had got to know Rehnquist during the previous year’s unsuccessful Justice 
Department drive to confirm Clement Haynsworth. The Senator’s comments on 
Rehnquist’s conservatism in these letters (‘Some attack Mr Rehnquist for his 
conservatism. Yet a strong article of conservatism has always been the strong 
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emphasis on individual liberties’) provide another example of Hollings using a 
‘strict constructionist’ approach to judicial interpretation as a selling point when 
defending a nominee, without reflecting on the potential consequences of the 
nominee’s decisions. 44 His claim that ‘I believe [Rehnquist] holds the First 
Amendment and the rights of the individual in highest respect’ does not 
acknowledge that a judge can hold the original meaning of the First Amendment 
‘in highest respect’ while at the same time handing down decisions which fail to 
protect the rights of all individuals all of the time.45 
 With Strom Thurmond and others on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
supporting both nominees, and in the absence of a ‘Vend-A-Matic’-style 
controversy, Birch Bayh knew that his opposition to William Rehnquist stood no 
chance of developing the same momentum that his campaign against Clement 
Haynsworth had managed to generate. His most potent weapon – a one-and-a-
half page memorandum written by Rehnquist in 1952 while working as a law clerk 
for Justice Robert Jackson, in which the nominee had apparently advised the late 
Justice that the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy should be upheld – proved 
ineffective in gathering support for his opposition. Rehnquist maintained that he 
had outlined only one hypothetical position for Jackson to adopt when 
considering his opinion in Brown, but many Senators remained unconvinced, not 
least because the memo was written in the first person, with the line ‘I have been 
excoriated by my “liberal” colleagues but I think Plessy was right’ seeming to 
provide incontrovertible evidence of Rehnquist’s racial conservatism.46 
Nonetheless, with only Bayh and Senators Philip Hart of Michigan, Edward 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, and John Tunney of California, voting against 
Rehnquist in Committee, the nominations went to the full Senate. Powell received 
only one negative vote when he was confirmed on 6th December 1971, while 
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Rehnquist was confirmed by a vote of 68-26 on 10th December, with Bayh’s effort 
to mount a filibuster defeated by a vote of 70-22.47 
 For John Dean, the appointment of William Rehnquist, who would later be 
promoted to the position of Chief Justice by President Ronald Reagan, ‘redefined 
the Supreme Court, making it a politically conservative bastion within our 
governmental system ... With Rehnquist, Nixon found the conservative who would 
sit on the high bench for three decades.’48 The process initiated by the once-
unlikely double act of Richard Nixon and Strom Thurmond had proved remarkably 
successful. With his enthusiastic backing of Nixon’s Southern Supreme Court 
strategy, the senior Senator from South Carolina began mellowing into the 
persona of a kindly elder statement, smiling benevolently upon each Republican 
nominee offered by Republican Presidents Nixon, Ford and Reagan during the 
1970s and 1980s. Fritz Hollings, despite the apparent political contrast with his 
South Carolina colleague, remained locked into the very same process of crafting 
a conservative line-up of ‘strict constructionist’ judges who would, in theory, 
begin dismantling the legacy of Earl Warren, Hugo Black, William O. Douglas and 
the other Justices of the Warren Court era. With Lewis Powell’s confirmation, 
Thurmond and Hollings had finally overseen the appointment of a conservative 
Southern judge on the US Supreme Court ... but from Virginia and not South 
Carolina. 
 
 
Going Against the Brothers 
 
With the Republican Party back in control of the US Senate for the first time since 
the Eisenhower era, President Ronald Reagan would benefit from a valuable 
Republican ally as the new Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee – none 
other than South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond. The Senator would continue his 
trend of supporting appointments of conservative Supreme Court Justices, and, as 
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Chairman, he would oversee the confirmations of the first female nominee, 
Sandra Day O’Connor; the first Italian-American nominee, Antonin Scalia, and also 
– despite a second round of controversy over the aforementioned memorandum 
from 1952 – President Reagan’s promotion of William Rehnquist to the Chief 
Justiceship following the retirement of Warren Burger.49 The Chairman reportedly 
toasted Sandra Day O’Connor’s confirmation in a manner ‘more suited for a 1950s 
bride than for the newest associate member for the Supreme Court’, with the 
truly Thurmond-like declaration, ‘We love you for your beauty, respect you for 
your intelligence, adore you for your charm, and will come to love you ... because 
we can’t help it.’50 As noted in the previous chapter, Thurmond’s role on the 
Judiciary Committee could now be utilised to ensure a smooth passage through 
the confirmation process for conservative nominees, and nowhere was this more 
evident than during the Robert Bork hearings of 1987, during which, as noted by 
Michael Comiskey, Thurmond protected the nominee repeatedly from difficult 
questions.51 
However, the Democrats’ success in regaining control of the Senate in the 
1986 mid-term elections – which resulted in Thurmond being replaced as Judiciary 
Committee Chairman by Democratic Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware – 
suggested that Reagan’s success in appointing solid conservatives to the Supreme 
Court might now be challenged if not curtailed. Furthermore, Thurmond knew he 
could not rely on the support of his independent-minded South Carolina colleague 
to support his preferences for judicial positions. Just as Thurmond had offered 
Donald Russell as an alternative to Fritz Hollings’s recommendation of Clement 
Haynsworth in 1969, Hollings had offered African American Judge Matthew J. 
Perry as an alternative to Thurmond’s choice of lawyer Emory Sneeden for a 
newly-created seat on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1984.52 Ironically, 
Perry’s appointment to the US Court of Military Appeals had been engineered by 
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Thurmond back in 1976 when the latter was making one of many efforts to 
improve his standing with black voters.53 
As the senior Republican member of the Judiciary Committee in the late 
1980s, Thurmond was barely recognisable as the giant of Southern politics who 
had interrogated Thurgood Marshall and engineered the destruction of Abe 
Fortas’s promotion to Chief Justice twenty years earlier. Robert Mann, who 
worked on the staff of Louisiana’s Senator Russell Long before becoming a 
respected scholar of Southern politics, recalls that, by 1987: 
 
Thurmond was really in his dotage. I would see him shuffle down the hall 
of the Russell Senate Office building on his way to the Senate floor or to a 
committee hearing. He looked old and bent over, like a man who had just 
a few years to live. Little did I know he still had many years ahead of him. 
Most famously, he dyed his hair ... When you saw him, it was hard not to 
stare at his orange-tinged head.54  
 
Meanwhile, South Carolina’s junior Senator was fast becoming one of the 
Senate’s more distinctive and colourful Southern characters, as suggested by his 
participation as a member of the Senate Commerce Committee. One of the more 
bizarre moments in Senate history occurred during Commerce Committee 
hearings in 1985, when Fritz Hollings and Frank Zappa discussed the merits of 
including lyrics sheets within album packaging in order for parents to ensure that 
their children would not be exposed to inappropriate sexual or violent content. 
While the pair seemed to agree that lyric sheets would be preferable to a ratings 
system, if only to respect the fact that, in Zappa’s words, ‘not all parents want to 
keep their children totally ignorant’, the Senator claimed, ‘Well, what’s – yeah, 
you and I would differ on what’s ignorance and educated, I can see that,’ to which 
an unimpressed Zappa responded, ‘No, I happen to think you’re very educated.’55 
Hollings was not one of the critical figures in the Supreme Court 
nominations of Robert Bork in 1987 and Clarence Thomas in 1991, yet his role in 
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the outcome of each selection provides a further suggestion of his unique 
perspective on the judicial nominations process. Nearly twenty years on from his 
spirited defence of Haynsworth, he seemed no less enthusiastic about involving 
himself in controversy through backing divisive nominees for the nation’s highest 
court. In the case of Robert Bork, President Reagan had selected a judge with 
impeccable conservative credentials but without considering the significance of 
timing. As Jan Crawford Greenburg has argued, Bork might have been confirmed 
in June 1986 had he been nominated for the vacancy left by William Rehnquist 
when the latter was appointed Chief Justice (a vacancy which was ultimately filled 
by Antonin Scalia). Instead, he was nominated to replace the outgoing Lewis 
Powell, who announced his retirement one year later, in June 1987, by which time 
the Democrats had taken control of Congress, and Reagan’s approval ratings had 
dropped following the scandal of the Iran-Contra Affair.56 
Having been overwhelmed by Bork’s intellectual superiority, the Reagan 
Administration remained confident of the nominee’s ability to handle the 
Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings, without ever formulating a plan to 
‘sell’ Bork to the American people, and without anticipating the remarkably frank 
responses offered by Bork to his questioners.57 One example is his exchange with 
Chairman Joe Biden regarding the Griswold v. Connecticut decision (1965), in 
which the Supreme Court struck down a statute preventing the use of 
contraceptives by married couples. Bork claimed that Justice William O. Douglas’s 
concern for ‘how awful it would be to have the police pounding into the marital 
bedroom’ was a moot point because the Fourth Amendment prevented this 
scenario. In other words, ‘the police simply could not get into the bedroom 
without a warrant.’58 He was then pressed by Biden on the potential implications 
of the Connecticut statute: 
 
The Chairman: If they had evidence that a crime was being committed – 
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Judge Bork: How are they going to get evidence that a couple are using 
contraceptives? 
The Chairman: A wiretap. 
Judge Bork: Wire-tapping? 
The Chairman: A wiretap.  
Judge Bork: You mean to say that – 
The Chairman: They – they have a legal wire-tap. 
Judge Bork: You mean to say that a magistrate is going to organise a 
wiretap to find out if a couple is using contraceptives? 
 The Chairman: They could –  
 Judge Bork: No, it’s – 
The Chairman: - couldn’t they, in law? 
 Judge Bork: Unbelievable. Unbelievable. 
The Chairman: Let – no, I understand that, but under the law, Judge, could 
they not have – it was a crime, correct? 
Judge Bork: It was a – it was a crime in – on the statute books, which was 
never prosecuted. 
 The Chairman: No, I – 
 Judge Bork: Never. 
 The Chairman: Well, the fact that it wasn’t prosecuted – 
 Judge Bork: Well, let me – 
 The Chairman: - did not mean that it wasn’t a crime, doesn’t it? 
Judge Bork: I have – I have more to say about that, whether it was a crime 
or not.59 
 
 Biden continued to press the issue by asking what would happen if a 
wiretap installed on the basis of a couple’s involvement in illegal activity, such as 
drug dealing, happened to reveal that the couple had been using contraceptives. 
Appearing to stifle a giggle, an incredulous Bork asserted that ‘nobody is going to 
get a warrant for that, and no prosecution is going to be upheld for that.’60 Bork 
later sighed with frustration during questions from Senator Dennis DeConcini of 
Arizona on gender discrimination, and, when Senator Edward Kennedy of 
Massachusetts accused him of a ‘bias against women and minorities in favour of 
big business and presidential power’, an agitated Bork replied, ‘Senator, if those 
charges were not so serious, the discrepancy between the evidence and what you 
say would be highly amusing.’61 Thanks to the introduction of television cameras 
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for Sandra Day O’Connor’s hearings in 1981, the confirmation process had 
become a remarkably public event by the summer of 1987, with millions of 
Americans watching these tense exchanges live, or as complete re-runs starting 
on C-SPAN at 8pm, or in the form of extended coverage on the evening news. In 
the view of Jan Crawford Greenburg, Bork’s answers ‘made him seem anything 
but witty, warm and responsive’, and implied an arrogant attitude, which enabled 
his opponents to portray him as ‘cold, uncaring and unsympathetic to the 
problems of ordinary Americans.’62 
The Bork nomination showcased a notable explosion in interest group 
activity, with over three hundred groups mobilising in opposition to the 
nominee.63 The grave concerns of Bork’s opponents were articulated in a dramatic 
television commercial which chronicled Bork’s conservative record on abortion 
and civil rights, and advised Americans, in the sobering tones of Hollywood actor 
Gregory Peck, to ‘please urge your Senators to vote against the Bork nomination, 
because if Robert Bork wins a seat on the Supreme Court, it will be for life – his 
life and yours.’64 In addition to the growing number of groups opposing Bork for 
his views on abortion and gender discrimination, Southern Senators with 
sympathy for the nominee’s judicial philosophy had other reasons to hesitate 
before declaring their support. As Ethan Bronner has explained, in the most 
comprehensive study of the Bork nomination to date, the opposition of African 
American groups to Bork’s confirmation was so virulent that most Southern 
Senators felt they had little choice but to oppose the nomination. Having adjusted 
to a transformed political landscape by showing greater sensitivity to black voters 
following the passage of the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, Southern 
Senators now felt compelled to vote against a highly-qualified yet ultra-
conservative Supreme Court nominee, as the risk of losing black support made the 
pressure to oppose Bork in the Senate seem irresistible.  
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Having declared ‘we’re gonna go with the brothers on this one’ with 
reference to the young black men on his staff, Louisiana’s three term Democratic 
Senator, J. Bennett Johnston, presided over a meeting with other Southern 
Democrats, including his Louisiana colleague, John Breaux; David Pryor of 
Arkansas; Wyche Fowler of Georgia; Richard Shelby of Alabama, and Bob Graham 
of Florida. All would vote against the nominee.65 Breaux later admitted that he 
‘didn’t make the decision based on *Bork’s+ qualifications.’66 Southern Democrats 
with much longer histories in the US Congress were inclined to agree with his 
outlook: Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia and John C. Stennis of Mississippi, both of 
whom had opposed the Voting Rights Act in 1965, also felt compelled to join the 
opposition. As one advisor to Chairman Biden observed, ‘To see the reaction of 
white Southerners afraid to go back on civil rights was overwhelming.’67 With the 
gradual expansion of Republican Party control throughout the Southern states, 
the Southern Democrat was on the road to becoming an endangered species by 
the late 1980s. As Nicol Rae has pointed out, Southern Senators ‘had to face the 
new reality of Democratic Party politics in the South.’68 Without solid black 
support, the survival of the Southern Democrat had become unthinkable in most 
instances. 
It is highly significant that Fritz Hollings was the only Deep South Democrat 
who maintained his independence with regard to the Bork nomination. Crucially, 
Hollings’s defence of Robert Bork suggests very personal reasons for refusing to 
join his Southern colleagues in opposing the nominee, and, perhaps more 
importantly, provides another example of the unique role of South Carolina in the 
nomination of Supreme Court Justices. Hollings’s only practical involvement in the 
Bork nomination came in the form of three speeches made in the Senate. Shortly 
before the first speech, delivered on 8th October 1987, Hollings indicated in a 
letter to Atlanta’s African American Mayor, Andrew Young, his concerns over 
Republican encroachment in the Southern states, explaining that, ‘The situation is 
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much like the Haynsworth nomination, which I handled. But be that as it may, I 
don’t think we ought to hold up the judicial appointments like Thurmond did 
Fortas. We are being polarized too much now and we are fast losing our 
Democratic Party in the South.’69 While only too happy to distance himself from 
his South Carolina colleague, Hollings’s recollection of the Fortas and Haynsworth 
nomination disasters illustrates the extent to which these dramatic episodes in US 
politics – both of which featured the state of South Carolina in a leading role – had 
by now characterised the nominations process for Supreme Court Justices. 
The text of Hollings’s 8th October speech in defence of Bork suggests 
strongly that the Senator felt compelled to support the nominee because of his 
earlier association with Clement Haynsworth, and, more specifically, because of 
his personal view that a terrible injustice had been done to Haynsworth when the 
Senate rejected him in 1969. Opening with a lengthy and detailed account of how 
he had recommended Haynsworth to President Nixon and then attempted to 
steer the nomination through the Senate, Hollings reminded his colleagues once 
again of the events involved in the Haynsworth debacle, utilising his familiar tactic 
of blaming the Republicans entirely, before making a claim later repeated in his 
2008 memoirs, that, following Haynsworth’s rejection, ‘at least seven Senators 
have individually recanted to me.’70 Later in the speech, Hollings proved that he 
was no less aware than his colleagues of the pressure from black voters to oppose 
the nomination, when he claimed that his 1986 re-election victory was due in no 
small part to ‘the overwhelming black support that I received’ and admitted that 
the Executive Director of the South Carolina NAACP declared that ‘if Hollings 
supports Bork, he might as well forget the black vote.’71 Yet this was followed by a 
surprising admission that ‘were it not for my experience in the Haynsworth 
defeat, were it not for the distinguished character and ability of Bork the man, it 
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would be easy politically to find something wrong or puzzling and vote “no” on 
Bork’, followed by the insistence that ‘being reminded time and again by strong 
supporters that this is a vote they won’t forget – and they won’t – makes it 
difficult to vote “aye”. But vote aye I must. For somewhere, sometime in this 
Senate we must stand up to the onrush of contrived threats and pressure.’72  
In addition to suggesting that his personal involvement in the Haynsworth 
affair virtually compelled him to support Robert Bork, the Senator from South 
Carolina made a strong case for resisting pressure to oppose the nomination. In 
complete contrast to his Southern colleagues, who felt that demands from African 
American voters constituted an entirely logical reason to vote against the 
nominee, Hollings appeared to be implying that the overwhelming black 
opposition to Bork made it absolutely imperative that he assert his support for the 
nomination and resist caving in to ‘threats and pressure’ from the NAACP. 
One of the more complex aspects of the speech is the bizarre manner in 
which Hollings attempted to portray Robert Bork as a racial moderate while at the 
same time praising the nominee for refusing to hide his genuine beliefs. Hollings 
was, of course, correct that ‘Judge Bork did not hide. He was forthright’, but 
Bork’s openness in articulating his judicial philosophy had reflected a deeply 
conservative interpretation of the US Constitution, thus contradicting entirely 
Hollings’s claim that Bork had worked to increase the ‘opportunities of blacks and 
women in this country.’73 Interestingly, in an earlier draft of Hollings’s speech, 
from 7th October, the line dealing with Bork’s ‘forthrightness’ originally read 
‘Judge Bork did not hide from his record’, but the words ‘from his record’ were 
removed and replaced with ‘He was forthright’, presumably in a bid to praise 
Bork’s honesty whilst avoiding drawing attention to the actual record.74 While it 
may have been true that the nominee ‘was downright masterful in his more than 
sixty hours of testimony’, it seems unlikely that black South Carolinians were 
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reassured by Bork’s constitutional expertise, especially when articulated in such a 
blunt, almost confrontational manner, and equally unlikely that they were 
reassured that Hollings had ‘lived through those turbulent, troubled times in the 
South.’75 
Throughout the remainder of the speech, Hollings’s references to ‘calls 
from my home state’ were used not so much to acknowledge understanding, but 
in order to contradict the criticisms being made of Bork by South Carolina’s black 
community. When he did introduce a black voice into the speech, it was that of 
Jewel Lafontant, former Deputy Solicitor General and former Secretary of the 
Chicago branch of the NAACP, who, according to Hollings, said of Bork, ‘as a 
woman and a black woman ... let me tell you about the heart of the man ... I have 
no fear of entrusting my rights and my privileges to Robert Bork ... I sincerely 
believe he is devoid of racial prejudice.’76 His use of Lafontant’s sentiments to 
defend Bork recalled his earlier use of Ben Holman’s words as a means of 
defending William Rehnquist during his troubled nomination as Associate Justice 
in 1971.77  
Approaching the end of the speech, Hollings was careful to avoid offending 
fellow Democrats by removing a line arguing that ‘Senators lining up against Bork 
are now suddenly becoming constitutional experts. The attempt is to dignify and 
obscure their local politics and dignify their decisions.’78 He also removed the 
argument that ‘we become a lesser body when we trash a distinguished judge ... It 
says to the country “give us Roman Hruska’s mediocrity”’, which, had that line 
been left in, would have offered Senators a reminder of the failed nomination of 
the undistinguished G. Harrold Carswell, and the catastrophic defence of that 
nominee by the Republican Senator from Nebraska, outlined in the previous 
chapter.79 
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The most famous line from the speech, later repeated in Hollings’s 2008 
memoirs, is the judgement that ‘We are governing by political poll. The most 
deliberative body in the world is becoming a rigged jury.’80 Originally appearing, in 
the 7th October draft, in the section dealing with the ‘contrived threats and 
pressure’ of the NAACP, the line was relocated to a new section dealing with the 
intentions of the Founding Fathers, who ‘crafted a disciplined, representative 
democracy’, suggesting strongly that Hollings believed the line to contain his most 
powerful political point, and wanted to maximise the impact on his colleagues.81 
After the inclusion of Winston Churchill’s claim that ‘There is only one duty, one 
safe course, and that is to try to be right,’ Hollings concluded his lengthy defence 
of Bork by quoting political commentator David Broder’s view that ‘it’s something 
else when judges are lynched to appease the public.’82 Aside from providing an 
unfortunate reminder of a barbaric practice that is frequently associated with the 
history of the American South, the final line of Hollings’s speech would prove 
rather prescient, as those involved in the chaotic nomination of Clarence Thomas 
would discover during the late summer of 1991. 
In the meantime, Hollings’s characterisation of the Bork opposition as a 
‘lynch mob’ provoked a public row with NAACP national board Chairman William 
Gibson, and confusion among Hollings’s supporters, many of whom recalled that 
the Senator’s past actions seemed favourable to the very groups now opposing 
Bork.83 The day after he made the first speech, The Spartanburg Herald-Journal 
chronicled the debate within the Southern political science community over 
Hollings’s support for Bork, suggesting that a consensus existed among South 
Carolinian academics that the junior Senator’s position did in fact seem logical, 
given that, firstly, it would confirm Hollings’s credentials as an authentic 
conservative, but also the fact that, secondly, the timing of the nomination would 
allow a sufficient period for Hollings to make amends before his re-election 
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campaign of 1992. As Charles Dunn of Clemson University argued, ‘When the dust 
settles, both sides are going to understand and respect one another once again.’84  
While Dunn’s prediction ultimately proved correct, the criticism aimed at 
Hollings over his support for Bork prompted the Senator to make a second 
speech, on 22nd October 1987. Clearly upset that he had been ‘publicly vilified’ by 
black South Carolinians for making the ‘arrogant’ decision to support the Bork 
nomination, Hollings claimed to be ‘hurt’, and declared solemnly that ‘after nearly 
four decades in public service, it is painful to have my civil rights bona fides 
impeached.’85 In one of the most significant yet overlooked statements of his 
lengthy career, Hollings argued that Robert Bork, during his tenure as Solicitor 
General, ‘argued more pro-civil rights cases than any Supreme Court nominee 
since Thurgood Marshall.’86 It seems incredible that Hollings would seek to defend 
Bork by comparing him to Marshall, particularly given that it was during Bork’s 
tenure as Solicitor General that he argued on behalf of the state of Michigan 
before the Supreme Court in the Milliken v. Bradley case of 1974, which, as Bob 
Woodward and Scott Armstrong have explained, resulted in ‘the first major 
cutback in desegregation remedies by the Court since [Marshall] argued the 
Brown case nearly twenty years before.’87 Far from proving his ‘civil rights bona 
fides’ as a Senator, Hollings’s baffling comparison of Bork and Marshall succeeded 
only in dismissing the far more convincing civil rights record achieved by the 
Supreme Court’s first African American Justice, whose nomination to the Court 
was, of course, opposed by Hollings in 1967. 
On the other hand, with the chorus of condemnation drowning out the 
detail of the nominee’s record, Hollings’s defence did expose some of the lesser-
known cases that Bork had been involved in as Solicitor General, the results of 
which betrayed the ruthless conservative persona being portrayed each night on 
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the evening news. One example offered by Hollings was the case of Runyon v. 
McCrary, in which Bork upheld civil rights laws preventing private schools from 
denying admission to black children.88 James Clyburn, then serving as South 
Carolina’s Human Affairs Commissioner, later claimed that his opposition to Bork 
‘may have been a horrible mistake.’ With regard to Bork’s role in Runyon, Clyburn 
expressed the view that ‘I find it a bit hard to believe Mr Bork would have 
reversed himself on this very important issue. I admit, however, that I have no feel 
for what he may have done in other instances.’89 
Hollings’s final speech in defence of Bork was given on the same day that 
the Senate rejected the nominee by a devastating vote of 42-58, with Hollings and 
David Boren of Oklahoma the only two Southern Democrats to vote in favour of 
Bork’s confirmation. 90 Making his final stand, Hollings outlined clearly his view 
that the duty of judges is to interpret the US Constitution with no regard for the 
actual political outcome of their decisions. This is evident in his claim that the 
criticism directed at Bork by interest groups resulted from their complaint ‘that 
Judge Bork will not bend or ignore the Constitution in order to reach results they 
want but cannot achieve through the political process.’91 In a blistering display of 
his conservative credentials, Hollings referred back to the ‘marital bedroom’ 
debate which had emerged during the hearings, insisting that ‘when the ACLU and 
law professors like Larry Tribe say “right to privacy”, they mean rights to obtain an 
abortion and engage in homosexual sodomy. You may be surprised to hear this 
because no-one opposing Judge Bork wants to talk about it.’92  
Hollings’s willingness to stand alone while his Southern Democratic 
colleagues pursued a different path was motivated as much by the unique political 
realities of his state as his own personal decisions. As Charles Dunn pointed out 
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during the deliberations over Bork’s confirmation, ‘the damage to Hollings would 
have been greater had he hailed from another Southern state, where many 
Democratic incumbents were carried to office by an overwhelming black vote and 
little of the white vote.’93 In contrast to Alabama’s Richard Shelby, elected as a 
Senator in 1986 with a 50% share of the vote, winning 88% of the black vote and 
38% of the white vote, Hollings was elected with 63% of the vote, taking 96% of 
the black vote and a whopping 56% of the white vote. Senators John Breaux of 
Louisiana and Wyche Fowler of Georgia were elected in 1986 with similar 
numbers to those of Shelby, with Breaux winning with 53%, taking 86% of the 
black vote and Fowler winning with 51%, taking 82% of the black vote, and each 
man taking 39% of the white vote in their respective states.94 Breaux, Fowler and 
Shelby were all freshman Senators during the Bork episode, whereas Hollings, 
armed with seniority on Senate committees, was serving his fourth term. The fact 
remains that although Hollings acknowledged the potential dangers of alienating 
black support, his seniority combined with the make-up of the South Carolina 
electorate in the late 1980s resulted in a situation where he simply had less to 
lose than his fellow Deep South Democrats when supporting the nomination of 
Robert Bork and, four years later, the nomination of the equally controversial 
Clarence Thomas. 
Following a second unsuccessful attempt to replace Lewis Powell – with 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg, whose name was withdrawn following the revelation 
that he had smoked marijuana while working as an Assistant Professor at Harvard 
University in the 1960s – President Reagan and the Senate finally settled on Judge 
Anthony Kennedy as the new Justice of the Supreme Court. Senators declined to 
fight the nomination, with John McCain of Arizona declaring that ‘Nobody wants 
to go through that again. There’s too much blood on the floor.’95 After his arrival 
on the Court in February 1988, Kennedy, who today occupies the enviable 
position of the ‘swing vote’ on the US Supreme Court, was sent a friendly note by 
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Justice Harry Blackmun, welcoming him to the ‘good old Number Three Club’, in 
reference to the fact that each man had been the third choice of the President 
who nominated him.96 
 
 
Hell Hath No Fury 
 
Four years on from the Bork debacle, Fritz Hollings’s sense of judicial conservatism 
was once again on display as he set out to defend President George H.W. Bush’s 
nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall on the 
Supreme Court. The reaction of African Americans to the selection of a deeply 
conservative, anti-affirmative action African American judge as a replacement for 
the civil rights hero who had argued the Brown case was largely negative – film 
director Spike Lee famously referred to Thomas as ‘a chicken and biscuit-eating 
Uncle Tom’ – and Democrats in the Senate were divided, with many happy to see 
the continuation of the Court’s ‘black seat’ but others underwhelmed by Thomas’s 
conservatism and also the first notably lukewarm American Bar Association (ABA) 
rating since that given to the ill-fated G. Harrold Carswell in 1970.97  
The nomination received a mixed reaction among prominent African 
Americans in the South: James Clyburn overcame his ‘concerns’ to speak 
favourably of Thomas’s confirmation, stating ‘if not Clarence Thomas, who? It is 
unrealistic to even think George Bush will nominate someone more sympathetic 
than Clarence is to the civil rights community’s agenda’, while Alabama’s 
Congressman John Lewis, former head of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating 
Committee (SNCC), announced his opposition to Thomas, claiming ‘Some have 
asked, “If not him, who?” That, to me, is not the issue. I would oppose any 
nominee who espouses the views that Thomas has espoused.’98 To complicate 
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matters further, the confirmation hearings descended into chaos when law 
professor Anita Hill alleged that Thomas had behaved inappropriately and made 
sexually explicit comments to her on a regular basis when she worked for him at 
the US Department of Education, and later, when he served as Chairman of the US 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In defending himself before 
the Judiciary Committee, Thomas described his nomination hearings as ‘a national 
disgrace’, adding, ‘this is a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way 
deign to think for themselves.’99 In addition to presenting yet another complex 
political dilemma for Southern Democrats, the Thomas nomination, in the words 
of David Bositis, ‘checkmated black activists, making it difficult for them to 
aggressively oppose a black nominee even though they dislike his views.’100 
Furthermore, as Michael Comiskey has shown, Thomas’s supporters were happy 
to argue that attempts to hold the nominee to a high standard could be perceived 
as racism, with memories of Strom Thurmond’s interrogation of Thurgood 
Marshall providing a useful historical reference point.101 
The significance of the Bositis chessboard metaphor would not have been 
lost on Fritz Hollings, who clearly understood the racial dimension of the 
nomination, and appeared to agree with Clyburn’s ‘if not Thomas, who?’ 
perspective. In responding to criticism of the 43-year old Thomas’s limited judicial 
experience from a constituent urging the Senator to ‘tell Bush to try again’, 
Hollings wrote, on 25th September 1991, that ‘if you tell Bush to try again, you can 
bet your boots you’re going to get an Hispanic of the same ilk. Otherwise, take 
your criticism and go to the Marshall nomination. While Marshall argued more 
cases of a specific nature, no-one would have called him profound.’102 The thick-
skinned Senator continued shrugging off criticism from his constituents for 
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supporting Clarence Thomas. Following Thomas’s confirmation, on 15th October 
1991, by a wafer-thin margin of 52-48, Hollings received a note from his colleague 
on the Commerce Committee, Senator John Danforth of Missouri, who had been 
responsible for guiding Thomas through the troubled confirmation hearings. 
While Danforth thanked Hollings, claiming that ‘during a time of glaring national 
attention and sometimes heated battle, I appreciate your support’, Hollings 
received far less appreciative communications from disappointed supporters, 
prompting him to write several ‘I’m sorry you feel as you do’ responses, with one 
letter from 21st October offering a typically Hollingsesque assurance that ‘my 
decision was not based on any poll. I’ve long since felt that polls are a curse of this 
profession and couldn’t agree more about your analysis of the Bush 
Administration.’103  
Hollings’s support for Robert Bork had provoked gloomy predictions 
regarding the disappearance of his African American support, but the letters sent 
to the Senator’s office during the Clarence Thomas controversy suggested the 
possibility of a far bigger section of the electorate deserting him in 1992. A report 
sent from Judith L. Lichtman, the President of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, 
provided an intensely critical perspective of Thomas’s record on ‘issues that have 
life-shaping importance to women and their families.’ The assertion in Lichtman’s 
accompanying letter, that ‘this is a time when women, especially women of color 
who face double discrimination based on gender and race are even more 
vulnerable to invidious discrimination that threatens their security and personal 
freedom’ would not have eased the complexity of the nomination from Hollings’s 
point of view but it did provide a sudden injection of a non-white female point of 
view into the Supreme Court nomination process. The revelation of Anita Hill’s 
allegations would add a new dimension to this development two months later. In 
another, equally notable, correspondence, Carolyn Hoover Sung, a native of 
Chester, South Carolina, complained to Hollings that:  
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The pictures of Strom arm in arm with Thomas were so revolting when I 
remember asking him to vote for the Civil Rights Bill in 1964 when I was a 
junior at Winthrop College. I just am sorry to see you on the same side as 
that old lecherous coot, who has harassed six generations of women (my 
aunt knew him in the early 1930s and he was still ‘hands on’ with the 
scholarship recipients in the 1960s at Winthrop). Next time will you try to 
remember the women?104 
 
Hollings’s typically idiosyncratic folksiness was laid on thick in his two-line 
response, which read simply, ‘Thanks for your letter. I enjoyed it and my secretary 
especially loved it!’105 
The anger of Hollings’s female constituents over the Clarence Thomas 
nomination followed him all the way to his re-election campaign in 1992, and 
intensified following the announcement of the Court’s Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey decision, which constituted the biggest threat to abortion rights since Roe v. 
Wade was handed down in 1973, but which ultimately upheld Roe’s 
constitutionality. Attorney Debra A. Faulkner, of Greenville, South Carolina, wrote 
to the Women’s Alliance for Hollings on 9th September 1992 to announce that, 
despite her consistent support for the Senator over the years, she would not be 
voting for Hollings in future on account of his support for Clarence Thomas, citing 
Thomas’s alignment with ‘the right-wing conservative Justices who consistently 
chip away at Roe v. Wade.’ In sections highlighted by a member of Hollings’s staff, 
Ms. Faulkner claimed that the Senator ‘will never receive my vote, the vote of any 
of my friends and colleagues who care about women’s issues, or the vote of 
anyone that I can contact about this’, adding that ‘Senator Hollings ought to 
address this issue with his female constituency.’106 A Ms S.J. Conner returned to 
Hollings a letter he had sent her on 27th August 1992, in which he had pointed out 
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his support for Roe v. Wade and his support for ‘efforts to improve the choices 
available to women and to promote their economic and social equality.’107 At the 
bottom of the letter, Conner had scrawled in pen her ‘strong disagreement’ with 
Hollings over the Thomas nomination, and outlined her concern that another anti-
Roe Justice may be appointed in the event of President Bush’s re-election later 
that year.108 In the event, Hollings survived a strong Republican challenge from 
former Republican Congressman Thomas F. Hartnett, winning by 591,030 votes to 
554,175, his narrowest margin of victory since the close contest against Marshall 
Parker in 1966.109 As the junior Senator had discovered in his ill-fated primary 
challenge to Olin Johnston in 1962, seniority and incumbency have consistently 
proved to be the most powerful re-election weapons in South Carolina politics. 
Thirty years later, the seventy-year old Hollings – still the junior Senator due to 
Strom Thurmond’s continued service – enjoyed the benefit of these important 
political assets, securing his fifth term in the US Senate. 
The disappointment of black South Carolinians in Hollings’s conservative 
view of judicial nominations would continue during the 1990s. His endorsement of 
Patrick Martin Duffy to replace the outgoing Matthew J. Perry on the United 
States District Court for the District of South Carolina was criticised by Fred Davis 
in The Spartanburg Herald-Journal, who complained that ‘you don’t just make a 
half-hearted effort to replace the state’s only black federal judge, as the South 
Carolina junior US Senator has done, then expect the state’s African American 
community to look the other way.’110 On the other hand, Hollings did place a 
greater emphasis on the interests of female voters during his final election 
campaign in 1998. The Citizens’ Committee for Ernest F. Hollings ran a television 
spot featuring two women from Camden, South Carolina who had been diagnosed 
with breast cancer. Fran DiBiase and Susan Makla claimed that Senator Hollings 
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intervened personally on their behalf when their treatment was terminated by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). According to Ms DiBiase, ‘When Senator 
Hollings came to my home, I was so excited. He entered my front door and I ran to 
him, and I grabbed him, and I just hugged him. He reminded me so much of my 
father. And the care, and the love, that he felt, was easy to see.’111 With a huge 
campaign war chest ensuring blanket coverage of spots such as these, Hollings 
was returned to the Senate for his sixth and final term, during which he would 
briefly serve as the state’s senior Senator following Strom Thurmond’s retirement 
in January 2003. 
 
 
The Perfect Outlet 
 
As with so many aspects of Fritz Hollings’s colourful career, his participation in the 
nomination process for Supreme Court Justices seems characterised by 
contradictions. His supporters had good reasons for their confusion over the 
unusually conservative position adopted consistently by Hollings with regard to 
judicial nominations throughout the course of a thirty-eight year career in the US 
Senate. Despite his claim to support the preservation of the abortion rights 
established by Roe v. Wade, Hollings voted to confirm the nomination of Clarence 
Thomas, who later argued in his dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) that no right 
to an abortion was to be found in the US Constitution.112 Despite his repeated 
complaints regarding the overwhelming influence of lobbying in US politics, 
Hollings voted to confirm the nomination of Lewis Powell, the author of the 
‘Powell Memorandum’, a document sent by the future Justice to a friend at the US 
Chamber of Commerce, which later became massively influential in the rise of 
conservative lobbying organisations. For James Clyburn, the evolution of the 
lobbying industry was evident nearly forty years later in the Republican reaction 
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to the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States, not least in the 
comments of Mitch McConnell, the Republican Senate Minority Leader: 
 
Mitch McConnell said that his number one priority was making sure Barack 
Obama was a one-term President. He didn’t dream that up alone. They 
had a meeting the night of the inauguration, with him and not just the 
leadership in the Congress, but with the representatives of the Koch 
Brothers and all the people who were financing this stuff. These guys, they 
all had their roles to play, and they have methodically gotten their five 
votes on the Supreme Court. It didn’t start with Obama’s election. My 
theory is that it started with Lewis Powell and the Powell Manifesto.113  
 
Shortly after becoming Senate Majority Leader on 3rd January 2015, 
McConnell declared that ‘the Koch Brothers as citizens have every right ... to 
spend every penny they’ve got on political expression if they choose to. I don’t 
think that’s anything that threatens America’s democracy.’114 Despite his approval 
of Powell and other conservative judges, Hollings’s comments on the influence of 
lobbying would suggest agreement with Clyburn. As recently as 2012, the former 
Senator was complaining that ‘the lobbyists fix the vote now on the important 
issues and they absolutely – well, what’s his name, Grover Norquist, he takes 
pledges and says not only that you can’t vote for taxes, anything that affects taxes 
and an increase in taxes, you can’t vote for it ... I mean, they run it. They run it. It’s 
cash and carry government.’115 
 On the other hand, there are three theories to suggest that Hollings’s 
conservative position on the nominations of Supreme Court Justices was perfectly 
logical. The first is the matter of inevitability: having become personally involved 
in the failed nomination of Clement Haynsworth, and so openly bitter about the 
Senate’s failure to confirm the man he had recommended personally to Richard 
Nixon, Hollings may well have felt bound to vote for Robert Bork, not only to 
support the many statements he had made over the years in support of judicial 
restraint, but also as a means of reminding Senators of the injustice done to 
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Haynsworth, who, like Bork, was in fact a distinguished and highly-qualified judge. 
Given the link between the failed Bork and Haynsworth nominations (and the 
obvious parallels between the nominations of Haynsworth and John J. Parker, 
discussed in the previous chapter), the limitations of analysing Supreme Court 
controversies as ‘one-off’ events – as outlined in research objective (3) – is once 
again evident.   
Secondly, it is clear that Hollings saw the politics of the Supreme Court 
nomination process as a means of proving his conservative credentials. The need 
to make political gestures to indicate a conservative ideology became increasingly 
important for Hollings’s survival as a Deep South Democrat. With public 
statements in support of judicial restraint, strict constructionism, and the 
intentions of the Founding Fathers, Hollings was able to build a conservative 
profile which would contain the Republican threat to his re-election efforts while 
at the same time asserting a traditional South Carolinian style of independence 
from the national Democratic Party. The course of Hollings’s actions in the 
Supreme Court nomination process suggest that the conservative streak which 
was in evidence in the early phase of his career remained intact, although no 
longer in the form of a pro-segregation ideology. The frequent portrayal of 
Hollings as a forward-looking racial moderate – at least when compared to 
Johnston and Thurmond – has obscured a lengthy, distinctive conservative voting 
record which ensured his popularity with white conservatives and consistently 
disappointed his African American supporters. 
Thirdly, the influence of the party dimension remained significant. Hollings 
was motivated throughout so much of his career by the need to retain a 
significant Democratic Party presence in South Carolina. Knowing that his survival 
could not be guaranteed simply by securing a huge majority of black voters in his 
state, Hollings regularly endorsed Republican Supreme Court nominees as part of 
a continued need to lure conservative whites away from the Republican Party. 
Just as Strom Thurmond aimed to build on the Republican party-building effort in 
the state by endorsing Donald Russell – a Democratic judge with a segregationist 
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background – Hollings aimed to prevent the exodus of white conservatives from 
the Democratic Party by endorsing Republican Clement Haynsworth. The impact 
of the confusing and ironic yet revolutionary changes in South Carolina’s two-
party system on the behaviour of the state’s Senators in the nomination process 
for Supreme Court Justices cannot be overstated.  
For those who credit Hollings with making an invaluable contribution to 
the peaceful desegregation of South Carolina, his assertion that judges have a 
duty to interpret the Constitution without regard to the outcome of their 
interpretations may seem puzzling. On the other hand, this view is in itself a 
conservative perspective which is shared by the Supreme Court’s strict 
constructionist Justices, and might ultimately provide a true indication of an 
authentic conservative ideology on Hollings’s part. His outlook seems very similar 
to the ‘originalist’ philosophy of Justice Antonin Scalia, by far the most outspoken 
conservative Justice on the Supreme Court, who has argued consistently that 
judges must interpret the words of the US Constitution according to their original 
meaning, leaving to legislators the job of determining the impact of a Court’s 
decision on US society. For Scalia, this is the most appropriate means of 
interpreting the document because, as he claimed in 1997, ‘it certainly cannot be 
said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole 
purpose is to prevent change – to embed certain rights in such a manner that 
future generations cannot readily take them away.’116 During the bicentennial 
celebration of the US Constitution in 1987, Justice Thurgood Marshall, only two 
months prior to Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court, had offered a 
radically different perspective in a controversial speech, arguing that the system 
of government created by the nation’s Founding Fathers ‘was defective from the 
start, requiring several amendments, a civil war and momentous social 
transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect 
for individual freedoms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today.’117  
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The text of Hollings’s defence of Robert Bork suggested that the Senator 
was no more willing to associate himself publicly with the views of Thurgood 
Marshall in 1987 than he had been twenty years earlier when opposing his 
nomination to the Supreme Court. His belief that judges should refrain from 
considering the potential political impact of their decisions reflects only his view 
of the role of judges, rather than his view of any of the issues that come before 
them. In other words, his attitude towards the nominations process was 
influenced to a great extent by the view that the judges are there to judge, and 
that his primary role as a legislator was to legislate. The unique manner in which 
Hollings stood by this principle is in itself a useful example of the fierce South 
Carolinian brand of independence that has characterised the behaviour of the 
state’s politicians throughout history, not least with regard to the nomination of 
Supreme Court Justices. Although the ironclad control of South Carolina’s 
segregationist political establishment had finally been broken by the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 and the Court’s Stevenson v. West decision of 1975 – which ensured 
the re-apportionment of the state’s legislature – it is clear that the uniquely 
defiant South Carolinian approach to judicial nominations remained intact. 
Before offering the closing remarks of the next, final, chapter in order to 
bring this thesis – and the story of South Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court – to 
a conclusion, it is worth considering briefly the significance of Fritz Hollings’s 
retirement in January 2005. For a period of one hundred and twenty-eight years, 
South Carolina was represented in the Senate by at least one, if not two, 
Democratic Senators. Following Hollings’s departure from the Senate, the lengthy 
process of Republican party-building – to which Strom Thurmond had made such 
a significant contribution – appeared to be complete, with both Senate seats now 
held by Republicans. Former Congresswoman Liz Patterson, whose father, Olin 
Johnston, played a key role in protecting Democratic Party control in South 
Carolina, accepts the label of ‘Deep South Democrat’ only reluctantly, claiming, ‘I 
don’t particularly like the word “South” being attached to that, I just like to be a 
“Democrat.” Somehow when you say “Deep South Democrat”, it conjures up all 
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the things of the past about race. I mean, I think of some of the campaigns we’ve 
gone through here, not just with George Wallace, but now with the Tea Party and 
whatever. I’m sure there are some “Deep South Democrats” and that almost puts 
us in a category all of our own.’118  
Patterson’s notion of the unique existence of a Southern Democratic 
‘category’ – supported in the work of scholars such as Nicol Rae – is evident 
throughout the story told in this and the preceding instalments of the thesis. The 
war of South Carolina’s Senators on the US Supreme Court is in many ways the 
story of the Democratic Party in the South, from the era of Jim Crow segregation 
until the present day. South Carolina’s transition to a more enlightened era of race 
relations may have been accomplished with relatively few incidents of violence 
and unrest when compared to other Southern states, and with a measure of 
responsible leadership which may have been sorely absent in the Alabama of 
George Wallace, the Arkansas of Orval Faubus, and the Mississippi of Ross 
Barnett. On the other hand, Olin Johnston, Strom Thurmond and Fritz Hollings 
opted to pursue an altogether more unique form of resistance within a very 
different arena of battle. The course of Hollings’s career suggests that the 
conservative South Carolinian influence on the nomination process for judicial 
appointments provides perhaps the ultimate testament to the South Carolinian 
trait of resistance. Yet the resistance to the Court’s desegregation order in Brown 
offers the historian only part of this story. The resistance of the state’s Democratic 
Party to the development of a two-party system, culminating in the Republican 
Party’s virtual takeover of the state, is a story with a much more recent 
conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
A War on the Judiciary in the Southern Secessionist Tradition? 
 
 
 
You suggested that I might give you some story about Senator Johnston 
that would enrich his biography. I do not know any story that would be 
particularly helpful to you.1 
 
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon 
 
 
It will never be known what Olin D. Johnston’s pastor, John E. Huss, made of this 
comment from Republican Senator Wayne Morse. In responding to Huss’s request 
that he offer a story which might ‘enrich’ the pastor’s biography of South 
Carolina’s senior Senator (published in 1961), Morse evidently decided to be 
candid in admitting his struggle to think of a story which would aid Huss’s out-
dated approach by portraying Johnston in an overwhelmingly positive light. 
Fortunately, Morse did then manage to offer an amusing reflection on Olin 
Johnston which has been included in this chapter as a final perspective on South 
Carolina’s war on the US Supreme Court, not least because it offers some 
indication of the extent of South Carolinian influence in the US Senate. 
When, in June 2015, South Carolina’s Republican Senator Lindsey Graham 
announced that he was campaigning to secure the Republican nomination for the 
US Presidential Election of 2016, he made the unintentionally amusing comment, 
‘I won’t run just to win in South Carolina.’2 To some, this may have appeared to be 
a grand statement of the obvious, but for those with an inexplicable passion for 
the state’s political history, the notion of a South Carolinian politician campaigning 
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for the Presidency solely for the benefit of his appeal to voters in South Carolina is 
hardly inconceivable. From the drama of the state’s threat to secede from the 
Union during the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s to Strom Thurmond’s breakaway 
run for President on a third-party ticket in 1948, to the aborted 2008 Democratic 
Party primary campaign of satirist and TV presenter Stephen Colbert – who 
announced that he would run only in South Carolina – the political history of the 
Palmetto State suggests that anything is politically possible. The involvement of 
South Carolina at the centre of important and surprising political events, 
particularly those relating to the state’s struggle with its history of segregation, 
has been especially evident within a recent period of eight months. In December 
2014, the conviction of George Stinney – the black teenager executed for the rape 
and murder of two white girls in a case widely believed to be a miscarriage of 
justice – was overturned after seventy years, while in January 2015, the 
‘Friendship Nine’ protesters finally received an official pardon. The fatal shooting 
of Walter Scott, on 4th April 2015, drew South Carolina into the activities of the 
grassroots movement Black Lives Matter. The killing of nine people only two 
months later at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston 
rocked the state to its foundations, resulting in a remarkable political consensus 
which ensured the controversial and highly symbolic removal of the Confederate 
battle flag from the State House grounds, on 11th July 2015. 
South Carolina’s dramatic political history suggests that a war of the state’s 
politicians on the US Supreme Court was simply an inevitability. As explained in 
the Introduction, the very fact that the name ‘Palmetto State’ was adopted as a 
reminder of the spongey log walls of Fort Sumter, which absorbed the impact of 
British cannonballs in 1776, further suggests the pride taken by South Carolinians 
in gestures of defiance and defence. The frequent comments made regarding the 
comparatively smooth process of integration which occurred within the 
boundaries of the state during the 1960s have obscured the unusually abrasive 
behaviour of South Carolina’s Senators within the walls of the US Congress. The 
horror of Preston Brooks’s savage beating of Charles Sumner on the Senate floor 
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in 1856 established a pattern of violence and confrontation that became evident 
in the behaviour of subsequent notorious figures, albeit in diluted form, during 
the twentieth century. ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith’s angry jabs at the arm of his chair with a 
penknife to get the Speaker’s attention, Coleman Blease’s recitation of N*****s in 
the White House, and Strom Thurmond’s desperate attempt to physically drag 
Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas into the Senate chamber to vote against his 
will, all suggest that the behaviour of South Carolina’s politicians within the 
dignified institution of the US Senate has been anything but peaceful, and, some 
might add, anything but dignified.3 With Senators taking the lead in resisting the 
Supreme Court’s order to desegregate, it seems logical that the Senate, rather 
than the state itself, has served as the battleground for the state’s gestures of 
defiance. The state’s war on the Supreme Court illustrates best this largely 
overlooked phenomenon. 
Through research objective (1), the thesis has argued in Chapters Four, 
Five and Six that, of all states, South Carolina has played the most important, 
although overlooked, role in the development of Supreme Court nomination 
hearings into political, and confrontational, public events. No other Deep South 
State has pursued such a spirited and consistent antagonism in the judicial 
selection process, and no Senator from any other Deep South state undertook a 
public one-man crusade against a particular nominee during the period under 
study. Research objective (2) has emphasised, in Chapters Three, Four and Five, 
that South Carolina provided the best example of a state’s political agenda 
becoming evident on a national scale in the judicial nominations process 
throughout a lengthy period in the era of civil rights. Scholarly attention has been 
given to the role of the state’s leaders in galvanising white voters in an anti-Court 
agenda, but little or none of the existing literature has focused on what the state’s 
Senators actually did to combat the influence of the nine Justices, particularly 
through the process of appointing them. In emphasising research objective (3), 
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the thesis has argued in Chapters Five, Six and Seven that analyses of Supreme 
Court nominations as ‘one-off’ events are ultimately restrictive and unhelpful. The 
thesis has shown that the intense conservatism of South Carolina’s influence in all 
matters relating to the Supreme Court did not begin in 1954, nor did it end in 
1970. Scholars have made clear distinctions between the lives and political careers 
of the three Senators under study, but this thesis has shown that the final votes 
on each of the Supreme Court nominations made during this period imply that no 
ideological difference existed between them whatsoever. On the other hand, the 
thesis has also shown that the standard method of analysing the nomination 
process by focusing solely on the outcome of each confirmation vote is 
particularly unhelpful in gaining a true understanding of the politics of the 
nomination process. 
By way of research objective (4), the thesis has brought together the 
Supreme Court nomination process with the study of Southern political history – 
combining two worlds of the existing US politics literature which have rarely, if 
ever, been studied together – in Chapters Two, Four and Seven. The thesis has 
offered for the first time, in the form of research objective (5), a thorough and 
objective study of a ten-year period in the life and career of Olin D. Johnston 
following his election to the US Senate. With the current literature still lacking a 
comprehensive Johnston biography, and with the current tendency of writers to 
view Hollings’s career by adopting the ‘self-congratulatory’ model of analysis, this 
thesis offers an unusually balanced account of the unique contributions made by 
Johnston and Hollings in the arena of judicial politics. The events of Chapters Two 
and Three have exposed the significance of Johnston in the relationship between 
judicial politics and Southern political history, particularly with regard to lower 
court nominations. These have also been emphasised through research objective 
(6), which has analysed the politicisation of appointments to the lower courts, 
particularly in Chapters Two, Three and Five. 
 This final chapter will provide an overview of the South Carolinian attitude 
toward the Supreme Court and will then offer an assessment of whether or not 
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the conduct of the state’s politicians in waging war on the Court constituted a 
political success, before considering in depth the consequences of this war for the 
state’s political development. 
 
 
The Spirit of Calhoun 
 
The threat made by Vice President John C. Calhoun to lead his state out of the 
Union in 1832 proved to be the landmark political event that would define South 
Carolina, and the behaviour of the state’s many flamboyant politicians, for 
generations. With Calhoun’s belief that South Carolina’s powerful economy was 
compromised by the Tariff of 1828, the Nullification Crisis began as a dramatic 
gesture of belief in South Carolinian exceptionalism, and the manner in which it 
concluded – in the form of the Compromise Tariff of 1833 – implied that Calhoun 
had achieved success by standing up to a popular President and protecting South 
Carolina’s autonomy as a state.4 On the other hand, as Walter Edgar has argued, 
South Carolina became deeply unpopular as a result of the Nullification Crisis, 
acquiring ‘a reputation for rashness that lingered for a generation.’5 When 
contrasted with the era of Brown v. Board of Education, during which South 
Carolina retained the support of other Deep South states in the fight to preserve 
segregation, the manner in which Calhoun’s actions provoked unfavourable 
responses from states such as Mississippi and Georgia seems truly extraordinary.6 
With the tensions between Nullifiers and Unionists only worsening during the 
1830s, Calhoun urged moderation, but, as Edgar notes, he would forever consider 
opponents of Nullification to be men ‘who had not done their duty’, a perspective 
which appears to support Tony Badger’s claim of the state’s politicians acting less 
through their convictions over the race issue, and more through a concern that 
they were ‘too quiescent and resigned.’7 James O. Farmer has argued that Olin 
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Johnston and state legislators need not have acted so drastically in their 
resistance to Smith, but concedes that a restrained response would have been out 
of character given their history, which taught them that ‘anything less than full 
vigilance against the black peril’ would undermine their prospects for re-election.8 
Calhoun’s expectation that Southern men – more specifically, men from South 
Carolina – would ‘do their duty’ in defending the autonomy of their region has 
clearly influenced several generations of South Carolinian leaders. 
More than one hundred years on from the Nullification Crisis, with the 
state facing an equally imposing threat to its autonomy in the form of Brown, it 
may seem surprising that South Carolina’s legislature did not join the legislatures 
of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida in declaring the Court’s decision null 
and void.9 The failure to invoke the spirit of Calhoun during this critical moment in 
the state’s history may suggest that South Carolina’s political establishment felt 
no pressure to remind others in the Union of its defiant past. Alternatively, of the 
five Deep South states, only South Carolina had been involved in one of the 
decisions that formed the Brown case, and to respond by unleashing an outright 
claim of nullification might have undermined the repeated argument of the state’s 
leaders that the Court had created a problem that affected the entire Southern 
region. In March 1956, during the peak of Southern resistance to Brown, Governor 
James F. Byrnes appealed for calm with the statement that ‘South Carolina is not 
thinking in terms of secession. Fort Sumter is now a national monument to the 
opening battle of the Civil War and South Carolina is content to let it go at that.’10 
His claim that ‘the interposition resolution confines itself to protest and avoids 
any mention of “nullification”’ sounded as much like a reminder to his South 
Carolinian colleagues as an assurance to the rest of the Union that South Carolina 
would not repeat the rebellious actions which characterised its past. The 
determination of Olin Johnston, Strom Thurmond and Fritz Hollings to win 
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election to the US Senate suggests their recognition of the need to work within 
the federal system, and their use of vaguely secessionist language for rhetorical 
impact (and the purpose of securing re-election) magnified not only their inability 
to exert the kind of influence which they claimed to wield, but also their tendency 
to take matters into their own hands without the full support of the Southern 
delegation – a tradition which Fritz Hollings would continue by supporting the 
conservative Supreme Court nominations of the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
struggle of the state’s Senators to influence the nomination process for Supreme 
Court Justices remains an important yet overlooked chapter in the efforts of 
Southern politicians to impose a regional agenda on a national scale. 
Furthermore, South Carolina’s role in that story highlights the relevance of state 
(in addition to ‘regional’) traditions during the most tumultuous period of social 
and political transformation in twentieth century US race relations. 
 Along with the underlying assumptions of the state’s exceptionalism, the 
stand taken by John Calhoun came to symbolise the romantic image of the South 
Carolinian defiance of federal authority. Following the Civil War and the 
comprehensive drive to roll back Reconstruction through the implementation of 
Jim Crow segregation, the spirit of Calhoun lived on in the behaviour of South 
Carolina’s Senators. As noted in Chapter Three, ‘Cotton Ed’ Smith’s trump card in 
defeating Olin Johnston’s challenge to his Senate seat in 1938 was his 
uncompromising stand on segregation. In reminding crowds of his infamous walk-
out at the 1936 Democratic Convention in Philadelphia in protest at the invocation 
given by a black clergyman, Smith claimed that ‘John Calhoun leaned down from 
his mansion in the sky and whispered in my ear, “You did right, Ed.”’11 The 
aforementioned Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon responded to Strom 
Thurmond’s aggressive promotion of the Southern Manifesto with the 
observation that ‘you would think today Calhoun was walking and speaking on the 
floor of the Senate.’12 Robert Mann has claimed that Senator Russell Long of 
                                                             
11 Edgar, South Carolina, p.507; Bryant Simon, A Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p.205. 
12 Robert Mann, The Walls of Jericho: Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Richard Russell, and the Struggle for Civil Rights 
(Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace and co, 1996), p.163. 
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Louisiana secured Olin Johnston’s support for his promotion to Assistant Majority 
Leader by giving him a desk that once belonged to Calhoun.13 While the state’s 
leaders may have opted to remain in the Union rather than make a dramatic 
gesture of secession worthy of Calhoun, the desire to re-capture South Carolina’s 
authoritative voice in national affairs, which Congressmen and Senators had 
defended aggressively prior to the Civil War, remained a key motivator in the 
state’s war on the Supreme Court. 
 
 
The Success of Failure 
 
Any attempt to determine the success (or otherwise) of South Carolina’s war on 
the Court is complicated by the inevitable claims of political historians that 
Southern segregationist politicians lacked a genuine belief that any form of 
‘massive resistance’ would succeed.14 This problem is particularly relevant when 
analysing the politics of the Supreme Court nomination process: as explained in 
the Introduction, an extraordinary collective effort is required if Senators are to 
engineer the rejection of a nominee, and, while presidents enjoy a wide range of 
administrative tools and the support of a large team of staff to promote a 
nominee, an individual Senator will carry the burden of proof when setting out to 
convince colleagues that a rejection is necessary.15 Given that these conditions 
offer only a bleak chance of defeating a nomination, particularly when the 
objection rests on regional, or state, concerns, it seems logical that Southern 
Senators held out little hope of achieving victory in their obstruction to nominees. 
On the other hand, despite the assumptions made regarding the lack of 
belief in any satisfying outcome in the drive for ‘massive resistance’, there 
remains a degree of exceptionalism in the case of Strom Thurmond. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Thurmond’s Senate colleagues viewed him as a law unto 
                                                             
13 Letter from Robert Mann, 19th November 2014. 
14 See, for example, Badger’s comments on South Carolina’s politicians in ‘From Defiance’, p.128, and also Robert Mann’s 
comments on Richard Russell’s disillusionment in Walls of Jericho, p.366. 
15 Henry P. Monaghan, ‘The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?’, Harvard Law Review 101(6), April 1988, pp.1202-1212. 
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himself, at least in terms of the extent of his belief in the sanctity of racial 
segregation. In addition to the alleged remark of Olin Johnston, mentioned in the 
Introduction, that Thurmond ‘believes that shit’, Robert Mann recalls Senator 
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota being asked if he thought that Louisiana’s Russell 
Long genuinely believed all he had said during a stirring attack on the 1957 Civil 
Rights bill, to which Humphrey apparently replied, ‘I don’t think he believes a 
word he said. But that S.O.B., Strom Thurmond, does.’16  
Others remain more sceptical. Robert Mickey has argued that Thurmond’s 
‘Dixiecrat’ run for President in 1948 was undertaken as a means of laying the 
groundwork for his challenge to Johnston in the Senate primary of 1950: with 
Johnston having established an unbreakable base of support in the upcountry, 
Thurmond’s only chance of toppling his opponent lay in his ability to win over the 
conservative white voters of the state’s ‘black belt’ region through a grand gesture 
of commitment to segregation.17 John Spratt recalls that Thurmond ‘was out there 
early on, with the issue of civil rights at the 1948 Convention. Clearly this helped 
him, he knew it was helping him, he was taking this position because it was 
advantageous to him politically. Strom would tell you he believed all this.’18 The 
authenticity of Thurmond’s views on segregation will always be questioned, but it 
is clear that his ideology was considered more orthodox than those of his 
Southern peers, and few would dispute the evidence indicating the extent to 
which he was willing to push the race issue in his pursuit of power and influence. 
The possibility offered by his biographer, Joseph Crespino, that Thurmond’s 
orthodoxy was pursued in part to offset criticism in the event of his mixed-race 
daughter becoming public knowledge cannot be ruled out.19 
It could, of course, be argued that the serious constraints faced by 
Senators when pursuing their grievances through the Supreme Court nomination 
process only highlight Thurmond’s remarkable achievement in building a 
successful crusade to defeat the confirmation of Abe Fortas. Nonetheless, even 
                                                             
16 Mann, Walls of Jericho, p.197n. 
17
 Robert Mickey, Paths Out of Dixie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), p.145-7. 
18 Interview with John Spratt, 28th September 2014. 
19 Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, p.120. 
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with Thurmond’s ground-breaking victory in the Fortas affair, the task of 
portraying South Carolina’s war on the Supreme Court as a success remains 
challenging. Arguments can be offered to suggest a significant South Carolinian 
impact on the process, but these arguments are easily deflated by a lack of 
tangible results. For example, it could be argued that throughout the events 
discussed in Chapter Two, Thurmond and Johnston succeeded in creating a 
comprehensive anti-Supreme Court agenda that garnered the support of several 
Senators outside the South. Yet while their arguments over the Court’s threat to 
national, rather than simply regional, interests might have provoked greater 
scrutiny over nominees while encouraging wider support for court-curbing 
legislation, the momentum of the growing anti-Court agenda proved insufficient 
in reducing the power of the Justices, and ineffective in forcing President 
Eisenhower to re-evaluate his methods of judicial selection, at least with regard to 
Supreme Court nominations. Neither Eisenhower nor Kennedy agreed to 
nominate Supreme Court Justices who would jeopardise the safety of Brown, 
although their willingness to appoint the favoured judges of Southern Senators to 
the lower courts did assist in the construction of a segregationist firewall, which 
would in theory protect the South from a federal erosion of states’ rights. On the 
other hand, the firewall crumbled following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 
1965, forcing even Strom Thurmond to accept the reality of the desegregated 
South Carolina which Fritz Hollings had chosen to acknowledge years earlier.  
 The fact that South Carolina’s war on the Court constituted a hugely 
significant component of the state’s sustained resistance to the progress of civil 
rights is another factor that limited the success of the state’s Senators. As Wayne 
Morse of Oregon has recalled, in an anecdote which probably should never have 
reached John Huss’s biography: 
 
When it was announced in the cloakroom that Olin Johnston had started 
to speak, one of his colleagues from a Southern state said, “What are we 
waiting for? We have plenty of time for eighteen holes of golf. Let’s go.” 
Then, like a group of schoolboys – after all, that is all United States 
Senators are, schoolboys grown up a bit – about eight of them left for the 
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golf course. When they came back to the Senate, it was almost dinner 
time, but Olin was still talking, and a note of thanks from the Senate 
truants who had played golf that afternoon was sent to Senator Johnston’s 
desk.20  
 
The story is clearly a reference to the ‘tag team’ system employed by 
Southern Senators in their use of the filibuster – which required one Southerner 
to hold the floor while his colleagues took a break, in a scheme designed to allow 
a continuous filibuster by eighteen Southern Senators – but the temptation to 
interpret Morse’s choice of anecdote as an indication of the liberal Northern 
Senator’s belief in the futility of Southern opposition to civil rights is irresistible.21 
In addition to alienating Northern Senators, and aside from the practical 
difficulties involved in overcoming the challenges of the judicial selection process, 
there remains a more compelling case for South Carolina’s failure in waging war 
on the Court. In the early 1960s, Johnston was receiving letters from a new 
generation of voters, one telling him, ‘I am 22 – young America is watching more 
than you know’, and another constituent informing him that ‘the reactionary 
forces of bigotry and prejudice are on the wane.’22 By the time of Thurgood 
Marshall’s elevation to the Supreme Court in 1967, Johnston’s desperate 1944 
effort to maintain the all-white primary and Thurmond’s 1948 segregationist 
campaign for the Presidency seemed woefully irrelevant and out-dated. As noted 
in Chapter Four, a New York Times article from October 1963 even speculated that 
an increasing African American voting bloc would in fact relieve South Carolinian 
politicians of ‘the necessity of having to run on a racist platform.’23  
The war waged on the Supreme Court may have satisfied South Carolina’s 
conservative political establishment during this period, but sufficient evidence 
exists to suggest that Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings did in fact antagonise, 
frustrate and embarrass a great many South Carolinians with their attempts to 
                                                             
20 Huss, Senator for the South, p.225-6. 
21 Mann, Walls of Jericho, p.156. 
22 Telegram from Price Riley to Olin D. Johnston, 5th September 1962; letter from Bruce Tremain to Olin D. Johnston, 6th 
September 1962, Olin D. Johnston Collection, Senate Papers, Legislative Files, Box 101, Judiciary Committee, Appointments, 
Marshall, Thurgood, Folder 2. 
23 ‘South Carolina Shuns Militancy’, The New York Times, 26 October 1963, p.13. 
 350 
 
influence the nomination process. The sheer volume of disapproval expressed in 
letters sent to the three Senators regarding their conduct in the judicial selection 
process would suggest that each of them overestimated the extent to which 
South Carolinians expected them to invoke the spirit of John Calhoun. 
Perhaps inevitably, any debate over the success or failure of South 
Carolina’s war on the Court will be influenced by whichever method is chosen by 
modern day historians to analyse the politics of the judicial nomination process. If 
they are to continue the existing trend of emphasising the outcome of 
confirmation votes in the Senate, then South Carolina’s attempt to influence the 
nomination process will appear, once again, to be an abject failure given that only 
one unfavourable liberal nomination, that of Abe Fortas, was prevented, while 
South Carolina’s Clement Haynsworth, supposedly the ideal nominee in the eyes 
of the state’s conservative Senators, was rejected by the Senate. Furthermore, if 
Thurmond’s tactic of opposing Fortas through offering a smorgasbord of criticisms 
– some of which did not relate to the nominee’s qualifications – was intended as a 
drive to encourage a greater degree of scrutiny in the nominations process, it is 
difficult to argue with the theory that this venture backfired in the short term, 
with Senators retaliating by applying a similarly rigorous form of scrutiny in the 
case of Haynsworth. As noted above, a Senator carries a heavy burden of proof 
when opposing a presidential nomination, and even with considerable resources 
at the Senator’s disposal, a successful attempt to build opposition to a Supreme 
Court nominee demands not only superior powers of persuasion but also 
overwhelming evidence of the nominee’s lack of suitability.24 To complicate 
matters, the Fortas, Haynsworth and Bork examples suggest that a rejection is 
possible only when the nominee’s position on more than one political issue is 
objected to by a variety of powerful interest groups, or where ethical 
considerations exist on more than one level. Thurmond’s campaign against Abe 
Fortas was successful in that it incorporated a wide range of criticisms, including 
the nominee’s unusually close relationship with President Johnson; claims of the 
                                                             
24 Joel B. Grossman and Stephen L. Wasby, ‘The Senate and Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections’, Duke Law 
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nominee’s role in facilitating the spread of ‘obscene’ material; objections over the 
questionable payments he had received for his lecturing services, and, of course, 
his views on interpreting the Constitution, which supposedly leaned toward the 
much-derided ‘judicial activism’ of the Warren Court. 
Apart from the fact that the record of rejections tells the historian very 
little about the substance of the Supreme Court nomination process and how it 
has evolved over time, it remains the case that, throughout the period under 
study in this thesis, the process developed into an arena of political debate which 
would transcend all notions of the Senate’s function as a ‘rubber stamp’ for 
presidential nominations. Even in the absence of a controversial or divisive 
nominee, the process for confirming Justices of the Supreme Court continues to 
function as one of the most powerful – and, thanks to the introduction of 
television cameras in 1981, also one of the most public – outlets for Senators, 
interest groups and other public figures to debate the Court’s influence on the 
political issues of the day. When considered from this perspective, it is clear that 
the actions of Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings did succeed in putting South 
Carolina at the forefront of a much wider campaign to check the power of the 
Supreme Court. With the increasing willingness of the nine Justices to exercise 
political influence in a multitude of policy areas, the Southern concerns over 
nominees’ judicial experience would gain legitimacy, and the repeated criticism of 
the Justices for not applying the ‘strict constructionist’ approach of following the 
words of the Constitution as intended by the Founding Fathers would only gain 
momentum in the coming decades. Despite failing to hold back the dramatic 
expansion of the Court’s power during this era, South Carolina’s war did 
contribute to the development of a new level of Senatorial scrutiny while at the 
same time raising awareness of the Court’s growing influence in all areas of the 
American polity. 
Given that their actions throughout the period under study seem to be 
entirely consistent with South Carolina’s reputation for rebellion and non-
conformity, it seems ironic that the state’s Senators appeared to enjoy some 
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success, perhaps unwittingly, in building a degree of consensus with regard to a 
much wider debate regarding the Supreme Court. Through the repeated reminder 
of the Justices’ role in threatening national security by allowing the spread of 
communist subversion, South Carolina’s war on the Court attracted the interest of 
conservative Republicans during the era of the McCarthy crusade. Later, during 
the 1960s, conservative Americans engaged in a drive for ‘decency’ were drawn 
into the war by the argument that a radical interpretation of the First Amendment 
was increasing the availability of pornographic material on newsstands and in 
movie theatres. Similarly, the accusation that the Court was undermining Christian 
values through the school prayer decision struck a chord with an equally sizeable 
religious element in US society. Liberal Northern Senators proved to be just as 
opposed to recess appointments as conservative Southerners, and the outbreaks 
of racial violence that occurred during the 1960s convinced many others of the 
credibility of Southern claims that the Justices were prioritising the constitutional 
rights of criminals over the safety of law-abiding citizens. Under the 
circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that the comprehensive anti-Court 
agenda crafted by Johnston and Thurmond became a crucial component of the 
highly politicised Supreme Court nomination process that was firmly in place by 
the late 1960s. The impact of South Carolina’s crusade is also evident in the near-
success of the HR3 bill in the summer of 1958, and also in the pressure exerted on 
Justices Brennan and Douglas to scale down their extra-curricular activities in 
1969. 
While the prospect of making an argument for success in South Carolina’s 
war on the Supreme Court at the federal level continues to present challenges, it 
remains the case that the impact made by Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings on 
the political development of the state itself provides an opportunity to explore a 
very different analysis which offers two additional arguments in this concluding 
chapter. The first is that South Carolina’s war on the Court was, of course, a 
rhetorical war first and foremost, allowing Senators to ‘do their duty’ by 
defending South Carolina and the Southern way of life. The Court provided the 
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most obvious, and most convenient, target for condemnation, enabling the three 
Senators to portray the Justices as a threat to national interests in a manner which 
would make clear their commitment to segregation yet without descending into 
the unfiltered racist demagoguery of a Benjamin Tillman or a Coleman Blease. The 
‘court-baiting’ tactic seemed particularly logical to the three Senators when 
evaluating their prospects for re-election: as Chapter Three has shown, Olin 
Johnston escalated his lengthy obstruction to Thurgood Marshall’s Second Circuit 
appointment while engaged in a lively primary contest, followed by an unusually 
strong Republican challenge in November 1962, and Chapter Four has explained 
that Fritz Hollings opted to vote against Marshall’s 1967 appointment to the 
Supreme Court following a very narrow Senate election victory in 1966, while no 
doubt looking ahead to his re-election battle in 1968. The involvement of South 
Carolina’s Senators in the nomination process enabled a powerful means of 
rallying the folks back home against a common enemy in a manner which would 
invoke the spirit of Calhoun, ensure re-election, and solidify seniority on Senate 
Committees. Richard Nixon’s preference for ‘strict constructionist’ judges may 
have ushered in the final phase of South Carolina’s war on the Court, but the need 
to push back against the Court’s legacy under Earl Warren ensured that the 
rhetoric used by South Carolina’s Senators in the nomination of new Justices 
remained largely unchanged thereafter. 
 Secondly, it is clear that the involvement of South Carolina’s Senators in 
the nomination process served two very different party-building strategies within 
the state. Following his defection, Thurmond worked hard to maintain his base of 
segregationist support while building a solid Republican Party in South Carolina, 
while Johnston and Hollings spent much of their careers preventing white 
conservative voters from deserting the Democratic Party, with each succeeding in 
antagonising the state’s African American population without compromising their 
share of the black vote. Through guiding a string of Republican nominees safely 
through a Supreme Court confirmation process in which he had once behaved as a 
titan of obnoxious obstructionism, Thurmond was able to promote the idea of the 
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Republican Party as the natural home for Southern conservatives. During the 
same era, the support offered by Hollings to the very same Republican nominees 
could be used to assure the state’s Democratic loyalists that ‘South Carolina 
Democrats’ would continue to stand apart from the national Democratic Party. 
From this perspective, the unhelpful approach of analysing the Supreme Court 
nomination process through focusing solely on the outcome of each vote appears 
to present the ironic, and misleading, conclusion that no meaningful ideological 
difference existed between these very different politicians. Yet, as with the history 
of South Carolina itself, much of which remains unwritten, the preceding chapters 
have demonstrated that Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings were very different 
men who made highly unique contributions to the state’s political development in 
a lengthy and extraordinary effort to scrutinise, obstruct and influence the 
Supreme Court nomination process. 
 
 
A Note on the Future 
 
By offering a fresh perspective on the history of South Carolina’s involvement in 
the fight against Brown v. Board of Education, it is hoped that this thesis will 
determine future directions for research into American political history, 
particularly as it relates to the American South. Perhaps the most significant and 
persistent gap in the current literature is the lack of a complete study of Southern 
dominance of Senate committees in the 1950s and 1960s. As noted in Chapter 
Two, the fact that Southerners were chairing fifteen Standing Committees of the 
US Senate by 1961 highlights a recurring theme of this thesis, namely, the fact 
that a regional agenda could easily be imposed on a national scale simply by 
Southerners achieving senior status through constant re-election.25 While civil 
rights advocates were dismayed by a collection of elderly Southerners maintaining 
control over these committees, the age and outdated political philosophy of these 
                                                             
25 ‘A Group with Real Power’, US News and World Report, 21st March 1961, Edgar A. Brown Papers, Mss.0091, Johnston, 
Olin D., Box 30, Folder 390. 
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Southerners would eventually count against them, with ill health and the arrival of 
a newer generation of Southern politicians eventually diluting their influence over 
Senate rules and procedures by the mid-1960s.26 
 There are other possibilities for a more focused variety of research in the 
area of Southern influence over Senate Committees. James Eastland’s leadership 
of the Judiciary Committee represents only one example of the many Southern 
Chairmanships of committees during this era, and only one example of the 
Southern segregationist influence on the Judiciary Committee itself. The Southern 
political literature would benefit from a full study of the Southern influence on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee throughout this era, focusing not only on Eastland 
(Mississippi), but also John McClellan (Arkansas), Sam Ervin (North Carolina), Olin 
D. Johnston (South Carolina), and Strom Thurmond (South Carolina). This thesis 
has provided insight into the South Carolinian influence, but a fuller study of all 
Southern Judiciary Committee members would build on it helpfully, if only in 
allowing further research into areas of interest mentioned in this study, but not 
discussed in great depth. For example, the research undertaken into the 
confirmation hearings of Potter Stewart, Thurgood Marshall, Abe Fortas and 
Clement Haynsworth suggests that Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina proved to 
be unusually articulate, loquacious and good-humoured in his style of questioning, 
with his passion for law and his knowledge of the US Constitution quite evident 
even when expressing grave concerns over the judicial philosophy of the nominee. 
In stark comparison with Thurmond’s provocative and embarrassing theatrics, 
Ervin’s lengthy questioning of nominees played a vital role, perhaps unwittingly, in 
the development of Supreme Court confirmation hearings into an arena of 
exciting judicial and political debate. 
 Further suggestions for future research might include a study of the 
reactions of Committee members Ervin, McClellan and Thurmond to the Miranda 
v. Arizona decision, which would form the centrepiece of an ambitious project 
examining the significance of that landmark decision on the Southern states. As 
                                                             
26 Mann, Walls of Jericho, p.401. 
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noted in Chapter One, and also earlier in this concluding chapter, the current 
literature is sorely missing a comprehensive biography of the legendary Olin 
Johnston. A fresh biographical treatment of Johnston – offering the same modern 
and objective approach of Joseph Crespino in his study of Thurmond – would no 
doubt offer a valuable contribution to the political history of South Carolina from 
the New Deal to the era of the landmark Voting Rights Act. 
Finally, a fresh study of the development of the Democratic Party in the 
Deep South would also constitute a valuable addition to the existing literature. As 
the story told in these pages has illustrated, the destruction of the once-
immovable one-party system has reduced the South Carolina Democratic Party 
(SCDP) to a fraction of its former size, allowing it barely a sliver of the power and 
influence that Democrats enjoyed in the 1950s. Despite his optimism for the 
future of the party, the current Chair of the SCDP, Jaime Harrison, concedes that 
the development of the two-party system has done little to offset political, if not 
literal, segregation, with many conservative whites keeping their distance in the 
belief that the state Democratic Party now exists to represent African Americans. 
Robert McNair, whose period as Governor (1965-71) witnessed South Carolina’s 
acceptance of racial integration despite the tragedy of the Orangeburg Massacre, 
wrote in his preface to Frank Jordan’s legendary study, The Primary State: A 
History of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, 1896-1962, that ‘Mr Jordan 
brings truth to his claim that the one-party system in South Carolina has been the 
“purest democracy found anywhere” because of the primary.’27 Glancing down at 
the battered copy of Jordan’s book lying on his desk (which, perhaps fittingly, was 
given to him by his counterpart in the Republican Party), an amused Jaime 
Harrison ponders his rise to the Chairmanship of the SCDP, and observes that ‘the 
former Chairs would probably be rolling in their graves to know that the current 
Chair is a little African American kid from Orangeburg.’28 
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28 Interview with Jaime Harrison, 3rd October 2014. 
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Despite the success of Barack Obama in substantially increasing African 
American voter turnout in South Carolina during the 2008 Presidential Election, 
the 2014 mid-term elections saw victories for Republican incumbents in one 
Gubernatorial, two Senatorial, and six out of seven House election contests, 
leaving Congressman James Clyburn as the state’s one remaining Democratic 
representative in Washington, DC. The extent to which South Carolina’s war on 
the Supreme Court had the strange effect of slowing the party-development 
process on the Democratic side, and accelerating it on the Republican side, 
suggests one further avenue of future research, particularly as the state’s 
Democratic Party has reached a critical point in its history. 
Until then, the story of South Carolina and the Supreme Court has allowed 
a fresh perspective on the state’s crucial role in the development of judicial 
nomination hearings into confrontational public events. With the state’s war on 
the Court offering the best example of a Southern state’s political agenda 
becoming evident on a national scale, the thesis has shed light on the 
considerable influence of Senators Johnston, Thurmond and Hollings in the 
combative arena of judicial nominations. In showcasing a story that does not 
conform to the current Supreme Court nominations narrative, the thesis has 
argued against an analysis of nominations as ‘one-off’ events, and also 
demonstrated that the outcome of each confirmation vote has little use in 
constructing a thorough understanding of the politics of the nomination process. 
In focusing on the relationship between judicial politics and Southern political 
history, the thesis has highlighted the political significance of Olin Johnston’s 
twenty years in the US Senate, and given long-overdue exposure to the intense 
politicisation of lower court, in addition to Supreme Court, nominations. On the 
one hand, the thesis has showcased an overlooked chapter in the history of 
Southern resistance to Brown. But, as the story told in these chapters indicates, 
the war of South Carolina on the Supreme Court transcended the issues of race 
and states’ rights which informed ‘massive resistance’ and instead emphasised a 
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radical and ground-breaking response to the Court’s consistent role as the final 
arbiter of policy in US society.    
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